Presidential Rhetoric at the United Nations: Cosmopolitan Discourse and the Management of International Relations

Andrew D. Barnes

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PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC AT THE UNITED NATIONS: COSMOPOLITAN DISCOURSE AND THE MANAGEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

by

ANDREW D. BARNES

Under the Direction of David Cheshier (PhD)

ABSTRACT

Despite longstanding attention to rhetorical form and structuring logics that give discourse its persuasive power (metaphor, genre, narrative, definitional frames, ideology, etc.), the relative amount of publication attending to international rhetoric remains slight. As the composition of audience(s) has stretched to global proportions the challenges of apprehending the manifold cross-cultural complexities for presidential address have expanded. Spanning five decades and three presidencies (Kennedy, H.W. Bush and Clinton), this dissertation takes presidential public address at the United Nations as its object of study in an effort to help remedy this shortcoming, while also aiming to provide a richer theoretical underpinning for accounts of globalization and its impact on the modern presidency. The analysis grapples with three
particular problems: conceptualizing increasingly pluralized audiences, the matter of ascertaining how non-American institutions (like the United Nations) shape and are shaped by American rhetorical productions, and the difficulties in gauging presidential rhetorical efficacy. Two main arguments are advanced. First, the dissertation argues that presidential rhetoric at the United Nations traffics in a particular brand of cosmopolitanism, which helps presidents to constitute a universal audience nonetheless ideologically sympathetic to American goals. The terrain and implications of this cosmopolitanism rhetoric are mapped and unpacked. Second, it is argued that when crafting rhetoric for the specific audience of the United Nations General Assembly, the President is obligated to work within the confines of the rhetorical institution that is the United Nations. The project seeks to understand the limits and possibilities of presidential rhetoric based on existing international institutional constraints. Taken together, the resulting scene of presidential cosmopolitan address, rather than culminating in efforts primarily concentrated on persuasion, end up mainly interpellating a global audience supportive of a cosmopolitan agenda which in turn is pre-structured to support the interests of the United States.

INDEX WORDS: Rhetorical Theory, Presidential Rhetoric, Cosmopolitanism, United Nations, International Relations, Constructivism
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ANDREW D. BARNES

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctorate of Communication
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ANDREW D. BARNES

Committee Chair: David Cheshier

Committee: Carol Winkler
Mary Stuckey
Jelena Subotić

Electronic Version Approved:

Office of Graduate Studies
College of Arts and Sciences
Georgia State University
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DEDICATION

For Nicole.
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1 Rhetoric, International Relations and a Proposal for Study

The trauma of World War II, in particular its conclusion with the use of nuclear weapons, served as an operating logic to underwrite and push anew the politics of international ordering. In 1945, with the conclusion of World War II on the horizon, representatives from more than forty nations arrived in San Francisco to begin the work of negotiating the establishment of an international institution able to provide for the collective security. The ability of these nations to successfully negotiate a charter for what became known as the United Nations was not a foregone conclusion. Establishment of an international organization capable of providing for the collective security required the mediation of myriad interests (political or otherwise) of all parties involved. And while previous documents and declarations established the parameters for debate structure and even drafted language, doubts persisted. The previous effort towards collective security was deemed unnecessary by American politicians and deficient as a mechanism to provide international security in light of appeasement. Further jeopardizing negotiations was the passing of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt a mere thirteen days before the conference was to convene. President Truman was determined that the conference succeed.

With Truman’s lack of foreign policy experience – he had not been informed of the outcome of FDR’s negotiations at Yalta, did not know that the Atom bomb existed and had not been privy to much of the war planning – San Francisco presented him a moment to establish himself as a leader invested in pursuing peace while honoring a lost president by seeing the establishment of a new international institution tasked with providing collective security. Truman’s position against isolationism was well publicized. Less clear to the American public and indeed the world were the ambitions of a new president faced with the prospect of an

---

1 The operation of appeasement in historical memory, especially as it relates to the perpetuation of war myths is a recurrent thematic in rhetorical criticism (Noon, 2004; Ivie, 1986).
immense standing army, powerful economy and an enemy in defeat. For these reasons, Truman’s quick decision to keep the schedule of the conference and to address the opening of the conference was an opportunity to present the world with his ideas for the future.

Trauma discourse can perform power and exclusions, particularly “an account of historical trauma where ‘what may be forgotten’ constitutes the terrain of the political” (Meek, 2010, p. 3). For President Truman, what must not be forgotten by the statesman convening was the “magnitude of the problem before us,” based on the “ever-increasing brutality and destruction,” of modern warfare which “if unchecked would ultimately crush all civilization.” A conclusion foreseen as early as 1898 now served as evidence to support arguments in favor of completing the charter for a new international mechanism to provide for the collective security.\textsuperscript{2}

The pre-history to World War I and the failure of the League of Nations, while tending less to causes such as institutional limits in light of a rising totalitarian regime with imperial ambitions, reinforced the point. Truman also encouraged the audience of individual representatives to remember the “other courageous champions, who also made the supreme sacrifice, serving under your flag.” The remembrance of shared trauma, where individuals are subject to the same conditions and responsibilities, operates as a site for rhetors to seek authorization for the constitution of a global politics.

The phantasmic is at the root of an international politics that claims to be representative and attention to this condition works to animate the rhetorical possibilities of presidential address. The president of the United States cannot reasonably assume to be operating in the

\textsuperscript{2} Ivan Bloch (1923) observed that the sophisticated production practices coupled with advanced engineering were producing weapons that were increasingly accurate and deadly. He predicted that in the future wars would be so devastating that it would no longer be possible to imagine surviving modern warfare. Evidence suggests that Russian Czar Nicholas II convened the Hague Conference of 1898 (Van Den Dungen, 1983). As a point of clarification, Bloch was referred to Ivan in English works and Jean in French works hence the use of different proper names.
wishes of all people, nor can his invited counterparts. The vast complexities of difference across nations and cultures (political and religious) must temper any claim to representation in the democratic sense. As public sphere theory notes, the formation of collectivities that clearly articulate a series of demands remain elusive. Yet articulating a global political demand is precisely the move that Truman makes. “We represent the overwhelming majority of all mankind. We speak for people,” the president argues. He further notes that, “we hold a powerful mandate from our people,” to “prevent, if human mind, heart and hope can prevent it, the repetition of the disaster from which the entire world will suffer for years to come.” Here, then, the president also enacts communal fantasy where a global phantom public sphere (itself a fantasy) functions as a source for rhetorical invention (Bormann, 1972, 1982; Robbins, 1993).

The address of President Truman also works to demonstrate national interest. After all, it was the United States that was drawn into two world wars, and it was the United States that first developed and deployed nuclear weapons. A third world war would quite possibly lead to the end of all humanity, as so direly predicted in 1945. This dissertation, then, begins by recognizing that a contingent ordering of international relations is predicated on the paradox that members of the international community must protect the sovereignty of the nation-state yet override that sovereignty when international security or the protection of individual human rights is deemed necessary (Pierik & Werner, 2010). Within this contingent situation, what are the possibilities for discourses that attempt international ordering? What constraints are imposed upon these discourses by power relations and the full complexity of cross-cultural difference? And, given such constraints, how are lines of assent and agreement formed? These questions suggest both a scene and actor for the project.
The United Nations is likely the toughest case for this project given the full complexity of its globally pluralistic audience. While there are a growing number of international organizations, none include all of the recognized nation states in the world. Further, other international organizations are exclusionary to the extent that the main function is to provide a framework for trans-national security or economic development. We can also note that the United Nations is a location from which the leaders of nation states have attempted to tackle a diverse set of challenges that span both the local and the global. For example, President Clinton’s address to the General Assembly on September 26, 1994, outlined a series of challenges from nonproliferation, terrorism and ethnic conflict to AIDS, environmental threats, and the global drug trade.

American presidents also provide a tough case study. As the work that Dr. Stuckey and I conducted on assessing presidents at the United Nations concludes:

American presidents like to talk about global community and shared international interests. Absent that consensus however, presidents do not hesitate to act unilaterally and outside of the UN. And when it suits the American agenda, they will work with the UN, endeavoring to establish some sort of consensus for their preferred policies. Global community, like the UN, has its uses for American presidents; but contemporary occupants of the office are likely to act unilaterally, and in even in defiance of that community when they believe it suits U.S. national interests (2012).

These findings direct attention the contextual complexity of presidential rhetoric at the United Nations. On the one hand, we see that presidents can be inscribed by national interest and as a result choose to work outside the framework of the United Nations. On the other hand, we can
see there are moments in which the interests of the United States and the United Nations overlap. Here, the context of international relations requires the United States to seek consensus with other nations.

Narrowing the scope of study to moments of tension or high drama for both the President and the United Nations provides a challenge because presidents will undoubtedly be confined by national interest yet be willing to transgress that interest if the outcome is a more stable international environment. Presidential address therefore provides a strong case study because of the likelihood that speech is inscribed by national interest. By examining presidential public address to the General Assembly of the United Nations, the dissertation maps the production of cosmopolitan rhetorics, delivered in moments of high drama, and designed to resolve challenges to the global security order. Specific cases include: President Kennedy’s response to proposals of reform that would fundamentally reduce the scope and significance of the United Nations as an institution following the death of Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld; rhetorical management of the international scene marked by power vacuums and disorder resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union during the Presidency of George H.W. Bush; and the return of ethnic conflict in Europe and Africa while William Clinton was President.

To return to the research question, then, a study of presidents in key historical moments at the United Nations will map international rhetoric capable of withstanding nationalistic appeals. I argue that this rhetoric will likely seek lines of assent premised on ‘thin’ lines of identification grounded by universal human experiences. To ground the study both theoretically and methodologically, I first sketch the significance of a rhetorical perspective and review the existing literature on presidential foreign policy address to demonstrate the need for a project that tends to a broader set of audiences. Then, I read responses to the paradigm of a realist theory of
international relations to carve out an explanatory space for rhetoric when theorizing ordering of
the global and the interaction between nation-states. Third, I ground the study methodologically
by identifying the markers of a cosmopolitan scene for international relations, and the subset
markers of a cosmopolitan rhetoric. The chapter concludes by justifying the additional
theoretical chapters and case studies.

1.1 Rhetoric and Foreign Policy

The study of rhetoric has established itself across the allied fields of the humanities and
as a result carries different denotations. This study follows Kenneth Burke’s definition of
rhetoric as, “the essential function of language itself, a function that is wholly realistic, and is
continually born anew; the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in
beings that by nature respond to symbols” (Burke, 1969). This definition requires a bit of
unpacking; to begin, we can note that rhetoric has a specific relationship to language. For Burke,
since language is concerned with creating symbols that bring meaning to the world for its users,
rhetoric is the function of language. Language is the creation of meaning, and meaning is
constituted by the symbolic, which forms what is understand to be real – a conception that
parallels notions of truth. This real, symbolized by language, is for Burke “a rhetorical product as
much as a rhetorical precursor” (Murray, 2002). A study of language, then, is a study of how
rhetoric is able to constitute the terrain of social relations. David Zarefsky, analyzing President
Johnson’s “War on Poverty,” argues that “language plays a central role in the formulation of
social policy by shaping the context with which people think about the social world” (1986). The
rhetoric of poverty – like all political issues – involves “a choice of symbols and language”
which entails a decision about “how to characterize and discuss the world” (Zarefsky, 1986). The

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3 More on alternative definitions of rhetoric can be found on pages seven and eight in Booth (2004).
decision over the choice of symbol is an important location for intellectual inquiry because these choices constitute the terrain of meaning. When applied to politics, symbols constitute the terrain for options, both what is included and excluded, and thus have a very real impact on the function of society. Contrary to understandings of rhetoric as simply hollow or worse, manipulative, this study understands the creation of meaning as a rhetorical process and thus seeks to understand how meaning can be created and shared when considering the formation and execution of foreign policy.

International developments and the rise of the Cold War, coupled with the growing interest and study of rhetoric domestically, marked the beginning of what has become a forty year tradition of studying symbols that constitute the relations between audience or political constituencies, policies and the relations between nations. Wayne Brockriede and Robert Scott, arguing contrary to the dominant explanation of relations known as realism, were the first to argue for the significance of rhetoric during the Cold War (1970). For these scholars, the Cold War was a quintessentially rhetorical war. Nuclear weapons became a symbol for the dangers of military confrontation as their use would lead to total annihilation. The multi-author collection *Cold War Rhetoric* followed, operating within the same situational constraints and arguing for new readings based on new methods (Ivie, Medhurst & Wander, 1997). The strategic nature of rhetoric, the implications of metaphor as a symbol in the meaning making process following the tropological work of Burke, and the role of ideology in the formation of the symbolic, following the Marxist tradition, expanded the possibilities for rhetorical scholarship that interrogated foreign policy and international relations. Additionally, rhetoricians read the strategic positioning of the myriad types of nuclear weapons around the world as argument, which allows for an analysis of how the logic of weapon placement and deterrence functions with the political elite
(Dauber, 1993). Rhetoricians can then explain the multiple connections between ideas, the formation of the social, and how discourse constitutes the terrain by which nations can prevent a cold war from going hot. Of course, the contextual ground that underpinned this scholarship has shifted. Yet, it provides a foundation for rhetorical analysis of international relations between nations.

Permanence and change are important variables. To the extent that some components of context remain the same, e.g. the president leads on foreign policy and the United States remains the world’s pre-eminent super power, scholars have applied and further developed the construct of genre to explain presidential response to international events. Genre studies, stemming from the Aristotelian tradition, identify both constraints and opportunities when attempting to rhetorically constitute meaning. Situational criticism attempts to navigate the relationship between rhetoric’s ability to be constrained by existing meaning and its ability to constitute new meaning, with mixed results (Bitzer, 1968; Vatz, 1973). Conceptualizing the rhetorical situation led to the theorization of genre; particular situations generate expectations on the rhetor by the audience. Theorizing presidential public address through genre helps to establish the rhetorical and hybridic nature of the presidency as an institution (Jamieson & Campbell, 1982). In turn, *Deeds Done in Words* dedicates a chapter to the genre of presidential war rhetoric (Campbell & Jamieson, 2008), and argues crisis as a situation constitutes a genre of presidential speech. In this way, rhetoricians tend to another facet of relations between nations; how peace can be threatened or precipitated by crisis formed either accidently or intentionally through provocation (Kiewe, 1994). Genre, predicated on situation, provides rhetorical scholars the means to map the constraints and opportunities of presidential foreign policy address.
The work of public address scholars has also mapped constitutive effects of presidential texts by examining ideological tropes and figures in foreign policy speeches. To understand the constitutive effect of rhetoric requires an understanding of the relationship between rhetoric and world-making, or what Zarefsky labels an analysis of symbolic choices. Building on the work of Campbell and Jamieson, who argue that presidential rhetoric constitutes the institution in its various forms, Robert Ivie contends that rhetoric can expose ideological worldviews that also reveal political calculation and decision-making. He argues that President Bush constitutes an audience willing to provide unambiguous support for an invasion of Iraq by analogizing Saddam Hussein to Adolph Hitler, a figure that maintains a strong negative currency within political culture. Mary Stuckey argues that rhetoric can constrain policy alternatives. Following the work of Lakoff & Johnson, she argues that orientational metaphors such as anarchy produce a lens for realism that excludes apprehension of causal relationships between states and international institutions (Stuckey, 1995). The deployment of historical analogies in deliberations over foreign policies attempts to control meaning of international events (Goodnight, 1996). We can note that historical narratives from the Cold War maintain an ideological function that establishes heroes and enemies as well as an expansion of executive power capable of being reappropriated by future presidents for the war on terror (Winkler, 2008). The triangular relationship between the president, public address and domestic audience points to how rhetoric operates within a democratic society. And while the consequences of foreign audiences abound (whether they are defined as rogues, terrorists or allies) it is the case that these studies have not taken up foreign audience(s) as a constraint on presidential rhetoric. Without additional study it is impossible to know whether the conclusions hold when presidents address multiple foreign audiences simultaneously.
1.2 The Limits of U.S. Hegemony

My effort to locate rhetoric as an important component in the production of international politics is based on the idea that rethinking state relations as discursively constituted (which is to say, building on the work of social constructivism in international relations theory), can help specify interdisciplinary connections that forward a stronger case than now available for the relevance of rhetorical scholarship in related disciplines.

In response to the increasing significance of the nation-state in the international system – especially in light of the bipolarity that marked the Cold War – realism as a theory of causal relations between nations became a dominant theory within the scholarly literature and political elites. Among the basic tenets of this approach are the following (e.g. Morgenthau et al., 1993; Waltz, 1979): first, in a world system where the nation state exercises preeminent authority, the resulting international system can never be characterized as anything but anarchic. Second, in such a system, each state seeks to guarantee its own survival, and this is only possible by acquiring and maintaining unilateral power. Power in such a view tends to be principally defined around the contours of military capability, which is then leveraged as a coercive tool to achieve particular interests. And third, lacking any international governing authority, all state behavior can thus be explained through the interplay of power relations between sovereign nations.

The problem for alternative accounts of international politics – and a problem specifically for rhetorical accounts – stems from two locations. First, we have noted that foundational tenets of realism argue that both the scene of international relations (anarchy) and the motive for action (the will to power) are immutable. Alternative explanations have suggested that arguments can alter the international scene; the institutions can minimize anarchy as a variable, and administration officials can alter public perceptions of the international scene and its actors
(Crawford, 2002). Yet, the immutability of an international and human condition is proffered as grounds to deny alternative explanations because advocates “have no standing in debate because they do not see the intractable scene that dominates human action” (Kraig, 2002, p. 22). A second problem emerges within rhetorical theory. Bitzer seeks to theorize a means to assess the quality of rhetoric by understanding theorizing rhetoric as responsive to a situation. For our purposes, two components of his theory are relevant here: “rhetorical discourse comes into existence as a response to situation, in the same sense that an answer comes into existence in response to a question” and that “a situation is rhetorical insofar as it needs and invites discourse capable of participating with situation and thereby altering its reality” (Bitzer, 1968, p. 5-6).

These two planks suggest that rhetoric will only exist if a situation arises which calls rhetoric into being and that a rhetorical response to a situation that does not invite discourse allows for dismissal of that discourse. Further, Bitzer argues that:

> Neither scientific nor poetic discourse requires an audience….the scientist can produce a discourse expressive or generative of knowledge without engaging another mind, and the poet’s creative purpose is accomplished when the work is composed. … But the rhetorical audience must be capable of serving as mediator of the change which the discourse functions to produce (1968, p. 8).

Here, if one can understand the situational forces that lead to particular events, they hold all of the cards for explanation. Rhetoric, then, is simply a result. The grounds for critique are limited to assessing the quality of the speaker and the rhetor’s ability to perceive the situation correctly and formulate the proper response. Similarly, if rhetoricians grant the presuppositions of realism, the grounds for a rhetorical explanation are already undermined – rhetoric becomes assimilated, as it can only be a tool used to advance the power interests of nation-states.
And this is precisely what we find with a rhetorical approach to analyzing international relations. Medhurst, following the realist tradition in international relations, argues that rhetoric is strategic, designed to achieve a specific interest of the state. In analyzing Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” address, Medhurst concludes that the address was designed to gain a psychological victory through linguistic deception (deception because the United States never intended to actually disarm) and strategic posturing (in the sense that the address was mainly motivated by the strategic benefit to be gained in responding to the Soviet peace offensive already underway) (Medhurst, 1987). A parallel argument suggests that rhetoric is best understood as a conveyance of coercive power in managing international relations. Krebs and Jackson argue as “coercive constructivists” that persuasion alone does not produce results (Krebs & Jackson, 2007). Because any given nation engages in internal processes to determine its own true interests, they are therefore immune to the appeals of others. Rather, in rhetorically framing a situation, one nation might successfully coerce others to act in line with its interests by leaving its “opponents without access to the rhetorical materials needed to craft a socially sustainable rebuttal (2007, p. 36).” The result is that “opponents are compelled to endorse a stance they would otherwise reject (2007, p. 36).” The Medhurst and Krebs/Jackson alternatives elaborate accounts of rhetoric that rest on its strategic and coercive capabilities. But a common limitation in these accounts is that both remain closely related to if not predicated on realism, and neither finds room to provide an explanation for why nations nonetheless persistently pursue rhetorical strategies clearly aiming to unify broader audiences behind an international agenda. Furthermore, neither perspective accounts for the diminishing role of “hard power” in international relations.

This study breaks with the established frameworks for assessing rhetoric on the international scene by studying moments in which coercion is distinctly not possible. To achieve
this end, I read responses to realist paradigms to chart space for a rhetorical explanation of nation-state relations independent of U.S. hegemony, thereby escaping the possibility for coercion. I then posit that such an environment will be marked and shaped by a particular type of cosmopolitan rhetoric.

International relations, when practiced as a social science discipline, tends to offer causal explanations for how and why states act as they do. Initially, the field sought case studies of action that could provide reasonable and generalizable conclusions. But as the nation-state system moved into an era of Cold War bipolarity, alternative realism accounts emerged and then came to dominate the scholarship. Among the basic tenets of this approach (Morgenthau et al., 1993; Waltz, 1979) are the following: First, in a world system where the nation state exercises preeminent authority, the resulting international system can never be characterized as anything but anarchic. Second, in such a system, each state seeks to guarantee its own survival, and this is only possible by acquiring and maintaining unilateral power. Power in such a view tends to be principally defined around the contours of military capability. Lacking any international governing authority, all state behavior could thus be explained through the interplay of power relations. Henry Kissinger, a decisively influential theorist of realism, was among those who relied on a balance-of-power thesis during the Cold War to structure the first published documents of U.S. foreign policy.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, international relations theorists began to question whether realism had ongoing conceptual staying power given profound changes in the international system, including the more complicated interactive dynamics entailed by multipolarity. The development of international law, the proliferation of international and non-governmental institutions and the growing interdependence of nations resulting from
globalization presented serious challenges to theories of state power that rested mainly on the assertion of hegemonic military capabilities. Attacks to realism’s understanding of power mounted. Liberal institutionalism argued that states acted to establish international governing bodies such as the UN and that states sought power by seeking (sometimes through persuasive means) leadership in those institutions (Ruggie, 1995). Joseph Nye (2004, 2008) argued that power was best understood as dualistic: a nation could exert power through its military capabilities (hard power), but the alternative possibility also existed that enabled states to project cultural or economic good will (soft power).

Of most relevance to rhetorical scholarship, of course, are accounts that revitalized social constructivist explanations of interstate influence. Alexander Wendt (1992) famously argued that “anarchy is what states make of it,” and expanded this view in his widely cited monograph, Constructing International Politics (1995). Wendt was careful to argue that constructivism was only one of many international relations theories enabled by the emergence of critical theoretical studies, but he also saw these plural approaches as sharing some common tenets. He notes that:

…what unites them [critical theories of social relations] is a concern with how world politics is “social constructed,” which involves two basic claims: that the fundamental structures of international politics are social rather than strictly material (a claim that opposes materialism), and that these structures shape actors’ identities and interests, rather than just their behavior (a claim that opposes rationalism) (p. 71-2).

Realism, premised on the idea that military power mainly determines the mobilizable resources of a state, is characterized here as materialist. And this materialism is seen by Wendt (and rhetoricians who followed this line of thought) as denying rhetoric any true explanatory power in
international relations (Beer & Hariman, 1996). Constructivism, as outlined by Wendt, thus provides a point of entry for rhetoricians because the rhetorical tradition is among the richest available when it comes to explaining the formation of social relations (Zarefsky, 1986, 2008).

The field of international relations continues to search for a unified theory able to accept the main insights of realism and constructivism, for while materialism is insufficient as a sole determinant of state action, it also cannot be denied that such forces as armies and sheer industrial might still deeply enable the possibilities of state action. Realist-constructivism attempts to integrate the two main theories by arguing that the main difference between classical realism and constructivism does not hinge on the idea that one view endorses power and the other doesn’t, but rather on the relative importance of materialist forces in human history (Jackson et al., 2004; Jackson & Nexon, 2009; Sterling-Folker, 2000, 2002). The point of such integration, therefore, is not to try to delete either brute force or ideas from the domain of international relations, but rather to provide a more nuanced account that makes room for both. Barkin, for instance, argues that the empiricism of social sciences has inappropriately eliminated ideas as a variable in state action, and then works to make a case that persuasive ideas also play a role in underwriting collective social action (2003, 2004).

Rhetoricians who maintain an interest in international relations have also moved to bridge the gap between realism and constructivism. By appropriating Ceccarelli’s term “conceptual chiasmus” as an interdisciplinary bridge, Gordon Mitchell has suggested that argumentation and rhetoric can function as the conceptual chiasmus linking the “isolated islands” of realism and constructivism. Rhetoric, given its multiplicity of forms and structures, presents ideas to an audience that then interprets, circulates and re-circulates texts and textual fragments (Mitchell, 2010). It is this rhetorical process that constitutes good reason for action. Certainly, within the
context of international relations, materialism would function as a reason for action, but even such elements as warhead counts are only made sensible when embedded as evidence within broader mechanisms of social deliberation (which in one context might read a given capability as evidencing “weakness” while in another “strength”). Rhetorical explanations thus provide an analytical tool helpful in judging the relative weight to be assigned to realist, constructivist and the other conceptual islands that constitute the archipelago of IR. Further, there is cause to be optimistic that a rhetorical explanation of international relations will be taken seriously, given the increasingly diminished respect of realism in the literature (Walker & Morton, 2005).

Recent work in communication scholarship has begun to further elaborate the productive possibilities of a rhetorical intervention in the debates over national force, and establishes a foundation for the work I propose to do in the dissertation. Marilyn Young, following Burke, has recently argued that during the Cold War, U.S. exceptionalism fueled a “prophetic dualism” between the United States and its allies, and Communism and its allies (Young, 2008). Within such a view, one was either with America or with the communists. Here, the rhetorical constructs of communism, friend, and enemy shaped foreign policy for decades by limiting options and guaranteeing that dovish positions would be politically impalpable. Young further points us to George W. Bush’s construction of the “terrorist” and the redeployment of prophetic dualism as encoded by his national security strategy. She concludes that scholars of international relations should study rhetoric in order to understand how presidents will think about and justify their foreign policy decisions. This approach, while basically sound, does run the risk of returning us to the problem of foreign policy rhetorical analysis to which I first called attention, namely, that it reiterates the move that again has the critic turning inward rather than outward.
Medhurst, following the realist tradition in international relations, argues that rhetoric is strategic, designed to achieve a specific interest of the state. In analyzing Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” address, Medhurst concludes that the address was designed to gain a psychological victory through linguistic deception (deception because the United States never intended to actually disarm) and strategic posturing (in the sense that the address was mainly motivated by the strategic benefit to be gained in responding to the Soviet peace offensive already underway). A parallel argument suggests that rhetoric is best understood as a conveyance of coercive power in managing international relations. Krebs and Jackson argue as “coercive constructivists” that persuasion alone does not produce results (2007). Because any given nation engages in internal processes to determine its own true interests, they are therefore immune to the appeals of others. Rather, in rhetorically framing a situation, one nation might successfully coerce others to act in line with its interests by leaving its “opponents without access to the rhetorical materials needed to craft a socially sustainable rebuttal (2007, p. 36).” The result is that “opponents are compelled to endorse a stance they would otherwise reject (2007, p. 36).” The Medhurst and Krebs/Jackson alternatives elaborate accounts of rhetorical effectivity that rest on its strategic and coercive capabilities. But a common limitation in these accounts is that both remain closely related to if not predicated on realism and neither finds room to provide an explanation for why nations nonetheless persistently pursue rhetorical strategies aiming to unify broader audiences behind an international agenda. Furthermore, neither perspective accounts for the diminishing role of “hard power” in international relations upon which they premise coercive capability.

This study breaks with these established frameworks for assessing rhetoric on the international scene by studying moments in which coercion is distinctly not possible in a material or strategic sense. Previously, I reviewed the literature which detailed the analytical insufficiency
of causal theories of international relations dependent upon accruing material power in the form of weaponry. Studies of international relations that adopt a systems theory approach to causal explanations outline several negative outcomes from an over-reliance on ‘hard power’. Strategic choices of state action are analyzed by assessing whether the support of the populous and political allies, the technological ability to produce advanced weaponry and the economic foundation to fund adventurism. The projection of hard power is linked to technological advances coupled with an economy that can support such projection. Yet power projection can be a perilous proposition.

Kennedy, in his study of imperial powers, recognized that power projection presents a series of paradoxes to political leaders based on particular contexts. Kennedy argues that his assessment of the fall of empires was usually presaged by over extending strategic military resources (Kennedy, 1989). Overstretch occurs when nations take on increasing responsibility for the protection of territory. Even when such reasons are sound – the territory is an ally that requires supplements to its own defense capabilities, for example – it can get to a point where strategically, the state can neither withdraw as a means of defense nor hold to its commitments. Here, leaders are required to project forces for their defense, but by spreading forces too thin, protection is impossible. The domino presents another paradox. During the Cold War, leaders feared that if they did extend military resources to all allies bordering communist countries, such nations would be over-run and lost. The ideological inability to accept the spread of communism and the concern that ‘red spread’ would unbalance power relations and create a threat to

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4 Systems theory when applied to international politics links broader historical, cultural, technological trends with military capability and power projection to gain a fuller prospective of the international environment in which actors express agency. This approach allows for a more complete explanation of the risks, opportunities and choices available (Buzan & Little, 2000; Hall, 1999; Linklater, 2000; Stetter, 2007).
international security meant that leaders were committed to the defense of small nations which otherwise garner no national interest. The paradox of the domino theory was potential for great powers to be drawn into war. One the one hand, each side must be committed to defending nations on the capitalism/communism border, yet it this militarization risks conflict and drawing in both powers (Jervis & Snyder, 1991). The final paradox is that of blowback. When a great power provides military assistance – especially the positioning of troops on foreign soil – that military presence alone, even with permission from foreign governments, can create political and potentially insurgent responses that upend the military mission of the great power. The United States and the Soviet Union learned this lesson through their experiences in Afghanistan, albeit at different moments. As a result, power projection is linked to a series of cultural, political, economic, technological and military factors (Haugaaard & Lentner, 2006). Additionally, it should be noted that there can be diplomatic consequences to aggressive unilateralism which manifests in policies of power projection. Allies willing to engage in multilateral military efforts are empirically less likely to go along when a great power engages in excessive unilateralism. And the negative effects of unilateralism can spill over into other areas of cooperation, further debilitating the unilateralist nation. Given the globally interconnected and interdependent environment, the loss of allies willing to engage in multilateral action is exceptionally debilitating precisely because only multilateralism can solve problems in a globally connected and interdependent world (Gallarotti, 2010).

A strong record of scholarship also documents how discursive norms can in fact change the course of international policy and conduct; even "thin" norm creation has political and power politics effectivity. Studies of argumentation demonstrate that adopting different reason-giving strategies during deliberation can move states to modify their practices (Crawford, 2002; Payne,
2007). Articulated norms have socialization consequences, and essentially "teach" nations how to act. The spread of constitutions as governing documents are increasing in commonality but, more significantly, are creating domestic code from international law. Over time, thin norms are "thickened" as they end up cited in more places — international treaties, regional covenants, and so on — and this norm thickening ends up exerting accumulating influence on state conduct (Broude & Shany, 2011). There is also evidence of specific states changing their behavior in response to international norms on issues such as arms control (Garcia, 2010), the conduct of national elections (Clark, 2006), and nuclear nonproliferation (Rublee, 2009); Latin America (Kacowicz, 2005), South Africa (Klotz, 1999), and Europe (Flockhart, 2005) demonstrate these norms can also work in regional contexts. There is evidence these norms have staying power even under the most intensive pressures of total war (Thomas, 2001). While scholars might dispute the levels and formations of communication as power within international relations, nevertheless, communication has been theorized as such.

1.3 Method

Cosmopolitanism is a productive lens through which presidential rhetoric can be apprehended because it anticipates the possibility of polysemic coherence (even if such a possibility is predicated on very thin dimensions of communicative solidarity, speaker to audience and the reverse) in messaging for the divergent globally composite and domestic audiences of presidential address. The long tradition of cosmopolitan theorizing – which spans intellectual history from the Stoics, through Immanuel Kant and to present – is helpful in part because of the manner in which it bifurcates normative and empirical research agendas, and both of these instincts are relevant to this dissertation. On the one hand, cosmopolitanism provides an empirically driven theory of social relations, which offers a productive location for imagining the
operating and invention constraints of a president engaging global politics. On the other hand, the president seeks to change global politics in the cause of, among other things, U.S. interests, and therefore is likely to advance normative claims about the way the world should be. Importantly, in what follows I point to distinctions in the literature between the sociological and democratic strands of cosmopolitanism and those literatures that conceptualize cosmopolitanism as a form of global citizenship (Nussbaum, 1997; Von Burg, 2011) to establish the markers of cosmopolitan rhetoric. I conclude with a discussion of how cosmopolitan principles and norms – integrated into international law and their enforcement institutions – provide the grounds for a rhetoric I label diplomatic cosmopolitanism.

Cosmopolitan theories that emphasize the normative possibilities of world citizenship and that could in turn form the foundations for a rhetorical criticism of international relations rhetoric tend to focus on equality and the necessity of establishing distributive systems of justice to achieve it. Democratic cosmopolitanism is thus often motivated by the following question: if democracy is good because it allows citizens to make decisions relevant and important to their lives, why should we maintain an international system of relations that is by definition and from empirical observation truly undemocratic? The question invites political proposals aimed at reconfiguring existing institutions, while also imagining new institutions that are democratic by design, legitimate because they are democratic and powerful enough to resist the non-democratically motivated actions of states that simply assert national self-interest. Thus cosmopolitan democracy scholars argue that the system of international relations requires democratization. Nation-states and the individuals they aggregate lack equal voice in the international system, and the dimensions of this structural inequality are mapped in the related literature, which often starts by noting that Western nations and their citizens have, and will
continue to have in the near future, a stronger voice and as a result power to make international political decisions. Daniel Archibugi argues that cosmopolitanism, “as a form of global governance thus needs to be realized on three different, interconnected levels: within states, between states and at a world level” (Archibugi, 2003, p. 8). David Held furthers the claim by suggesting that “the principles of democracy and cosmopolitanism need to be protected and nurtured across all human spheres – local, national, regional and global” (Held, 2010, p. xi). This diagnosis leads Held and Archibugi to finally rely on two mechanisms for the enactment of change. International institutions are necessary yet must also be strengthened so that nation-state power can be checked (Archibugi & Held, 2011). They also encourage the development and strengthening of a “global civil society” typically composed of citizens, citizen groups and non-governmental organizations motivated to address specific issues on a local and global level, and whose existence is sufficient to offer or deny legitimating power to national leaders.

The research tradition I’m describing has not often focused on international discourses, or on how the rhetoric of leaders (local, national or global), might function to garner support or opposition to potential global reforms. Yet communicative behavior implicitly underwrites the entire cosmopolitan project, and even in cases where theorists appear inattentive to rhetorical possibility, it inevitably arises. Urbinati, for example, has wondered whether cosmopolitan democracy is even possible when it is predicated on rhetorical distinctions between members and non-members (Urbinati, 2003). Others have noted that a global cosmopolitan project would necessarily create additional layers of coercive power – if only those necessary to overrule state sovereignty – and is more likely to decrease equality and agency (Hawthorn & Archibugi, 2003). Here, the question of how discourse accompanying an internationalist program privilege western understandings of politics, ensuring the replication of colonialism (Chaudhuri, 2009; Latour,
2004), are inevitably reprised. And finally, the potential trade-off between established discourse communities and cosmopolitan democracy arises as well. Calhoun argues:

…we should recognize the importance of public discourse as a source of social solidarity, mutual commitment, and shared interest. Neither individuals nor social groups are fully or finally formed in advance of public discourse. People’s identities and understandings of the world are changed by participation in public discourse. Groups are created not just found and the forms of group life are at least potentially open to choice (Calhoun, 2003).

Certainly the potential to fracture such groups is problematic. But Calhoun goes a step further in diagnosing the failure of cosmopolitan accounts, arguing that the contours of attempted cosmopolitanism cannot be understood when the scholarship under theorizes representation; as he puts it, the advocates of cosmopolitanism typically “find themselves falling back on notions of ‘peoples’ as though these exist naturally and pre-politically (2003, p. 97).” One of the aims of this dissertation is to remedy this deficiency in the literature; that is, rather than defending an account that conceptualizes people within existing global political practices, the dissertation elaborates upon how presidents have conceived of the plurality of ‘peoples’ who form their audiences. This provides a historical perspective sufficiently rich to interrogate the willingness of powers to advocate for a more cosmopolitan world while also interrogating the implications of their political choices.

In contrast, empirical cosmopolitanism arises mainly from the field of sociology, and attempts to locate changes in the international system that would justify a new theory of international politics. Observations on globalization, the interconnected nature of humans based on global communication technologies, the integrations of local, national and regional markets
on a global level, and the continuing ability for war or injustice to spill across borders, threatening the security of all, serve as the evidence that cosmopolitanism marks the transition from a first to second modernity. Ulrich Beck argues that this transition is productively illustrated by the analysis of risk, noting, “we are not living in a post-modern world, but in a more-modern world. It is not the crisis, but the victory of modernity, which, through the logics of unintended and unknown side-effects, undermines basic institutions of first modernity” (Beck, 2006, p. 338). Essentially, modern institutions – science, the state and international commerce – are responsible for establishing and accelerating globally collective risk (science: global warming; states: war; and commerce: economic bubbles and collapse) which Beck (2006) labels the ‘world risk society.’ Empirical work on cosmopolitan rhetorics will be marked by and urgently responsive to the expanded interconnectedness of peoples, nations and economies, that symbolic representations are thus required capable of imagining an audience as capable of both local and global action, that problems shared by some could be shared by all, and that people and organizations face dramatic uncertainty as a result of ‘second modernity’.

Normative and empirical strands cosmopolitanism suggest that global discourses will reflect specific values, including but not limited to: equal worth and dignity, active agency, personal responsibility, consent, collective decision-making, inclusiveness, avoidance of serious harm and sustainability (Held, 2010, p. 69). These discourses in turn offer cosmopolitan justifications for the existence and legitimacy of international law and institutions premised on three theses: 1) human beings are the ultimate units of concern; 2) the status of every human being as the ultimate concern is extended to all; and 3) equality creates binding obligations on all humans (Pierik & Werner, 2010, p. 2-3). We can see these three normative premises mirrored
within the institutions of the United Nations. The primary unit of concern within the United Nations, however, is the state; international law demands that states provide and protect fundamental human rights for all people. When these rights and responsibilities are not met, the Security Council can authorize interventions which, along with pre-existing international law, create binding responsibilities on all people. While cosmopolitans have spent time justifying the premises that gird international law, these same scholars have been “largely agnostic about the form in which these institutions are organized” (Pierik & Werner, 2010, p. 4). Importantly, some argue cosmopolitan justifications do not support an interpretation where “cosmopolitanism necessitates the idea of a world state” (Tan, 2004, p. 94). The literature then paints a complicated picture of disagreement amongst scholars and practitioners as to what types of political formations are acceptable, how those formations implicate cosmopolitanism, and what types of relations individuals should have with nation states, if any. Nevertheless, politicization of the particular cosmopolitan ideals articulated above proves to be pragmatically problematic.

The formation of international ordering premised on a particular set of cosmopolitan ideals articulated above produces a contingent set of contradictory demands on individual states and the international system. This international ordering is what I refer to as diplomatic cosmopolitanism. The first marker of diplomatic cosmopolitanism centers on the paradox between the need to act globally to protect collectivities of humans and the need to respect state sovereignty as a condition for moving beyond a system rooted in anarchy. This paradox can be more fully apprehended through an examination of both the coercive and non-coercive means of the United Nations. Collective international security provides a productive example. Here, the international system is considered stable when states adhere to a set of “rules and principles” that “inform state behavior in order to maintain international peace and security” (Tsagourias, 2010,
p. 131). However, the institution also provides an enforcement mechanism for the violation of such rules and principles. All transgressions are subject to review and action by the Security Council. The paradox reveals itself when one nation interprets the norms and principles of international ordering to support a case for action that can be described as defensive and the international community disagrees, calling for international action against the offending state. The nuclear proliferation of North Korea and Iran come to mind. Both nations deemed it to be within their national interest to develop a nuclear deterrent while the international community strongly disagreed, sanctioning both nations.

These examples point to the lack of a self-executing order which functions as the second marker of diplomatic cosmopolitanism. The paradoxical tension within international law requires enforcement at the institutional level. Yet enforcement is unevenly applied, and deliberative communication practices are critical to underwriting international action. That is, norms do not provide sufficient justification for action; when they do, a secondary level of enforcement is necessary. Diplomatic cosmopolitanism suggests principles and values that underpin the international system and might even call for action, yet interpretation and implementation “gives rise to disputes because they [diplomatic cosmopolitan appeals] are often vague, ambiguous, or contradictory” (Tsagourias, 2010, p. 133). The second marker of diplomatic cosmopolitanism, then, centers on the deliberative practices of resolving who the necessary actors should be, given the question of “who is in a position to prioritize conflicting values and who has the power to determine and enforce their meaning in concrete circumstances” (Pierik & Warner, 2010, p. 5). Further compounding consensus for action is a lack of “common political and security ethos” regarding UN principles from Security Council members (Tsagourias, 2010, p. 144).
A diplomatic cosmopolitanism, marked by contradiction and a lack of self-executing normative principles, produces discourses that demand both contextual interpretation and appeals to the universal in an attempt to constitute a “thin” audience capable of overcoming nationalistic difference. The challenge for presidents, then, is immense. Establishing justifications for action must be continually reconstituted within the context of each challenge to international order and security. The fissures that emerge in response to contextual challenges present a unique set of challenges and opportunities. The challenge is to manage complex cross-cultural and transnational politics through public address. The opportunity is that each challenge to the international order allows solidarity to be reconstituted through the articulation of cosmopolitan values. President's must continually reconstitute their relationship to the UN on cosmopolitan grounds to justify interpretations of policy as a means to gain leverage or move past gridlock. If the UN is capable of recasting itself every time gridlock is experienced, it must do so on grounds rooted in cosmopolitanism because it is those grounds that support collective action. Mapping these rhetorics allows an analysis that demonstrates the ways context produces differing types of diplomatic cosmopolitanism.

My reading of the literature surrounding the justifications for a cosmopolitan international ordering, coupled with my reading of presidential public address at the General Assembly of the United Nations, suggests that the type of presidential public address that I have identified as expressing diplomatic cosmopolitan can be identified by a series of specific rhetorical markers given the context described above. Richard Weaver (1984) argues within discourses, “rhetorical absolutes” hierarchically order language so that some terms achieve force through associations to particular human ideals. By surveying the data set that Dr. Stuckey and I created, and then narrowing that data set to the presidencies of Kennedy, Clinton and H.W. Bush,
I have identified three ultimate terms within discourses of diplomatic cosmopolitanism. Peace (and its derivative peaceful) appears in these speeches 1,168 times while justice (or just) appear 518 times (Andrew D. Barnes & Mary E. Stuckey, 2012). These terms imply a third, responsibility, for it is only through responsibility for both the local and the global that the ideals of peace and justice can be achieved. I found that responsibility appears 155 times. But simply deploying these ultimate terms is not enough. Crucially, the address must also express openness to the other, a willingness to engage in cooperation and a respect for the ideas of others.

The texts will also feature rhetorical markers of archetypal metaphor, scapegoating, mortification, synecdoche as well as several narrative forms. Archetypal metaphor follow experiences of life, death, birth, shame and sadness. Previous studies have noticed that a myriad of speakers representing nations with divergent interests have honored the founding of the UN through metaphors of birth and argued for particular policies as extending the life of the institution (Prosser, 1970). Diplomatic cosmopolitanism is also likely to deploy synecdoche wherein the rhetorical move constructs a part of the human condition as a universal whole to be ordered. To achieve peace and justice, the international order must be capable of enforcing norms through positive and negative actions, and we see in speeches the experience of nuclear annihilation or terrorism constituted as a problem for all humanity that must be challenged through international law. Following Burke’s *Rhetoric of Motives*, when particular crises disrupt the scene of international relations, both scapegoating and mortification are at work. The rhetorical technique of scapegoating occurs when international consensus determines that an individual nation ought to be disciplined to preserve the international order. The syllogism might look like: X is the establishment of an international norm that must be respected, Y is the consequence for failing to respect an international norm, Z nation violated X norm, therefore X
norm must be enforced through Y disciplinary action against nation Z. Mortification as a
syllogism might look like: X is a norm that exists, as a global community we have all fallen short
of upholding the X norm, and if we are going to be more perfect we need to take a particular
action that recasts X as a global norm. And finally diplomatic cosmopolitanism can exhibit the
narrative forms of tragedy, birth or rebirth, overcoming that which is deemed intolerable or the
quest to maintain or build up the international order. It is entirely possible for an address to
exhibit multiple markers and for those markers to function in harmony with each other.

As a final comment on the methodology, I note that it is possible to have a cosmopolitan
context open to the rhetorical possibilities of a speaker and have that speaker fail to deliver an
address that matches the context. On the other hand, it is entirely possible for a context where
frameworks of state power function to undermine the possibilities of an address that features
cosmopolitan markers. This project intends to study those contexts open to a cosmopolitan
message and seized upon by the speaker as a means to engage an audience that might have
previously been unreachable through rhetoric.

Cosmopolitanism is a widely contested term and thus, it necessary to address several
extant criticisms that could be applied to the dissertation project. The strongest line of attack is to
argue that “institutionalized cosmopolitanism risks become the normative gloss of globalised
capitalism at its imperial stage” (Douzinas, 2007, p. 176). The non-self-executing nature of
cosmopolitan ideals requires coercive forces capable of enforcement its ideals on others. In this
scenario, then, “cosmopolitanism thus ends with a nightmarish quest for hegemony; in assuming
the best of humanity, cosmopolitanism becomes its worst enemy” (Lu, 2000). Despite the
boldness of such claims, analytic and empirical evidence is lacking.
First, these scholars fail to account for the political by conflating justifications for a diplomatic cosmopolitanism with a predetermined outcome of enforcement in every case. They assume that each violation will justify intervention and that such an intervention will gain universal approval from the community of nations. The case against the regime of Saddam Hussein began in earnest in 2002 and is instructive here. In that attempt, we can note that George W. Bush (2002) argued before the General Assembly:

The conduct of the Iraqi regime is a threat to the authority of the United Nations and a threat to peace. Iraq has answered a decade of U.N. demands with a decade of defiance. All the world now faces a test and the United Nations a difficult and defining moment. Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced or cast aside without consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant? … We want the resolutions of the world's most important multilateral body to be enforced.

Building a case by constituting what Beck (1999, 2009) labels ‘global risk,’ Bush argues that resolutions must be enforced. But even here we see that Bush is first asking for the international community to force Saddam Hussein to choose between compliance and subversion. It is only under the condition of subversion that Bush can move to justify intervention. In either case, President Bush portends that these are the only two options, yet the international community justified a series of other actions, including further sanctions, to stave off an intervention. As Zarefsky (2007) notes, the appeals made a year later by General Colin Powell could be considered a “trial balloon” for a second resolution. Yet, the speech did not achieve the desired result; the speech did not improve support for a resolution. Scholars critical of diplomatic cosmopolitanism then engage in conflation on two levels: they equate the existence of law with a
predetermined enforcement outcome, and they conflate discourses at the United Nations, disregarding the ability of the international community to engage in a communicative process that rejects both falsely constructed threats to peace and alternative courses of action.

Second, the alternative to diplomatic cosmopolitanism requires cosmopolitanism to transcend state action. This too is problematic. Recall that the first premise to most cosmopolitan thought is that the individual is the moral unit of concern. Refusing a conception of the individual existing within a pre-existing ideological construct and assuming that such an actor can simply be removed from that context is naïve at best. At worst, distancing the individual from the state based on a transnational cosmopolitanism removes an important component of responsibility within the framework of the nation state which can serve as a check against state aggression (Calhoun, 2007). Further, abandoning diplomatic cosmopolitanism would not only eradicate the only lines of identification that divergent cross-cultural audiences have, it would dissolve the lines of consensus that make the existence of international ordering possible (Nath, 2010). While the absence of a shared place can function as a marker of cosmopolitanism, place provides inventional sources for argument and meaning making (Darsey, 2011, p. 130). What type of world can be constructed when institutions such as the United Nations no longer exist? And how does a return to an anarchic world not result in the imperial outcome feared by scholars such as Douzinas? In certain contexts, the international ordering of diplomatic cosmopolitanism is the only buffer to all out hegemonic aggression.

Third, political analysis suggests that in spite of the limitations of international ordering, institutions like the United Nations will persist in their existence because “no actor has completely withdrawn their support… and, above all, everyone frets about opening the Pandora’s box of radical reforms, or of negotiating a new World Order” (Tsagourias, 2010, p. 154). If we
are to follow the rejection of diplomatic cosmopolitanism, the logical result would be a cosmopolitan alternative that ignores the agency of the individual within the political context of nation states capable of enacting change and reform within the system of international ordering. And, as Carol Gould (2010) argues, “those who simply give up on democratic accountability for global governance institutions … tacitly endorse having global governance institutions continue to respond only to the powerful interests and wealthy countries that hold the preponderance of power within them” (p. 161). Abandoning diplomatic cosmopolitanism, then, might again lead to the precise outcome feared: the ability of hegemonic orders to dominate. The problem for alternative cosmopolitanisms is that they are incapable of theorizing the complex layers of political agency for the individual, the state and the international order (Slaughter, 2010). Combined with theoretical conflation, “the worry that liberal cosmopolitanism dangerously greases the path of intervention is unfounded” (Tan, 2010, p. 156).

The contribution made by this dissertation is to further specify the significance of rhetoric to international relations by explaining how presidential communicative practices function within a self-identified discourse community of political elites that constitute the United Nations, an environment where one might argue the brute force of interstate power is institutionally ameliorated or at least always foreground. Through archival research, I map the internal administrative arguments that arose in the speech drafting process to understand how various administrations pursued rhetorical strategies to achieve particular goals within the United Nations. I should make clear from the outset that I am not proposing to conduct an audience analysis of different international audiences on how presidential rhetoric proved influential. Nor do I propose to defend the claim that the mechanics of state power are wholly sidestepped in the arena of UN deliberation. Rather, what I explicate are the specific ways in which American
presidents conceptualize their global audiences, and how in turn their conceptualizations function as an invention resource when crafting public addresses given at the United Nations.

These methodological moves are not, of course, self-evident. Archives provide evidence related to specific issues (Parry-Giles, 2010) and evidence that improves the interpretive work of the critic, establishes nuance and understanding of contextual dynamics, demonstrates effect, clarifies perception or motive, and recovers “lost voices” (Houck, 2006, p. 136). Yet, the “archival turn” has led to considerable experience and methodological analysis that reveals challenges unique to researching within an archive (Morris III, 2006; Robertson, 2010).

Presidential libraries are required by law to collect all documents, but only those documents that circulated in a given Presidential White House staff. As a result, the repositories of libraries render invisible some participants in the political process. Research access to documents is also governed by a classificatory power structure with archivists serving as gatekeepers. Certainly, classification schemes can deny access for years if not decades (Stuckey, 2006).

Presidential libraries are also cites for what Derrida refers to as “archontic power” and, as an extension of this work, Biesecker argues that critics can and should challenge the rhetoric of the archives by writing “critical histories of the situated and strategic uses to which archives have been put” (Biesecker, 2006, p. 130). While recognizing the merits of such criticism, the solution still seems untenable; that is, abstaining from archival work is problematic. Richard Rorty maligns post-modern philosophy for encouraging the academic to remove him-or herself from politics, which in turn offers the public only one voice: the voice of the ideologue or political opportunist. A recent example illustrates the risk: Dick Cheney’s *In My Time* (2011) references specific records from the George W. Bush administration in order to substantiate his claims about the need for enhanced interrogation techniques. In time, if scholars do not enter
archives to review these documents, to lay out what the government knew and how decisions
were made during interrogation, then the narratives of Bush administration officials might
become the history on these techniques. A parallel justification for archival research argues that,
“we must not be naïve about our ability to authenticate the past in the archives, but it will not do,
either, to give up to the ideologues and opportunists” (Starn, 2002, p. 388). Abandonment of
archival research increases the archontic power of archives to sanction problematic histories
because there won’t be anyone to ‘read against the grain.’

The writing conventions of the discipline render the research processes of the critic
invisible, yet research methods can be used to navigate the uneven terrain of archontic power
(Johnes, 2007). Archival research occurs in four phases: locating documents within the archive,
determining the relevance of a document to the research project, determining the quality of the
document as evidence, and finally creating and organizing reproductions of archival documents.
I deploy a method of reading speeches, corresponding secondary histories and biographies to
generate knowledge of the details of important events, the dates of those events and who was
involved, thereby making it possible to locate documents within the archive. This method of
reading also generates a list of important people in the administration who likely worked on or
influenced the speech that I am studying and a list of dates that narrows the timeframe for
relevant documents. Once inside the archive, I use finding aids to locate the documents based on
the list, and my list of dates to move through the Chronological files. Finally, and this is
especially true for speechwriters, there is usually a collection of memos, research, assignments,
etc., that go into a separate collection such as the Saars & Sandich file at the Carter library. Once
I have located a set of documents, I use a method of questioning to determine the relevance and
Guide, provides the questions that form the backbone of this research methods. Documents that are relevant were preserved though a systematic technique that I have developed through numerous research outings.

1.4 Chapters and Case Studies

A word about the choice of American presidents whose discourse I chose to examine: Presidential Cold War terministic screens, structured by tension and competition, extended to the deliberations of the United Nations General Assembly. For presidents Truman and Eisenhower, the United Nations General Assembly functioned merely as another forum for comparison of U.S. and Soviet policy in relation to perceived international public opinion. Truman’s rhetoric about and at the United Nations embodied what we would now consider to be a liberal position tending to the importance of multilateral cooperation. However, the institution was in its infancy, and most of Truman’s discourse was dedicated to communicating to the rest of the world that the United States would continue to support the institution and its charter in the hopes that the UN would not share a similar fate as the League of Nations. Eisenhower, on the other hand, viewed the United Nations as a location from which the United States could rhetorically position itself to allies and neutral nations as the preferable hegemon. One such example, receiving considerable scholarly attention, is the “Atoms for Peace” address. Medhurst (1987), through an exhaustive examination of the archival record, concludes that “the public ‘exploitation’ of the speech emphasized peace and negotiation, the backroom decisions,” intended that ‘nothing more than hope be offered’” (p. 218). The Truman and Eisenhower presidencies thus provide a jumping off point for a study of multilateral administrations, each of which faced unique global challenges.

Mary Stuckey and I (2012) found that the Kennedy, Carter, H.W. Bush, and Clinton presidencies, while reserving the right to act unilaterally when necessary, more often than not
sought multilateral solutions to global problems. Each president advanced calls for the General Assembly to sanction U.S. (and allied) actions related to Berlin and Vietnam, terrorism and human rights, the collapse of the Soviet Union and threat of regional and genocidal conflict, respectively. Calls to establish a world order, to move past anarchy as a given condition and thus break with realism, mark these speeches. Kennedy (1961), for example, argued that “we far prefer world law, in the age of self-determination, to world war, in the age of mass extermination.” International norms and law were necessary to regulate the production of fissile material and nuclear weapons. In the aftermath of the cold war, similar calls for global structure emerge. George H.W. Bush (1989) argued that “law, not force, shall govern.”

These presidential addresses are also marked by appeals to a global humanity that articulate an ethical responsibility on a local and global level. Kennedy recognized that the United States had a “threefold responsibility – a responsibility to our own citizens; a responsibility to the people of the whole world who are affected by our decisions; and to the next generation of humanity” (1963). Importantly, these presidents invite multilateral cooperation with U.S. goals and interests by recognizing limits to United States power. Carter (1977) maintained “that the United States cannot solve the problems of the world. We can sometimes help others resolve their differences, but we cannot do so by imposing our own particular solutions.” For these presidents, acting unilaterally – even if acting responsibly and in the interest of a broader humanity - cannot always resolve global problems. Finally, freedom is constructed as a universal organizing principle of human agency and collective social construction. George H.W. Bush (1992) stated:

... I believe we have a unique opportunity to go beyond artificial divisions of a first, second, and third world to forge instead a genuine global community of free
and sovereign nations; a community built on respect for principle of peaceful settlements of disputes, fundamental human rights, and the twin pillars of freedom, democracy and free markets.

Political freedom, democratic governance, and free markets are the principles that underpin a liberal cosmopolitan rhetoric at the United Nations. These brief examples point to the potential interpellation of audience through constitutive rhetoric that seeks to advance the interests of the United States.

Partisan difference is one basis by which some presidents can be ruled out as case studies for the dissertation, but while I analyze discourses offered by advocates from both of the major American political party perspectives, it is more important to note (in defending a strategy for reading) that different presidential decisions and thinking about foreign policy were influenced both by competing theories of the international system and by the advisers they selected. Advisors including Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, John Bolton, and others, span the presidencies of Nixon, Ford, Reagan and George W. Bush. The influence of realism on those administrations, coupled with the advisors selected for influential positions regarding foreign policy, make it likely that those presidencies will consider the institution of the United Nations to have little significance relative to U.S. interests.

More importantly, the criteria for case studies are animated by the paradoxical nature of diplomatic cosmopolitanism and the research question which asks: how are attempts to order the international not always undone by frameworks of state power. Moments of high drama, then, must entail an ordering of the international, premised on diplomatic cosmopolitanism, which endures despite nationalistic appeals. And, because the dissertation project is interested in rhetorical appeals that engage the broadest audience, the United Nations was chosen as the scene
due its diverse membership. This criteria then points to three historical moments for case study: the death of Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld and the subsequent debate to reform multiple levels of the United Nations, the collapse of the Soviet Union and response to the subsequent power vacuum, and the re-emergence of ethnic conflict. These moments overlap the presidencies of John F. Kennedy, George H.W. Bush and William Jefferson Clinton.

2 Global Pluralism and Presidential Audience: the Challenge of the Cosmopolitan Condition

On January 20, 1977, President Jimmy Carter assumed the office and as is customary delivered an inaugural address to the nation. Two speeches were delivered that day: the traditional speech, to a domestic and public audience composed of political dignitaries and crowds that filled the Washington mall, and a speech videotaped and broadcast by the Voice of America network. That second speech, soporifically titled United States Foreign Policy Remarks to People of Other Nations on Assuming Office, is significant not simply because this was the first and last of its kind, but also because it was distinctly designed for foreign audiences (Carter, 1977). Certainly, an inaugural is an opportunity for a president to send signals to foreign adversaries, and sections of that address can stake out important foreign policy positions (Bose, 1998). While attention has been paid to specific foreign actors in specific cases, when attending to inaugural addresses, rhetorical scholars have typically examined the significance of the address for a domestic audience. Campbell and Jamieson (2008) conclude that inaugurals rehearse national values, establish administrative policy priorities, and serve an epideictic function where the president enacts the appropriate persona to demonstrate fitness for the office (Campbell & Jamieson, 2008). Audience is both a result of the speech – the people reconstituted
through the covenant between the executive and the nation necessary for a democracy – and a necessary witness for the president to assume the proper institutional role. In a slight departure from this position, we can also note that the rhetorical choices of an inaugural can include which people to speak for (WAUDAG, 1990). Within this context, then, Carter’s address demonstrates a clear departure from established expectations about audience.

Carter began his Foreign Policy Remarks by recognizing the significant absence of democracy on a global level by recognizing that those citizens of the world whom did not elect him would “nevertheless be affected by my [Carter’s] decisions.” This simple recognition is an expansion of audience to the global level. And while we tend to think of presidential messages being distributed on a global level, we don’t always consider those messages to be constructed for a global audience. Further, Carter grounds the values of his administration in universal terms: “I want to assure you that the relations of the United States with the other countries and peoples of the world will be guided … by our desire to shape a world order that is more responsive to human aspirations,” and that: “The United States will meet its obligation to help create a stable, just, and peaceful world order.” These values extend beyond traditional nationalistic appeals or interests to what are considered the enduring interests of humanity. To bolster these claims, Carter, rather than following the traditional path of outlining an agenda to be accomplished, instead chooses to issue negative policy declarations. Carter’s list of what the U.S. could not do includes the ability to: “lift from the world the terrifying specter of nuclear destruction,” guarantee that humans everywhere will be “free of poverty, and hunger and disease and political repression,” nor could he provide an “equitable development of the world resources” or the “proper safeguarding of the world’s environment.” But this does not suggest that he will not take on the challenge of solving these problems. Rather, it is a statement that the U.S. will not be
isolationist and that the United States will take the lead in multilateral efforts to solve global problems.

This brief reading of the speech demonstrates a significant paradox for the presidency. On the one hand, the super power status of the United States leads presidents to the conclusion that they must engage world leaders and foreign populations on problems that are global in scope. On the other hand, that engagement requires crafting messages for audiences that are incredibly diverse and may share little to nothing in common with the president. Unlike the domestic rhetorical presidency, where the rhetorical construction of the institution provides valuable inventional resources and identificatory ground when crafting public address, this is not the case when speaking to foreign audiences. Yet a text capable of assent from both domestic and foreign audiences is precisely what is needed in order for a speech to be successful. This paradox is a result of what sociologists and scholars within the allied fields of the humanities label the cosmopolitan condition.

This chapter argues that in an increasingly globalized world, the cosmopolitan condition is inherent to presidential rhetoric.¹ As a result, this chapter argues that, given the impossibility of coming fully to terms with the polysemic qualities of globally pluralistic audiences when speaking at the United Nations, presidents deploy conceptions of a universal audience that are best understood as cosmopolitan rhetorics. To advance this argument, I first review the literature on the cosmopolitan condition and the difficulty inherent to the presidency in attempting to navigate the global and local simultaneously. I then argue that the existence of global

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¹ For the purposes of this study, it was necessary to avoid the modern/post-modern distinctions while also tending to the moment in time where the interconnectivity of nations constituted a threat to global security. As a result, the rhetorical presidency as a phrase was selected because it demarcates a specific epoch beginning with Wilson and carrying forward to the present moment (Tulis, 1987). Despite this demarcation, I recognize that rhetoric maintains significance for all presidents (Medhusrt, 2008).
communication networks compounds this problem by delivering messages to all audiences and therefore risks alienation or confrontation with any one audience. In order to resolve the paradox of dealing with a globally composite audience – particularly in international forums – presidents attempt to constitute a universal audience capable of assent by relying on universal appeals. The chapter concludes by analyzing how the reading of different presidential addresses can provide insight into how presidents understand their role in addressing both global problems and how global audiences capable of enacting the desired change.

2.1 Contemporary Problematics to the Conceptualization of Audience

Audience has traditionally been understood as an empirically observable phenomenon and construct imagined by those creating messages for public consumption. Randomized survey methods and Nielson ratings provide a map of an audience for a domestic address. For example, it is common to generalize both the number of people that witnessed a state of the union speech and to establish the demographic markers of those viewers. As a result, it is not uncommon for analysts to label this generalized group of people an audience. These empirical observations of audience often provide pundits and commentators with the necessary evidence to declare whether the speech was a success and whether members of congress should implement the agenda of the president. Rhetorical scholars, while maintaining empiricism, recognize audience to be more complex; rather than understanding a collective of individuals to compose an audience, rhetorical scholars recognize that presidents address multiple audiences (Zarefsky 2004). As the Romney campaign reminds us, modern communication technology ensures that even candidates for the presidency cannot give speeches to a singular audience of wealthy donors without that message being publicized on the internet. Yet, even this conception struggles to capture the full complexity and plurality of presidential audience(s). Given electronic and
network communication, anyone with certain communication technology can become a member of presidential audience(s). The consequences of the globalization on communication technology, then, are staggering, if we position ourselves as the messenger. The president is confronted with a condition in which every syllable can be broadcast globally to friends and enemies alike; tuning in or out means anyone can be an audience at any time. These audiences demand attention, yet a full understanding of global presidential audience(s) is illusive from a social scientific perspective precisely because we don’t yet have the tools to know who is and who is not tuning in or out. A rhetorical conception of audience capable of responding to the multiplicity of context is in order.

2.1.1 Global Communication Networks: Potentiality and Problematics for the Presidency

Presidential speech often receives global attention, particularly when an address tends to issues of international significance or crisis, when an address is delivered in a global forum or when an address is delivered at a state function. In these instances, speech, or its fragments, are contextualized necessarily by globalization. Globalization is a process wherein social configurations are being radically redrawn. To offer a definition, globalization is a process whereby “information flows almost instantaneously, commodities and people transgress national boundaries, time accelerates, space collapses, and distinctions between such classic demarcations as agent and subject or politics and economics erode” (Chaput, 2010, p. 2). The distance between two different locations is often measured in time rather than distance. Where we work, shop, go to school, and are entertained is being de-territorialized. We no longer have to go to a specific geographical locations to engage in those activities. And the global spread of communication technology functions as not just the new backbone of our information based global economy but also the backbone for new social formations (Castells, 2009, 2010). The trend of globalization,
then, is the establishment of increasingly complex connections between communities that create interdependence (Keohane and Nye, 2000).

The area of weakness for globalization theory is that a central tenet assumes that to a greater or lesser extent that the world is unifying. This one world thesis is problematic because it overlooks important cleavages, fissures and politics between and across cultures. Adoption of a cosmopolitan perspective allows one to recognize these multiple overlapping and interconnected worlds (Rumford, 2014). Presidents are likely to be confronted with this problem. They recognize, for example, that the interconnected nature of economies and communication devices will lead to closer ties between nations and particular communities, i.e. they recognize the significance of ‘the West’ as both a symbolic and material construct. They are also confronted with ‘non-western’ worlds in tension with the worldview (literally in this case, the view of worlds) of presidents. So, Carter can be championing human rights to ‘the West’ and be confronted with the Iran hostage situation; Clinton preaches ‘western’ market ideals yet is faced with ethnic conflict in the Balkans & Africa; for Kennedy, confrontation within the transatlantic alliance is premised on entirely different ideological parameters than the confrontation faced from Soviet and Chinese communism.

The global spread of communication technology renders any individual connected through technology a potential member of audience because the rhetor can simply connect through that technology to send a message. Satellite technology has functioned as a global agent of change because it has connected societies and cultures that previously did not have the infrastructure to support the communication technology of previous epochs (Pelton, 2004). Fiber optic technology has fostered computation processes, such as the ability to trade commodities and stock on a global level in real time. It is this development that has led to the new formations
of networks (Castells, 2009, 2010). So, we can see that societies and cultures are connecting to a global information network at an accelerating rate. The interconnection of economies, politics and culture demonstrate that Richard Vatz was likely correct. At any given moment, there are an infinite amount of competing exigencies which makes identifying the appropriate audience a dubious proposition.

Use of networks and communication technologies also demonstrate that it is problematic to identify audience by the ability to piece together circulating fragments as it is difficult to know which fragments are circulating at any one moment. Globalization further problematizes this connection because there are a variety of ways in which speaker and audience could be connected. Software such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube also create challenges because individuals receive messages in truncated forms or fragments rather than their totality. Any message can be altered or edited and then re-circulated in a myriad of ways. At this point, one might object and suggest this is evidence for McGee’s fragmentation thesis. Yet it seems to me that re-circulation of a re-circulated textual fragment that has received numerous edits demonstrates that circulation is itself fragmented, which problematizes the ability of the critic to gain an understanding of how fragments are interpreted in the first place. This process of circulating re-circulated fragmentary edited texts across trans-national networks creates a vortex the critic cannot escape.

The problem of multiple global exigencies and understanding audience through circulation are potentially resolved by the convergence thesis. Here, globalization is theorized to have a leveling function; all cultures would converge overtime creating a homogenous culture (Howes, 1996). If true, this would make the rhetorician’s job of identifying and constructing messages appropriate to audience possible because there would be a relatively narrow set of
audiences with finite exigencies. On the other hand, such convergence should, at least
theoretically, prevent the need for rhetoric, if everyone clung to the same values and ideological
structure. History is replete with examples where domination has led to resistance and
globalization theory does not prove to be the exception here. Benjamin Barber (1996) makes the
case that the resistance of culture to globalization is manifesting itself in jihadist movements. As
a result, globalization can have a polarizing effect, encouraging individuals to turn inward rather
than outward and thereby protecting culture.

Recent and thorough empirical research has demonstrated that evidence for the
convergence and polarization theses is thin. Norris and Inglehart (2009) note that these theories
are driven by assumptions of individuals as passive consumers of media to be influenced, or
what is known as the hypodermic needle theory, which they claim has become widely passé.
They theorize that global communication is incredibly complex, with different pockets of culture
responding in different ways; this suggests that a nation can simultaneously maintain cultures of
convergence and polarization. Ultimately, they find that different users, values, society and
media function as “firewalls” that prevent convergence.

The new network society, dependent on global flows of communication, can produce
both convergence and polarization. Benedict Anderson (2000) helps us to understand which we
are dealing with by keeping in mind that individuals identify with others as a community based
on the same characteristics that Norris and Ingelhart label “firewalls.” If culture and the
imagination of community can be stable or fluid, and if cultures can converge or preserve
difference, then a constitutive approach to understanding audience through a reading of ideology
would provide grounds for analysis while avoiding the vortex problem of circulation. However,
if we understand controversy in a globalized world as the struggle to structure subjectivity to
either support or maintain the global order, and if it is possible for these controversies go beyond traditional barriers such as borders, time, and language, what tools do we have to understand audience? Maurice Charland (1987) argues that localized controversy functions ideologically to structure subjectivity such that individuals aren’t persuaded by good arguments; rather, they are persuaded through the process of identification. An individual’s subjectivity identifies with a position and, for Charland, this explains support for a social movement. His argument becomes more compelling if we consider that globalization has the power to create identity: a globalized identity (Tomlinson, 2003). If we conceive of controversy in a globalized world as the struggle to ideologically produce global convergence, then rhetoricians need to be able to identify the ideological markers of a universal discourse, rather than an oppositional or polarizing discourse circulating on a global level. Globalization is producing two seemingly irreconcilable results: the ability to preserve cultural identity and the ability to converge with other cultures. What is needed in this instance is a theory of how convergence works on a global level. Charland’s theory about the pre-figuring of the subjectivity is most likely correct – but at this point, the discursive mechanism that operates on a global level to pre-structure the individual is unknown. While there are debates about what type of power cosmopolitanism represents, we can nevertheless recognize that cosmopolitanism as a discourse could potentially work to structure the subjectivity of its audience.

2.2 Rhetorical Constructions of Audience

For both Aristotle and the early leaders of the discipline, rhetorical criticism examines the suasory relationship between rhetor and audience. Frequently, the construction and delivery of public address functioned as the text for criticism but how the text was adapted to fit the audience constituted the grounds for criticism. Genres, tropes and persuasive strategies were
discussed with the assumption that if used properly, these rhetorical figures would prove to have
suasory effects with an audience. For these scholars, the audience (or reader) was implied.

2.2.1 Audience as Ideologically Positioned for Identification

Midway through the twentieth century, European philosophy was engaged in questions about ideological forces and their relationship to audience (Althusser, 1971; Hall, 1980). Edwin Black (1970) as part of the “ideological turn” in rhetorical criticism in the United States, links the concept of ideology with audience in his essay The Second Persona. For Black, the second persona is the implied auditor, but the suasory power of rhetoric is derived from the deployment of “tokens” that functioned to ideologically align the audience with rhetor. Tokens, or what we might refer to as rhetorical elements such as metaphor, synecdoche, or allegory, provide the “vector of influence” by [re]structuring ideology. Verification of Black’s argument about the second persona is established by metaphoric studies of cold war public address (Osborn and Ehninger 1962; Osborn 1967a, 1967b). Shifting from the implied audience to persona is not inconsistent with audience-based criticism that relies on Bitzer’s rhetorical situation. Critics can simply analyze the tokens to determine whether they are responsive to the exigence and thus audience. But the shift to persona also allows critics to read audience into the text. That is, in the age of post-modernism and fragmented audience, examining the tokens allows critics to imagine who an audience for the text. Phillip Wander argues that Black’s second persona identifies only the rhetorical audience as conceived by Bitzer (Wander, 1984). That is, the second persona identifies and ideologically interacts with an audience that can take action to create change. Wander posits through the metaphor of silhouette that just as there is an audience that is included, there is an audience to be excluded; the second persona casts a shadow which Wander
labels the third persona. This concept allows the critic to interrogate the excluded audience and critique texts for precisely this move.

Each of the three theories of persona problematically assume a stable identity, which is to say that each assumes that once an individual self-identifies as a member of an audience, they belong to that and only that audience. Chuck Morris III (2002) argues individuals can inhabit multiple subjectivities with their own ideological positions simultaneously. By working through the queer concept of passing, Morris is able to demonstrate that an individual engaged in “passing” ideologically engages a text from a queer perspective, keeping that perspective private while simultaneously engaging in a heteronormative identification of a text in public. The fourth persona, then, shares characteristics of the second (identification made public) and third personas (identification rendered invisible) but differentiates itself precisely because it contains elements of both simultaneously. Persona offers insight into how audience is ideologically targeted and theorizes how individuals will ideologically identify with rhetoric, thereby committing themselves to an audience, as well as how audience can be made either visible or invisible.

2.2.2 Audience as Exigence or Constitution

Aristotle’s conceptions of situation (deliberative, judicial and epideictic) suggest that audiences are primed for particular messages given particular situations. As a result, rhetors improve their chances of success if they craft messages that account for how audiences are primed regarding one of three specific situations. Recognizing that modern society affords a plethora of situations for citizen oration, F. Lloyd Bitzer expands our understanding of the rhetorical situation by theorizing exigence: that which calls rhetoric into being and justifies action on the part of an audience (Bitzer, 1968). He posits that the rhetors who understand the exigence driving a rhetorical situation increase persuasive efficacy. Identification of the
“complex of persons, events, objects, and relations” allows the critic to identify the rhetorical situation and provides the basis for criticism. Exigency also determines the audience. Bitzer notes that, “In any rhetorical situation there will be at least one controlling exigence which functions as the organizing principle; it specifies the audience to be addressed and the change to be effected” (p. 7). Here, the exigence encompasses not just the context, but also the human capacity to understand the context, respond to it, and for the rhetor to identify those people who can enact the desired change. Bitzer further argues that the rhetorical audience is defined not by the individuals consuming rhetoric but by those capable of creating the change necessary to address the situation.

Scholars have long recognized that presidents have multiple audiences (Zarefsky, 2004). When delivering an inaugural address, for example, the president attempts to bridge differences of proponents and opponents alike through calls of national unity (Campbell & Jamieson, 2008). Cleavages within a larger audience that supports the president can also be addressed with specific lines of text, which can address factions within a larger audience that supports the president or suture together a group of bipartisan lawmakers. Public address scholars have identified attempts of the president to persuade particular audiences with specific proposals and we have critiqued extensively and maybe even exhaustively the choices that a president makes. Despite specific attention to smaller, even minute audiences, that form a composite audience of ‘the American People’ for example, conceptualizing the challenges of creating an address for broader audiences is lacking. More significantly, when thinking about composite audience, we tend to conceptions of the domestic audience. While the president represents the people of the United States, as an actor in the international system, the president exerts agency with considerable consequences for many that did not vote, did not seek leadership and that did not
grant the power for action. Yet the power of the institution allows for action to be taken nonetheless.

Ideology as a concept understood in relation to audience requires working through the theoretical advances in audience theory made by Richard Vatz and Barbara Biesecker. The critique of Bitzer is that the rhetorical situation is overly-deterministic in that it structures the exigence, the response and the audience; one is left to ask what type of valuable insights can be gained from criticism. Richard Vatz argues that there is little to be gained: “If one accepts Bitzer's position … then we ascribe little responsibility to the rhetor with respect to what he has chosen to give salience” (Vatz, 1973). Rather than premising rhetorical responses on rhetorical situations, Vatz argues that rhetors create situations through the rhetorical choices they make. Vatz thus attempts to rescue the critic by suggesting that rhetorical situation and audience are constituted by the rhetor. Constitution in this sense refers to the selection process of the rhetor in choosing to create salience for particular situations. Choice, then, becomes the critical component by which rhetorical critics can render judgment on both text and rhetor.

Yet rhetorical constitution remains problematic because—in the case of both Bitzer and Vatz—each theory of the rhetorical situation has an essentialized conception of the audience (Biesecker, 1989). Working through the deconstructionist theory of Derrida, Biesecker notes that the difference inherent to the subjectivity of individuals that compose an audience is overlooked. Maurice Charland takes issue with Biesecker’s recommendations: “Consequently, attempts to elucidate ideological or identity-forming discourses as persuasive are trapped in a contradiction; persuasive discourse requires a subject-as-audience who is already constituted with an identity and within an ideology” (Charland, 1987). Following the work of Black (persona), McGee (construction of a people) and Althusser (interpellation), Charland argues that rhetorical criticism
is ill-equipped to understand persuasion because rhetoricians do not have a theory as to how audience is constituted prior to entering the rhetorical situation. Charland argues that Black is fundamentally correct in recognizing that there are personas that people identify with, and it is this process of identification that leads to persuasion. However, he argues that what is missing from Black’s theory of persona is an understanding of how identification is possible in the first place. For an answer to this problem, he turns to Althusser’s concept of interpellation and suggests that rhetorical processes of socialization constitute pre-rhetorical subjects that then identify with a persona once engaged in a rhetorical situation. Charland’s significant contribution to understanding audience, then, is to suggest that we can understand the formation of audience by examining the circulation of ideological narratives that constitute a person’s subjectivity.

The case for studying audience may seem dire at this point: a rhetor can’t know who the audience is because circulation is a known unknown; a rhetor can’t predict audience because few if any exigencies will be universal, and if such exigencies arise they are likely to be interpreted universally; a rhetor can’t prepare for all of the ways in which the subjectivity of the individual has been pre-positioned ideologically for identification with particular messages. However, by thinking through the implications of the cosmopolitan condition – a condition experienced by all according to Beck but for the purposes of this study certainly experienced by presidents – it is possible to read conceptions of audience out of the text while also providing insights into the mind of the rhetor and how that rhetor seeks to enter ideological discourses and influence circulating narratives. And when that rhetor is the president – an individual invested with incredible power on both a local and global level – attention is warranted.
2.3 Theorizing the Cosmopolitan Condition as Means to Engage Individuals and Institutions as Audience(s)

The cosmopolitan condition tends to present itself as a predicament; we are all implicated by cosmopolitanism even if we do not self-identify as cosmopolitans as such. Emerging from the field of sociology, this reading of the cosmopolitan condition suggests not just that we all experience to a greater or lesser degree the impacts of globalization but that we have structured our consciousness to navigate both the local and the global. Images of the planet Earth from space help us to imagine the world as a whole, yet we also identify as a congregation, or members of social organizations like the Rotary Club that tend entirely to local issues. This cosmopolitan consciousness is not a new phenomenon, as it is evident in the writings of the Stoics, Kant, and can be traced to other civilizations throughout time dealing with a shrinking world as a result of developments in technology, trade and transportation (see: Robertson, 2006). If the cosmopolitan condition in all its particularities is experienced by all, and if that condition is indeed universal, then thinking through the implications of this condition can contextually situate both rhetor and audience, opening space for a constitutive capability for messages. To further specify possible connections, I bifurcate the cosmopolitan condition into two components: crisis and imagination.

2.3.1 Cosmopolitan Crisis

Invoking the concept of cosmopolitan crisis is to invoke the work of Ulrich Beck (2002, 2006). For him, there are two sides to the coin of crisis. The first side of the coin is the interconnectedness related to processes of globalization, which in turn establish what he labels ‘shared risk’ simply demonstrated by links forged between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China. Here, excesses in capital inflows to China combined with a major influx of
farmers into urban areas lead to massive construction efforts that have created a potential housing bubble which, if it were to burst, would have nearly the same domestic economic effects as those experienced by the U.S. The risk from this bubble would be shared by many other nations, especially the United States. Subsidizing the U.S. economic recovery and wartime expenditures required the selling of bonds, purchased in large quantities by China. If China were to face their own economic downturn and cashed in that debt it could destabilize the U.S. economy in the process. But we also know that it isn’t simply the largest capitalist economies that demonstrate shared risk. The troubles with debt in Greece and Spain are well known, and the collapse of that economy could lead to the fragmentation and ultimate elimination of the euro as a currency, the implications of which abound.

The opposite side of the coin from shared risk is the idea of a shared collective future. For Beck, articulations of a shared collective future contradict state centric versions of future. And while there is some debate over the accuracy and desirability of such observations (see: Calhoun, 2007) for the purposes of this study, where political elites meet in an international institution to debate and construct a shared collective future, risk is one inventional resource that provides possibilities for thin lines of cosmopolitan argument to forge identification. And we can note that President of the United States certainly understands the concept of shared risk. Every president, and presidential candidate that won their party’s respective primary, has received intelligence briefings from the Central Intelligence Agency outlining numerous threat scenarios and hotspots that could potentially draw-in U.S. forces (Helgerson, 1996). Additionally, overlapping political interest areas reflect the need to attend to shared risk. The Mexican economic crisis of 1994 is another productive example; the exposure of U.S. investors prompted immediate attention from the Clinton Treasury department (Beeson et. al, 2003). Economic impacts are rarely limited to
economies alone, and the failure of the Mexican economy would have likely led to a greater influx of migrants, which could have both political and economic consequences for the United States.

2.3.2 Cosmopolitan Imagination

How a presidential administration deals with shared risk requires an imagination capable of conjuring both a future free of the extant risk and a means to get there. Whether capable of effecting the outcome of legislative debates or moving public opinion, presidential speech is widely regarded as significant because it can set the agenda for the nation and drive news cycles. As such, the imagination of the president or those working within the administration can be of significance to audiences working to understand their relationship to the government. Premised on a social constructivist reading of language, the invention of symbols can define the ‘social imaginary’ and how these imaginaries organize and categorize the world (Castriota, 1992). The symbolic and the imagination were critical to the establishment of social formations, whether they be loose affiliations between individuals, tighter bonds forged through membership in an institution such as the Rotary Club, a religious congregation or a political party. Benedict Anderson (1983) in a parallel move argues that imagination is the driver of community, and the ultimate symbol of community is the nation state. In this way, then, imagination invents the symbols that in turn provide meaning to the local world. A cosmopolitan imagination is necessary to balance the inevitable friction between local and global interests.

To be clear, a cosmopolitan imagination requires presidents to inhabit a specific subject position. Gerald Delanty (2009) argues that to inhabit this position requires a “sense of openness as opposed to a closed or particularistic view of the world” (p. 14). Openness in a cosmopolitan imagination is the result of slippage between understandings of oneself, understanding of others,
and understanding of the world. This slippage produces a subject position that recognizes the value of a multiplicity of social imaginaries which importantly contributes to self-reflexivity. And it is this self-reflexivity that then allows the imagination to push past existing social constructions and their constraints on what can or should be done. Put another way, “cosmopolitanism understood in terms of immanent transcendence refers to an internally induced social change whereby societies and social agents undergo transformation in their moral and political self-understanding as they respond to global challenges” (2009, p. 251). Delanty concludes that globalization provides the external preconditions for the emergence of a cosmopolitan imagination. Applied to this study, emerging risks shared by the community of nations provides the precursor by which a cosmopolitan imaginary might emerge within presidential rhetoric. For Kennedy, the threat of mutually assured destruction was the defining risk of his presidency, the splintering of the Soviet Union the shared risk of the H.W. presidency and for Clinton, renewed ethnic conflict, genocide and terrorism in failing states constituted threats to the United States. These moments of risk within globalization should produce rhetorical interventions that seek to reshape the international imaginary.

Reading presidential rhetoric through the lens of the cosmopolitan condition provides additional benefits as well. First, cosmopolitan crisis provides an empirically more precise framework for understanding context. We have long recognized the relationship between text and context (Lucas, 1988). Rhetoricians early on sought theories that specified this relationship by thinking through situation. But neither Bitzer nor Vatz could map the multiplicity of territorial or culturally bound contexts or anticipate where they might overlap. What constitutes risk and the manner in which risk is shared as a result can specify a particular set of overlapping connections. Second, cosmopolitan imagination provides for a specific reading of public
communication which can yield insights into the self-reflexivity of the rhetor and, in this case, the President of the United States. Competing speech provides a means by which we can evaluate different imaginations and how those imaginations constitute what the world could and should be like. And finally, imagination is what positions an individual for identification. Yet the identificatory process is a complex and sometimes contradictory one for the imagination because cosmopolitanism by its very nature creates a split subjectivity. One the one hand, a person can imagine belonging to a sovereign nation who witnesses an affective response when the national anthem is played before a commemorative event. On the other hand, a person can imagine belonging to a global collective of individuals whose goal is to combat global warming. A return to rhetorical conceptions of audience can assist in forming connections between a rhetor and individuals pre-figured for rhetorical situations through cosmopolitan discourses and as a result of the processes of globalization.

2.3.3 Implied and Universal Audiences

The concept of the implied reader or implied audience has been circulating in literary theory for some time. Wayne Booth (1961) argues that the implied audience is the second self of the author. That is, the author thinks of the person they would have read their work and then writes for that person. The relationship between implied reader and actual reader functions when the actual reader agrees to bring their beliefs about the text into complete agreement with those of the author. The implied audience does not require that all readers assent to the text. The author, in imagining an implied audience, deploys logics which they understand to command universal assent. The limitation of the implied audience, then, is that the logics could be more useful when dealing with agonistic discourses, but that such discourses might not result from the cosmopolitan condition.
I maintain that the universal audience as a construct can help to identify those claims by which an individual will be positioned for identification. Unpacking the universal audience in *The New Rhetoric* (TNR) requires an establishment of the characteristics of audience. We can begin with a definition: audience is, “the ensemble of those whom the speaker wishes to influence by his argumentation” (2006, p. 19). Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (2006) expound by noting that, “Every speaker thinks, more or less consciously, of those he is seeking to persuade; these people form the audience to whom his speech is addressed” (p. 19). The audience is a collection of individuals that do not necessarily exist in reality but is rather constructed within the mind of the rhetor.

A second characteristic of audience is that it is not based on material conditions. A rhetor’s understanding of audience could be influenced by polling or other demographic data, but it is the imaginary and construction of arguments in relation to that imaginary that is key. This characteristic is tied to a third. There is a distinction between the public and audience based on publicity and circulation. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (2006) note, “the prime concern of publicity and propaganda is to draw the attention of an indifferent public” (p. 18). Attention is drawn through the societal, “institutions which facilitate and organize this contact of minds” (p. 18). The public can be identified by the circulation of messages. Audience, however, is a narrower subset, given the rhetorical constraints of the situation and the strategy for influence being deployed. It should also be noted that the public is not constituted in the mind of the rhetor. Here, it isn’t just that the rhetor cannot imagine an American public, given the extensive diversity of such a group, it is also that the rhetor should not attempt such an imagination because they simply cannot adequately capture the myriad of material conditions of an American public.
At this point, it is fair to ask if TNR misses the mark. Certainly, if we were to examine a stump speech of a president, we would recognize that there were different arguments and ideas to capture fissures within the president’s base. Theoretically, there can be sections of individuals, each with their own interests, goals and demands, within an ensemble. This is what TNR refers to as a composite audience. So, a composite audience is what results when the scope of influence expands to incorporate multiple audiences.

Crafting messages for specific audiences, or constituencies within a composite audience, might have the opposite effect in that the arguments designed for others decrease influence overall. At this point, TNR recognizes that it might be necessary, at least in practice, for a rhetor to seek influence based on claims that should be unanimously agreed upon. They note that, “the value of this unanimity depends on the …agreement of the universal audience.” To elaborate, the universal audience, “refers of course, in this case, not to an experimentally proven fact, but to a universality and unanimity imagined by the speaker, to the agreement of an audience which should be universal” (2006, p. 31). If a rhetor needs to transcend the differences inherent to the composite audience, imagining arguments to which all reasonable people would agree to is the formative process that establishes a universal audience.

TNR has been criticized for the previous passage on the grounds that it establishes a rigid rationalism, that it is confusing, that it contradicts itself, and that it is a tautology (Ede, 1981; Johnstone, Jr., 1954; Ray, 1978). A defense of TNR asserts that such critiques fundamentally misread the passage, that they discounted the nuanced yet complete theory as offered (particular, composite and universal) (Gross, 1999; Perelman, 1955, 1984). Overtime, the separate but similar interpretations of Perelman and Gross have prevailed, but additional insight into the
trajectory of the book project and its interpretation should prove helpful in demonstrating the continued utility of the universal audience as a concept (Jørgensen, 2009).

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca were interested in challenging philosophy over the framing and treatment of rhetoric. Following Plato, it was not uncommon for philosophers to place rhetoric on a continuum of flattery to knavery. TNR argue that philosophers should respect and investigate rhetoric because it functions as a philosophical epistemology. Philosophers produce texts because those texts are thought to produce a particular knowledge for society. These scholars are no fools; they know that only a small percentage of the population will read their texts and that they can’t possibly predict what logical systems or experiences those readers might have. Therefore, philosophers must imagine arguments that will be universally accepted by any individual from any background based on what they consider to be good reasons. TNR argues that this practice, the practice of imagining universal arguments, is a rhetorical practice of constructing an audience in one’s mind and then finding the appropriate arguments to persuade that audience.

In order to recognize the significance of this argument, we can note that the universal audience actually serves an epistemic and pragmatic purpose (Aikin, 2008). Epistemically, the argument advances the field of informal logic while preserving a special role for rhetorical studies. Pragmatically, the concept of the universal audience can be used by critics to draw attention to specific types of appeals that socially construct universality (de Velasco, 2005). In other words, critics can use the concept of universal audience to interrogate values and directions for action (Crosswhite, 1989, 2010a). If we understand cosmopolitanism as engaged in a hegemonic struggle for domination through the establishment of an ideology that structures subjectivity, the universal audience can allow the critic to read back through circulating
discourses to unpack both universal appeals and the direction for action those appeals suggest (Crosswhite, 2010b). This opens up potential space for criticism.

2.3.4 The Relationship between Presidential Address and Audience: The Efficacy of Discourse

Audience is central to understanding persuasion and the rhetorical tradition has evolved its conception of audience and persuasion as circumstances have evolved within the broader intellectual tradition of the humanities. Rhetoric as a means to understand persuasion is faced yet again with a challenge to understanding persuasion precisely because audience is difficult to ascertain within the milieu of globalization. This chapter has reviewed the literature on audience and globalization, advancing two primary claims. First, conceptions of audience emanating from situational analysis have been problematized for having a narrow conception of agency, subjectivity and ideology. I further added that the processes of globalization have made it pragmatically impossible to locate audience through material conditions. In other words, the infinite possibility for audience, given the multiplicity of material factors, prevents the rhetor from tailoring a message for all audiences. Second, I have argued that the major political move as a result of globalization is the ideological structuring of new social relations created by globalization. It is this politics of cosmopolitanism that I suggest can be productively unpacked through the concept of the ‘universal audience’ which allows the critic to focus on how ideological notions of our collective and common humanity are structured.

To this point, I have reviewed the relationship between rhetor, the text, and audience, but I have done so in rather generic terms; a defense of the relationship between presidential rhetoric and its audience is necessary. Opportunities and limitations abound with any approach to rhetoric and this study is no different. An ongoing inter-disciplinary research agenda deals with the
effects of rhetoric, how we can know effect, and whether or not effect is a causal result of rhetorical appeals. Jeffry Tulis (1987) built on the idea of “going public” to argue that public address had effectively changed the distribution of power authorized by the Constitution because presidents were able to influence Congressional action by manipulating public opinion. This view suggests that rhetoric can have profound institutional effects. George Edwards (2003a, 2003b) strongly disagreed with this thesis and through an analysis of Gallup polling of presidential approval studies conducted directly after major presidential addresses finds no change in approval rating. For him, if there is no measurable effect resulting from presidential rhetoric than the rhetorical presidency thesis is disproved. And here the struggle to understand effect as influencing the public becomes a substantial line of inquiry. A narrower accounting of audience (sample populations based on narrower geographic parameters) finds presidential address to positively effects approval when presidents ‘go local’ by visiting specific sites of importance (Cohen, 2010). Maintaining a similar approach, Rottinghaus (2010) finds that media technologies have amplified the voices of presidential opposition thereby offsetting gains in approval which preserves a space for rhetorical effectivity while explaining the results of Edwards. Public address scholars such as Michael Hogan and Elisabeth Lipari have critiqued the work of qualitative scholars on methodological grounds. Hogan (1997) persuasively makes the case that Gallup, whose data is used by Edwards, used rhetorical techniques to persuade the world that changes in audience on political issues could be quantitatively measured. Hogan continues by documenting how polling was not been trusted prior to Gallup which has since created an industry for itself. This industry is also critiqued by Lipari (2001), who argues that the polling industry functions as an ideological feedback loop. If polling is able to affirm the questions that it is asking, by persuading individuals of their results, she argues, it functions as a
tautology. Rhetoricians also advance a strong case for rhetorical effects that transcend public approval. Martin Medhurst has drawn distinctions between the rhetorical presidency and presidential rhetoric to suggest that rhetoricians understand both public address and effect differently (Medhurst, 2004). Roderick Hart (2008) furthers this argument by concluding that there are twelve effects of rhetoric that are not accounted for by Edwards. More sophisticated accounts of rhetoric, particularly within institutional contexts, emphasize both rhetoric’s ability to influence institutions and the ability of the institution to influence rhetoric.

2.4 The United Nations as a Rhetorical Institution

The United Nations, crafted in the aftermath of World War II as a means to prevent global conflict, is distinctly rhetorical and often is either defended or attacked as the world’s greatest debating society. The institution lacks a standing army by which to coerce member states. It cannot collect taxes or regulate the global economy and relies on membership donations to administratively operate. Yet, the United Nations has brokered numerous treaties and resolutions that constitute international law, established external international organizations designed to carry out missions established by the membership (such as UNESCO), and recognized nations send ambassadors to engage in a plethora of discussions related to international issues. The institution could not have been created, would not function and could not tackle global issues without rhetoric. As a result, the United Nations constitutes a rhetorical scene whereby presidents through public address can assert themselves as global leaders interested in crafting international policies that are responsive to global issues and audiences.

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2 Hart (2008) posits that rhetoric: “(1) crystallizes vague concepts, (2) alters the national imagination’ (3) changes definitional habits, (4) shifts people’s presuppositions, (5) relocates sources of authority (6) changes the arc of time (7) and space, (8) shortens the political agenda, (9) shifts the locus of controversy, (10) alters our political metrics, (11) models specific attitudes, and (12) instantiates new possibilities” (p. 246).
Given the accumulating body of public address connected to the U.N., a thick set of rules and procedures defined by the Charter form a series of expectations. During his infamous speech in 2009, Colonel Gadhafi demonstrated that neither timeliness (he called for an investigation into the assassination of President Kennedy) nor decorum (he spoke for nearly one hundred minutes) are constraining factors. However, alternating seats on the Security Council, the makeup of the Human Rights Committee, and the ability of the Secretary General to engage in direct negotiations (thus asserting the U.N.’s role as a normal player in conflict and crisis situations) are all factors that shape rhetorical interactions. But the institution affords the opportunities for considerable rhetorical elasticity.

To argue that an institution is rhetorical is to argue that the rhetorical practices that occur within the framework of an institution are paramount to understanding outcomes derived within that institution. Thomas Farrell (1995) argues that an institution is rhetorical when a “symbolic environment is created within which issues, interests, positions, constituencies and messages are advanced, shaped and provisionally judged” (p. 282). The United Nations is interesting institutionally because of the division between the vestiges of power in the Security Council, the General Assembly, the office of the Secretary-General, and to nation states exercising sovereignty. Each of these vestiges of power become sites for rhetorical analysis because each engage in the sharing and creation of symbols through communicated messages to complete their work. The formation of international law is not possible without a text being proffered, interpreted, and deliberated upon – both within the diplomatic corps of individual nations and amongst all nations in the General Assembly – and without the Secretary General making recommended changes. At each level and throughout an evolving context, nations attempt to persuade each other to support particular agendas and issues. And the individual civil servants
are often judged competent by their ability to secure passage of – or stymie when interests conflict - particular initiatives as they arise on the agenda of the General Assembly or Security Council. The United Nations exhibits other markers of a rhetorical institution as well.

First, the existence of a forum is a hallmark feature of a rhetorical institution, and clearly the General Assembly and Security Council function as forums for constituting an international political response, the establishment and practice of norms, and the invention of international law. In each case, rhetoric is prominently featured: wielding of knowledge, the sharing and disputation of the ‘facts on the ground,’ interpretation of events and the formation of judgment and widely considered to be rhetorical practices. One marker of a rhetorical institution, then, is that the production and circulation of rhetorical texts matters to the functioning of that body.\(^3\) For political scientists, rhetoric matters when it is the only variable that adequately explains institutional shifts. When I say that rhetoric matters, I am suggesting that the production and circulation of texts – here broadly understood as speeches, published opinion, images and the like – has a role to play in the internal functioning of the institution. As a constructivist, I take a broader and more complex account of rhetoric in relation to institutional change. That is, I read rhetoric within the contextual terrain of the institution to understand how texts influence the relationship between participants. And this methodological approach preserves space for

\(^3\) In the preceding sections I have spent some time dedicated to the idea that a focus on circulation could be problematic for rhetorical scholarship. This study cannot avoid the problem in its entirety for presidential speech circulates broadly. However, my attention to discourse at the United Nations operates on the assumption that texts are often studied – at least by subordinates – of the diplomatic missions of various nation states and that texts must be circulated in order for the institution to function. The General Assembly cannot craft law without drafts being submitted by various delegations. Delegations cannot develop reasonable positions or defend those positions publically without access to the text in question. This study will not attempt to account for circulation of texts created in the United Nations writ large. It is commonly understood that the rhetorical practice of circulating and responding to texts is part of the everyday operation of the United Nations – there are rules about language, number of copies and the like that guide this process – and its representatives and thereby provides a foundation upon which a theory of diplomatic cosmopolitanism can be built.
criticism. As Farrell (1995) notes, “a rhetorical forum provides a provisionally constrained context and an avenue of mediation among discourses that might otherwise be self-confirming” (p. 282). Adlai Stevenson’s presentation at the United Nations featuring images of ballistic missiles in Cuba provided the international community with the evidence necessary to render judgment on competing arguments from ideological opponents which would have otherwise been impossible to verify. Treating the United Nations as a rhetorical institution then provides new explanatory ground for the levers of international politics while preserving a central role for the critic.

Second, “A forum helps to stabilize rhetorical practice. By allowing topics to be classified as open for discussion and by encouraging advocates and their constituencies to exert some public influence, rhetorical forums lend a weight to rhetorical occasions” (Farrell, 1995, p. 284). While it is now typical for the president to speak at the opening of every general assembly, this is a relatively new development that began with Reagan. President Kennedy, considered by many to be the most cosmopolitan and internationalist president, only spoke at the UN twice. The fact that Presidents only speak at the General Assembly once a year provides significance for each address. There are good reasons to attend to the nuanced scene of the General Assembly in conjunction with an analysis of presidential address, even given a widespread sense that the operations of the Assembly and the speeches given there are mainly for show and do not drive geopolitical action. The deliberations of the General Assembly are relatively understudied likely as a result of the realist and institutional perspective that encourages scholars to simply examine outcomes in relation to state interest. For those who think deliberations matter, attention to the General Assembly allows for interrogation of debate and subsequent votes that legitimize “norms, rules and actions; and a provider of some administrative oversight of the UN system”
Further, the normalization of deliberation as a political process becomes embedded in the bureaucratic routine which structures and constrains rhetorical opportunity (on the subject of the growing U.N. bureaucracy see: Johnstone, 2003). We can also note that aside from lending weight to presidential speech, speeches within the General Assembly can also be of significance. For it is here that all recognized nations of the world maintain representatives. It is a centralizing hub for diplomacy. While Stevenson was clearly a success, Colin Powell’s presentation on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq was clearly a failure (Zarefsky, 2007). The results also lend credence to political analysis: strong arguments are likely to produce positive political results while weak reasoning can contribute to international backlash.

A third marker of the rhetorical institution is the degree to which institutional doctrine can be leveraged to justify specific courses of action or the reconstitution of the institution. That is, the institution itself provides invention grounds for argument to the rhetor. Of assistance here is the work of Campbell and Jamieson (2008), who argue that the Constitution imbues the institution of the presidency with invention grounds by which the president as rhetor can enact “the process through which presidents play their role as the symbolic, as well as the real, head of state” (p. 7). Certain speeches, where the president acts as spokesperson for the nation, are generic in the literary sense of the word. The institution provides elements that when replicated instill the rhetor with the characteristics that an audience thinks of as “presidential.” Epideictic platitudes towards the institution and deploying themes from the Charter itself allow presidents to enact an ethos of cosmopolitan stewardship which positions them as global leaders (Prosser, 1970). Additionally, Campbell and Jamieson observe that institutional doctrine, such as the Constitution or in this case the Charter, “permits varying levels of discretionary power in rhetorical action and provides for varying degrees of rhetorical effect” (p. 5). An approach to the
preamble that follows Lucas’s reading strategies in rhetorically assessing the Declaration of Independence might not be a productive intellectual exercise given a distinct lack of artistry, but there can be no doubt that the preamble and first chapter were designed to make an argument to an international audience of sovereign states and political elites (Lucas, 1990). But there are parallels to the American Declaration of Independence, including the fact that as the Declaration functioned to constitute the United States as a new nation (Wills, 2002), the United Nations Charter similarly constitutes the organization as the first institution with global reach, significance and membership (thus asserting the prerogatives of nationhood). The Charter of the United Nations is frequently used to justify policy and ground international law. At the same time, within the international system, the UN has adapted to changing circumstance mostly through bureaucratic expansion and mission creep. The implication is twofold: the Charter provides grounds from which its own expansion can be justified, and that expansion serves as precedent which can then influence future decisions (Gordenker & Jönsson, 2007).

The fourth marker of a rhetorical institution is the existence of a rhetorical community, for without such a community, there would be no purpose for the creation of texts. “People who participate in a rhetorical vision,” and tend to, “respond to messages in ways that are in tune with their rhetorical vision,” operate as a rhetorical community (Bormann, 1982, p. 53). Governmentality is a central function of the nation state and as a result, each diplomatic mission is likely to adopt a vision for what the international political should be and what their role within that scene is. These communities, of course, are not monolithic, and by rereading articulations of the polis in ancient Greek literature, Carolyn Miller (1993) is able to demonstrate that communities can feature sites of contestation where diversity of opinion is expressed despite underlying normative agreement. In an attempt to understand how nations form collectivities
capable of cooperation (despite the intensity of national interest) and organized by normative practice, Stanley Fish in a parallel move argues that these political formations are the result of shared interpretations (1980). For him, these interpretive communities form around a shared interpretation that functions to create understanding of contemporary affairs. Importantly, these interpretive communities can exist inside and outside of institutions. Collectivities of individuals with particularized expertise can operate within the academy and government while providing service to an international organization. For example, scientists were able to force consensus around the technical parameters of acoustic signatures for nuclear weapons detonations as a means to establish verification. A separate collectivity of individuals came to a consensus on what the response of a particular nation should be given the existence of a norm against proliferation and testing within the international community. The operation of interpretive communities then works to bolster the case for the United Nations as a rhetorical institution because the United Nations in this context functions as a meta-interpretive community – it is the location where overlapping interpretive communities convene to engage in deliberative politics.4

Finally, a comment on the flows of power within the multiple locations for deliberation with the United Nations. The Security Council, a small but powerful subset of the Assembly, typically overshadows the General Assembly. The literature tends to treat this council as the

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4 Human rights provide a useful example. Mary Stuckey (2008) advances the compelling claim that ‘human rights,’ while notably Western – despite historical antecedents in ancient cultures – were fomented in the minds of U.S. political elites by Roosevelt and the persistence of the Human Rights agenda of the U.S. can be traced to President Carter. Additionally, human rights present distinct problems to the United Nations General Assembly. Stuckey observes, “The Declaration [of Human Rights] contains provisions for both political and economic rights, and thus could not garner enough support to have the force of a treaty. In particular, it fell victim to Cold War politics, as communist nations supported economic and cultural rights, and capitalistic nations such as the United States were only comfortable supporting political and civil rights, where were not supported by the communist bloc nations” (2008, p. 7). I contend that these differences persist precisely because of the agonistic epistemologies of interpretive communities.
location where power politics are most important, a point hard to deny given the states that are permanent members to the committee and given that actions involving security cannot be taken without the sanction of the Security Council. Sanctioning action, including the act of sanctioning other nations, is made all the more difficult given that each of the permanent members has a veto. Given the complex layers of state interest combined with existing loyalties, two similar models for decision-making have been proposed. The legitimacy or consensus thesis suggests that action is deemed acceptable if the Security Council can come to a consensus, where consensus is seen as providing a layer of legitimacy for international security operations (Albright, 2003; Boulden, 2005; Ikenberry, 2007). The “rally ‘round the flag” thesis suggest that a domestic audience of veto wielding states will be more apt to support conflict if it is clear the Security Council will approve it. This approach, drawing from a long line of international relations scholarship examining the relationship between domestic support and foreign policy, has been limited given that it has usually been conducted within the political context of the United States (Chapman & Reiter, 2004). Given the disparate political cultures of the U.S., Russia, and China (to saying nothing of the French), it is likely that generalizing these findings would require the specific contextual information provided by the United Nation’s history.

The interactive rhetorical effects of activity in the Security Council and the General Assembly also need to be engaged. Despite the lure of power politics, maintaining an exclusive focus on the Security Council is to overlook the crucial role the General Assembly plays in laying the foundation of good reasons for action. This role is particularly important when “the rules of the game are in flux, that is, when there is a transition from order to another or when there are significant challenges to the established order” (Barnett, 1997). While recognizing the rhetoricity of the Security Council, then, this study will attend largely to the General Assembly,
except for those situations in which the archival research points to an important connection
between the address and the Security Council.

The increasing significance of the Secretary General has been mirrored by the expansion
of the United Nations; the Secretary-General now has a larger staff and more responsibility
(Eckhard, 2007). Article 100 of the Charter stipulates that the Secretary should not “seek or
receive instructions from any government,” but this does not prohibit the Secretary from
expressing an opinion, even if it mirrors the position of one or more states. The Secretary-
General thus has access to his own distinctive ‘bully pulpit’ (Alvarez, 2007). The opportunity to
wield influence is presented when the Secretary acts as a mediator during discussions and also
when they must deliver an annual report to the General Assembly. Given this position and
power, the Secretary General is an audience of one and should be an important target for U.S.
presidential influence.

On the question of power, realists contend that it is not rhetoric that moves nations to
action, but power. Here, the realist argues the large state powers constituting the Security
Council only use the UN to achieve their interests. The point I want to elaborate is that because
the U.N. remains a location from which the great powers seek to increase their leadership to
achieve their interests, even in the realist framework, a consequence is that rhetoric matters.
Rhetoric is necessary to chart a path for leadership, it is necessary to articulate policies designed
to achieve one’s interest, and it is necessary to simultaneously defend those policies and
encourage others to join the actor in support of those policies.
2.5 Conclusions: Presidential Address, Competing Cosmopolitanisms and Structuring of the Global Imaginary at the United Nations

Cosmopolitanism, a pragmatic and epistemic mode of inquiry, is a global discourse that seeks global assent through claims of universality. The link between cosmopolitanism and globalization stems from the premise that harm felt anywhere, is harm felt everywhere as a result of globalization. The recent economic crisis demonstrates that irresponsible managers can collapse the global economy. Bosnia and Libya demonstrate that civil war can spill across borders and draw in great powers. Environmental disasters such as tsunamis and earthquakes can strain the global food supply. In these times, our global connections necessarily require that risk is shared across borders or what Ulrich Beck has labeled the world risk society (Beck, 2006). In response to the world risk society, individuals, non-governmental organizations, sovereign states and international institutions have sought a global politics that can mitigate this risk: this politics is cosmopolitanism (Beck, 2004, 2011; Beitz, 2005; Bohman, 2004; Saito, 2011; Vertovec, 2003). Cosmopolitan politics begins with, “the acknowledgement of some notion of common humanity that translates ethically into an idea of shared or common moral duties toward others by virtue of this humanity” (Brown & Held, 2010, p. 1). The technical rhetoric that is emerging in global debates in response to risk has opened up new possibilities from which to challenge established positions (Danisch, 2010). And the circulation of cosmopolitan discourses function rhetorically to “guide debate” and, “should be capable of specifying the kinds of argument that can be accepted as valid while ruling out other considerations that might be put forward” (Barry, 2010). Such arguments are usually grounded on one of the following: “interrelated themes: global justice, cultural cosmopolitanism, legal cosmopolitanism, political cosmopolitanism, and civic cosmopolitanism” (Brown & Held, 2010, p. 9).
The processes of globalization are pre-figuring individuals ideologically in ways that are likely to make them responsive to cosmopolitan appeals. This is particularly true for the United Nations, where the audience is composed of political elites who travel internationally and are likely to be highly educated – mostly in Western nations – and therefore at least have a horizon by which understanding of each other is possible. For those individuals, global governance as a productive process is both possible and desirable. However, this also explains why those who are deeply nationalistic are unlikely to be moved, or why cosmopolitan messages are unlikely to resonate with those who have not experienced the world beyond their local communities. This speaks precisely to the cosmopolitan condition; from the subsistence farmer in China to a pirate in Somalia, global forces are exacting changes to their communities, whether or not they recognize the causal link between globalization and local change. The universality of cosmopolitanism is inherently unstable and allows for rhetorics that both interpret and interpellate foreign audiences. Whose universality, and what type of work that cosmopolitan discourse seeks to do, can be understood by examining archival documents that reveal the speech writing process and help to paint a portrait of how presidential administrations imagine the universal audience.

Treatment of the United Nations as a rhetorical institution allows for an assessment of cosmopolitan discourse within a particularized institutional context and historical moment. By examining how the institution itself is a scene for individual actors to engage in public deliberation and address might establish the conditions under which rhetoric (proclamations, the formation of treaties, censure, shaming and the constitution of international law) is action. How does rhetoric constitute perception of one’s own nation or other sovereigns? How does this rhetoric constrain international action? When does it fail and under what conditions? As an
institution dedicated to global dialogue and problem solving, one is free to ask, who gets to participate, which voices are reflected and how might this implicate the president’s message? Attention to these questions through rhetorical criticism of presidential public address should also reveal how UN is constituted as a location for the resolution of global issues, thereby bolstering constructivist explanations for international relations. Reading presidential speeches opens space for different types of emerging cosmopolitanisms precisely because the grounds for becoming consubstantial (diplomatic cosmopolitanism) constitutes a globally composite audience capable of confronting the challenges of the cosmopolitan condition.

3 John F. Kennedy and the Power of the Negative: International Leadership and the Soviet Scapegoat

The lessons for the international system of sovereign states in 1945 were fairly clear to both the studied observer and diplomatic participant. International trade with its long provenance had solidified deep connections between economies and governments. World War I demonstrated the instability inherent to an international politics that sought to guarantee through military commitments these connections, and it demonstrated that an international institution capable of maintaining the peace would necessarily require the ability to trump the sovereignty of the nation state – a condition most if not all were unwilling to relinquish. World War II demonstrated that the increasing sophistication of human weapons threatened the survival of the entire biosphere. Thus, the foundation of the United Nations not only coincided with a new era of globalization where whole nations and economies were being rebuilt to be integrated and cooperative and the risk to one threatened the survival of all. The premise of this project has been
that response to globalization will take many forms (protest, terrorism, celebration, etc.) but that states are likely to respond to the challenges of globalization through the performance of cosmopolitan rhetorics and the enactment of cosmopolitan politics (constructing international law, justice and institutions capable of fulfilling these goals). The project has also argued that moments of high drama on the international scene are best able to illuminate the problematic of globalization and the performance of cosmopolitan rhetorics. 1961 constitutes one such moment.

President Kennedy, shortly after taking office, faced a complex international environment that was increasingly influenced by the bipolarity by then established as the marker of the Cold War. April 1961 was an embarrassing month for the United States. The complete failure of the attempted invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs weakened Kennedy’s confidence in his military and intelligence advisors. April of 1961 also proved to be an embarrassment from a technological perspective as Yuri Gagarin became the first human to enter space. Peaceful developments in space technology raised military concerns as well, and the United States questioned its ability to keep up with Soviet intercontinental missile technology while pondering implications for international peace and NATO. Kennedy responded to this situation by encouraging the domestic ‘military-industrial complex’ to follow suit and even surpass the Soviet Union when he declared, “I believe that this nation should commit itself to achieving the

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1 The primary political goal of the administration was to demonstrate that the U.S. was winning the Cold War. Foreign policy related to Cuba was centered on a zero sum proposition where any Soviet gains were tantamount to U.S. losses. Cuba in particular presented problems to the Monroe Doctrine, and Kennedy felt betrayed by Castro from his earlier days as a Senator (Paterson, 1989). Kennedy’s political strategy behind the scenes demonstrates an acute awareness of the various false choices that the CIA had presented him, but also demonstrates his eagerness for invasion (Pious, 2008).
goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to the earth.”\(^2\)

Despite these multilateral and technological setbacks, the bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union continued to occupy the minds of top administration officials. In June, Kennedy (troubled by those foreign policy setbacks) met with Nikita Khrushchev in Vienna for a bilateral conference on a variety of foreign policy issues of global consequence: their talks covered proliferation, possible frameworks for disarmament, cessation of nuclear testing and the question of a divided Berlin, among others. Accounts of this meeting conclude that Kennedy was quite shaken by the experience (Schlesinger, 1993, p. 374-5). He had hoped that negotiation would result in productive movement on these issues. Not only had Khrushchev taken to lecturing the president as if he was a schoolboy during meetings between the two principles, he referred to Kennedy as a man in short pants outright (Taubman, 2003, p. 485). Despite the difficult nature of the negotiations at Vienna, Khrushchev regarded Kennedy as a worthy adversary who was likely to quickly learn from mistakes while yielding little in terms of international commitments that would weaken the United States or its allies.\(^3\)

The Potsdam Conference had divided Germany into four sectors (American, British, French and Soviet) while also splitting the capital city of Berlin between the four powers. As the superpower status of the Soviet Union and the United States solidified, tension between them

\(^2\) The fact that the President Kennedy (1961a) delivered an address to both houses of Congress tantamount to a State of the Union Speech at the midpoint of the year speaks to the pressure and stress of the position of the United States within the international system.

\(^3\) A common account of the Vienna meeting positions Kennedy as a weak and unconfident leader who was lectured and verbally beaten up by Khrushchev, which then serves as evidence for an account that suggests it was this weakness that invited Khrushchev to build the wall in Berlin and to place missiles in Cuba. A comprehensive examination of first-hand Soviet and U.S. accounts of the Vienna meeting conclude that Khrushchev developed the impression that Kennedy’s resolve should not be doubted (Lebow & Stein, 1995).
escalated, and as relations deteriorated between the two, the city of Berlin became a site of military contestation. In August, barely two months after the meeting in Vienna, Khrushchev granted permission to Walter Ulbricht, General Secretary of the German Democratic Republic, to divide East Berlin from West (Smyser, 1999, p. 145-162, and Smyser, 2009, p. 91-100).

Kennedy, surprised by the East German move to erect a wall, faced a difficult decision; a military response could potentially trigger superpower war, resulting in mutually assured destruction, and a diplomatic response could be seen as weak, fracturing West German support for U.S. foreign policy while potentially encouraging Soviet adventurism. The response was ultimately a muted one. Kennedy officials denounced the building of the wall but took no other action. The Soviet Union engaged in aggressive attempts to increase its own power on the international scene through strategic alignments with Cuba and East Germany, which in turn put tremendous pressure on the U.S. to demonstrate its own strength and resolve. A response by President Kennedy that could begin to push back against a surging Soviet power was necessary.

As the administration prepared an address for the 16th General Assembly, tragedy struck. A mere seven days before the Assembly was to convene, Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld perished in a plane crash while flying to the Congo to oversee a peacekeeping operation. The Soviet Union was able to use this tragedy to open an additional line of pressure against the Kennedy administration by renewing their call for an amendment to the Charter of the United Nations that would alter the leadership structure of the Secretary-General. The Soviet ambassador sought more control by proposing a triumvirate of leadership composed of three

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4 The inability of intelligence services to deliver timely information to the President is not a new phenomenon. Surprise at the East German action could have been prevented “had the significant advance intelligence which was available to the intelligence community been given sensitive, continuing, and discriminating assessment for timely consideration by the President, the members of the National Security Council, and other top policy officials” (Bundy, 1962, p. 3).
Secretary Generals: one representing the U.S., one the Soviet Union, with a third independent Secretary General. This presented the administration with a crisis. A lack of precedent and vague procedural charter language dictating how to move forward exacerbated the problem.

This historic moment, rendered problematic by the global connections and power politics of the Soviet Union, demanded a political and diplomatic response. It called for public address from President Kennedy. Given the time constraints, waiting for the State of the Union in January was tantamount to doing nothing, and would allow Soviet leverage and pressure to continue through the fall and into the winter. Waiting would surely entail psychological costs for the western alliance. A unique speech, broadcast to the entire nation and world, would also not suffice. Given the absence of direct crisis – and choosing not to elevate the Berlin situation to crisis level – an address of this nature would likely sow confusion among a domestic population and stir political dissent (the president refused to take a harder line against Khrushchev). Such an address necessarily written for a domestic audience would also likely contain ambiguities and simply would not be a direct enough challenge to the actions of the Soviet Union on a global stage. Rather, Kennedy needed to address a global audience, where the Soviet Union maintained a presence, so that the vision and goals of the administration could be articulated clearly – so as to not elevate the problem to a crisis level – all the while demonstrating a strengthening of focus and resolve on the part of Kennedy.

The United Nations General Assembly was selected as the location for Kennedy’s address and provided a unique forum for a president to speak. It sits in the heart of Manhattan on the East River in the largest and most well-known of American cities. It was constructed amongst the ashes of World War II with great leadership from the United States. And presidents have found it a useful location to address the community of nation states. That the forum’s
cosmopolitan rhetorical tendencies lends itself to tropes that can be wielded to serve American interests (peace, freedom, prosperity and human rights) is a benefit. It was also a location wherein the President could use all of the diplomatic power at his disposal to follow-up on agenda items with the global community throughout the fall of 1961.

I now turn to analysis of President Kennedy’s 1961 address to the 16th General Assembly as a case study in diplomatic cosmopolitanism. I argue that President Kennedy’s address to the General Assembly works on three levels: first, it deploys openness and towards others as a means to relocate international decision-making to the forum of the General Assembly (and away from bilateral summits) where all nations can deliberate and vote; second, it deploys Burkean techniques of scapegoating and mortification to invert perceptions about which of the two super powers is more peaceful and necessarily more mindful of fellow nations/peoples; and third, the speech constructs Kennedy as the cosmopolitan most capable of preserving the interests of all nations and peoples, thereby positioning him for identification with any nation that views itself as belonging to the coalition of free and peaceful nations.

3.1 The Cosmopolitan Condition: Preparing Themes and Remarks

The tension between global and local politics often serves as a constraint on policy outcomes across all levels and this general rule holds true for the United Nations as well. But whereas nations might be more apt to deploy a logic of realism when determining whether to sign onto a specific treaty or vote for a particular resolution, multilateral cohesion around a set of operating principles for the organization is possible. The challenge for President Kennedy in 1961 was to seek and receive ascent around his vision for global politics and the United Nations itself. As a result, the General Assembly was a natural forum for delivering an address in which Kennedy could lay out his vision for peaceful global politics. But the constraints of this
institution are vast and varied given the number of states that participate. Additionally, the Soviet Union in the prior assembly had laid out a series of proposals that would again come to dominate the attention of the General Assembly in 1961.

As documented in the previous chapter, the negotiations at Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta, while persuading Stalin to approve of the United Nations, did not assuage him of the notion that the United Nations was simply an international organization structured to allow the United States and its allies to exploit their post-war power advantage. Recent historical examinations of archival documents demonstrate that the tactics of the Eisenhower administration in particular created a deep suspicion of the United Nations by Stalin shared by a number of other Soviet political elites. One of these elites was Nikita Khrushchev, who would travel to the United Nations to speak directly to the General Assembly.

On Friday, September 23, 1960, Khrushchev delivered a scathing speech now (in)famous for its attacks on the United States, other Western colonial powers and on the Secretary-General. He attacked the global array of U.S. military installations as a “deep source of dangerous infection” that “destroy normal political and economic life” and threaten local populations with extermination. He then offered several proposals related to disarmament – an explicit goal of the United Nations Charter. Extermination again makes an appearance later in the speech as the stated goal of the colonialists, and Khrushchev accuses the United States of acting in concert with those nations. Khrushchev was a strong supporter of recognizing former colonies, which would increase dramatically the number of voting members in the General Assembly, and so he put forth a bold proposal on decolonization. And finally, he attacks Secretary-General

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5 The ire of Stalin according to the archival documents results from what was considered to be the heavy propaganda efforts of the Eisenhower administration. The Soviet council was particularly disturbed by the president’s ‘Atoms for Peace Address’ and the perceived unwillingness of the United States to follow through on its own policy prescriptions (Gaiduk, 2012).
Hammarskjöld as a colonialist for his actions with the Congo.\textsuperscript{6} It is these actions, according to Khrushchev, that demand an amendment to the UN charter which divides representation at the level of Secretary-General among “the Western powers, socialist states and neutralist countries” – a policy that would come to be known as *troika*. The proposals here were doggedly pursued by the Soviet delegation through the 15\textsuperscript{th} General Assembly and many of the issues were successfully tabled, yet not defeated, putting tremendous pressure on the incoming Kennedy administration. Khrushchev’s speeches always garnered attention from the media (foreign and domestic), yet this speech was seen as much more significant precisely because it had occurred at the General Assembly. A response from Kennedy would have to be made at the 16\textsuperscript{th} General Assembly.

In the spring of 1961, the prospects for achieving U.S. interests at the 16\textsuperscript{th} General Assembly seemed grim. Given the transition between administrations, the United States had not made any serious proposals at the 15\textsuperscript{th} General Assembly. President Eisenhower did not want to force the hand of Kennedy on any particular issue, and because of the timing of presidential elections, the 15\textsuperscript{th} General Assembly had closed by the time Kennedy assumed office. Adlai Stevenson, as Kennedy’s ambassador to the United Nations, noted in June of 1961 that the United States would largely be in a defensive position on important matters that had already been confirmed on the agenda including: elections, disarmament, country specific issues (coup in Korea, apartheid in South Africa, the civil war in Congo and the representation of Mauritania,

\textsuperscript{6}The historical record demonstrates that Dag Hammarskjöld had an expansive vision for the United Nations. It was his contention that the Cold War environment demanded that the United Nations intervene in regional conflict to provide for collective security (Kelen, 1969). However, Khrushchev found this position to be against the spirit of self-determination, particularly where nations were struggling to unseat long standing power structures as a means towards developing their own socialist governments. To allow the United Nations to intervene to prevent a transition to socialism infuriated Khrushchev (Gaiduk, 2012: 256-260).
Stevenson suggested that the United States regain ground by adding terms to the agenda to shift the debate. “This GA, like last year’s most likely be negative [sic] in nature from US point of view,” Stevenson notes while pushing further that he, his UN Mission colleagues and the UK delegation, “believe we must do something to overcome this negative appearance of GA (which may continue into future also), and must look for initiatives” (Telegram from the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, June 1, 1961). If the 16th General Assembly of the United Nations perpetuated the status quo, it would likely contribute to a further degradation of the U.S. global position and the perception of President Kennedy as a global leader. The administration had a choice; they could have the president not speak, which would invite criticism, or they could use the occasion to deliver an address that would impact international relations. The ambassador then offered a two prong solution: first, the United States should offer a series of proposals on issues that are of paramount interest to the international community and second, that the President could offset Soviet gains by clearly delineating the differing visions of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. for the international community. This vision could then serve as an argumentative warrant by the U.S. Mission in a variety of bilateral and multilateral contexts of debate across the 16th session.

The groundwork for a new vision for the United Nations began months earlier, when the administration committed to deliver an address. The significance of the United Nations General Assembly to U.S. foreign policy and the need for Kennedy to speak was plainly made by

7 The justification for moving ahead with the address at the UNGA was detailed by Dean Rusk in a memo for the president (September 15, 1961). It argued that since the president’s plans were widely reported in the media, “a contrary decision now might be misinterpreted as a lack of confidence in the UN, a lack of confidence in ourselves at the UN, or in the possibility of peaceful resolution of present problems.”
Assistant Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland in a memo to the president: “…nearly every major issue of American foreign policy will be before the sixteenth General Assembly of the United Nations. This would be largely true even if we did not want it that way. It is all the more true because we have deliberately decided on some very important matters, that the United Nations must be the central forum in which to pursue our objectives” (Cleveland, 1961). Indeed, in several prominent speeches, the Kennedy administration laid the groundwork for the United Nations as a locus for multilateral deliberation. In his inaugural address, Kennedy declared: “To that world assembly of sovereign states, the United Nations, our last best hope in an age where the instruments of war have far outpaced the instruments of peace, we renew our pledge of support--to prevent it from becoming merely a forum for invective--to strengthen its shield of the new and the weak--and to enlarge the area in which its writ may run.” Part of the administration’s foreign policy relied precisely on the ability of the United Nations to expand its authority in international affairs. Economic development and peacekeeping operations to prevent the spread of conflict were of particular interest. One problem from Kennedy’s position was that the United Nations General Assembly had become a propaganda battleground. To reclaim a positive role for the institution, he exclaimed in his State of the Union (1961) that, “We must increase our support of the United Nations as an instrument to end the Cold War instead of an arena in which to fight it.” And a prominent address to the Canadian Parliament noted that the United States was “working throughout the United Nations, and through regional and other associations, to lessen the risks, the tensions and the means and opportunity for aggression that have been mounting so rapidly throughout the world.” The public address of President Kennedy outlines U.S. foreign policy at the United Nations: the United States would seek to bolster the
role and capabilities of the United Nations so that fulfillment of the mandates in the Charter could become possible.

Internally, the logic of routing most issues of foreign policy through the United Nations was both idealistic and pragmatic. The administration believed that the values that guided U.S. foreign policy – freedom, self-determination and human rights – could be leveraged in the General Assembly to support particular policy outcomes that were favorable to the U.S. Drafting the president’s speech began with George McGhee (1961), Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, circulating a memo to Ted Sorenson, Special Counsel to the President and chief speechwriter, on September 16, 1961. That document established the themes for the speech and reflected the strategic thinking the State Department and other advisors had established in the previous three months. The document provided direction in several areas. It argued: “The speech should have a central theme clearly stated at the outset … along the following lines….The nations of the world face two major tasks: a) to create a viable world order which can best be described as a “free world community of nations” and b) to prevent this emerging order from being overthrown by force or the threat of force.” To align outcomes in the General Assembly with U.S. foreign policy goals, then, would require the president to rhetorically construct a ‘world community of nations’ that shared the values of the United States. But this rhetorical move would require the operation of the negative in Burkean terms. Thematically, and based on the second sub point, the speech would contain an inherent tension premised on inclusion and exclusion; the address must seek to build consensus for a global ‘community of free nations’ while excluding the Soviet Union from this constructed community precisely because they were the threat, the enemy of free nations. Strategists hoped that a presidential address would be capable of reframing the agenda of the General Assembly in a manner favorable to the U.S.
policy interests through public arguments premised on shared values that would also serve to construct the Soviet Union as the antithesis of those values.

Reflecting on the last few years of the Eisenhower administration and the first few months of their own term, officials within the administration realized their own culpability in the problem of achieving bilateral or multilateral diplomatic successes. The diplomatic relationship with the Soviet Union was exceptionally complicated as it demanded attention across all levels of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy due to its significance and lack of stability. A key observation, then, was that the instability of the relationship was actually working to advance the interests of the Soviet Union. Again, the memo from McGhee argued, “We must not … be diverted by these recurring crises from our long-term constructive and creative purposes.” Kennedy strategists read Khrushchev’s policy as seeking crisis on a re-occurring basis. Such maneuvers reinforced Soviet interests by unbalancing U.S. deliberation and decision-making while stymieing the international community from collective action. In order to achieve its symbolic and political objectives, the speech would need to reorient the international agenda towards a long-term plan based on U.S. proposals rather than lurching from crisis to crisis. The solution to crisis management was to deliver a speech that could reframe not just the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union but between all sovereign states and the Soviet Union.

The problem for the administration was to anticipate what type of rhetorical appeals would be most likely to create assent for U.S. positions – or lead to a compromise favorable to the U.S. position. While the United States shared an intellectual history with all of Western Europe and a cultural history with the United Kingdom, these histories, cultures, religious and philosophical traditions were not shared with Latin American nations or those countries in Africa.
and Asia emerging from the colonialist system. Strategists, then, had to imagine appeals that which would transcend the local conditions that constituted a collection of individuals as ‘a people,’ or a nation-state; strategists had to imagine appeals for a ‘universal audience’.

Cosmopolitan themes offered such a possibility because at the very least they create thin lines of connection. And while thin lines of connection may not be enough to establish full-fledged relations, or to resolve all difference, those connections might be enough to create assent for an expanding vision of how the international system should be ordered and could be enough to encourage votes on some key issues that would serve to contain the Soviet Union.

### 3.2 Global Decision Making: Cosmopolitanism and the Diffusion of Power at the United Nations

The goal of the administration was to not only increase the responsibilities and capabilities of the United Nations, but also to constitute a new order that would attempt to use the United Nations as a mediator of the interaction between states. This strategy imposed several constraints. First, the Soviet Union and members of their voting bloc were perceived to be working through all potential avenues to limit the effectiveness of the United Nations in all of its capacities. Harlan Cleveland in a memo to Secretary of State Rusk argued that those nations sought a UN “limited to debate.” Further, the “size and power are limited,” Cleveland claimed, “by those who think international operations are dangerous to their national interests.”

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8 This memo was included in the briefing book that President Kennedy took with him to Hyannisport to more fully prepare for this address and it is therefore likely that he read the memo (United States Strategy at the Sixteenth General Assembly: Tab A, 1961).

9 Within the context of 1961, Cleveland is referring to Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld’s efforts to expand the ability of the United Nations to provide for the collective security of nations through the intervention of peacekeeping operations, particularly in the Congo. These operations were deemed to be a violation of sovereignty, and both the Soviet Union and France refused to pay their dues or provide technical support (Bederman, 2002; 60).
Certainly, questions of sovereignty were at play, but so too were limitations imposed by a nation’s decision to provide fiscal, military and technical support, which would necessarily trade off with the ability to use those resources at home or elsewhere abroad. A second constraint, imposed by the Western Alliance, required the president to stand firm against the aggression of Khrushchev while avoiding the perception of provocation which could upset the careful balance that the Soviet Union and the United States were maintaining, particularly in Berlin. A third constraint was the membership itself. The Cleveland memo also noted that those nations which would be considered ‘neutral’ or ‘non-aligned’ – the nations from whom the administration was seeking assent – were limited by their power and experience. These nations could often only cast a vote, with ambassadors who wielded little to no power over policy in their home nations, and as such their “delegations are often manned by men of limited expertise and correspondingly limited sense of responsibility for use of that vote.” The challenge, then, was manifold. The speech needed to be able to instill a specific set of values that could develop a responsibility among inexperienced members while avoiding the paternalism of the faltering colonialist bonds these states were seeking to free themselves from. The expansion of a role for the United Nations in multilateral diplomacy would have to be carefully justified through proposals that were specific to the initial mission of the Charter.

Political opportunities and constraints are an ever present concern for rhetoricians. But where we might expect political and institutional constraints to narrow the field for rhetorical

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10 The first draft of the address for the UNGA, authored by Ambassador Stevenson (September 12, 1961), took a hard line against the Soviet Union. It accuses the Soviet Union of engaging in a series of provocation from the resumption of nuclear testing, boasting of the intention to build a 100 megaton bomb, and threatening to turn orange groves into a “radioactive wasteland.” These accusations were indeed supported by facts, yet stylistically such an onslaught would only encourage a vigorous and retaliatory response from the Soviet Union. These specific accusations are not included in the final speech: the approach was likely abandoned because it ran contrary to the primary goals of shifting UNGA debate towards the proposals of the U.S. and for Kennedy to appear as a reasonable leader.
decisions, in this context, we find the inverse to be true. The fact that all nations have their own interests is something that is shared between them. That all nations value sovereignty and increasingly were coming to support self-determination on a global level was yet another point of consensus. The danger from these positions is not chaos, but rather the chaos that could ensue should nations not have an outlet by which their interests could be voiced, concerns addressed, and their problems resolved without the use of force. Through this prism, then, the United Nations becomes an essential institution to the functioning of both global and local cultures. This political diversity – and anticipating outcomes that could emerge should the world move away from international political institutions – provides a strong warrant for why nations should work together to ensure that international forums like the United Nations are successful. Of course, we return to the initial problem: that international institutions (especially in 1961), struggled to act precisely because a consensus about what the role of these institutions in international politics should be. The demands of the situation required Kennedy to provide justifications for a particular set of characteristics, unique to the United Nations, that justified expansion in each case related to the specific U.S. proposal.

Establishing a respect for the shared similarity of discordance premised on difference presents the administration with a value that can be leveraged when constituting a new political order. McGhee, in the previously cited memo, noted that the vision of the administration to “build a free world community” must be built on the understanding that each nation should make political calculations, “according to its own desires, while at the same time shielding its members against outside threats and pressures.” Adherence to two seemingly disparate presumptions about the nation-state produces a specific tension related to sovereignty. On the one hand, every state has the right to self-determination and on the other, a degree of freedom must be relinquished in
order to promote international stability, especially when the result of individual decision-making could result in the exchange of nuclear weapons. Yet, it is precisely this tension that opens up productive space for cosmopolitan rhetorical appeals and deliberation.

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (2006) posit that argumentation produces adherence when a particular or set of notions inform epistemology. The deployment of evidence in an argument is a double move, justifying a particular interpretation of events, ideas or the like, as well as providing qualifications (taken here to mean both its quality and characteristics) for that evidence. This double move of interpretation and qualification is referred to as an argumentative notion. Empirically, these notions contribute to the creation of an epistemological system: “notions appear also as data on which one thinks one can depend on and on which one depends indeed effectively.” In other words, notions are the conclusions not just about what counts as evidence but also how and when that evidence can be used within a particular logic system. The keen observation of interest here is that notions are inherently ambiguous – the context in which the notions of freedom are deployed will influence the range of interpretations and qualifications that can be used to support a particular argument. It is this ambiguity inherent to argumentative notion that produces flexibility for the rhetor. Within the international political context of 1961, we can see precisely such notions in operation when the President discusses peace. As I argue in the first chapter, peace operates as an ultimate term in the United Nations, but peace as an argumentative notion preserves an ambiguity that allows the president flexibility to justify policies that on face may appear to be at odds. Peace is qualified by its relationship to the use of force. When Kennedy speaks about the problem of Berlin, he deploys notions of strength to preserve peace. He suggests that to draw down armaments protecting West Berlin would certainly result in adventurism where the implied actor would be the German Democratic
Republic or the Soviet Union. Thus, peace (dependent upon conflict that produces a stalemate) is preserved by demonstrations of military strength that result in conventional (as opposed to nuclear) deterrence. However, the opposite is true when dealing with disarmament. Here, peace is jeopardized by the continued testing and development of both weapons and delivery systems. Peace, the necessary precursor to the survival of humanity, could be undone by either accident or miscalculation when demonstrations of strength produce technical failures or a misinterpretation of military intent (exercise from actual invasion or first strike). Diplomatic cosmopolitanism as a logic system then provides a series of notions each with their own ambiguities which allow them to be applied in specific contexts.

This understanding of adherence through argumentative notion helps us to further understand how cosmopolitan appeals operate within presidential public address. Unsurprisingly, the United States does not have a rhetorical monopoly on what I previously discovered were ultimate terms including: freedom, peace, justice and responsibility. Many speakers deploy these terms in the General Assembly. As such, the meaning of these terms – as a result of their inherent ambiguity – depends on the logic structure in which they are used. And as previously noted, the Kennedy administration needed to rhetorically constitute a new vision for the organization precisely because the Soviet Union had come to dominate the previous General Assembly with its own proposals and thus notions about what the United Nations was and could be. These notions about the UN had been appropriated within the logic system of communism by the Soviet Union and its allies. Fortunately for the Kennedy administration, ambiguity allows for rhetors to “change the meaning of a notion,” by placing it within a different context which allows the speaker to “integrate it [the changed notion] in new lines of argument” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2006, p. 134-5). And this is precisely the move that the President makes. The
exigence of the Charter in San Francisco was to prevent the reformation of alliances and rearmament that would cause nations to be drawn into another devastating world war. Kennedy argues that this is no longer the exigency that should drive the United Nations role in international politics: bipolarity and deterrence premised on mutually assured destruction should prevent conventional war. But this fragile peace is qualified by the risk of nuclear holocaust as a result of accident or miscalculation. The new exigence is, “a nuclear disaster, spread by wind and water and fear, could well engulf the great and the small, the rich and the poor, the uncommitted and uncommitted alike.” Kennedy (1961b) concludes this passage with the observation that, “Mankind must put an end to war – or war will put an end to mankind.” To stave off nuclear holocaust, then, requires “new strength and new roles for the United Nations,” which Kennedy proposes would operate within a robust international framework of disarmament which would include new treaties (both for nuclear testing of warheads and delivery vehicles as well as peaceful uses of outer space) coupled with the capabilities to observe and verify these efforts at the national level. These are the ‘positive’ proposals of the U.S. designed to win the ‘peace race,’ but they also provide the notional qualifications by which expansion of the United Nations could be grounded. Kennedy seeks to amplify these notions by claiming that, “the events and decisions of the next ten months may well decide the fate of man for the next ten thousand years,” adding, “There will be no avoiding those events…no appeal from these decisions.” The choice, then, is presented as a metaphor: “the problem is the life of this organization,” which will “either grow to meet the challenges of our age, or it will be gone with the wind without influence, without force and without respect.” Kennedy concludes this passage by asserting, “were we to let it die…we would condemn our future.” By shifting the notional ground of context via the assertion of a new exigence for the international community, and by ascribing all nations as both equally effected
by and responsible for a possible catastrophic outcome, Kennedy is both able to offer positive justifications for the United Nations and the negative consequences for not doing so.

In 1961, Kennedy argues that the General Assembly must proactively work to reduce the threat of global nuclear holocaust, and he uses cosmopolitan notions of the Charter and global responsibility to construct an argumentative notion that justifies expansion of the power and responsibility of the United Nations as a force in international politics. The use of notions, grounded in cosmopolitanism, assisted in making a case that reinforced U.S. policy prerogatives, as demonstrated by the archival record. Yet Kennedy was not about to let a good crisis go to waste. This was also an opportunity for him to further elaborate upon the state of bipolarity and the nature of the Soviet Union to carve out political space in the United Nations where a “community of free nations” could pursue their strategic interests. I now move from the more ambiguous sections of the speech to analyze cosmopolitan rhetorical forms that gird specific attacks against the Soviet Union.

3.3 Argument Forms: Cosmopolitan Linkages in Association, Scapegoating and Mortification

The tragic and somewhat suspicious death of the Secretary-General in the Congo created an institutional crisis within the United Nations.\(^{11}\) In an already tense international environment, the death of the Secretary General created political consternation because there was no precedent for that appointment of a new Secretary-General in the middle of an existing administration

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\(^{11}\) Physical evidence at the scene of the crash suggests it was visited by other unknown individuals before government representatives arrived. Dag Hammarskjöld’s body was removed from the wreckage and propped up against a tree with an Ace of Spades playing card tucked into the breast pocket of his shirt. The wreckage itself had burned badly, but visual evidence of bullet holes in the plane persisted. It strangely it took more than six hours for government forces to arrive despite being located only four miles away at the arrival airport (The Hammarskjöld Commission, September 6, 2013).
(“Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs” (Cleveland), 1961). It created controversy because the need to debate a successor opened the doors for the Soviet Union to propose anew its policy to amend the Charter such that the office of the Secretary-General would no longer be maintained by a single individual but would rather be maintained by the troika policy.

Beginning with Truman at the San Francisco conference, presidents have frequently associated the Charter with peace, the prevention of war, the ability to provide international security, the promotion of human rights and the aspirations of humankind generally. Kennedy deploys parallel associations in his speech between the Charter of the United Nations and a series of other concepts which within cosmopolitan logics would be treated as universal goals. He states that the fundamental context that brought the UN into existence is the fundamental question that faces his audience. The audience must continually renew its pledges to use the UN as an instrument of peace, to promote the progress of all, and to be a forum where reason can triumph over (nuclear) ‘terror.’ Thus, when Kennedy asks whether, “the pledges of our Charter are to be fulfilled or defied,” he is implicitly defining the Charter as conceived in 1945 and as it exists in 1961 as the linchpin between peace and freedom, as opposed to terror and anarchy. And if the Charter is to remain unadulterated, we can also read this passage as providing context for his upcoming argument about the need for the international community to reject the Soviet troika policy. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca observe that association between one concept and another – or series – of concepts is a powerful argumentative move. Associations and particularly associative pairs can be powerful because they can be applied across different ‘planes,’ or in this instance, across different issues with differing logics. War and peace themselves function as what Kenneth Burke would refer to as a dialectical pair; each word is a
linguistic antonym, and the mind cannot comprehend the positive without its negative opposite and vice versa. Peace, then, is the absence of war, and is the preferable option because war requires human carnage. The winners and losers of conventional war are determined by sacrifice, resources, strategy, technology and a host of other specific factors. But war is an unthinkable option in the atomic age because the result is not just carnage but nuclear holocaust with the potential to wipe out all life on earth. ‘Conventional’ as a modifier to war – which has been and will continue to be justified under particular circumstances – is a modifier that cannot be applied to the context of bipolar superpower relations. The rhetorical move is to pair two concepts in a way that leaves only one desirable and rational option. Peace must be pursued at all costs. Of course, this observation is not remarkable and would be entirely expected from a president in this moment at the forum of the General Assembly. But this dialectical pair does more, as it can be transposed to an entirely different issue to reframe which logics should be operational. This is precisely what this section of Kennedy’s speech is designed to do.

The transposition in associations is rendered possible by diplomatic cosmopolitan rhetoric. Life and death are universal conditions, and while cultures might disagree on the meaning of death, what it means to have died justly, and the like, genocide is broadly considered an unjust death and a crime against humanity. Kennedy draws on the universal tendencies of the audience to put their own lives – and the possibility of their own death – at the forefront of the decision making. And if the United Nations itself is what makes peace possible, then that organization itself must not just continue to exist or live but to grow. As noted in chapter one, metaphors of birth and often deployed to support particular policies and the mission of the UN itself (Prosser, 1970). Here, the construction of an international institution is metaphorically contextualized as a living thing so that it becomes possible to also imagine the death of that
institution, or a world without the United Nations. These metaphors of life and death of the institution associated with the dialectical pair of peace and war provide cosmopolitan justifications for the rejection of the Soviet policy troika.

3.3.1 Scapegoating

Cosmopolitanism is an identity-based construct, which necessarily means that there will be those who are cosmopolitan and there will be other(s) who are not. Inherent to cosmopolitanism, then, is a dichotomy which can be deployed in public address to advance arguments and interests. I theorize that a diplomatic cosmopolitan rhetoric would in some instances require scapegoating in order for identification to occur that could potentially coalesce the international community into action. Kenneth Burke, in *Language as Symbolic Action*, argues that principles of inclusion and exclusion of an audience are the result of continuity and discontinuity. Applied to the context of international institutions, we can note that the audience is frequently fragmented as a result of national interest when lacking an agenda upon which to unify. Burke is useful here because his concept of scapegoating provides a theoretical framework by which it is possible to establish continuity between oneself and others. That is, a scapegoat is “a device that unifies all those who share the same enemy” (p. 51). If we view nation states as individual actors with interests within a global political system, it follows that two or more nations, by sharing an enemy, could come to support a particular political agenda within an international institution. While it is unlikely that attempts to scapegoat premised on appeals rooted in ethnic, religious or cultural difference would be strong enough to link multiple and diverse nations, cosmopolitanism can provide such linkages. Like all identity based discourse, justifications for inclusion and exclusion abound, yet cosmopolitan linkages are based on appeals that substitute particular differences for that which is shared. Appeals to that which should be
universally shared provide implicit warrants as to what is in the common interest, making it possible to specify those actors and actions which run contrary to the common interests of all humanity. Cosmopolitanism thus becomes an exclusionary discourse when the many can be separated from the few, the righteous from the evil, and the wise from the ignorant.

I argue in previous chapters that the United Nations functions as an epistemic community whereby attempts are made to codify the highest aspirations of all peoples into law that transcends sovereignty. International law itself and the discourse surrounding this law provides the invention grounds from which rhetors can specify a scapegoat worthy of punishment, or at the very least ostracization from the international community. By attacking the troika policy and actions related to the Berlin question, Kennedy deploys the rhetorical construction of the scapegoat to the Soviet Union by positioning them as the enemy of the United Nations.

3.3.2 **Troika**

The troika policy was an attempt to undermine the influence of the United States directly as well as undermine the long terms strategic interest of the U.S. by reducing the overall effectiveness of the United Nations, and required the administration to form a response to proposals to reform the position of Secretary-General. Khrushchev (1960) in proposing three Secretaries-General instead of one had attempted to associate these reforms with the politics of decolonization, arguing that the post-colonies would have more political representation under his proposal than a singular Secretary-General subservient to imperialism. Yet, the Premier’s troika proposal was met with considerable resistance in the 15th General Assembly. In a bilateral meeting, Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, expressed the notion that “most of us were astonished.” The troika policy was perceived as an attack on the United Nations itself, and for Nehru it “would be a catastrophe for the UN to break up since it is one thing [sic] which holds
the world together” (“191. Memorandum of a Conversation, Waldorf Towers, New York,” September 26, 1960). Despite the United Kingdom’s predictable opposition, bilateral consultations reveal that Prime Minister Macmillan read Khrushchev’s speech and troika policy as being completely destructive both to the United Nations and to Soviet interests (“193. Memorandum of a Conversation, Waldorf Towers, New York,” September 27, 1960). The threat was not that the Soviet Union would be able to have troika approved by the General Assembly, but rather that the policy was an opening salvo in a debate over executive reforms that would force a compromise likely to further paralyze the institution. These concerns carried over from one administration to the other and one General Assembly to the next. Given the unique forum of the United Nations and Khrushchev’s speech to the General Assembly, his first, any policy proclamation was read as contributing to an overall vision for how the United Nations should operate. Strategists within the organization recognized that Khrushchev by announcing and defending troika opened up the possibility for Kennedy to compare and contrast the competing superpowers’ visions for the United Nations.

The association between peace and war provided the basis for scapegoating the Soviet Union. One the one hand, the General Assembly could appoint a new Secretary-General, and on the other, they could proceed to amend the Charter of the United Nations and to adopt the Soviet policy of troika. On its face, both of these choices seem to be choices about how the executive of the UN will function. If the policy is framed as a reform of bureaucratic management (the organization of hearings, the publishing of findings, scheduling debate and offering policy

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12 A compromise of reorganizing the Under-Secretary position into a triumvariate which whose recommendations would have to be followed was a prominent concern. President Nkrumah of Ghana had introduced just such a proposal in the 15th General Assembly. Ambassador Moore, from the UK, argued that such a compromise would advance the “basic Soviet aim to transform and thereby gain control of the UN for their own use” (“201. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State,” October 1, 1960).
suggestions among other duties), it is hard to make a reasonable case that no reform is necessary. And if the role of the UN is to expand, it might even be considered advantageous to expand the executive so that increased time demands of the Secretary-General can be offset by burden sharing. We can see that the logics of bureaucratic management differ from the logic of leadership which differs from the logic of warfare or its absence. To associate the Secretary-General with peace, Kennedy first makes it clear that the two choices on offer are choices that advance particular ideological interests. “In this Hall there are not three forces, but two,” Kennedy (1961b) argues; “one is composed of those who are trying to build the kind of world described in Articles I and II of the Charter.” Implicitly, the President represents the United States and thus, if he is speaking about forces to preserve the United Nations, the audience will naturally infer that he is claiming that the United States is the force attempting to construct a world premised on the first two articles of the UN Charter. He goes on to note that, “the other, seeking a far different world, would undermine this organization in the process.” Enthymematically, the audience will infer that Kennedy is arguing that communism seeks to undermine the UN. This might not seem to be a compelling argument, but it has to be considered within the context of presentation in which Kennedy has already made a strong association between the prevention of nuclear war and the existence of the United Nations. Association, then, supplements scapegoating to position the Soviet Union as the enemy.

Kennedy then argues that only a singular Secretary General is capable of securing the peace describe in the Charter of the UN itself. Kennedy argues that what is needed is careful selection of a successor: “the Secretary General--a man endowed with both the wisdom and the power to make meaningful the moral force of the world community,” is needed. As an epideictic exhortation of Hammarskjöld, Kennedy suggests the late Secretary-General was an exemplary
model for he “nurtured and sharpened the United Nations' obligation to act. But he did not invent it. It was there in the Charter. It is still there in the Charter.” The President has already established the relationship between peace and the existence of a healthy United Nations, and he has already proclaimed that the audience can understand the health of the UN through its ability to act in accordance with its original charter. Support of Articles I and II is support for the Charter and hence the United Nations itself. Kennedy then posits reforming the Secretary-General through an amendment to the Charter would not only destabilize the sanctity of that original document but would also undermine the United Nations mission by replacing, “order with anarchy, action with paralysis, confidence with confusion.” And Kennedy rejects the triumvariate proposal despite power advantages that it might afford the United States because, “we far prefer world law, in the age of self-determination, to world war, in the age of mass extermination.” The association between ideological posturing, bureaucratic efficacy and war is now complete; to support the policy of troika is to do violence to the Charter, which undermines the ability of the Secretary-General to enact the mission of the United Nations necessary to providing peace and preventing war.

3.3.3 Berlin

Attention to the closest allies of the United States was also warranted. The situation in Berlin had changed remarkably – the negotiated close left Berlin divided and it would become only more so with the construction of the wall by the German Democratic Republic. Kennedy’s placid response to the construction of the wall had shaken many. West Germans worried that, much like Hitler at Munich, General Secretary Walter Ulbricht was using the crisis to gauge how Kennedy might respond to invasion (Smyser, 2009). The President used the forum of the United
Nations to not only address the situation but also scapegoat the Soviet Union for threatening international peace.

Recall that scapegoating in Burkean terms is the process of creating a perfect victim where the blame for society’s sins can be placed. Kennedy seeks to demonstrate that manufacturing the Berlin crisis is the sin of the Soviet Union thereby positioning them as scapegoat. “If there is a crisis,” he argued, that crisis exists “because an existing peace is under threat, because an existing island of free people is under pressure, because solemn agreements are being treated with indifference.” A global civil society requires an order whereby international political agreements are both forged and upheld. Kennedy’s claim is that the actions of the Soviet Union are threatening the careful balance of the international order which provides for peace. And the President is unrelenting. Khrushchev in his previous speech to the GA had maintained that the United States was to blame for the crisis in Germany because they were preventing a peace agreement from being signed between the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union. Refuting the claim, Kennedy indignantly declared,

it is absurd to allege that we are threatening a war merely to prevent the Soviet Union and East Germany from signing a so-called "treaty" of peace. The Western Allies are not concerned with any paper arrangement the Soviets may wish to make with a regime of their own creation, on territory occupied by their own troops and governed by their own agents. No such action can affect either our rights or our responsibilities.

The Soviet Union, according to Kennedy, is guilty of violating the sovereignty of East German citizens as a result of imposing a Socialist government, and this action undermines international order while spurring a crisis that could result in mutually assured destruction.
The gravity of geopolitics weighted on the administration, who understood that a defense of their own policies was necessary to avoid the counter argument the U.S. was the aggressor. Indeed, Dean Rusk (1961) observed in a memo to President Kennedy that, “the more we talk about stronger defenses, the more important it is for us to emphasize our desire for a kind of world that doesn’t live on a precipice.” And Kennedy walks the line in his speech. He argues that the United States maintains obligations to West Berlin and signals to Western allies and the Soviet Union that; “We cannot yield these interests. We cannot fail these commitments. We cannot surrender the freedom of these people for whom we are responsible.” These interests and commitments have been read within the broader context of the conclusion of World War II, the Potsdam Agreement and the UN Charter itself, but it is also clear that the President intends for the General Assembly to sanction U.S. actions and interests as legitimate. He notes: “The elementary tools for a peaceful settlement are to be found in the charter. Under its law, agreements are to be kept, unless changed by all those who made them. Established rights are to be respected.” Yet, the president rejects commitment to a rigid formula for peace, instead stating, “we believe a peaceful agreement is possible which protects the freedom of West Berlin and allied presence and access, while recognizing the historic and legitimate interests of others in assuring European security.” Again, the Soviet Union as foil to the United States is portrayed as offering proposals that the U.S. and its allies could never accept, not simply because of the concessions that would be required in Germany but also because of the implications for the existing international order.

This section of the speech, then, works to provide a defense of U.S. actions as peaceful while scapegoating the Soviet Union. The need to stand firm (demonstrating the impossibility of compromise on key issues) yet suggest positional flexibility through negotiation reflects the
contradictory demands of international politics during the Cold War. Of interest is the in-
between nature of Kennedy’s diplomatic rhetoric in this moment of the speech. The context of
the crisis and the fact that international norms and agreements are non-self-executing requires
cooperation of all parties involved. The justification for peaceful resolution of conflict based on
cosmopolitan ultimate terms and argumentative notions of maintaining international order then is
fitting. On the other hand, this section of the speech can also simply be read as a defense of U.S.
unilateral policy.

3.4 Mortification

and in ancient cases materially – individuals would engage in self-sacrifice as a ritual of
purification resulting from the individuals need to feel redeemed. Redemption is a motive for
action which can be achieved through self-sacrifice: a process Burke labels mortification. This
process of mortification situated within a hierarchy enacts a particular governing order. And
while the specific differences between religious logics, e.g. the differences between Catholics
and Buddhists, would dictate different processes of mortification, the outcome (self-sacrifice)
was a constant. For Burke, authority and order within the hierarchy of a given religion provide
the grounds for “thou-shall-not” claims; when the individual engages in self-repression, that
person is said to be enacting mortification. Extrapolating this ordering principle from the context
of religion, Burke finds that mortification is at work elsewhere in society. He notes, “certain
requirements for the maintaining of a given social order attain their counterparts in the
requirements of an individual conscience; and when the principle of such requirements is
scrupulously carried to excess, you get ‘mortification’” (Burke, 1970, p. 289, emphasis in
original). Order through hierarchy produces conditions in which, “the categorical motive may
serve as the matrix for a corresponding *personal* motive” (emphasis original). That is, there are conditions under which both the order and the individual will seek the same outcome – redemption in the aftermath of committing a ‘thou-shall-not’ act.

The United Nations has no god and is not god. Yet we know the General Assembly and the Security Council, among other commissions, have authority within the framework of an international order girded by international law. This international order as first constructed through the Charter of the United Nations provides for a series of measures (thou-shall-not) that should be pursued cooperatively between member nations. Disarmament as both a process and goal to be achieved requires the self-sacrifice of the nation state: it must forfeit its weapons of war in the pursuit of legal machinery that will provide for collective security leading to the end of war. Recognizing that the Charter and its goals of total disarmament on both a conventional and nuclear level are idealistic, if not outright utopic, the document and principle of disarmament provide invention grounds for mortification. It specifies a category of state behavior in need of regulation and provides specific courses of action that can be pursued so that the state is able to demonstrate its submission to this international ordering principle. Of particular interest, the section of the address on mortification implicitly inhabits a cosmopolitan position while simultaneously performing mortification.

Two weeks prior to the 16th General Assembly, in early September 1961, nations that considered themselves neither allies of the Soviet Union or the United States met in Belgrade for the Conference of Nonaligned Nations. The conference was an opportunity for these nations – operating outside the traditional boundaries of multilateral diplomacy – to meet and discuss their concerns on the state of international politics. The meeting, planned years in advance, was an important gesture to the Soviet bloc and the larger Western world that these nations planned to
play an increasingly significant role in international politics. Khrushchev had attempted to exert influence through suasory discourse. His 1960 speech had large sections dedicated to disarmament as well as colonialism. Staunch conservatives within the bureaucracy of the Department of State predetermined the outcome of the conference as anti-west (Rakove, 2012). Liberals who were much closer to Kennedy were more optimistic, yet more importantly were convinced that a policy of containment (in its infancy at this moment and not yet labeled as such) would depend on tilting global opinion to favor the United States (Rakove, 2014). It is no surprise, then, that both the Soviet Union and the United States monitored the conference as it happened.

The Kennedy administration was anxious to understand the opinions of individual nonaligned nations. Daily memos between the state department and George Kennan, then ambassador to Yugoslavia and stationed in Belgrade, contained full text statements of the participants as well as interpretive summaries. The U.S. Information Agency was also being briefed so that public responses could be broadcast to specific nations that had voiced opinions deemed problematic by the administration (“Memorandum for: Mr. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.” August, 28, 1961). The conference itself proved frustrating; bulletins from the Central Intelligence Agency noted that, “Most participants in the Belgrade conference have thus far shown little or no tendency to depart from their traditional generally anti-Western, anticolonial attitudes” (“Central Intelligence Bulletin,” September 5, 1961). The conference also struggled to develop a coherent policy-based plan that would help them to achieve their goals. “All fear world war, but few can suggest anything but the panacea of negotiations” (Nonaligned Conference, Central Intelligence Bulletin,” September 5, 1961). As a barometer of the conference, several speeches demonstrated a unity of purpose in two areas: the first the need for rapid disarmament
to reduce the threat of nuclear annihilation and the second the righteous nature of their political quest. President Tito of Yugoslavia argued that the world was on “the brink of the greatest catastrophe in its history,” maintaining that nonaligned countries must assert themselves at the international level because “the responsibility for the future of mankind cannot be borne by only a few states, irrespective of how large and powerful they may be” (“Tito Speech,” September 1, 1961). Premier Salam of Lebanon called on the great powers “to counsel prudence and save mankind from a war of destruction” (“Salam Speech,” September 1, 1961). Such threats should “increase our belief in the righteousness of our aim and should stimulate us to be more persistent in giving expression to the desire of peoples to defend their survival,” he exclaimed. President Bourguiba of Tunisia argued to the delegates that they, “stand between the two blocs as the human conscience which strives for peace, justice and dignity” (“Bourguiba Speech,” September 1, 1961). These opinions found many common expressions in the addresses of other delegates. The conference thus was clear: disarmament was a political if not existential priority, and their opinions were emblematic of world opinion which implored both superpowers to act prudently and responsibly to preserve life.

The ‘righteousness’ that results from being the ‘human conscience’ points to an existing order that is of the utmost importance and which is unnecessarily violated by both the United States and Soviet Union. The document concluding the conference states: “Governments of countries participating in the Conference resolutely reject the view that war, including the ‘cold war,’ is inevitable,” and that they, “affirm their unwavering faith that the international community is able to organize its life without resorting to means which actually belong to a past epoch of human history” (Belgrade Declaration of Non-Aligned Countries, 1961). The document implicitly suggests that the United Nations Charter provides the legal mechanisms by which
states should pursue policies of disarmament and that the United States and Soviet Union had an obligation to use those mechanisms. To reject the very notion of a Cold War is to reject any justification as to why the building and testing of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems is necessary. To return to our discussion of mortification, the nonaligned countries in all of their multiple texts articulated an international political order to be respected while placing equal onus on both superpowers to align their policies with this international political order. The logic of the nonaligned nations, then, dictates that winning the battle for global opinion required each nation to position themselves as attempting disarmament.

The implications for the Kennedy administration were clear. To secure support from nonaligned nations for the series of policies that was to get the administration back on track, Kennedy needed to demonstrate a commitment to the political priorities of the nonaligned countries. We can note that Kennedy began the speech with his most important political priority: defeating proposals of troika at any level within the executive of the United Nations. Disarmament was the second issue to be addressed yet received the most attention, the prominence of which could not have gone unnoticed by nonaligned representatives to the General Assembly. The difficulty in all plans for disarmament is that they require mortification: weapons must be sacrificed in order for the nation to be redeemed. The advantages to attaining nuclear weapons, particularly from a realist perspective, are many, and there are few obvious advantages to the individual nuclear state in forfeiting these weapons.\(^\text{13}\) The non-aligned movement might have had the moral authority they claimed, yet the Belgrade conference grappled with the inability to provide policy prescriptions. The Kennedy administration had a

\(^{13}\) More recently, the debate has shifted to nonproliferation which seeks to lock in the current nuclear status and numbers (vertical proliferation) while also preventing other state and non-state actors from acquiring weapons (horizontal proliferation).
series of policy prescriptions for the international community to pursue but worried the moral authority needed to muster majorities in the General Assembly was lacking. We can note here that in discussing disarmament, the President could have continued to attack and scapegoat the Soviet Union, or he could have pursued justifications for current U.S. nuclear posture. Instead, Kennedy offers a clever quid pro quo: the United States offers to sacrifice its nuclear weapons so long as the international community agrees to strengthen the mechanisms by which the United Nations can monitor processes of disarmament. In other words, the Kennedy compromise is to engage in self-repression so long as the order by which the U.S. seeks redemption is strengthened, ensuring all nations will comport with the stated goals and policies that produce disarmament.

If the authority of an order reveals itself through the willingness of an individual to self-repress, then we would expect something like the ‘moral authority,’ expressed as a demand, of a block of voting members of the United Nations to result in an outside nation forgoing a political choice. For the nonaligned countries, the categorical principle is the avoidance of war. Kennedy echoes this principle when he returns to the audience to originary trauma that brought the United Nations and the concept of global disarmament into being. “War appeals no longer as a rational alternative,” he claims because, “unconditional war can no longer lead to unconditional victory.” In an age of interdependence, all wars have the potential to be global wars. The President then demonstrates that excess of nuclear weapons (both qualitatively and quantitatively) has compounded calculations about the irrationality of war: “The mere existence of modern

14 A section of the September 12 first draft, later abandoned, defends U.S. buildup of weapons by reflecting on the threatening nature of the Soviet Union: “They may feel that…they can bring to bear effectively the threat of nuclear war; and by so doing induce others to back away from their responsibilities.” The draft passage abandoned concludes, “This dangerous doctrine of nuclear blackmail….this talk of nations being hostages will fail” (“Draft Passage for United Nations Speech: Nuclear Blackmail,” September 12, 1961).
weapons—ten million times more powerful than any the world has ever seen, and only minutes away from any target on earth—is a source of horror, and discord and distrust.” The first step in the process of mortification for Kennedy is to recognize the grounds for a righteous demand issued by the non-aligned nations. Survival is necessary to the international order and the weapons that threaten survival then must be sacrificed.

The enactment of mortification on the part of Kennedy does not follow Burke in the strictest sense; Kennedy is not seeking redemption from the non-aligned country for building and maintaining vast stockpiles of weapons. This speech is certainly not an act of apologia. However, Kennedy in referencing the ‘spirit’ of the Belgrade Conference informs the General Assembly that, “we in the United States have labored this year, with new urgency, and with a new, now statutory agency fully endorsed by the Congress, to find an approach to disarmament which would be so far-reaching yet realistic, so mutually balanced and beneficial, that it could be accepted by every nation.” Kennedy affirms his commitment to satisfying the demands of the nonaligned by demonstrating authenticity; as backing for the implicit warrant of authenticity, he uses his efforts in both Congress and the Executive to demonstrate his commitment to disarmament. As a result of domestic support and his personal commitment, the United States is prepared to “challenge the Soviet Union, not to an arms race, but to a peace race,” which can be achieved through Kennedy’s policy program for disarmament. This section of the speech, then, recognizes the importance of the preserving international order, that the threat to peace is nuclear weapons, and that the United States and the Soviet Union in concert with the United Nations should engage in an act of self-repression through disarmament. However, the conditions under which it would be possible – both strategically and politically – for the United States to engage in self-repression requires the international community under the authority of the United Nations
to: 1) develop the capacity for verification of compliance, 2) cede authority for verification to the United Nations, 3) as a condition of verification, require each nation to submit to inspections at every stage of disarmament, 4) require each nation to sign a treaty that bans atmospheric testing with its own inspection controls, 5) require each nation to halt the production of fissionable materials, 6) adopt of a legal framework that prevents the transfer of fissionable materials between nations, 7) prevent of the sharing of whole-sale nuclear weapons between nations, 8) craft a treaty protecting outer space from armament, 9) oversee the gradual destruction of existing nuclear weapons or conversion to peaceful purposes, 10) halt the development of nuclear delivery vehicles. The list is expansive, and given the complexity of verification alone, it is unlikely that these policy prescriptions are realistic. But this section of the speech serves an important rhetorical function. The quid pro quo, self-repression in exchange for strengthening the United Nations as an international institution, allows the non-aligned countries in concert with a super power, to enact mortification.

This cooperative invitation for mortification is itself a cosmopolitan gesture offered to the audience of nonaligned nations which is significant for its potential for the United States to recapture its moral authority ceded as a result of the ‘peace deficit.’ In referencing the Belgrade conference and citing their specific conclusions that nuclear annihilation is not just a superpower problem but a human problem, Kennedy implicitly confirms a stark conclusion of the conference that the non-aligned members have an important role to play. This reference can also be read as a rhetorical gesture of openness which works to demonstrate a respect for the inherent work of each nation in international politics precisely because they are willing to engage that system. This type of openness towards other nations pays tribute to their voice and in so doing, treats them as equals, as only can happen in General Assembly. Each nation is equal because they have
a voice and a vote; Kennedy treats them as equal by recognizing their voice and by encouraging them to participate as equals in the structuring of a new international mechanisms that they have demanded.

Rituals of purification through appeals to disarmament had long been grounds for speakers to assuage audiences of their goodwill towards other nations and the international community writ large. The mass atrocities of modern warfare and the sins of the nations that fought in those wars posit each nation as needing to be redeemed. The crucial move related to mortification is not just the setup – how Damocles’ sword hangs over us all – but also the claims that no nation can escape the necessity of acting. In so doing, Kennedy is using his own mortification to force the General Assembly to also engage in mortification for that which they have power over – the ability to pass a series of resolutions that will create the conditions for disarmament. By acting together, based on mortification, nations are necessarily working to promote their own agenda (an end to the terror of nuclear annihilation) while advancing the agenda of the U.S. (increasing the authority and range of policy action for the United Nations). New members are not in need of redemption, but it is clear that their entrance into the ‘Parliament of Man’ carries with it considerable responsibilities, in part related to disarmament. So while there is nothing they need to repress in themselves, they must recognize their responsibility in helping to create the conditions under which the mortification of the great powers would become possible.

3.5 Identification: Global Leadership in an Age of Interdependency

Decolonization was a major issue for the 15th and 16th General Assemblies. The negotiations of San Francisco preserved the global condition of colonialism by categorizing
nations as either ‘trust’ nations (the colonial powers) or ‘trustee’ nations (the colonies). Further, the charter specified a number of responsibilities of the trust power that would govern its relationship to the colony. For example, Chapter 11, Article 73, subsection b, demands that trust nations work to “develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement.” The Charter (Chapter XIII) also established a ‘trustee’ council made up of only colonial states and then afforded them to issue an annual report to the General Assembly. While significant in that it was the first attempt to provide international legal protections to colonial nations, the Charter overall preserved colonialism and its power structures (Patil, 2008).

The introduction of Resolution 1514 in 1960 by Khrushchev guided the debate. The resolution stated that “the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation.” It goes on to claim that “all peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.” Resolution 1514 (1960) prohibited preparedness as an excuse for delaying independence, encouraged expediency in ending the trust/trustee relationship, and decried the use of force to pacify self-determination movements or tactics to disrupt “national unity” or “territorial integrity” and to afford and respect the sovereignty of all states and peoples. The emergence of the neutral or non-aligned countries was all but guaranteed after the unanimous passage of this

resolution which did not free any colonies but did make it possible to dissolve the trust/trustee dichotomy by denying grounds of colonial powers to reject recognition of former colonies (Chapter XIII). This resolution increased the scope of the United Nation’s authority and afforded the General Assembly the authority and legal recognition to construct international law through the issuance of resolutions.16

The passage of Resolution 1514 did not settle the issue of decolonization, and this issue presented a unique challenge for the United States. On the one hand, the most important allies of the U.S. in Western Europe were colonial powers, and to support the dissolution of the colonial system was to work against the stated interests of those nations. On the other, the completion of decolonization as a process was only a question of timing: sooner or later many new nations would be joining the General Assembly, each with their own vote. If the Kennedy administration wanted to continue to wield power and to lead the General Assembly, they needed a strategy that would allow them to overcome perceptual deficits that might prevent identification. This was particularly true given that Khrushchev had not just proposed the policy but used the forum in 1960 to denounce the United States as complicit with the system of colonialism and therefore did not have the best interest of the colonies in mind. In other words, the ‘community of free states’ would exclude nations emerging from colonialism.

Khrushchev’s speech again provides the Kennedy administration with the opportunity for defense and counter-attack. Responsive to the political reality of decolonization, a memo expanding on the basic themes of the address suggested that the concept of pluralism feature prominently as a component of the ‘free world community’ (“Suggestions for the President’s Speech to the UNGA” September 13, 1961). Pluralism is perfectly compatible within the

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16 McWhinney (2008) argues Resolution 1514 was a test case for the construction of international law and that its success as had a profound effect on international human rights law.
imagined community that is the United States where religion, race, color, and creed are markers for which discrimination is prohibited. As such, associations between pluralism and freedom are possible. Within the context of colonialism, the key question regarding freedom is the question of self-determination: the ability for a people to choose their own government. In this instance, freedom is the freedom of nations to choose their own government. That same memo reasoned that each nation that can “seek out its own destiny in ways which will contribute to the welfare and the dignity of the individual,” are potential candidates for membership in Kennedy’s free community of nations. And in his address, Kennedy declares, “my country favors a world of free and equal states,” and that, “my country intends to be a participant and not merely an observer in the peaceful, expeditious movement of nations from the status of colonies to the partnership of equals.” A free community of nations necessarily entails respect for sovereignty and by joining this community, the President makes clear that they would be treated as equals. And as the Cleveland (1961) memo makes clear, the administration read post-colonial states as being wary of ‘great power – weak power’ diplomatic relations. By providing assurances that each nation would be treated as equal, Kennedy attempts to narrow the distance between himself and this audience.

If the first component of the strategy seeks to overcome cross-cultural difference of the audience by demonstrating the openness and flexibility of the United States, the second strategic component is to demonstrate with whom post-colonial states might have difference. Again, the Soviet Union is positioned as the foil to the United States. Kennedy argues that the Soviet Union cannot be counted on to defend the rights of self-determination. He argues that “governments installed by foreign troops…which suppresses free debate and free elections, and free newspapers … and which builds a wall to keep truth a stranger to its own citizens prisoners,”
demonstrates the lack of freedom and self-determination. If the administration calculated correctly that self-determination is the single most important political objective to be achieved by the nonaligned nations, then positioning himself, the United States and the United Nations as valuing freedom should support efforts for identification.

Kennedy seeks to complete the process of becoming consubstantial by drawing attention to the primary characteristics of the world he seeks to construct: “My country favors a world of free and equal states.” These ultimate terms are structured through analogy to synecdochally position all newly emerging nations as part of the world Kennedy seeks to create. Kennedy establishes that these nations are inherently free and equal because they have shrugged off the shackles of colonialism. He states: “since the close of World War II, a worldwide declaration of independence has transformed nearly 1 billion people and 9 million square miles into 42 free and independent states.” The second move is to analogize those nations to the United States. Kennedy argues, “My Nation was once a colony, and we know what colonialism means; the exploitation and subjugation of the weak by the powerful, of the many by the few, of the governed who have given no consent to be governed, whatever their continent, their class, or their color.” The shared experience of colonialism – like many experiences – influences one’s outlook on the world. For Kennedy, to defeat colonialism is to “apply the principle of free choice and the practice of free plebiscites in every corner of the globe.” If the experience of colonialism in other nations is similar to the United States, and if these experiences result in a specific process of world making, then Kennedy has positioned these nations to become consubstantial with U.S. attempts to refashion the world. The synecdochal move – to take a part as evidence of the whole – is complete: each new nation, imbued with the values of freedom and equality, now
join other free and equal states to compose a whole. That whole is a world of states seeking to advance freedom and peace.

3.6 Conclusion:

To advance claims about a persuasive speech is to advance claims about whether an audience was persuaded. To advance a claim about persuasion requires an understanding of both rhetor intent and an attitudinal or behavioral shift of an audience. I have conducted a reading of the archival documents of the Kennedy administration preparation of the 1961 address to the General Assembly of the United Nations to provide insight into the intent of the President and his staff. The audience, however, remains problematic. It is simultaneously difficult to know the mind of one’s audience and to know what appeals might alter that consciousness. In the forum of the United Nations, with a myriad of individuals who consciousness as individuals is less relevant than how they operate within the institution and as national representatives, the challenge for apprehending persuasion might be considered extraordinary. The important insight that Kenneth Burke (1969) provides in *A Rhetoric of Motives* is that rhetoric as persuasion is problematic because it assumes that the subjectivity of the individual – their consciousness – is free to be persuaded. Maurice Charland (1987) argues that the concept of identification is a useful one for rhetorical scholars because it allows for us to account for the circulation of rhetoric premised on that about which we already agree. For Charland, this move allows for the study of ideology; for this study, identification allows for a reading of diplomatic cosmopolitanism that provides specific appeals justifying an international order that during the Cold War predictably breaks along ideological lines.

A president’s audience might be fragmented and oppositional, but this is precisely the communicative context that makes identification possible. Importantly, Burke recognizes that
individuals are unique and that such uniqueness will never entirely be overcome by persuasion that results from rhetoric. Rather, he notes that the subjectivity of the individual is in fact fragmented – there are issues around which an audience and speaker can coalesce despite the inherent limitations of rhetoric for total or complete persuasion. Consustantiality, or the process of coming together, is central to the concept of identification, but so too is division. For alignment to occur, the audience and the rhetor must first be different in some way, even if they are already in agreement on some issue/s. It is in this way, then, that rhetoric can operate to bring alignment based on mutual interest, or because the audience interpellates itself as belonging to a community. Identification allows for a reading of rhetoric in which the audience and rhetor are simultaneously able to come together while maintaining their uniqueness, which scales up nicely when considering strategy at the level of the nation-state operating within an international political system. Every member nation at least agrees that the world is a better place because the United Nations exists, but there is much debate about all other institutional arrangements. Division is inherent to the institution of the General Assembly, but it is also the case that majorities are formed to pass important resolutions.

Thematically, the administration attempted to create identification between the audience and the president by advancing specific arguments about the policies of the United States versus those of the Soviet Union, and evaluating which was more likely to serve others’ national interest (establishing new notions, through scapegoating and mortification). It is also the case that the administration sought to establish identification through consustantiality; they encouraged other nations to interpellate themselves as belonging to the ‘community of free nations.’ The Hyannisport briefing book contains a memo that argues:
There is a truism regarding the 100-nation United Nations which is as significant today as it was in the 51, 60 and 82-nation Organization: there is no substitute for United States leadership. We can still mobilize required majorities, and we can prevent adoption of unacceptable proposals; but to do so we have to keep everlastingly at it (Cleveland, 1961).

In order for the administration to pursue their agenda successfully, they had to continually seek assent for their proposals by continually forming majorities that would lead to passage or defeat of those resolutions deemed to have implications for U.S. foreign policy. The issues of troika, nuclear disarmament and decolonization presented an opportunity for the President to assert himself as a leader capable of articulating and defending a peaceful vision of world order that would continually require nations to consider their positions on these issues. Given that the choice was between the United States and its Western allies and the Soviet Union and their Eastern allies, neutral nations during a moment of intense insecurity were positioned through the address to identify with President Kennedy and thereby view U.S. interests as principally their own.

4 George H. W. Bush Evokes a New World Order

A disorienting trauma for the Bush administration as it navigated the aftermath of the Cold War was that despite the threat of total annihilation, the Cold War had paradoxically provided a level of stability that provided considerable order to the international system. The ‘red lines’ for both the Soviet Union and the United States were clear. But as major economic disintegration engulfed the Soviet Union, its ability to project power, particularly in satellite states, began to unwind. In a significant move, Premiere Mikhail Gorbachev pushed for two
major governmental restructuring processes, perestroika and glasnost; the first decentralized control over the economy, while the second eliminated the central committee and established a new federal democracy. The steady implementation of these reforms over several years were also leveraged to advance the claim that the Soviet Union was no longer a threat to the United States. President Bush at the Malta summit was confronted by Gorbachev, who sought a “new relationship” based on shared values and a rejection by the Russian people of “those things that divide us” (“Second Expanded Bilateral Session,” 1989). Yet Bush had already established a cautious approach.

On taking office, the Bush administration – in an attempt to chart a distinctive course from Reagan – engaged in a review of all policy towards the Soviet Union. This process was initiated during the transition and lasted for more than three months, ultimately concluding with a new policy that was internally referred to as “status quo plus” (“United States Relations with the Soviet Union,” 1989). The policy imagined a tentative approach to the reforms implemented by Gorbachev. While recognizing these reforms as positive, the overall policy was not to support a particular Soviet leader, but to ensure a consistent foreign policy approach. “Status quo plus” promised flexibility that was well justified by the speed of regime change underway, but it also locked the administration into a certain course – they would respond to events as they arose but

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17 The extent of these reforms, the implications for domestic power relations within the Soviet Union and the long term consequences informs much of the instability in Eastern Europe and the collapse of Soviet Union itself. Gorbachev, Brown, and Coates, (1988) provide an English translation of the original work and Gorbachev and Mlynar (2003) detail the former premiere’s more contemporary thoughts on the subject. Desai (1989) provides a primer on the economic and political forces and makes the case for why reform was inevitable. Of note, the policy of perestroika was also instituted amongst the ‘client states,’ to uneven effect (Shama, 1992). Ultimately, these reforms were not implemented to the fullest extent of Gorbachev’s vision and led to his political downfall (Boettke, 2002). As an aside, perestroika as a metaphor lives on in the discipline of political science (Monroe, 2007). Glasnost, literally translated as ‘openness,’ was an attempt to provide transparency to governmental, economic and cultural institutions. More opaque in its description and execution, much of the scholarship of interest to communication scholars is situated around the role of journalism (McNair, 2006) and media representations produced within film and television (Galichenko, 2013).
not proactively seek to speed-up the changes or in other ways be confrontational to the Soviet Union. The Bush team simply did not trust Gorbachev early on, and when they finally concluded he could be trusted as a partner, it was not entirely apparent that he could maintain control.

In the context of intensive efforts to manage the global transitions underway, the collapse of the bipolar order, and with it the threat of nuclear annihilation, created a series of power vacuums around the world. In these moments where nations were seceding from the Soviet Union, where democracy was taking root in former revolutionary republics, and where backlashes to democracy were occurring, the international order was marked by bottom-up instability. Whereas in the past, the prospect of a nuclear exchange between the super powers that would necessarily destroy human civilization understandably concentrated the diplomatic mind and created incentives for the imposition of regional stability, the threat to the international order during the Bush years was that interdependence might draw nations into the sort of catastrophic multipolarity that the world witnessed in 1913.

In strategizing an American response to these challenges, President Bush was also acutely aware of the limits on U.S. power. Interventions from outside that aim to contain or normalize self-determination movements perform a diplomatic contradiction and also run the risks of local backlashes that might incline to extremism. And yet, to stand idly by while a transition to an apparently new international order was occurring would be to invite challenges to U.S. leadership abroad while also provoking political dissent at home.

In the assessment of the Bush foreign policy rhetoric that follows, I use the concept “diplomatic cosmopolitanism” as a lens through which to grapple with the discursive constraints of the Bush years. Diplomatic cosmopolitanism, as deployed by President Bush, is premised on shared symbols of the universal human condition and grounded by international law in the form
of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. It simultaneously sustains a rhetorical case for an international order where the United States and its allies retained significant influence, especially attuned to the emergence of new global powers (such as China and India), while simultaneously welcoming into this Western order states in transition, including Russia.

The presidency of George Herbert Walker Bush provides an excellent test to the theory of diplomatic cosmopolitanism. First, the Bush presidency was marked by high drama. The histories appearing in the years since, especially those written by those in power during the transition resulting from the collapse of Soviet influence, are marked by a certain tone of self-congratulation and the confident sense that the United States made the right strategic decisions, but also that such decisions were made in an environment of extreme uncertainty. They convey the stark impression that early on, the administration realized the limitations of American power projection and the constraints on its ability to influence outcomes in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. In such a situation, the power of public communicative strategies took on a special importance, an admitted irony given the contemporaneous acknowledgements of President Bush’s competencies as an eloquent advocate for his worldview.

Close attention to George H.W. Bush’s addresses to the United Nations General Assembly illuminates an attentive and proactive yet cautious approach to the changing conditions of the international scene. A key finding revealed by the archival record across the H.W. Bush presidency is that an underlying consistency in policy approach, articulated as a version of diplomatic cosmopolitanism, persistently aimed to order the international scene. Three rhetorical periods in the Bush presidency reveal the emergence of the Bush worldview: initial articulations of what would become the vision for a ‘new world order’; Iraq as a litmus test for
the global community to choose a new international order; and finally, a fully developed vision of the ‘new world order’. Each moment articulated cosmopolitan principles against the backdrop of complex policy challenges that required the President to translate local American interests into a case for new global governance, albeit one to be led by the United States of America.

4.1 The Vision Thing: Managing the End of the Cold War (1989)

The Bush speechwriting staff had been looking for a way to communicate to the General Assembly that, although he had been Vice President to Ronald Reagan, a president well known for his antagonism towards the institution, Bush would be a cooperative partner and enthusiastic supporter of its work. Daniel McGroarty, deputy director of White House speechwriting, issued a memo encouraging the president to engage in personal reminiscence at the beginning of the speech as a way to “lend a personal tone,” while simultaneously establishing “that you speak as one who knows the UN from the inside” (“UN Speech – Personal Reminiscences,” 1989). It appears that the intention was not so much to create a wider audience identification with the president as to demonstrate to the Assembly that Bush was one of them; he could be trusted and was willing to work with the United Nations. Bush’s reflections indicate a strong sense of respect and camaraderie with those who work at the UN. In his response to McGroarty, he noted: “friendships are formed here; genuine understanding is enhance here [sic]; a genuine sense of service prevails here” (“UN Speech – Personal Reminiscences,” 1989). The president elaborated by noting that “one makes fast friends here,” and that friendship speaks to a “spirit of fraternity

18 The wider record reveals that this strategy was more stylistic than substantive. The partially opened archival material does not yet reveal a comprehensive strategy for the role that the United Nations should or would play for the administration. Nor is there a memo that assesses the overall perceptions of the U.S. by UN member delegations and the need for course correction from Reagan. It might be that the ‘guardianship’ nature of this presidency lent itself to assuming that the United Nations had already carved a role for itself in international politics and that such a role should be supported – no more or less.
and that is good” (“UN Speech – Personal Reminiscences,” 1989). Nearly twenty years later, it is clear that the president has fond memories of his time as America’s UN ambassador, and it is these experiences that seem to inform his optimism about the institution itself. It is also clear that he found the condition of being a delegate rather remarkable in that friendships “cut across political boundaries” (“UN Speech – Personal Reminiscences,” 1989). President Bush, then, perceived that the value of the United Nations was the ways it facilitated a fraternal community upon which friendships could be built that could transcend specific political interests to foster an international order which spoke to the highest aspirations of humanity. Rhetorically fashioning this sentiment would serve to remind the audience of their duties in a familial manner while positioning Bush as a member of the fraternity.

4.1.1 Individual and Institutional Intersections

President Bush’s personal experience with the UN allows him to deploy a cosmopolitanism more specific than his predecessors: he is able to speak as an insider, and to use anecdote as a means to reference a universal experience. He begins by alluding to the universal experience of labor at the United Nations. He notes that, for him, returning to the General Assembly is in a way a glorious homecoming. Recalling memories “still with me today” he expresses fondness for the “human moments, the humorous moments are part of even the highest undertaking.” These ‘human’ moments espouse universal aspirations that guide the fraternity under the auspices of the charter. Bush (1989c) then recounts a particular story:

I was 45 minutes late getting to the meeting and all 45 minutes were filled by the first speaker to take the floor. And when I walked in and took my seat, the speaker paused and said with great courtesy: "I welcome the Permanent Representative of the United States, and now, for his benefit, I will start my speech all over again
from the beginning." [Laughter] That's a true story. And at that moment, differences of alliance, ideology, didn't matter. The universal groan that went up around that table from every member present, and then the laughter that followed, united us all.

He positions himself as a member of the rhetorical community that is the United Nations, and pays homage to those who served with him and still serve today. His humorous story at the beginning speaks to a universal experience of all political operatives at the United Nations. And he specifically recognizes those individuals who continue to work in the institution with whom he served. These personal and individual attributes reinforce his insider status.

The introduction closes by reinforcing the idea that shifts in the international order are occurring and that the United Nations itself is transitioning from “polemics to peacekeeping.” “The founders of this historic institution believed that it was here that the nations of the world might come to agree that law, not force, shall govern. And the United Nations can play a fundamental role in the central issue of our time. For today, there's an idea at work around the globe, an idea of undeniable force, and that is freedom.” Freedom, both as force and ideal, is an anchoring point for the rest of the speech. The introduction establishes a rhetorical seamlessness where the integrity both of the institutional ideals (especially freedom) and the personal narrative of President Bush are interconnected. The groundwork for diplomatic cosmopolitanism has been foreshadowed; it appears to the audience as though President Bush will be relying on his personal diplomatic style to draw on particular universal experiences of the delegation to advance an overall argument for his vision for the operational relationship between the United States and the United Nations. Such an introduction, then, establishes the expectation that additional personal anecdotes and tropes about life both inside and outside the institution will
feature prominently. Rather than featuring these markers, however, the address seeks to orient the rest of the speech around metaphoric conceptions of freedom.

4.1.2 Political Strategy and Archetypal Metaphor

Metaphors are complex rhetorical devices with many different definitions and positions. Yet a consensus has emerged in studies of public address of how a metaphor can reveal what Kenneth Burke (1962) calls the ‘perspective’ of the rhetor. Early scholarship conducted by Michael Osborn and Dennis Ehninger (1962) aimed to identify the elements that must congeal so that metaphorical meanings can be constructed by a rhetor and successfully apprehended by an audience. They argue that there are logically prior elements to the construction of metaphor that make the transfer of meaning from one thing to another possible. First, the subject of the metaphor is that situation, person or object to which the metaphor refers. Second, the lines of association refer to the new situation, person or object from which meaning is borrowed. Third, the tenor refers to the understanding of the subject prior to and post the deployment of metaphor in communication on the part of both speaker and audience, and the vehicle is the stimulus the metaphor produces in the minds of the audience. All metaphors contain these elements, but much like ultimate terms that create a hierarchical ordering effect in language, certain metaphors acquire increased significance as they circulate.

Archetypes in literature and in the broader culture are suggestive of what resonates with audience(s) because the members of that audience share something in common as a result of

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19 The study of metaphor has a long history amongst scholars such as Aristotle, Cicero, Vico, and Richards. Studies of metaphor proliferated to such an extent that Wayne Booth (2004) declares that metaphor can literally mean anything. I hope that it is clear that this study understands metaphor on multiple levels: as a source of invention for the rhetor, as a rhetorical device within a specific text that has suasory power, and as a contribution to an overall system of thought that influences rhetorical communities.
belonging to a particular collectivity. Life together is constituted out of experiences of symbol sharing, and symbolic recurrence generates and sustains higher order value in a rhetorical community. Much like the archetypes constructed around mythical legends, for example, rhetors have deployed metaphors that have achieved archetypal status as well. Osborn argues that archetypal metaphors are important inventionial resources for rhetorics because they provide inventionial grounds for argument. But he goes one step further in arguing that the persuasive force of these metaphors – and thus of the speech that deploys them – is made possible because these archetypes form “the bedrock of symbolism…which represents the unchanging essence of human identity” (Osborn, 1967).

The United Nations is an interesting and challenging scene for a rhetor interested in deploying archetypal metaphor. When discussing audience in Chapters One and Two, I noted that audiences at the United Nations are inherently fragmented and that the challenge is not just to apprehend cross-cultural difference but also to construct strategic messages that will resonate with all audiences. Here, then, archetypal metaphor intersects with cosmopolitanism in seeking to identify those conditions that are universal. President Bush’s speech at the 1989 General Assembly is of interest precisely because he advances archetypal metaphors that argumentatively assert a specific universal condition (freedom), which in turn is used to justify calls for his vision of a post-Cold War international order.

Freedom functions as an ultimate term for presidents because it allows them to access core values enshrined by the constitution. But freedom is also an empty signifier, made meaningful as the rhetor provides specification. Within the U.S. constitution, for instance, the exercise of freedom only acquires meaning in relation to other human practices. We see that freedom is proactively protected in relation to human practices in the first amendment (speech,
assembly and worship), while to deny the freedom of individuals also requires protections specified in the fourth amendment. Freedom derives its value as the relationship between the individual or communities and their government is mediated.

In this context, then, the contribution of Osborn’s work on metaphor is useful for two reasons: first, because it identifies some metaphors as archetypal; second, through an analysis of these metaphors he demonstrates how archetypal metaphors have significant persuasive power as they temporally extend beyond the present and geographically move across multiple audiences. Within such a view, the significant rhetorical move President Bush makes in his 1989 address is to deploy <freedom> as an archetype; it is a universal condition of humanity which by definition transcends difference. In turn, he is able to advance justifications for an order that returns the international community to the moment of conception of the United Nations, which in turn places communism in the ‘dust bin’ of history while suggesting ways in which the United Nations can remain relevant to a world in transition.

The metaphor of freedom offers itself as invention resource both as concrete value and legal construct protected by the Charter of the United Nations. It comes as no surprise then that Bush Administration crafts public address at the General Assembly of the United Nations around metaphors of freedom. The first indication that freedom will ground Bush’s international order appears approximately six weeks before the speech. Jim Cicconi, Assistant to the President and Deputy to the Chief of Staff, sent a memo to David Demarest, Assistant to the President for Communications, on preparation for the upcoming presidential address to the United Nations. Cicconi bemoaned that “it is hard to recall a memorable UN speech,” and argued that the reason

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20 This move has its own logic to it. Freedom is achieves the status of ultimate term for a domestic audience. Yet for a foreign audience of delegates representing states, that which they might seek freedom for would be environmental destruction, disease, starvation, debt or imperialism.
for this was that “the bureaucracy insists on loading up the speech with every foreign policy subject on the UN agenda” (“Themes for the President’s Speech to the United Nations General Assembly,” 1989). The mandate from Cicconi was clear; he was looking for a speech that was narrow and focused: “the theme of ‘free politics, free markets’ is one we laid out at Leyden [sic] and which could easily be developed beyond the European framework.” While the speech that Bush delivered in the Netherlands was thematically driven by its focus on democracy. This vision encouraged pluralistic participation in a ‘free’ world where interdependence as a characteristic of the international order – regardless of participation in markets – would encourage close cooperation. It was this vision that was to be more fully articulated to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

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21 The choice of Leiden as analogous is an interesting decision because the bold claim by Bush (1989a) in that speech is that “the new world we seek is shaped by an idea, an idea of universal appeal and undeniable force, and that idea is democracy.” Bush argued that democratic reforms in Eastern Europe would finally create the common ground necessary for reunification of Europe. Yet, democracy is not the primary governing feature of the international system – within or without the UN. For the entire history of the United Nations, power and regional voting blocs operating in accordance with international law when possible was the prominent feature of international relations. It also demonstrates that there was relatively little thought put into advancing a vision for the world. First, framing international politics in this way evinces if it was good enough for Europe it was good enough for the world type thinking. As such, it is woefully short in expressing an understanding of both the nature and direction of a world politics under immense transition. There can be no doubt that the thinking of many administrations focused on the ‘democratic peace’ theory where a nation that became a democracy would become an ally of the United States. But our historic bilateral relations with our closest allies in Europe should make it clear just how foolhardy such an assumption would be. Certainly we have been at peace with Europe since World War II, but it is also the case that the United States has frequently been at political loggerheads with these same nations. Second, this strategy seeks to re-appropriate that which has worked in the past – despite its highly particularized context – and overlay it onto contemporary politics. In other words, strategists seemed to posit that the Cold War struggle was always about capitalist democracy versus communism and now that communism was waning simply reasserting justifications for capitalist democracy would not suffice.

22 The ambiguous nature of the term democracy (democracy as noun for mode of governing, democracy as verb as in democratizing, and democracy as system of thought that legitimates power structures) allows for invention as well as polysemic flexibility (Dunn, 2005; Dewiel, 2000).
4.1.3 *Freedom as Force in International Politics*

President Bush constructs an archetypal metaphor by transferring the meaning ascribed to natural force to that of the somewhat nebulous political concept of freedom. In assessing the contemporary international political scene, Bush (1989c) posits, “For today, there's an idea at work around the globe, an idea of undeniable force, and that is freedom.” He notes that “freedom's advance is evident everywhere,” and in a bit of redundancy further observes that, “freedom's march is not confined to a single continent or to the developed world alone.” Here the metaphor operates in generalities, but given the context, it is clear that he is speaking of the Solidarity movement in Poland, the policies of perestroika and glasnost in the Soviet Union, the easing of restrictions along the Berlin Wall, and the overthrow of dictators in Latin American countries such as Panama. The subject of the metaphor is freedom; the item for association is natural force. The archetypal metaphor is inherently vague and must necessarily be so in order to attain a tenor (the interpretive work of the audience) that operates universally. Subjects themselves must be universal and political struggle is indeed a universal condition. However, the political movement as interpretant will necessarily be context dependent. In Laclau’s terms, populist movements result from the coalescence of individuals around a single political demand. Where *Solidarity* was a political demand for a democratization of government and the economy, where the political demands in Germany (on both sides during the Cold War) were for the unification of Berlin, and where the political demands in Latin American countries sought an end to dictatorial rule, each had their own set of particular characteristics. As a result, the metaphor cannot draw on any one of the political demands or movement by name in order for the metaphor to work across all audiences. These movements can serve as exemplars when referenced in address yet the demand cannot.
Geographically and geologically, the human experience of nature considerably varies. A mountain avalanche, a tsunami along an ocean coast, a sand storms in the desert: each experience is different and local, and if President Bush were speaking in Outer Mongolia, the speechwriters would likely craft an archetypal metaphor where freedom was associated with the winds that sweep the desert. Speaking in the Maldives, one might expect the tides or currents of the ocean to be the force for association. But in both situations, care must be taken. Sand storms or rogue waves can be worst case scenarios and their evocation can drift into hyperbole. The skilled rhetor at once needs to draw a line of association while ensuring that the stimulus the audience experiences is not fear or another extreme emotion. If one is to scale up the metaphor for a universal audience, both the subject and item for association must remain intentionally vague, for it is this vagueness that both excludes the particulars and thereby ensures the inclusion of all, while paradoxically inviting enthymematic connection.

Freedom as a force of nature is particularly significant because natural forces are conflictual; they act against something else in nature. This allows Bush to suggest a naturalized direction for the international community without specific resort to enemy construction. “Freedom as force” can push back against individuals, governments, markets and other human institutions. President Bush argues that the force of freedom acts against the political ideology of Communism. “Today we are witnessing an ideological collapse: the demise of the totalitarian idea of the omniscient, all-powerful state,” he notes. And Bush suggests a warrant; the idea that citizens are “no longer afraid to speak out or to assert the right to rule themselves” is evoked to demonstrate the yearning of Soviet citizens for democracy.

The translation from communism to ideology is fraught with meaning. Classical Marxism takes history as resulting from class antagonism, whereas since the Enlightenment, traditional
liberalism reads freedom as an inherent motor force. The bipolar Cold War was also a struggle between Marxist and Liberal ideology. Communism, then, is read both as ideology and history, where each component is intertwined and inseparable from the other. If the pursuit of freedom has come to trump class struggle, it becomes possible to argue against a Marxist reading of history and in turn undermine the case for Communism as a form of government. Bush, then, is able to advance the case for his ‘community of nations’ by arguing that history offers new evidence to support a liberal post-enlightenment reading of history that is justified less on its own terms than as the only alternative that has survived the collapse of communism.

President Bush’s pragmatism is also on display. While unwilling to formally announce the end of the Cold War and to declare victory at the United Nations, his use of archetypal metaphor demonstrates the strategic and pragmatic thinking of his administration. The ‘end of ideology’ moment in the speech makes clear to the audience that President Bush is not just interpreting events as they unfold, he is also making the case outright that the liberal order the west has been seeking has now arrived. With minor qualification, the case is clear: freedom is a force that acts against all equally, it is a force that will triumph, and as such it is best to get on with the business of codifying this order in international law and building multilateral relationships around the core principle of freedom.\textsuperscript{23} This is a particular type of rhetorical move

\textsuperscript{23} To speak in absolutes – a qualitative difference from speaking in universals that should be evident from this analysis – is not without risk. The administration therefore sought to include a minor qualification to the freedom as force claim. A working draft circulated on September 20, 1989, at 6:34 pm, contained a passage rendering a conclusion about freedom as a force in international politics. That draft read, “Of course, freedom’s work remains unfinished. The trend we see in the world is not yet universal. Some regimes stand against the tide” (“Presidential Remarks: General Assembly of the United Nations,” September 20, 1989). James Pinkerton (“Memorandum to Chriss Winston,” September 21, 1989) the Deputy Assistant to the President and Director of Policy Planning suggesting that this language was too definitive by noting, “present language suggests only that some will try to stand against the tides of freedom, and not that from time to time dictatorships will succeed in re-establishing themselves and democracies will be overturned by dictatorships.” This suggestion was not heeded, as the passage remains unadulterated in the final version. The only change was the direct mention of fourteen free elections in Latin America, suggesting a tide against dictatorship. Again, Pinkerton urged the exercise of caution:
that seeks, by force of linguistic naturalization, to stipulate as inevitable the intellectual and historical status quo.

4.1.4 The Metaphorical Perspective of President Bush

Metaphors deployed in public address can be analyzed to better apprehend the perspective or worldview of the rhetor (Burke, 1962). These rhetorical devices are symbolic in nature which, when circulated within a rhetorical community, will both reflect and shape the experiences of its symbol users. We can note that metaphors exert persuasive power when the stimulus produced results in a member of that audience identifying fully with the speaker as a result of its deployment in discourse. The suasory power of metaphor extends, however, when the circulation of metaphors leads to widespread adoption. Adoption of a metaphor can serve a leveling function; that is, metaphors can limit alternatives, while revealing the logic system of the rhetor. Metaphors then come to both represent and influence systems of thought. As Lakoff and Johnson (1980) note, “metaphors can be appropriate because they sanction actions, justify inferences, and help us to set goals.”

At the scene of the United Nations, President Bush deploys archetypal metaphors of freedom to justify his reading of the unfolding events against history (inference), to suggest a direction for the international community that invests itself in a legal order that exists to protect freedom (establish a goal) and seeks to guide policies – particularly economic policies – consistent with freedom (sanction action). As noted above, the significance of freedom as

“The fragility of the new democracies is reason alone to be cautious in our language.” This advice produced change and the language on elections was removed. The qualification to the archetypal metaphor of freedom as force proves prescient when on August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein invades its southern neighbor Kuwait.
archetypal metaphor is also linked to its disassociation from Communism, which also suggests particular inferences, goals and actions in the General Assembly.

It is also noticeable that Bush’s specific conception of freedom is rooted in the individual, which further narrows the horizon for political action. Governance necessarily entails a relationship between institutions, and individuals and the archetypal metaphor of freedom mediates this relationship for President Bush. As an exemplary model, Bush asks the audience to consider passage of the first ten amendments to the United States Constitution. The president notes, “our Congress proposed the Bill of Rights, fundamental freedoms belonging to every individual, rights no government can deny.” Freedom for the individual thus requires a political order that identifies a series of rights and codifies these rights in the form of prohibitions on the infringement of individual autonomy by the state. That order is boldly stated by the President: “If, for those who write the history of our times, the 20th century is remembered as the century of the state, the 21st century must be an era of emancipation, the age of the individual.” The historical dividing lines used here also do some rhetorical work, forming another natural boundary between eras and also stigmatizing the old order as irrelevant to a new century.

For President Bush, the governing order of liberal democracy in the United States, an order that has been adopted in and translated for a variety of nations, can and should function as the cornerstone of the post-Cold War era. This move is rendered possible because the archetype of freedom justifies the protection of rights enshrined in documents at the level of the nation state and also at the level of the international institution (Declaration of Human Rights). As a result, all nations must shift their attention from the well-being of the state to the well-being of the individual.
This is precisely the shift the administration sought. G. Phillip Hughes, serving on the National Security Council as an aide to the president, in a memo to James Cicconi, provides a framework for thematically structuring the speech:

The objective is to project a vision of Third World trends that is as sophisticated and path-breaking as the President’s major speeches on European and East-West relations. The speech needs to acknowledge the importance of the developing world to the international system and to sketch the powerful forces of change that are at work in the developing world just as in the industrialized world. In this framework the President can expound U.S. policy on a variety of global, political, economic and security issues (“Themes for the President’s Speech to the United Nations General Assembly,” 1989).

While the President’s European addresses had focused on the significance of making progress towards unification, premised on shared values, this was not the case with his discussions of the relationship between industrialized nations and the so-called developing world. Bush’s speech seeks to provide international order by gaining adherents to liberal democracy. The memo from Hughes contained an attachment from the National Security Council that more fully elaborated

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24 I grudgingly use the term ‘developing world’ throughout this chapter if only because it is most closely aligned with the perspective of the administration – that the way forward for the global economy in the post-Cold War age was the expansion of a global free market. This expansion necessarily required some nations to develop domestic markets that could then participate in the global market. ‘Developing world’ along with phrases such as ‘third world,’ ‘the global south’ or ‘emerging countries’ implicitly denote a superior/inferior relationship between democratic nations with advanced capitalist economies and those that do not. Solarz (2014) offers a good primer on the debate over terminology. The ‘third world’ most likely replaced the phrase ‘underdeveloped nations’ which circulated amongst political elites the textual evidence of which can be found in a UN report (“Relative prices of exports and imports of under-developed countries,” 1949). Phillips (1987) documents how ‘third world’ came to function as a replacement phrase. ‘Third World’ in systems theory has its own unique history the origins which are argued to trace back to 1400 (Stavrianos, 1981). Finally, Bolton, Graddol and Meierkord (2011) outline a possible direction in the establishment of linguistic practices premised on ethical relationship between worlds which in turn might mitigate some tension inherent to terminology.
on the proposed framework. Freedom in this document is the cornerstone of a legal order for all political, economic or security issues. It notes that the transitions taking place in the world are a “powerful example of the recognition of interdependence, grounded in freedom.” Further, it argues that freedom is “the best system for solving problems and for ensuring human rights,” that freedom promotes “the genius of the market in nurturing production, innovation, distribution and social progress,” and finally, that “In the security dimension, the historic easing of East-West tensions has its benefit (and reflection) in the easing of some conflicts in regions of the developing world and in prospects for future cooperation.” These discourses suggest both opportunity and threat. When countries adhere to this new order, they take on the responsibility of pursuing the interests of a liberal democratic order on a local and global level. And if they refuse to join a global regime built on freedom, they risk upending the entire system.

Another key dimension of the Bush cosmopolitan discourse is that, despite the naturalizing and irresistible forces of freedom, the new world order he imagines still requires the exertion of creative labor. It will not build itself, and the risks that the unfolding of freedom movements will trigger a backsliding reversion to Cold War are ever-present. The Bush national security team was acutely sensitive to this danger, a fact particularly evident in the work of the National Security Council deeply concerned with the possibility that a declining Soviet Union could fragment into a myriad of states with advanced weaponry, where the strong arm of the dictator had been successful at overriding long standing tribal, ethnic or religious differences.25

25 The Central Intelligence Agency was dedicated to monitoring strategic threats as a result of rapid change within the Soviet Union (“Soviet National Security Policy: Responses to the Changing Military and Economic Environment,” 1989). Concerns about regional and ethnic conflict would culminate with a presidential directive. President Bush recognizing that, “conflicts continue to plague many lesser developed countries as they try to establish or retain democratic governments and market economies,” directed the National Security Council to develop a policy responses when such conflict intersected with U.S. interests (“National Security Review of Low Intensity Conflict,” 1989).
As these fissures emerged, the United States was left with few satisfying policy choices and even less influence. What the administration could do, in the predominant view, was to advance inclusionary arguments that sketched a vision for how an international community in the post-Cold War world might look. The perspective offered would suggest an implicit set of suggestions for how transitioning states should proceed.

President Bush’s 1989 speech to the General Assembly leverages freedom as archetype to symbolically structure a relationship between government and the individual. But for Bush, embarking on a series of political actions that conform to his archetype of freedom also signals a nation’s candidacy for membership in the international community. There is little in the archival record to suggest that the president was a realist in the Nixonian sense. Indeed, his pragmatism positioned him in the camp of multilateral idealism. Yet, the administration did not see all states as equal partners willing to participate in his imagined international community premised on freedom. Hence, Bush utilizes a strategy at the General Assembly specifically designed for non-western countries, as opposed to a strategy seeking assent from all nations.

It must be noted that the speech concedes the community of nations Bush is seeking does not yet exist. The president might declare that “today is freedom’s moment” but it is also the case that, “the possibility now exists for the creation of a true community of nations built on shared interests and ideals.” For Bush, creation was the objective and the challenge. This passage also orients us towards his disposition for how such a community would function. Contrary to the Cold War where bi-poles had different ideologies, deployed different modes of production in political and economic spheres, and generally held different values, for Bush it was the absence of this difference that would signify an emergent international order. Absence of ideological conflict was a necessary condition but insufficient for the creation of a new international order.
Policies capable of girding an international community premised on freedom would necessarily entail democracy and free markets. He notes, “a true community,” would only be possible in, “a world where free governments and free markets meet the rising desire of the people to control their own destiny, to live in dignity, and to exercise freely their fundamental human rights.” Freedom, then, implicates the entire perspectival approach of the administration: freedom, a symbol of a moment in history, a symbol of political movements, a symbol of change in the international system, could also function to signify a nation’s willingness to identify with the United States and other advanced Western Capitalist democracies. Establishing a government – and then law itself – around archetypes of freedom was the key test for individual nations to signify that they could be trusted partners in multilateral cooperation.

The President clarifies his expectations for the creation of this new international community by returning the audience to originating moment of the United Nations as an institution. Such a move can leverage historical memory to produce an affective response that justifies specific calls for order. The public communications staff drew inspiration from specific moments in history when presidents had addressed the United Nations. The chronological file of the speech file backup series contain texts from the public papers of presidents that emphasize a focus on law and order premised on a consensus approach that freedom should be protected. For example, President Kennedy’s (1961b) address also appears in this file with the following passage underlined: “whether the pledges of our Charter are to be fulfilled or defied – pledges to secure peace, progress, human rights and world law.” This passage – an issuance of a test for the organization contextualized by the political struggle over the reform of the Secretary General – suggests that the staff were looking for parallels when seeking to foist a choice in the present. The choice that the administration seeks is similar to the choice that Truman asked the San
Francisco delegation to make. Within that same file we find a passage from the Truman (1946) address that states, “freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear,” were the, “fundamental freedoms to which all the United nations are pledged under the Charter.” Here, speech, religion, want, fear and ‘the Charter’ are underlined. Accompanying this underlining was a handwritten comment: “ideals as old as this organization itself.” Interestingly, then, rather than seeking to move the international community forward into the next century, the speechwriter’s attention is drawn to the past. And in this way, Bush’s twenty-first century vision, “an era of emancipation – the age of the individual,” returns the audience to the institutions founding and the unity of purpose that the events in San Francisco marked in order to substantiate claims about how the international order should be re-constituted in the present.

Once the intellectual arc of order premised on a collective desire for peace rooted in freedom is established, President Bush is then able to call on all nations to adopt democratic political institutions and an economic system comprised of capitalist markets. As John Dunn (2005) has aptly noted, democracy would not likely have become the dominant mode of political thought had its reconstitution in post-enlightenment thinking not been intertwined with the development of the modern capitalist system. Bush’s rhetoric seeks to maintain this relationship and themes for this address, suggested by the National Security Council, stress two observations: first, that the world is becoming more interdependent as a the collapse of communism become fully realized, and second, that commerce must be free: “we see the power of commerce – the vital global trading system that we must protect against protectionism.” These twin arguments result in separate but interrelated arguments in the address: first, that protectionism has negative
consequences for all participants in a global market, and second, that all nations should participate in global markets.

The President deploys arguments against policies designed to secure an economic advantage of a particular firm operating within a market. Protectionism in the late 1980’s became a phenomenon of great interest to economists who argued that the macro economy on a global level could only flourish if all nations continued to disavowed policies that would establish barriers for trade.\textsuperscript{26} For example, if labor was cheaper in one country and that drove down the price of goods, it was important for a different nation producing the same goods with higher labor costs to not impose taxes, tariffs, duties or the like to raise the price of the cheaper good. “Unneeded restrictions and regulations that act as a dead weights on their own economies and obstacles to foreign trade,” the president argues, and are to blame for some nations struggling to join global markets. To encourage nations to adopt reforms that would position their economies to join – and hopefully thrive – in global markets, the administration acted to reduce the debt of many of these countries. President Bush, took a moment to remind the audience of the debt problem and his political solution:

\textsuperscript{26} The negative consequences of protectionism for large states with modern economies was more dire as trade policies could spark reciprocal results increasing dramatically costs for producers, distributors and consumers (Bhagwati, 1989). However, it was noted that protectionism as a result of trade policy could see benefits for the host country if the particular market was emerging (Helpman & Krugman, 1989). It is clear that the Bush administration sought to reduce both types of protectionism, particularly in emerging countries. Trade emerges in all of the documents suggesting themes for the address and the speechwriters also had a marked up copy of a Wall Street Journal (September 19, 1989) article detailing a quid pro quo debt deal. It stated, “Two months ago, the U.S. dropped its longstanding opposition to debt forgiveness and said it would write off about 20% of its loans, or a total of about $1 billion, to 16 of the poorest African countries. In return, more than two dozen African countries are adopting market-oriented economic reforms under strict structural-adjustment programs funded by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.” Handwritten next to this text was “paired w/ ‘structural adjustments’” which makes clear the political goals of the administration. New nations would be encouraged to join global markets but those nations must reorganize their own trade policies to comport with the trade order already established by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
Too many developing countries struggle today under a burden of debt that makes growth all but impossible. The nations of the world deserve better opportunity to achieve a measure of control over their own economic fate and build better lives for their own people. The approach the U.S. has put forward -- the Brady Plan -- will help these nations reduce that debt and, at the same time, encourage the free market reforms that will fuel growth.27

Attuned to the political interests of the ‘developing world’, President Bush avers that a quid pro quo is politically possible and desirable. In the abstract, analysts often conclude that unrest within a state is the result of civil/political disputes or the result of a faltering economy. In this case, the failure of a single economy was grounds for concern, given that interconnections forged as a result of globalization could produce a ripple effect across global markets. Bush sought a path to secure the economic means of each nation, but his rhetoric reveals a perspective that required absolute submission to an existing economic order.

The President closes with a rhetorical question: “Can we not bring a unity of purpose to the United Nations,” which typifies the problem with the speech. Bush might seek a unity of purpose, but his address is structured to only bring about universal agreement on the political conditions of the status quo. The speech is designed to create unity around the interpretation that an international order should be built on the principle of individual freedom, already articulated in the Declaration of Human Rights, with implications for domestic political and economic reform. Yet the speech does not provide a path by which this purpose or reforms could be

27 The ‘Brady Plan’, proposed by US Secretary of the Treasury, Nicholas J. Brady, offered banks a U.S. backed guarantee of loan repayment in exchange for a reduction in the interest rate or the principal of remaining debt. This plan resulted in 35% of existing debt worth $200 billion to be forgiven (Mussa, 2006).
achieved. The vagueness inherent to the diplomatic cosmopolitanism of the President, then, avoids political demands that could upset the emerging post-Cold War order. Yet it is precisely this vagueness that prevents the establishment of a vision for what the post-Cold War order should be, as opposed to agreement on the current international political situation. As a result, his vision for an international order appeared incomplete, rudimentary and overall lacked a boldness of a leader who understood the historic nature of the moment. The unpredictable invasion of Kuwait by Iraq would provide the President with an opportunity to clarify this vision the following year.

4.2 Diesel in the Desert: A Test for Collective Security (1990)

1990 marks an important intellectual pivot in the cosmopolitan rhetoric of President Bush. Preparations for the president’s speech as the summer of 1990 was winding down shifted from his previous articulations of order premised on freedom to a thematic vision oriented around collective security and the global economy. The first memorandum was sent to Nancy Dyke (July 15, 1990) and summarized a special assembly of the United Nations General Assembly dedicated to free trade. A highlighted passage reads: “the great lesson of this century is that protectionism stifles progress and free markets breed prosperity,” and that, “president Bush has formulated a three-point trade plan to encourage the emerging trend toward free market reform now gathering force in the Americas.” To this point, the administration had spent much time focusing on the expansion of the global economy, a cornerstone of his previous address.

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28 President Bush does discuss some policy but these had all been discussed or negotiated outside the framework of the United Nations. For example, he mentions “Open Skies” which was a treaty that codified confidence building measures through verification by specifying a number of surveillance flights that could occur over the territory of other sovereigns. This treaty was negotiated between NATO members and the Soviet Union. President Bush (1989a) also called for a treaty to eliminate chemical weapons. But this was not a new policy and both had been previously announced during the President’s tour of Europe in the Spring of 1989, a full four months before the general assembly address.
With the exception of the participation of the US/UN mission in the special session, the foreign policy of the administration had been to focus on the development of regional organizations capable of developing trade and security jointly. In fact, the theme of ‘security for development’ was stressed as a theme in a memo from John Stremlau, the deputy director for policy planning for the Secretary of State, again to Nancy Dyke. That memo stressed that, “‘regional solutions for regional problems” has been a popular nation that is acquiring greater salience” (“UNGA Speech,” 1990). The memo further argued: “enhanced regional cooperation is likely to be a major building block in the post-Cold War world and this UNGA offers a timely opportunity to elaborate our ideas about how such coalitions complement the work of the UN.” Complementing the work of peacekeeping would be necessary, and it was argued that regional organizations might be necessary to prevent conflict in the first place. Stremlau provides insight into the security concerns of the administration: “it would be tragic if the end of the Cold War merely emboldened regional leaders to resolve their differences through the threat or use of force,” and that, “eliminating regional conflicts, and reducing the heavy investments to fight or deter them, will be essential for sustainable economic development.” The early strategy for the General Assembly, then, focused on how to rhetorically construct a message of US foreign policy that furthered an international order respectful of the United Nations but not dependent upon it. Regional organizations, while maintaining open communication channels to the United Nations, are neither dependent upon that body for support nor beholden to it. Further, this strategy was not dramatically different from the Cold War, where regional affiliations were used to construct bodies capable assisting in the policy of containment (e.g. NATO, SEATO and African Union) and where the United States could exercise significant leadership. Confronted with the diffusion of power as a result of fragmenting political blocks that had organized the Cold War order, this
strategy was less ‘new world order’ and more of an attempt to re-establish a system premised on the ‘balance of power.’

A strategic pivot within the administration occurred sometime between August 14 and September 9 which alters the entire theme of the speech; the Gulf Crisis interrupted not only the process of speech preparation, but became a central test for Bush’s vision of a ‘New World Order.’ The global geopolitical stakes of the invasion obviously played a significant role in this broader pivot. The President understood the domestic risks to his presidency early on. James Baker (1995), the Secretary of State, recalls:

Sometime in August, he and I were alone in the Oval Office. I said to him, “I know you’re aware of the fact that this has all the ingredients that brought down three of the last five Presidents: a hostage crisis, body bags, and a full-fledged economic recession caused by forty dollar oil.” The President understood it full well. “I know that, Jimmy, I know that,” he said. “But we’re doing what’s right; we’re doing what is clearly in the national interest of the United States. Whatever else happens, so be it.

In order to avoid the pitfalls of hostages or forty dollar oil, the administration needed to develop a strategy to satisfy the immediate interests of the United States while preserving broader international stability. Saddam Hussein had invaded another nation – an act not seen since World War II – and such an action was a direct threat to the international order premised on collective security that the Bush Administration was attempting to construct. The decision to develop and execute a multilateral response was relatively short and simple: interdependence as the defining feature of the post-Cold War era demanded it. Baker notes, “as a practical matter, the United States had no real choice,” because to act unilaterally would destroy credibility with Arab states,
lead to a repudiation of the U.S. and possibly lead those states to materially support Iraq. Failure to receive international community support would also make it difficult for Saudi Arabia to open its territory to U.S. troops, for Turkey to close its pipeline (thereby strengthening both oil sanctions and the embargo), and, most importantly, to persuade the Soviet Union to turn its back on a client state. “Almost by definition, the first stop for coalition building was the United Nations,” the secretary notes in his memoir.

Early successes in the Security Council increased the confidence of the administration. On August 2, the day that Iraq invaded Kuwait, the Security Council quickly passed its first resolution, a resolution of condemnation. Over the next twenty days, the Security Council would pass four more resolutions that condemned the action of Iraq, called for a complete, immediate and unconditional withdraw of Iraqi forces, established the quarantine, embargoed oil, established sanctions and sought protections for consular and foreign citizens. This success likely contributed to the decision by the Bush administration to continue to pursue its multilateral response through the United Nations. Again, this policy was not without risk. On August 2, 1990, President Bush kept his appointment to meet Prime Minister Thatcher in Aspen, Colorado. As always, given the ‘special relationship’ between the United States and the United Kingdom, there were a number of issues to discuss, but Iraq predominated. Of significance to this study was the debate over whether another United Nations resolution was necessary to intervene with

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29 This resolution passed 14-0 with Yemen abstaining. Ironically, the confidence of the administration was built by the fact that Cuba voted in support of the resolution and would do so four other times. Cuba only voted against one resolution and the circumstances are unclear as to why they cast a negative vote for Resolution 670 which simply specified in more detail how the embargo through the air and at sea was to take place. It is also important to note that aside from Resolution 678 providing final authorization for intervention, and 670 as previously noted, all votes in the Security Council were unanimous. Voting members included: Canada, Colombia, Cote d’ Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Finland, Malaysia, Romania, Yemen and the five permanent members (China, France, Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia/Russian Federation)(“Resolution 670,” September 25, 1990).
force on behalf of Kuwait. Thatcher argued that to seek another resolution was to risk a rebuke from the international community, which would deal a major blow to the efforts of the U.S. and UK, while potentially breaking up the coalition that much work had gone to creating.  

The President was of a different mind. His view was that the legitimacy of the use of force was imperative and that such legitimacy could only be granted by the United Nations. Further, he noted, a resolution of this magnitude from the United Nations would establish a precedent whereby multilateral coalitions could be implemented to act against unilateral aggression. In this way, the United Nations might finally be able to justify its collective security mandate. Thatcher later conceded to Bush, and the administration prepared a speech that would build on their shared vision for international order while using the crisis in the Middle East as a lever to induce the international community to support new action instead of reverting to traditional status quo behavior based on antiquated and dangerous notions of state power relations.

The archival record suggests that by September, the administration was preparing for war even as it made the case for a peaceful resolution of the crisis. Information gathering, sharing and resultant decision-making had been streamlined. President Bush organized a group of senior level staff and routed all updates through the National Security Council. This group was skeptical that Saddam could be forced to retreat through international shaming or because of the economic consequences that sanctions might bring. And with good reason: this group read

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30 This reading of events comes from James Baker (1995). The account is confirmed by President Bush and General Scrowcroft (1998). Prime Minister Thatcher’s (2011; 816-820) account, while stoic, also confirms the account.

31 This is not a unique feature of this address. Frequently, the Department of State, the Department of Defense through the National Security Council and a host of other agencies are permitted to vet the speech. Yet, this speech was qualitatively different. The NSC took a much stronger stance in the line by line editing of the speech (“Draft Four (B:UN),” September 26, 1990).
Saddam’s economic circumstances as a justification for the invasion. The international community already viewed him as a despot for his use of chemical weapons against Iranians and his own Kurdish population and had encouraged him to comply with international norms, while others called for trials to no avail. Conditions on the ground meant that if the U.S. was to lead a military coalition, operations would need to begin no later than February. The question was not whether the United States could intervene unilaterally – as it had done in Panama – but rather what type of multilateral support could be mustered for military action against Saddam. The address to the General Assembly, then, would be used to make the political case for intervention.

4.2.1 Articulating a ‘New World Order’

If 1989 was a year of uncertainty for the Bush administration, 1990 emerged as a year for the president to fully articulate his vision for global order. Addressing a joint session of Congress, the president declared that a “new world order” had emerged as the result of changing relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Where the relationship had once been marked by ideological differences and competition, the current moment saw these two nations cooperating. For Bush then, the only difference between the pre-Cold War era and the post-Cold War era was an abandonment of the system and ideals of communism on the part of the Soviet

32 The invasion of Kuwait came as a surprise to the President and the international community. It is true that Saddam had amassed 30,000 troops along the border, but he had also demanded debt forgiveness and $10 billion in aid from Saudi Arabia (Donaldson, 1996; 146-150). As President Bush (1998) recounts in his memoir, “Mubarak [then President of Egypt] declared that Saddam had personally told him Iraq had no intention of moving forces toward Kuwait. It appeared to us, and to the Arab leaders, that perhaps the worst of the crisis was past” (p. 312). Musallam (1996) provides confirmation for this account.

33 General Scowcroft (1998) on notes: “We would not be militarily prepared for attack probably until early December, assuming we continued our buildup. The window for military action would close soon after that. Late February ushered in a period of frequent bad weather in the region, and then came the Muslim holy month of Ramadan (March 17-April 14), followed by the Haj pilgrimage to the holy sites in Saudi Arabia. While there were various views about the acceptability of conflict during Ramadan, we did not consider it wise to test Arab tolerance. Following the Haj, the heat would become so oppressive that military operations would be all but precluded. These factors together led us to concentrate on a period no later than January or February” (p. 385).
Union and its client states. But this new order offered a chance to be “freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace,” the President argued. Bush (1990) elaborated:

Today that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we've known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak. This is the vision that I shared with President Gorbachev in Helsinki. He and other leaders from Europe, the Gulf, and around the world understand that how we manage this crisis today could shape the future for generations to come.

Modeled after the U.S.-Soviet relationship, this new world order provided the normative and legal grounds for all nations to be equal stakeholders and equally responsible for peace. The cooperative relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States came to fruition at a moment of crisis and the resulting instability of the Iraqi invasion provided an opening for a fuller articulation of a new vision for international order.

Diplomatic cosmopolitanism describes both the scene of international relations and predicts rhetorical responses that do particular interpretive or justificatory work. The cosmopolitan condition requires the rhetor to account for both global and local contexts when engaging in deliberative rhetoric, hence the need for interpretation. Interpretative work is also necessary if the rhetor seeks to justify a political demand. In order to establish a test for the international community, the President first needed to do the interpretive work of demonstrating that the trajectory of international politics aimed towards collective security before he could justify specific military or economic actions against Iraq as necessary to re-establish peace.
Preparations in September for the General Assembly address reveal that the administration was exceptionally optimistic about the future of international order. In 1989, President Bush psychologized the international community, asserting that democratic movements in Eastern Europe would prevail because they brought the freedom which is what the human spirit seeks most. As a result, his reading of human desire for freedom throughout history, coupled with the collapse of Communism as an ideological and political system exemplified by the movements in Poland, the collapse of the wall and the reunification of Germany, and the dramatic nature of détente with the Soviet Union, supported his assertion about freedom in international politics. These readings of history serve as evidence for interpretations of the international scene articulated in the 1990 address. The optimism of the administration was palpable. A memo titled “Themes for UNGA Speech” on September 17, 1990, noted: “the past two years have seen extraordinary breakthroughs toward a new era of peace and freedom.” Memorandum for the speech from the Department of State argued, “we have entered a period of rebirth for democratic hopes and aspirations,” that renewed calls for democracy based on values, “enshrined in the UN Charter,” and that such calls, “encourage our hopes for more stable, more peaceful world” (“Themes for UNGA Speech,” October 1, 1990). According to the United States Mission to the United Nations, “human aspirations for peace and security, freedom and prosperity have broken through all over the world,” and, “the past year has been revolutionary in international affairs.” Relative uniformity in the interpretation of the political scene at the international level spanned the administration. This interpretation allows for justifications not just for the existence of a “new world order” but also for the participation of all states in that order.
The cosmopolitanism of the Bush presidency in its full detail is announced to the world in this speech and its manifold elements justify extended quotation. Bush (1990) states:

We have a vision of a new partnership of nations that transcends the Cold War: a partnership based on consultation, cooperation, and collective action, especially through international and regional organizations; a partnership united by principle and the rule of law and supported by an equitable sharing of both cost and commitment; a partnership whose goals are to increase democracy, increase prosperity, increase the peace, and reduce arms. I see a world of open borders, open trade and, most importantly, open minds; a world that celebrates the common heritage that belongs to all the world's people, taking pride not just in hometown or homeland but in humanity itself. I see a world touched by a spirit like that of the Olympics, based not on competition that's driven by fear but sought out of joy and exhilaration and a true quest for excellence.

If the utterances of a President are to be taken seriously in matters of foreign affairs, then this passage fundamentally reshapes some policies of the United States. Bush declares that where another nation seeks democracy, to increase prosperity, or to reduce arms or seek peace, they will have a partner in the United States. Beyond the usual and regular consultation, the Bush policy also requires the United States to provide an equitable cost sharing of these efforts and to be an equal partner in collective action (itself an open ended phrase that could entail all sorts of obligations on the part of the U.S.). His vision is significant because of its entailments on the part of the U.S. and other cooperating states (which seeks increasing participation in both consultation and burden sharing), and also because these commitments are largely new. The partnership that Bush discusses also functions enthymematically within the context of the Gulf
crisis to demonstrate that the United States seeks input and contributions with others. Referencing collective action as a means to demonstrate equanimity between nations also entails responsibilities; each nation to be an equal must contribute as an equal. The President could have followed his Republican predecessors and simply used the forum as a means to communicate policy to a global audience. Instead, he strategically articulates a liberal cosmopolitan vision for the international community that extends beyond the unipolar power of the United States.

President Bush’s address to the forty-fifth General Assembly provides a second layer of interpretative work which offers the necessary data to support his cosmopolitan vision for international politics. He states, “for the first time, the U.N. Security Council is beginning to work as it was designed to work,” which demonstrates that the international community has moved beyond ‘polemics,’ beyond ideology. The argument here implicitly references the unanimous decision to demand the immediate and unconditional removal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. Unanimous action against Iraq also evidences the President’s claim that the international community can work together to provide for collective security. He notes, “We've shown that the U.N. can rise to the challenge of aggression just as its founders hoped that it would,” and that, “we must also show that the United Nations is the place to build international support and consensus for meeting the other challenges we face.” For Bush, then, “Now is the time for testing,” despite the cooperation of the United States and Soviet Union, precisely because the interconnected nature of global politics means that a challenge by one ‘rogue’ nation state is a challenge to the entire order.

The rhetorical move is evident: by interpreting the international community as having formed a consensus on the need for all to contribute to collective security, Bush also advanced the justifications necessary to take direct action against Iraq. If all nations must work together to
provide for collective security, then it is also the case that all nations must work against those nations attempting to disrupt the order. Iraq, in disrupting the international order through blatant violation of sovereignty, justified reprisals by other nations.

As a final move to assuage the audience, Bush worked to ensure the audience that collective action against Iraq would provide other benefits. “Success, too, will have lasting consequences,” argues the President; “reinforcing civilized standards of international conduct, setting a new precedent in international cooperation, brightening the prospects for our vision of the future.” By accounting for the contemporary cooperation and fissures at the level of the global and the local, President Bush is able to articulate an interpretation that works to justify both his vision for order and his positioning of nation states as facing a test to maintain that order.

4.2.2 Testing the International Community: Strategic Risk

This early articulation of order – an order of freedom, justice and equality – would also provide the means to test the intentions of all nations at the General Assembly. The secondary source literature and the archives demonstrate that pursuing an address that tested the international community was the administration’s very goal. In his post-presidential writing, Bush (1998) recalls a telephone conversation with then Premier Gorbachev in which he said, “the closer we can be together today, the closer the new world order,” and that, “I want to work with you as equal partners.” According to Bush, Gorbachev responded, “we now find ourselves with a problem no less difficult [than the reunification of Germany],” and that, “it may be that this crisis will be the stone on which we stumble.” This recounting by the President leads to the conclusion that he and Gorbachev were in agreement that “the crisis was a test of the transition the world was going through and the new US-Soviet relationship.” Handwritten notes appearing
in the Speech Backup Files conform to this interpretation. Those notes from a meeting with
General Scowcroft indicate that an address should be prepared that is “nice to Soviets,” noting
that, “UN action on Mid East would have been impossible during Cold War [sic].” Crucially,
those notes suggest that, “now is a time of testing for Security Council to see if new world order
is possible or whether cooperating on Iraq is a one shot deal” (“Meeting with Scowcroft,”
September 18, 1990). Themes passed on to the speech establish a similar test. It notes, “Iraq’s
aggression was thus a menace not only to its neighbors’ security, but to the world’s vision of its
future” (“Themes for UNGA Speech,” September 17, 1990). The document accentuates the
positive response of the international community and the challenge that remains; “the world
community reacted with historic unity and resolve,” yet the aggression of Saddam is also, “a test
that we cannot afford to fail.”

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34 As an aside, the administration was clearly focused on the Security Council as it was the arm of the
UN that the U.S. could exercise the most control over but also the location by which the power to impose
collective security derived. Yet, if the administration was serious about testing the long-term viability of
the ‘new world order,’ then testing the General Assembly would also be necessary. After all, the security
council might be the centralized location for the exercise of military power, but the General Assembly
was still needed for the implementation of sanctions, the construction of an international legal order
premised on treaties that could mediate conflicts on both the local and the global level related to
terrorism, trade and the environment which were goals of the administration.

35 My reading of the archival record also suggests that testing the international community was a
directive of the National Security Council. Three documents that suggest themes to the speechwriters
exist. The first document is presumed to have originated with the staff at the United States Mission to the
United Nations, as that header appears on the document. It was issued on September 19 and does not
frame the challenge of dealing with Iraq as a test for the international community (“Themes for the
President’s UNGA Address,” September 19, 1990). A second document of themes passed down to the
communications staff originated with the Department of State (“Themes for the President’s Speech to the
UN General Assembly,” September 21, 1990). It is thematically similar to those of the Scowcroft meeting
in their assessment of the threat posed by Saddam’s invasion, the importance of praising the Security
Council for their unified response, yet no language of a test exists. Finally, a third document suggesting
themes is issued on October 1, notes, “this challenge [Iraq] is also a test that we cannot afford to fail,” and
is entirely consistent with Scowcroft’s accounting of the U.S. position and the handwritten document
(“Meeting with Scowcroft,” September, 17, 1990). The streamlining of information through the NSC
during the crisis provides additional support for this reading.
On its face, presenting the General Assembly with a test of such magnitude was a risky proposition – especially if failure was not an option. Rhetorically, the address deploys lines of parallel reasoning to construct a reality in which the forum must commit to action when confronted with the choice between model and anti-model. The speech advances arguments from institutional history to frame the binary decision presented to the audience. Bush notes that the founders of the United Nations “sought to build a new kind of bridge: a bridge between nations, a bridge that might help carry humankind from its darkest hour to its brightest day.” The metaphor of a bridge is a strong one as it not only encourages connections between and amongst nations but also invites historical connections. Bush notes that, “Not since 1945 have we seen the real possibility of using the United Nations as it was designed: as a center for international collective security.” Much like their predecessors, contemporary statesman needed to recognize that they stood on the same precipice: nations had to choose a collective order hopeful for peace and security for the contemporary moment demanded it.

Next, the President attempts to narrow the horizons for decision-making such that the only reasonable course of action is the course he has prescribed. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (2006) argue that speech can incite a person to act when provided a model by which to follow. Similarly, a person can be persuaded to avoid particular actions when faced with an anti-model. President Bush attempts to limit the political choices of his audience precisely by following this line of persuasive reasoning. As we see above, the model for the audience is a collective legal order instantiated in the United Nations and observed by nations that see themselves reflected in that order.

The anti-model is made equally clear to the audience. Bush argues that this history demonstrates that the, “world's key task -- now, first and always -- must be to demonstrate that
aggression will not be tolerated or rewarded.” The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is read as a relic of a bygone era where the power of one’s military determined their position in the international order, where stronger states could impose their will on weaker ones and where anarchy rained. This is the anti-model. Bush emphasizes the danger of this anti-model by noting that the deep connections forged by globalization render no nation immune from an unstable international environment. He concludes, “This is precisely why the present aggression in the Gulf is a menace not only to one region's security but to the entire world's vision of our future,” as the crisis, “threatens to turn the dream of a new international order into a grim nightmare of anarchy in which the law of the jungle supplants the law of nations.” Building on his previous speech, Bush sought to demonstrate that an international community with freedom as its guiding principle enshrined in law was not just a reality – a reality premised on a long fought history – but that such a community could engage in pragmatic action to preserve itself and its legal order.

The administration was optimistic that action would be taken against Iraq, but also wary that dissent – even on a limited basis – could massively undercut efforts at the United Nations for a timely resolution. As President Bush (1998) recalls, if international resolve to act quickly waned, “we risk losing the support of Arab governments who will not understand delay and come to question our resolve.” Worse still, “we shall also be confronted with further peace proposals, further incidents in the occupied territories and growing strain on the coalition against Iraq.” In order to prevent delay, the president needed to advance a line of reasoning that would demonstrate the necessity of a nation state choosing to condemn Iraq in the strongest possible terms.

The archives demonstrate that the strategic approach to this problem was to attempt to convince smaller nations that President Bush was attempting to establish an order that would
mainly benefit them. The memo on themes from the state department (October 1, 1990) reasoned, “The most serious impact of Iraq’s invasion on small states may be the heightened sense of vulnerability that feel knowing that even in 1990, after the world has learned countless lessons about the need to resolve differences peacefully, there are powerful states who attack the weak to take their money and steal their land, that even in 1990 there are some for whom the law of the jungle is the highest law.” The administration calculated that coordinated, resolute and quick action would demonstrate that Bush’s new world order, “was intended to stand between small states and more powerful neighbors.”

To conclude the argument, the address seeks to assuage fears of a new imperial power. Bush states that troops will not be kept in Saudi Arabia “one day longer than is necessary,” that the U.S. “seeks no advantage for ourselves,” and that the United States hopes for, “a peaceful outcome, a diplomatic outcome.” By interpreting the international scene as on the precipice of crisis, requiring a collective decision for the provision of collective security on part with the choice of the founders, Bush urged individual nations to identify with his vision for a new world order.

4.2.3 Uncertainty and Inaction

Domestically, public deliberation reveals that audiences often allow security concerns (risk) to trump rights concerns. Interestingly, Bush made the opposite case to the international community. His claim is that universal human rights, democracy and economic markets are what makes a cosmopolitan order possible, where peace is produced through a collective will to act based on the shared values of freedom. This move helps to make sense of both the strengths of the message and its limitations. At the level of the international institution, the message is poised
for positive reception because the United Nations with its history of western liberal influence is pre-structured to offer invention support for that message.

At the level of the nation-state, the lack of experience with democracy or free markets are likely to present challenges to a positive reception of this message. And in some extreme cases, attempts to globalize the local are perceived as risks to local culture, which result in the opposite outcome: the local struggles against the influence of the global. Ultimately, cosmopolitanization of the political requires a complex where power flows productively in both directions; international law must work to promote rights at the local level, and the local level must work to provide some level of ambiguity at the level of the international in order to preserve the distinct diversity of the local.

Within these constraints, the Bush speech essentially makes three moves. The first is to posit that the trauma the global community now faces is one of uncertainty. Secondly, the speech articulates an order that both exists in the moment and, if further bolstered, can provide a framework for deliberation that resolves uncertainty where it emerges. Thirdly, the speech argues that now is a moment of choosing – that the Gulf Crisis presents a test for the international community – suggesting that if the new world order is not selected, uncertainty (i.e., anarchy) will become the dominant feature of relations between nations. By rhetorically constituting the Gulf Crisis as a test for the international community writ large, the President is attempting to force each nation to consider a response to the crisis not just in terms of their own national interest but to consider how their response might work to bolster or undermine the post-Cold War order.

Building on his 1989 speech, Bush sought to demonstrate that an international community, with freedom as its guiding principle enshrined in law, was not just a reality – a
reality premised on a long fought history – but that such a community could engage in pragmatic action to preserve itself and legal order. When dealing with risk at the level of the nation state, domestic audiences empirically privilege security concerns over rights concerns. We know that domestic audiences tend to ‘rally around the flag’ in support of military action. But President Bush chose not act unilaterally. Rather than construe the debate as a choice between security and rights, he claims that universal human rights, democracy and economic markets are what makes a cosmopolitan order possible where peace is produced through a collective will to act based on the shared values of freedom.

The speech itself – at least the new world order components of the speech – did not resonate with public news media in the United States and Europe. Coverage was dominated by the Gulf Crisis. Domestically, the news reporting framed the administration as speaking about peace while preparing for war and assessed whether political support for war existed (Dowd, October 2, 1990). Some international reports focused on whether the President had joined President Mitterrand in providing a passage for Saddam to save face in negotiations (Lewis, September 25, 1990). But it was the President’s schedule that likely drove the news cycle away from positive coverage of this speech. He attended a conference on the children and human rights before delivering his address to the General Assembly, a much reported event. And he returned to Washington immediately following the speech to conclude a budget agreement with Congress. Two days later, the ceremonial unification of Berlin would command attention as well as the conference on European Security attended by Bush. The international community, particularly Arab nations, were convinced that Saddam could be compelled to withdraw through
diplomacy, the nations of Western Europe were moving towards their own supra-national formation, and the United States was tending to their own interests (in the Gulf, negotiating the Doha trade accords and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty). President Bush had declared a new world order, yet it was likely that the response was muted precisely because the claim was self-evident. 1990 continued the trend of a president who seemed slightly out of touch with the rest of the world.

4.3  Towards a Future of One: Cosmopolitanism in the Age of Hegemony (91-92)

The flatness of the ‘new world order’ as rhetorical construct led to its abandonment, which marks the third rhetorical pivot of the H.W. Bush administration. Yet this pivot is largely unnoticed precisely because the ‘new world order’ was not replaced with a more robust concept or really any articulation of international vision at all. In 1990, the President had seemed to be observing rather than influencing change at the international level, and that viewpoint would remain consistent in the final two years of his presidency. Bush would address the forty-sixth and forty-seventh General Assemblies. The objectives for the 1991 speech could have been written for 1989. Another memo outlined the objectives as (“DRAFT: UNGA SPEECH OUTLINE,” September 10, 1991): “Demarcate clearly between Cold War and new era of cooperation that all together can shape if we shed Cold War mentality; Set forth a vision of the new world as a world community of nations/New World Order to be built by all, including blocks; Chart a general course for the UN and its specialized agencies,” among others.

The repudiation of Iraq’s invasion and the significance of a subsequent authorization for military action against Iraq, executed through the Security Council with the assistance of the

36 An Arab perspective on the crisis and the fissures within the Arab League help to explain why they sought to delay military action by President Bush and why a diplomatic outcome was unlikely to lead to Saddam’s unilateral withdraw (Khadduri, & Ghareeb, 2001).
Soviet Union, underscores just how much the world had changed. Intervention in the Middle East, particularly the provision of expressed permission for military action, simply would not have been possible during the Cold War. Further, the memo describes the President as the “undisputed world leader,” speaking to an international community, “looking to the President for a State of the World speech with vision and his definitions of the New World Order,” while also noting, “he need not give definitions,” nor, “dictate specifics but would suggest an agenda of opportunities made possible by the new era of cooperation and invite others to join in shaping the New World Order.” While the hegemonic power of the United States was coming into focus, the flows and fissures from globalization were demanding the attention of local governments everywhere. The peaceful world emerging in 1989 and defended in 1990 is showing strain by 1991.

The old saying that ‘all politics are local’ resonates here. While 1991 could have presented itself as another year in which the international community could have directed its attentions towards the establishment of permanent international institutions capable of enforcing the laws and norms thereby resulting in a new world order, attention instead turned to domestic or regional initiatives. In a positive turn, South African President F.W. de Klerk in February of 1991, speaking to his Parliament, set in motion the repealing of Apartheid laws (Wren, 1991). However, a reunified Germany captured the attention of Europe. Proliferation, with the ever collapsing military of Russia in conjunction with the independence of the Baltic nations of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, encouraged the President to conclude his treaty on Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in July. And the speech itself also points to the challenges presented by an increasingly globalized world. Bush (1991) notes:
In Europe and Asia, nationalist passions have flared anew, challenging borders, straining the fabric of international society. At the same time, around the world, many age-old conflicts still fester. You see signs of this tumult right here. The United Nations has mounted more peacekeeping missions in the last 36 months than during its first 43 years. And although we now seem mercifully liberated from the fear of nuclear holocaust, these smaller, virulent conflicts should trouble us all. We must face this challenge squarely: first, by pursuing the peaceful resolution of disputes now in progress; second and more importantly, by trying to prevent others from erupting.

Following the directive of administration advisors, the speechwriters constructed a speech in which the state of international politics is presented to the General Assembly. The Assembly is made aware of the U.S. point of view on the challenges facing the global community in the vaguest of terms. When Bush broaches the subject of Iraq and the continued sanctions and international pressure to disarm, or when discussing non-proliferation efforts with the Russian federation, the language of the speech is vague. The pattern holds when appealing for continued efforts towards the development of a free market.

As the post-Cold War era picks up steam, a rhetorical strategy premised on pragmatism and caution might be unlikely to be perceived as leadership, but communication strategists deemed the approach prudent. A memorandum between speechwriters Jennifer Grossman and Tony Snow elaborates on the debate. Grossman, picking up on Snow’s “hesitation in delivery specific proposals or decisive judgments – presumably given the fluidity of the ongoing Soviet crack-up,” argues that circumstances, “invite us to give a more thematic, philosophical and, yes, visionary speech than might be encouraged under ordinary circumstances.” Given the hierarchy
within the presidency, it is likely that these perceptions reflect their superiors. Indeed, Scowcroft was quoted as noting; “It is not necessarily in the interest of the United States to encourage the breakup of the Soviet Union” (Beschloss & Talbot, 1993, p. 102). Given this perspective, reflection and care were necessary. As Grossman understood it, the struggle over the ‘heart’ of the General Assembly address would be similar to the state of the union, it was struggle between, “the list vs. the leitmotif … the tasks vs. the vision.” She affirms the prudence of a thematic approach to the speech given that, “this year’s UN has been far from business as usual.” If this was the strategic path to prudence and positive reception, the speech itself becomes unbalanced by the individual demands that the speech itself makes.

The speech diverges from a singular focus that mirrors Bush’s previously articulated vision for a community of nations to a speech that was loaded up with items important to domestic foreign policy and one particularly controversial item. Aside from the comments on Iraq, proliferation, and the global economy, significant internal discussion resulted in a demand for the repeal of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379 that had equated Zionism with racism. Early draft outlines sketched in pencil (“Aboard Air Force One,” September 23, 1991) demonstrate that the administration was seeking a path for the repeal of 3379. While noting that values must be expressed, it questions how Zionism relates to these values. Whether repealing the resolution was an independent prerogative or the result of preconditions for Middle East peace talks the administration was attempting to broker, others within the administration

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37 That resolution states: “Taking note also of the Political Declaration and Strategy to Strengthen International Peace and Security and to Intensify Solidarity and Mutual Assistance among Non-Aligned Countries, adopted at the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries held at Lima from 25 to 30 August 1975, which most severely condemned Zionism as a threat to world peace and security and called up all countries to oppose this racist and imperialist ideology, Determines that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination” (Resolution 3379, November 10, 1975).
offered their perspectives. A memo from Joe Duggan to Tony Snow framed the resolution as an Orwellian use of “language and symbols,” because the resolution, “desecrated the memory of Holocaust victims.” John Bolton (September 18, 1991) from the Department of State argued that the resolution was, “based on a despicable lie,” and, “seriously undercut the moral authority of the U.N.” The President in his final remarks took a strong stand. He called for repeal, arguing, “To equate Zionism with racism is to reject Israel itself,” that, “this body cannot claim to seek peace and at the same time challenge Israel's right to exist,” and therefore, “by repealing this resolution unconditionally, the United Nations will enhance its credibility and serve the cause of peace.” Unsurprisingly, the unexpected and controversial nature of the comments dominated domestic media coverage. The efforts of the President and the U.S. Mission to the UN proved successful when Resolution 3379 was repealed on December 17.

The 1992 address follows a similar pattern; it is weighted by a series of statements about what the United States contribution to the international order will be as opposed to articulating a sustained vision of international order. The President articulates three goals: peacekeeping, anti-proliferation and prosperity. The first two goals relate to the providing for the collective international security. Bush orders the Secretary of Defense to organize multilateral peacekeeping training missions and to add peacekeeping to the curriculum of the military

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38 In an attempt to facilitate peace talks between the Palestinians and the Israeli government, James Baker reached out to Yitzak Shamir, the Prime Minister of Israel, for a statement of conditions. One of those conditions was the repeal of Resolution 3379 and Baker (1995) in his memoirs claims that, “after consulting with the President, I called Shamir back early the next morning and pledged the United States to a ‘serious effort’ to repeal the Zionism resolution” (p. 495).

39 A memo also directs Tony Snow to be particularly attuned with the language Richard Haass, Special Assistant and National Security Council Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs, on the Zionism resolution (“For Tony Snow from Joe Duggan,” September 19, 1991). This suggests that the language in the Joe Duggan memo originated in the National Security Council. The archives also record the existence of the resolution to be a personal affront to President Bush (“For Tony Snow re: UN Speech/McGroarty,” September 19, 1991).
academies. These efforts to enhance the possibility of success for peacekeeping operations signals a commitment to the rest of the world and suggests that the United States seeks to work with others as equals to ensure collective security and the international order. The second threat is proliferation, and he argues that the Security Council should lead the way on this front. He argues for making permanent the NPT, and towards nonproliferation goals, he redirects the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to “refocus its talents on providing technical support for nonproliferation, weapons monitoring and destruction, and global defense conversion. Under the direction of the Secretary of State, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency should be used not only in completing the traditional arms control agenda, but, just as importantly, in providing technical assistance on our new security agenda.” President Bush redirects portions of the military to aid multilateral peacekeeping efforts with no qualifications as to whether these missions would directly relate to U.S. interest, and directing an entire agency of the USFG to the task of multilateral non-proliferation efforts is no small matter. And with economics he references aid dependency and seeks to shift to an “economic relationship” which would “focus the U.S. assistance programs to building strong, independent economies that can become contributors to a healthy, growing global economy.” To facilitate growth, the President establishes a $1 billion growth fund. In each case, leadership of the United States features prominently but this leadership is deployed in areas that are presumed to be of collective interest to the international community.

The 1991 and 1992 addresses shift from grand discussions of what a post-Cold War international order is or should look like – including the responsibilities of nation states within this system – to an articulation of U.S. power and leadership. Essentially, these speeches move from a cosmopolitan articulation of freedom as entailing responsible action as a condition of
belonging to an international order to a rhetorical positioning of the United States as a benevolent hegemonic state.

4.4 Conclusion

The United Nations influenced Bush, and as ambassador and later president, Bush would work to influence the institution. What is undeniable is that his experience as ambassador created a deep appreciation not just for the institution but for those who worked there. While he did understand his position to be an advocate for U.S. positions within the institution, and while he maintained allegiance to the power politics of Kissinger and Nixon, he understood that there was an underlying universal desire for peace and security in the world. This was particularly evident for him when it came to matters that required votes of the General Assembly. Bush as ambassador discovered that his personal style of diplomacy was able to sway the votes in some occasions of small states, particularly those in Africa. As a result, he was able to see the benefit of a sustained presence for the U.S. in the U.N. and frequently argued that the presence and leadership should be increased. While he recognized that during the Nixon administration, the institution was held hostage to the swirling winds of Cold War political maneuvering, he optimistically held out hope that the institution could live up to its mandate from 1945 in the future.

As President, George Bush again sought to use the forum of the United Nations to both influence the institution itself as well as global politics. Given his belief in a universal desire for peace, the President sought to articulate a vision of an international order based on democratic capitalism, which he believed would result in peace. Appeals premised on archetypal metaphors of freedom allowed Bush to first articulate a vision and then later, challenge nation states to adhere to this vision of order by sanctioning an invasion of Iraq as a model response to those
who would abstain or dissent from this order. So while the diplomatic cosmopolitanism specific
to the George H.W. Bush Administration might have worked to facilitate solidification of a
particular international order, the major rhetorical pivots of his address worked to undercut his
leadership both at home and abroad. As Martin Medhurst (2006) notes, Bush missed his kairotic
moment—he did not develop his rhetorical capability or let others do so for him—and he did not
get the American public to identify with his vision. This chapter suggests that Bush’s diplomatic
cosmopolitanism created both opportunity and peril.

In the years that Bush was President, the economy of the Soviet Union collapsed, the
Warsaw Pact countries achieved independence, shortly thereafter twelve Baltic countries also
became independent, Iraq invaded Kuwait, and the contours of a unipolar international scene
with the U.S. as hegemon took form. The foreign policy establishment and intelligence
community simply did not predict these events, with one noting that “anyone who claims to have
predicted these events is either a liar, charlatan or both” (Berman & Jentleson, 1991). Thus, the
rhetorical demands were contradictory: on the one hand, he was expected to “dance on the wall”
as an indication of the rightness of U.S. policy; on the other hand, stark declarations could
present rhetorical traps given the unpredictable and unprecedented nature of events. President
Bush recognized that there was little the U.S. could do to impact the internal affairs of nations,
particularly former Soviet states, while recognizing that emerging fissures and power vacuums
would require an international response where U.S. leadership was increasingly important. The
inherent ambiguity of diplomatic cosmopolitanism allowed the President to articulate a historical
narrative why the west had won while encouraging cautious yet pragmatic approach to action
and the formation of policy that served the international community well.
The peril of Bush’s diplomatic cosmopolitanism was that it facilitated a rhetorical leadership style that was intentionally more careful and bureaucratic, which established a pronounced difference from his predecessor (Popadiuk, 2009). Intellectually, the President maintained a disposition of ‘do no harm,’ or what Mervin refers to as the ‘guardianship presidency’ (Mervin, 1998). His addresses are intellectually and thematically consistent across the years. President Bush through his addresses often offered a defense and maintenance of what has already been agreed upon – international law – so should new developments arise, they should comport with this lawful model. Additionally, Bush’s preference for private over public communication required ‘wiggle room,’ or leaving options open for interlocutors not to lose face. His approach placed constraints on his public communication. Another way to think about this is that if you are engaged in diplomacy with other political elites, the strategy and the language and the message itself will be different. Those skills, the ability to recognize what your opponents needs to “save face” or what your opponent cannot concede, are not skills that translate into deliberative rhetoric. It is a different style of political communication. Bush was now in a public position rather than a bureaucratic position stylistically and both he and the speechwriters struggled to adapt.

Our contemporary positions would allow for one to cynically read George H.W. Bush’s public address as simply using cosmopolitanism as a mask for a nationalist agenda, but a fairer reading of the man, his political history, and the trajectory of his administration suggests that he observed the world as he saw it, and his view was that democracy and capitalism emerged victorious. As a result, for Bush, liberal internationalism best described the world. But it is simply not the case that a new order emerged, but rather that a competing order had collapsed; there was no other order but the surviving order of liberalism. This order proved difficult for
some as it offered no guarantees that the ‘losers’ would have an easy time adopting the types of reforms necessary to make the economic and political transition that Bush suggested was universally desirable and inevitable. In addition to the question of liberalism, then, we can note that his address extended beyond national self-interests. His respect for others and deference towards self-determination allowed other nations to join the international order without punishment. It is the combinations of these features that allow for a better reading of both public address and how cosmopolitan appeals can be leveraged to read history in an attempt to (re)create international order.
5 The Clinton Presidency: When Cosmopolitanism is the Only Rhetorical Resource

Bill Clinton, because he lacked significant foreign policy experience and had focused his campaign on the priority of domestic issues, was not in a strong position to carry forward the internationalist vision of the Bush administration, nor to reconstitute the United Nations as a more capable international institution. In fact, it would have been difficult for any American president to rhetorically order the international landscape. During the Cold War, or when deeply engaged in trade, it was easier to negotiate bilaterally to resolve differences on topics like subsidies or tariffs. But in a world of economic global interconnectedness where new markets are emerging, old markets are forced to evolve and trade flows reroute, the ability to exert unilateral control is increasingly difficult. Forums to mediate disputes (GATT, Doha, and the WTO) and international financing to increase competitiveness (World Bank) provide platforms for international consultation and engagement, but these institutions provide rules for operation and mediation that may not be finally controllable by the leading economic powers. And control of capital and labor flows have slipped outside the sure grasp of American leadership, even though it was the United States who had dictated the shape of these organizations.

The Clinton years also revealed the limits of hard power. Where John Kennedy was able to position tactical nuclear missiles throughout Europe with very little public notice or oppositional attention (Dauber, 1993), or to use a naval blockade as a form of argument against Khrushchev, those deployments only worked in rare occasions, and in the aftermath of the Cold War had limited applicability to ethnic conflict. Certainly the United States military could be leveraged to destroy traditional but inferior force postures, but that capability, while impressive in its own right, is a capability with little utility in dealing with humanitarian crises and regional upheaval. This, then, is the challenge post-Cold War presidents face; as the principal economic
and military global superpower, and given a continuing status as leader of the global liberal order, the United States remains responsible to some degree for events occurring around the world. Yet in many cases it is now simply impossible for the U.S. to lead, given the manifold problems at the local level.

The security strategy of the Clinton administration depended on expanding the responsibilities of the United Nations to operate in a number of new contexts that required both institutional reform and reconstitution. In a memo to the President discussing the 1997 State of the Union speech, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger (1997) noted that the core elements of our foreign policy – security alliances like NATO; arms control regimes like Chemical Weapons Convention; free trade agreements like the International Trade Administration; international coalitions to support peace and to act against terror, crime and drugs; binding international commitments on the environment and human rights – each advance a distinct mission but also serve a common purpose: to secure and strengthen democracy, peace and free markets while turning back their enemies.¹

Military power still played a role in the administration’s thinking, but it was mainly agreed that such power would be more effective when deployed within a framework of global cooperation. Clinton’s security strategy continued to insist on the need to preserve the capability to fight simultaneous wars on separate continents, and yet the strategy positioned U.S. force in service of engagement. Berger concludes this passage by noting; “This network of institutions and arrangements forged by American diplomacy; guaranteed by American force – forms a bulwark for those who play by the rules, isolating those who do not.”

¹ Handwritten notes indicate that the memo authored by National Security Advisor Berger also circulated to Director of Speechwriting, Michael Waldman (“Memorandum for the President, State of the Union – Foreign Policy Section,” December 6, 1997).
The strategy suited a president who preferred to negotiate solutions through engagement and sought flexibility in decision-making when contemplating the deployment of military forces. The vision for Clinton’s foreign policy required a pivot away from Cold War policies and objectives. According to this thinking, “a shift in the strategic focus of foreign policy from the zero-sum political-military goal of containment and deterrence to the positive-sum political-economic goal of shared growth and cooperation” was necessary (Grossman, 1993). Clinton understood that connections forged through communication, trade and public diplomacy created cultural, economic and political flows across nations and continents were intensifying. An emerging depth of interdependence was fundamentally a new condition of the international political scene. The intensity of globalization also worked against the reversal of connections. To withdraw from the international community would be tantamount to ceding leadership to other nations on matters of vital interest to the United States. The U.S. sought leadership in international institutions so that they could be bureaucratically strengthened, seeking to craft policy able to ensure flows at the very least would not be detrimental to U.S. interests.

The Clinton administration’s reading of the international scene required rhetorical appeals able to both provide both an account of this new condition and to chart a path forward that would benefit the United States and its citizenry. Rhetorical articulations and defense of strategic foreign policy are often related to global exigencies that operate in a specific moment, but those articulations can often be wielded or at least refashioned to fit new exigencies by future presidents. For Clinton, the ability to borrow and refashion iterations of previous presidents were unsatisfactory responses to his contemporary exigencies and audiences. Audiences in the multipolar world presented a challenge to the Clinton administration in that the previous inventional grounds for the articulation and defense of foreign policy were quickly disappearing. Audiences
were no longer primed for messages about the superiority of the U.S. or the need for interventions that would operate to contain threats because, at least domestically, those threats were not as visible. An absence of clear threats also made the application of previous iterations of cosmopolitanism difficult because those discourses had depended on identity based arguments to justify the exclusion, politically and economically, of others. But the amorphous nature of new threats lent itself to polysemic interpretations of causal relationships between agents and change which rendered global consensus on any particular question all the more difficult.

Particular conditions of humanity might be universal, but that universality does not pre-determine specific political outcomes. The ambiguity inherent to these universal conditions can be appropriated by cosmopolitanism to justify political choices and thus functions as doctrinal assistant to presidents. In other words, a universal condition may lead to an apparent consensus solution, but these outcomes are as likely to be generalizations, vague and difficult to apply in a particular case, as leading to specific diplomatic results. The ability to participate in free elections, and thus to participate in the constitution of government itself, is understood as a human right. The resulting discourses about the franchise might regularly imply support for policies to protect voting as a human right. Yet such policy protections are exceptionally difficult to apply in a given case, particularly when the international community is disinclined to intervene (e.g., Tibet or Hong Kong).

This chapter articulates President Clinton’s struggle to find a rhetorical strategy able to convince listeners that his worldview was coherent. The wider coherence of his foreign policy, I argue, was subverted by its reliance on a thin cosmopolitan discourse read as ambivalent, uneven, and weak. Clinton has been widely praised for correctly reading the international political terrain and deriving responsible solutions to challenges as they emerged, but it was also
the case that his policies seemed to lack a unifying theme, and so were easy to criticize as inconsistently applied, and doctrinally insufficient to the wider geopolitical situation. I interpret the administration as recognizing the limitations of United States power projection through military or economic force and the need for other sovereigns to be equal partners in helping to contribute to the overall global order. I also read domestic economic arguments, particularly those about the need to modernize and to reposition workers/industry for a global economy, within the context of international relations as supportive of this interpretation.

5.1 Multipolarity and the Challenges of Interdependence

President Clinton understood the value of interdependence in its ability to produce a more democratic world and a world that was more committed to free trade. Interdependence also produced the conditions by which local actors could operate on a global scale. The paradox of interdependence is that connection at once provide benefits but also open up the possibility for harm. Clinton explicates threats posed by non-state actors such as drug cartels and terrorist networks to demonstrate the security imperative facing the international community. Clinton (1995) boldly declares:

No one is immune: not the people of Japan, where terrorists unleash nerve gas in the subway and poison thousands; not the people of Latin America or Southeast Asia, where drug traffickers wielding imported weapons have murdered judges, journalists, police officers, and innocent passers-by; not the people of Israel and France where hatemongers have blown up buses and trains full of children with suitcase bombs made from smuggled explosives; not the people of the former

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2 The reorganization of the American economy as a result of globalization presented resistance to free trade arguments, but the administration was convinced that embracing and liberalizing global free trade could work to the benefit of the American economy (Heale, 2011; Garrett, 2000).
Soviet Union and Central Europe, where organized criminals seek to weaken new democracies and prey on decent, hard-working men and women; and not the people of the United States, where homegrown terrorists blew up a Federal building in the heart of America and foreign terrorists tried to topple the World Trade Center and plotted to destroy the very hall we gather in today.

Clinton at once shines a light on the myriad ways in which political resistance increasingly is performed through violence to demonstrate that the victims of this violence are cosmopolitan. We cannot simply isolate one nationality (France, Japan or the United States) or ethnicity (Jewish) to which all violence is targeted. Rather, violence impacts all citizens everywhere and, importantly, fear and disgust for such tactics can form the grounds by which cross-cultural difference can be overcome. This passage, then, demonstrates how Clinton positions his multiple audiences to understand that the everyday situation (the subway), the person working on behalf of their communities (judges and journalists) or the innocent (children) can all become targets of these groups. For Clinton, the threat from interdependence functions as a universal condition that can be accessed rhetorically to underwrite a defense of his foreign policy initiatives.

To complete the pattern, Clinton argues that the dangers of violence as an inherent possibility of the cosmopolitan condition also suggests acting together can work to ameliorate the problem. “Nothing we do will make us invulnerable, but we all can become less vulnerable if we work together,” Clinton (1995) claims. Multilateral cooperation is particularly important in a globalized world because terrorists are not isolated actors, and neither are those who belong to drug cartels. They belong to a complex network of loosely affiliated groups who rely on multinational economic flows and operate in particular locations where governments are either
too weak to oppose or complicit because it satisfies some other state interest. In each case, the only way to diminish the capabilities of such groups is to engage in multilateral coordinated efforts. Here, the United Nations is already positioned within global politics as a location to negotiate multilateral cooperation in response to global challenges. As such, it functions as an institution of central importance.

The central importance of the United Nations presented a personal problematic for Clinton, at least in the early years of his presidency. Operating within the institution required an ability to lead on international issues, but his capacity for leadership on a global level was not immediately clear given his lack of qualification on foreign policy issues. I have made the case earlier that norms are constituted through rhetoric and certified by a meta-epistemic community with its own rhetorical culture. Attention to the relationship between norms and values to the rhetorical culture of the United Nations helps to explain how Clinton sought to resolve this problem through address. Farrell argues that norms follow the procedure of the rhetorical tradition, “for this is, quite literally, how we are able to see what is involved, risked, and interwoven in the fabric of practice” (Farrell, 1993). Attention to Clinton’s address, then, should provide insight into how rhetorical cultures operate at the level of the international. Specifically, the rhetorical tradition of the United Nations should provide inventional resources to the president when constructing address. But of more interest is the idea that “tradition, by itself, does not validate much of anything,” according to Farrell. From this perspective, the rhetorical tradition of a culture works to circulate reasoning that establishes a set of normative procedures, yet interlocutors must continually work to reconstitute these traditions through the practice of rhetoric. In other words, in order to position himself within the existing rhetorical culture of the United Nations, Clinton must establish though his epideictic address that he is a leader who
understands the value and values of the institution as a pre-requisite to the constitution of his own vision of international order.

The relationship between epideictic address and values as a rhetorical form is further explored by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (2006), who note that “the purpose of epideictic speech is to increase the intensity of adherence to values held in common by the audience and the speaker,” which serves as the foundation for deliberative appeals (p. 52). Applied to the United Nations, I have drawn attention to the work of Prosser, who articulates the epideictic nature of the address and frequently can be identified by its attention to value laden terms such as peace, justice and responsibility. These values, abstract in nature, are conceptually bifurcated from concrete values which for Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (2006) reference “a living being, a specific group or a particular object” (p. 77). These concrete values are particularly significant because the articulation of a concrete value is to suggest a uniqueness about a person or thing, and it is this uniqueness that establishes place within a value hierarchy. When connected through reason giving, a series of values (concrete, abstract or both) can come to form ‘characterial families’ which work to establish justify particular deliberative claims. I now turn to an analysis of democracy, free markets and nonproliferation as a set of concrete values which constitute a characterial family in Clinton’s rhetoric. This characterial family of values does particular work

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3 For presidential use of epideictic see at least chapters 1-4 of Campbell and Jamieson (2008) and Dow (1989). Carter (1991) takes up ritual in epideictic address.

4 Organizations are likely to deploy values in strategic communication in order to achieve three goals: the enhancement of organizational image, to deflect criticism and to establish new values that can support future discourse (Bostdorff, 1994). The United Nations through its web broadcasting, numerous public relations publications and Twitter feeds are evidence enough of this approach. But it is also the case that organizational values are articulated and contested within the deliberations of the General Assembly. To that end, the ‘characterial family’ of values upon which consensus is formed will impact both the norms of the institution itself and the way in which that institution articulates its values to its multiple stakeholders and audiences.
to explain the promise and perils of interdependence, which then opens space for a discussion of the ways in which the international might require reconfiguration.

5.1.1 Democracy

In 1993, the Clinton administration, seeking to establish a foreign policy distinct from containment, tested the idea of “democratic enlargement” at the forty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly (Brinkley, 1997; Olson 2004). The policy of containment had prevented political pressure from making fundamental alterations to government from flowing in both directions: democratic states were stalwart in the face of communist states, but so too were communist states when faced with the prospects of democratization. Democratic states were protected from the expansion of Communism, but the persistence of communism also worked to contain the expansion of democracy. The justification for policies of containment and the governmental forms of communism collapsed with the Berlin wall. Clinton notes (1993), “I agree with President Roosevelt, who once said, ‘the democratic aspiration is no mere recent phase of human history. It is human history.’” President Roosevelt as referent expresses a double value; the political legacy in defense of democracy and democracy itself are values that Clinton seeks to associate himself with, and to have the community of nations strive for. The quote also ascribes a universal condition to democracy – it is the aspiration of all, everywhere – and therefore should maintain a deliberative value. If, as Clinton posits, all aspire to live under democratic government, that in turn would require a political obligation to support democracy in its many iterations wherever they may arise. Indeed, such an appeal follows. As the President stated (1993): “Now we seek to enlarge the circle of nations that live under those free institutions.” Here, democracy is at once the concrete, composed of institutions that are intimated to qualify as ‘free’ because they fulfill expression to the “energies of every person.” But
democracy provides another layer of concrete value to the international community because, “a world of thriving democracies that cooperate with each other,” Clinton (1993) avers, “live in peace.” Of major concern, whether from the perspective of ‘balance of power’ theory or from a humanistic perspective, is that peace as a condition of the international derives its value both because its existence ostensibly preserves life and its absence in a globalized world can destabilize the international order by creating pressures that strain already weak states, or by drawing larger regional and global powers in an escalation of conflict.

President Clinton anticipates resistance that might emerge to his call for democratic enlargement given the historical, cultural and political differences that mark the membership at the General Assembly. In an attempt to quell resistance, Clinton first extends the following qualification: “where it matters most and where we can make the greatest difference, we will, therefore, patiently and firmly align ourselves,” with those states seeking democratic transition. Beyond considering alignment as a diplomatic form of solidarity, the ambiguity of the address provides the President strategic flexibility to decide with whom and under what condition the United States will in fact align with others. Second, Clinton posits that this policy will not require the use of force. He exclaims, “I do not mean to announce some crusade,” where crusade, while crude, does the dissociative work to imply that the President will not seek to use force. Further, “democracy is rooted in compromise, not conquest,” the President notes. For Clinton, then, an intrinsic characteristic of democracy is its ability to peacefully resolve difference, particularly useful at the level of the international because, “it [democracy] rewards tolerance, not hatred.” The move to democratize the international order is both possible and desirable because it maintains a unique character that facilitates peacefully overcoming difference through
compromise. These calls for democracy notably do not call for intervention in a specific case, nor do they establish ‘red lines’ for action, preserving flexibility while ensuring vigorous debate should conditions in a specific nation arise.

As a representative of a democratic nation, Clinton also had to work to secure domestic support for his foreign policy agenda by working to tamp down domestic opposition to his vision for strategic engagement. Or, as Anthony Lake, the National Security Advisor, noted, the “neo-know-nothing-isolationists,” might not have an “alternative vision,” but the President still needed to answer his critics (Friedman, 1993). According to Lake, these critics did not appreciate the need for engagement. Answers to these counter arguments emerge across several speeches. In 1993, Clinton argues that the international scene is marked by both, “peril and opportunity,” and in 1994 given efforts “to make this era of terrific change our friend and not our enemy,” notes the imperative for policy action. Given this construction, to withdraw in a moment of peril – particularly given the superpower status of the United States – would be to court disaster. It is equally important to note that the argument depends on the audience understanding that out of the trauma of the Cold War, and despite the incompleteness of Bush’s ‘new world order,’ a positive possibility for international politics persists. Clinton’s case rested on democratic peace theory. He argued in 1993 that “democracies cooperate with each other,” and that, “democracies rarely go to war with each other.” The justification is self-evident; a strategy that seeks

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5 The extent to which the Clinton administration might have been influenced by political theorists is difficult to gauge but the call to democratize the international order overlays with scholarly debate at the time. It was during this moment that Daniele Archibugi was articulating his vision for a new cosmopolitan order premised on a democratization of international institutions that would allow for debate and representation of previously disenfranchised nations states (Archibugi, 1992; 1993). This work also inspired others to critically examine international politics through the lens of cosmopolitanism (Butfoy, 1993; Held, 1992; 2003).

6 Democratic peace, a political theory spanning centuries, returned in 1983 and gained prominence thereafter (Doyle, 1983; Hook, 2010; Jones & Miller, 1996; Rasler & Thompson, 2005).
democratic transition through international engagement is likely to result in peace simply because democracy as shared value provides a commonality between peoples and nations that provides disincentives for conflict and warfighting. In order to accomplish such a task, he notes, “democracies will make us all more secure, more prosperous, and more successful,” and in so doing reiterates the previous warrants. Democracies will strengthen the international order because they will provide stability as a result of their being less likely to engage in war.

Democracy as a shared value in Clinton’s characterial family works on multiple levels to explain and defend his political choices. Articulated as a universal aspiration, democracy works to establish a possibility for identification, deployed as a theory of international security it seeks assent by suggesting a politics that is a comparative improvement to the status quo on both the local and the global level, and deployed as a deliberative strategy it marks a path for respectful dialogue that in theory would produce consensus results. Importantly, strategists within the White House paired ‘coalitions of democracy’ as a means to inject stability into the international system with market reforms that would allow nations to participate in the global economy.

5.1.2 Trade

Protectionism emerged as a response to the increasing penetration of globalization and how that reconfigured economic flows. Manufacturing and the production of consumables flowed to locations with few environmental or labor regulations (Lynch, 2003). Capital relocated to nations where tax and labor liabilities decreased. This was possible because corporations became larger trans-national fixtures and moved into and out of nations given a particular business case. Taken together, the consequences from this shifting economic landscape prompted resistance at both the local and the global level. On the campaign trail in 1992, then Governor Clinton had been made aware by union leadership of just how much damage could be wrought
from globalization. One year later, as president, the economic reforms that Gorbachev had installed were fraying, with consequences for regional economics. The stagnating economies of Europe and Japan were driving up pressures to enact protectionism in a variety of global institutional forums. The administration worried that the case for free trade was being debated and lost without their participation. As a result, we see attention to free trade and global economics featured across Clinton’s General Assembly addresses.

The preceding political epochs established a binary between global political elites and the people within the context of the Cold War. Global elites were responsible for imagining and putting into place international institutions capable of monitoring and regulating economic flows across Western and allied nations. Structured ideologically along the precepts of liberalism, this system sought to ensure that the interdependence of half of the world’s economies worked to strengthen security rather than undermine it. Whereas global elites maintained the macro economy, the people were responsible for economics at the level of the local – they prepare themselves to enter the workforce, function as productive members of the labor force and retrain if competitive necessity demands it. Local political actors and governments were free to introduce policies supportive of developing indigenous labor. This comfortable arrangement through dichotomous responsibility is upended by ongoing processes of globalization which results in a move towards insulating national economies from the global. Recognizing this move as inherently protectionist and a threat to trade that operates freely, Clinton takes up the task in intellectual securing global free trade as a value of the contemporary international order.

Clinton (1999) made the case that if the international community could come to a consensus on the value of free trade, globalization would not be “inherently divisive.” He made his case by disassociating traditional spheres of interest from specific economic benefits, as these
were of interest to all. If the free flow of economic goods and services on a global level produced
profits for firms on the local level, then Clinton could advance the case that free trade leads to
“shared prosperity.” The President deploys quantitative data to support the prosperity claim by
noting that measures such as NAFTA, “has produced in the United States alone an estimated
200,000 new jobs” (Clinton, 1994). Although NAFTA as exemplar might seem problematic,
given the relative differences between other national economies and the United States, he
consistently makes the case that free trade can positively improve the economic situation of any
nation. Clinton (1998) predicts that, “early in the 21st century, more than 20 of this Assembly’s
members, home to half the Earth’s population, will lift themselves from the ranks of low-income
nations.” This reasoning offers local economic benefits as evidence of the success of free trade
and justifies the existing international economic order.

The President deepened his case that economics matters to all by linking economic
stability to other areas of international interest. He suggests, “the United States believes that an
expanded community of market democracies not only serves our own security interests, it also
advances the goals enshrined in this body’s Charter and its Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. For broadly based prosperity is clearly the strongest form of preventive diplomacy. And
the habits of democracy are the habits of peace” (Clinton, 1993). Reiterating the claim that to the
extent democracy is linked with a free market economy, the world will be a more peaceful place.
An expansion of the global economy was a cornerstone of Clinton foreign policy and was
deemed necessary to provide domestic growth as well as international security.

5.1.3 Nonproliferation

President Clinton, while not alive for the formation of the United Nations, was certainly
practiced in the art of ‘duck and cover’. And despite the predictions of Kenneth Waltz (2013),
horizontal proliferation (an increase in the number of nuclear states) and vertical proliferation (an increase in the quantity of a nation’s nuclear arsenal) was a concern for both the President and the international community. Mutually assured destruction as a traumatic feature of the Cold War threatened the entirety of humanity, yet disarmament as outlined in the Charter (Articles 11, 26 and 47) was a goal without a suggested path of specific policies to be taken. So, while the threat of nuclear weapons and their potential spread was obvious, the possibilities for agreement over policy were not. President Kennedy in his 1961 address sought to balance the need to maintain weapons for defensive purposes with the need to prevent their spread or use from accident or miscalculation. Cosmopolitan ultimate terms such as peace and Damocles as metaphor for shared risk through interdependence provided doctrinal assistance for Kennedy to propose the establishment of a normative prohibition against nuclear testing, which he hoped would limit proliferation. That norm was partially established with the advent of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. For Clinton, the context of existential trauma from nuclear weapons was no longer present, and the drive for disarmament for all intents and purposes had been abandoned by the international community. The United Nations as a capable agent, able to respond to the challenges of interdependence in the age of unipolarity, required Clinton to reconstitute nonproliferation as a concrete value to facilitate an ‘acting together’ of the international community to provide collective security.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union presented new problems, since three nations immediately become nuclear states: Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Ukraine possessed up to 1,900 strategic warheads and up to 4,200 tactical nuclear weapons, with 44 strategic bombers and 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2014). A newly formed nation with the capability to launch a full scale nuclear strike had never been considered and was
worrisome enough. A newly formed nation undergoing dramatic economic and political upheaval while possessing such a capability was widely understood to present mortal dangers to the world. Even if a command and control structure persisted in the short term, if the nation deteriorated, then, for the first time, a non-state actor might acquire an atomic weapon or at the very least enough fissile material to create a ‘dirty bomb.’ Complex trilateral negotiations saw the destruction or return of every last weapon and missile, and yet the emergence of these nuclear states demonstrated the globally shared risk resulting from proliferation.7

Proliferation was yet another policy area where the United States sought to influence the policy direction of the United Nations, but where success required multilateral cooperation. To build support for his policies, Clinton (1993) unequivocally announced to the General Assembly that, “I have made nonproliferation one of our Nation's highest priorities,” and that his administration intends to “weave it more deeply into the fabric of all of our relationships with the world's nations and institutions.” This posture sent a serious signal to the international community, bolstered by treatment of proliferation as a prominent issue in each address to the General Assembly, in each of his State of the Union Addresses, and featured prominently in his National Security Strategies. His addresses at the United Nations also defined proliferation within the scope of weapons of mass destruction which included chemical and biological agents. “We know this is not an idle problem,” Clinton stated, intimating that particular actors were seeking capabilities to produce mass destruction. Saddam Hussein served as a scapegoat when Clinton recalled, “all of us are still haunted by the pictures of Kurdish women and children cut down by poison gas,” and that “Scud missiles dropped during the Gulf war that would have been

far graver in their consequence if they had carried nuclear weapons.” By recalling the trauma that results from the nature of the weapon and by drawing attention to the destabilizing effects proliferation could have on international collective security, Clinton provided the audience with grounds to join his appeals for policy action.

Calling attention to the issue, both by imagining the most horrific possibilities and recalling recent trauma, Clinton was able to justify calls for new policies that would reconstitute the United Nations as a significant contributor of collective security. During his tenure, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Clinton himself and a host of partners inside and outside the institution worked to establish an indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, while also completing negotiation on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Fissile Material Cutoff Treat, the Conventional on Chemical Weapons and the Biological Weapons Convention. Expanding international law in this area was important, but these efforts also required reforms that reconstituted the United Nations as being able to oversee inspections – a key component for verification. In 1997, Clinton boasted that the United Nations, “from UNSCOM in Iraq to the International Atomic Energy Agency,” was now, “the most expansive global system ever devised to police arms control agreements.” The ascension of the United Nations to this position was possible – in part – because President Clinton, through his cosmopolitan appeals based on shared risk, was able to expand the horizons of possibility, opening up space for multilateral negotiations within a legal framework that preserved the significance of the United Nations on the issue of proliferation.

The collapse of bipolarity produced an international system where interdependence forged by the forces of globalization result in pressures that impacted both global and local politics. Clinton attempted to overcome the tension inherent to a cosmopolitan politics by
hierarchically positioning specific readings of democracy, trade and nonproliferation as concrete values upon which an international politics could be constructed. Transitions to democracy were empowering new voices and leading to new political freedoms, but in certain locals, it also led to the formation of governments that unleashed ethnic and religious forces. Democracy, particularly in weak states, produced conditions of new freedoms while also opening up ethnic and religious fissures, often with great consequence to regional security.

For Clinton, democracy retained its value because of its relationship to human aspiration. It also necessitated multilateral cooperation to both support successful efforts and respond to unsuccessful efforts. Risk materialized from uneven development when transitions to democracy were taking place, and there was a danger that the sputtering of a domestic economy might lead a nation to backslide into a socialist or totalitarian regime. The inverse was also true; if an economy that had not been previously a participant in the global economy, then joined, and was able to establish an advantage which allowed for surging growth, it is likely that an economy that lost the advantage would suffer. Hence, Clinton rhetorically disassociated demarcations for responsibility by demonstrating that issues of trade were issues for all. And finally, the prospects of deteriorating and increasingly unprotected stockpiles of fissionable materials presented the horrifying prospect that material could fall into the hands of terrorists with catastrophic consequences for innocent life. The risk of nuclear war also escalated during his presidency when both India and Pakistan declared themselves to be nuclear powers. Nonproliferation then became a matter of global significance and would require extensive efforts to shore up the nonproliferation regime.

It is also important to note that a cosmopolitan politics premised on these values creates burdens for the United Nations. As such, Clinton’s address to the General Assembly does not
just work to explain why others should commit to participating in international politics, but also why the commitment requires dedication to the proposition that the United Nations must be reconfigured to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War environment. Reconfiguration of the international becomes a necessity because the issues of democracy, free trade, and proliferation demonstrate that states can no longer manage the challenge of interdependence as a result of competing interests, differing resources and capabilities.

5.2 Reconfiguring the International

As the first president to have not been born when the United Nations as an institution was established at the San Francisco conference, Clinton’s epideictic performance at the United Nations General Assembly sought to rehearse a specific set of norms that would buttress his foreign policy. As Mary Stuckey notes, presidential epideictic address maintains a hybridic quality; it is a rhetoric where praise or blame is framed within a broader political agenda to justify presidential policy (1995). Presidential address at the General Assembly is no exception; it is at once epideictic and deliberative. The values that a president articulates – especially the value of the institution in international affairs – often connect a defense of particular policy options to the constitution of a global political order.

Clinton, like presidents before him, used foreign addresses to articulate a vision for America’s place in the world and to suggest a series of values that would guide policy. The move to establish Clinton’s values as the values the international community should hold or aspire would also work to justify the foreign policy agenda of the administration. Unsurprisingly, Clinton deploys praise throughout the eight speeches he delivered to the General Assembly. What is surprising is how his praise – at least for the institution – is tempered by qualification. For instance, Clinton (1995) contrasts the promise of the U.N. with a reading of reality by noting,
“the United Nations is fifty years old,” and that “the dreams of its founders have not been fully realized, but its promise endures.” Rather than directly engaging in praise for the United Nations itself, Clinton praises particular programs or initiatives that he deems to be successful. In that same speech, Clinton (1995) argues that the value of the U.N., “can be seen the world over,” and then proceeds to list a series of humanitarian accomplishments, such as working to decrease child hunger, disease, flows of refugees and hosting the Beijing Conference as evidence for the claim.8 What these examples also reveal is the rhetorical operation of universal values (both shared and what we aspire to), that work to establish both a defense of U.S. policy and also a vision for the international order that requires reconfiguring the United Nations through efforts of renewal and reform so that it can function as an effective actor as new exigencies arise.

5.2.1 **Covenant Renewal**

The call for renewal is a distinctly epideictic call. Epideictic address, born in moments of crisis, expresses the possibilities to rewrite communal expectations and to seek adherence as a form of re-establishing order. As Celeste Condit (1985) notes, epideictic is capable of defining the problems a community faces and in so doing allows a community to activate specific values in order to induce unity. In his analysis of the Robert Kennedy’s response to the assassination of Dr. King, John Murphy (1990) argues that epideictic address prominently features what he labels the ‘American jeremiad.’ Importantly, the features of the American jeremiad – rooted in the Puritanical tradition – work to transform dissent into a rededication to “principles of American culture,” by offering a vision forward (Murphy, 1990). And Denise Bostdorff (2003) notes that it is this American jeremiad that allowed President George W. Bush, in the aftermath of 9/11, to

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8 The Beijing Conference in 1995 was part of an ongoing effort to assess the human rights of women around the world which continue in earnest today (“United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women”).
rally the nation, to renew its faith in the principles of American culture, and to be unified in our faith that the nation would persevere. American public address draws attention to the ways in which the jeremiad is primed to facilitate calls of renewal in moments of crisis precisely because it is able to animate problematics and prescribe solutions premised on existing values so long as the audience seeks to renew the covenant with the speaker, others and in certain cases institutions. Renewal as rhetorical form – particularly as it relates to institutions – has also been taken up by organizational communication scholars. When faced with an organizational crisis, leaders often seek to re-establish a commitment to that institution as a means to avoid abandonment. Renewal is rendered rhetorically possible by encouraging stakeholders, and employees in particular are to see value in the organizational mission and to rebuild (Ulmer, Seeger and Sellnow, 2006). Renewal rhetoric in this organizational context is prospective, value laden and encourages a reconstitution of the institution. The rhetoric of President Clinton harnesses the American jeremiad and organizational reconstitution within his public address.

The international political scene for the duration of the Clinton administration is marked by questions about how a new order will take place. While this does not evoke crisis, the possibilities for dramatic shifts and challenges to order could very well emerge. It is this context that allows for the deployment of an American jeremiad premised on renewal. President Clinton (1993) deploys a thematic of political change and its possibilities to disrupt international order. In his first address to the UNGA, he notes, “at his moment of panoramic change, of vast opportunities and troubling threats, we must all ask ourselves what we can do and what we should do as a community of nations.” The discourse works to establish him as a leader because of his forward looking calls to anticipate the problematic future and to act early and accordingly. Four years later, Clinton (1996) notes, “now we find ourselves at a turning point in history,” as a
result of global macroeconomic changes, but, “this is also an age of new threats.” And the following year, he (1997) states, “The forces of global integration are a great tide, inexorably wearing away the established order of things,” and that the community of nations, “must decide what will be left in its wake.” The moment of panoramic change positions the international community on the precipice of crisis. The juxtaposition of opportunity and threat works to provide a warrant for the imperative of the United Nations. He bolsters this argument by drawing the audience’s attention to the originary trauma that brought the United Nations as an institution into being. Clinton (1993) observes that, “a farsighted generation of leaders from the United States and elsewhere rallied the world,” and that, “their efforts built the institutions of postwar security and prosperity.” Covenant renewal is to be made with each other and those who labored to provide for international collective security through the construction of the institution. And this renewal in the United Nations should work to advance goals premised on universal values.

The contours of the American jeremiad, where the audience is encouraged to maintain faith in the institution and to chart a path forward, takes on a cosmopolitan dimension in Clinton’s address. The formation of renewal premised on covenant requires that leaders of all nations approach each other from a perspective of respect and equality. Indeed, Clinton (1995) argues that this cosmopolitan covenant is what makes action within and by the United Nations possible:

The United Nations is the product of faith and knowledge: Faith that different peoples can work together for tolerance, decency, and peace; knowledge that this faith will be forever tested by the forces of intolerance, depravity, and aggression. Now we must summon that faith and act on that knowledge to meet the challenges of a new era.
In what might be the most complete and succinct argument for renewal, values of the institution – held to be universal – work to enact a civil religion. Because different peoples value tolerance, decency and peace, it is possible to have faith that cross-cultural political work will provide solutions to what was already described as an era of promise and peril. The President also deploys the concept of human rights to articulate a system of shared values by which renewal of the institution can occur. Clinton (1997) notes, “The United Nations must be prepared to respond not only by setting standards but by implementing them,” which for him means establishing a, “core mission,” able “to defend and extend universal human rights and to help democracy’s remarkable gains endure.” Clinton extends his understanding of human rights as universal because these rights are, “not American rights, not Western rights, not rights for the developed world only but rights inherent in the humanity of people everywhere.” The articulation of a shared system of values enshrined by the United Nations allows Clinton to deploy a rhetoric of renewal through covenant.

The final step of renewal is reconstitution of the institution. Here, the appeals are quite simple; if the challenge to the international order is actually dissent from that order, then the natural move is to, “develop a concrete plan to meet the challenges of the next 50 years” (Clinton, 1994). Terrorism, ethnic conflict and totalitarianism as the anti-democratic forms of political resistance will persist, but Clinton maintains that such threats can be contained if the international community reconstitutes the United Nations anew. Clinton discourse lays plain the stabilizing concrete value of the United Nations to the international order through the institution’s good works. The President is also attentive to the historical tendency for some nations to withdraw from international politics in times of peace, and rightly worries that a lack of sustained engagement could unwind gains that have been made through recent democratic and
economic transitions. As a result, Clinton’s rhetoric works to invest the United Nations with abstract values such as representing the highest aspirations of humanity in order to ensure engagement by the diverse set of local audiences, including his own domestic constituencies.

5.2.2 Reconfiguration of the Global through Reform

Clinton’s characterological family of values was harnessed to make the case for reforms to provide the United Nations with new capabilities, and allowing for greater engagement at both the global and local level. A presidential model for reform already existed. Ronald Reagan, well known for his disdain for “big government,” persistently pushed for reform of the United Nations’ bureaucracy as well. Reagan (1986), in an address to the General Assembly, declared that “this organization itself faces a critical hour.” The crisis had been precipitated by the President himself, since he had continually complained that arms control treaties were unverifiable, that UN programs were too wastefully organized, that the price imposed on the United States was too much waste and that the financial burdens placed upon the United States were too high (Barnes and Stuckey, 2012). Reagan (1986) went further by recognizing that he had issued an ultimatum to the organization: “And I said that if the necessary reforms were adopted, the United States, ‘which has always given the U.N. generous support, will continue to play a leading role in the effort to achieve its noble purposes.’” Reagan (1986) then claimed victory when the negotiation of reforms had been completed by noting that, “my administration has long advocated such reforms, so we are very pleased that these measures have finally been adopted.”

Clinton suggests that previous failures and a changing international system require redemption on the part of the United Nations. Relative to the originating moment of the United Nations, the connections between nations, economies, and peoples had profoundly changed. And
the President questioned whether the global community needed to “think anew about whether our institutions of international cooperation are adequate to this moment.” This is not the patronizing call for reform offered by his Republican predecessors (especially Reagan), but rather a genuine call to consider reforms that permit global governance to remain practical and possible. To achieve his goals, Clinton would need to provide an account of the international scene that would require both reform and reinvestment if the United Nations were to remain relevant to all nations, not simply the United States.⁹

The existence of two fundamental situational changes are deployed to substantiate calls for reform. First, Clinton notes that bureaucracy at the United Nations had grown in scope, a fact justifying both greater resourcing and organizational reform. Further, as Clinton (1993) contends, “the superpower standoff that for so long stymied the United Nations work almost from its first day has now yielded to a new promise of practical cooperation.” And while cooperation remained a possibility, bureaucratic inertia suggested that such cooperation might be hard to come by. In other words, if the day to day operations of an institution are predicted in not accomplishing tasks to achieve goals through cooperation, problems will emerge precisely when cooperation is needed most. Reform in Clinton’s mind was therefore necessary.¹⁰ Second, as has been documented throughout the chapter, Clinton was attuned to the paradoxical nature of the cosmopolitan condition; interdependence opens up new possibilities for cooperation between

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⁹ This approach was also deployed in relation to U.S. dues. Clinton, particularly spurred by domestic Republican opposition, struggled to acquire funds for U.S. arrears to the institution. Where Reagan was confrontational, Clinton adopted a politically astute position. He simply noted the domestic political constraints to securing funding at the levels desired and as a result, the arrears for the United States were reduced in part.

¹⁰ Clinton (1995) argues, “Reform requires breaking up bureaucratic fiefdoms, eliminating obsolete agencies, and doing more with less.” Yet this was the only public declaration and this passage is suggestive much more as an attempt to quell domestic opposition to international spending. However, Clinton did work through the proper channels to introduce reforms on peacekeeping but also to support the efforts of other nations to propose reforms (Müller & Müller2001).
nations with shared values and global governance but cultural and economic linkages can also be exploited by those seeking to disrupt the security of the nation state. Adaptive and reflexive governments were already making changes to “move against the threats of this new global era,” by adopting a common security strategy” (Clinton, 1995). However, this common security strategy was predicated on existing institutions being able to achieve the mission of “democratic enlargement.”\textsuperscript{11} To remain relevant, the United Nations needed to integrate itself into what Clinton labeled the “information age,” which entailed updating communication and command infrastructure to be responsive to fluid situations. To fulfill its humanitarian goals, the UN needed to redirect resources to the establishment of more robust capabilities and to coordinate with non-governmental organizations.

President Clinton’s rhetoric of reform was paired with appeals for the reconstitution of the United Nations. He understood that the collapse of Soviet Union and transitions of the multiple client states of the former Soviet Union could present a series of challenges to the international community. To this end, Clinton argued that reconstituting the United Nations as an influential participant in collective security could work to shore up the normative structures that most nations had agreed to during the Cold War. Clinton, quite rightly, worried that without the exigency created by that conflict, the justification of existing normative practices might wane. “This system will develop and endure only if those who follow the rules of peace and freedom fully reap their rewards,” said Clinton. But either way, some system would emerge. The only question was thus whether the United Nations would be at the center or the periphery of this new international political system. A case for the relevance of the UN was necessary.

\textsuperscript{11} Here, Clinton is referring to the expansion of NATO, the negotiation of free trade regimes which include the North American Free Trade Act and the World Trade Organization.
In this context, calls for covenant renewal worked to unite audiences around a shared mission, and proposed reforms were designed to reinforce this covenant by improving the operational capacity of the organization. President Clinton (1997) observed that the core missions it had pursued during its first half-century would be just as relevant during the next half-century: “the pursuit of peace and security, promoting human rights, and moving people from poverty to dignity and prosperity through sustainable development.” If the international community were to take the covenant seriously, by collectively accepting the challenge of global security where nations and non-state actors chose to flaunt international rules, the instantiation and implementation of peacekeeping would also need to be reformed.

5.2.3 Peacekeeping Proposals

President Clinton understood that the power structures of the Cold War, particularly throughout Eastern Europe and the Middle East, had suppressed religious and ethnic fissures, and that the absence of those structures allowed these fissures to emerge and potentially engulf whole nations and regions. In his 1993 address, he observed: “For as we all now know so painfully, the end of the cold war did not bring us to the millennium of peace,” concluding that, “it simply removed the lid from many cauldrons of ethnic, religious, and territorial animosity.” The problem, then, was not that nations ignored an international political order premised on the formalization of rules and norms through law – with Iraq and North Korea considered outliers – it was that such an order had not anticipated the weakening and potential collapse of the nation state. Despite decades of experience in under-developed regions of Africa and Latin America, the system had not conceived of an alternative politics where the nation state played an increasingly insignificant role in political and military outcomes. Clinton, by contrast, suggests that, “U.N. peacekeeping holds the promise to resolve many of this era's conflicts.” For the
Clinton administration, peacekeeping operations had the potential to both prevent conflict (despite the agent and their motivation) and restore peace.

Peacekeeping also afforded President Clinton an opportunity to make the case for reforms that could reconstitute the United Nations as a stronger and more capable participant in securing peace. The case relied on three claims: first, the authorization of peacekeeping missions had increased dramatically. He noted (1993) that, “Today, there is wide recognition that the U.N. peacekeeping ability has not kept pace with the rising responsibilities and challenges. Just 6 years ago, about 10,000 U.N. peacekeepers were stationed around the world. Today, the U.N. has some 80,000 deployed in 17 operations on 4 continents.” Second, Clinton argues that resources and technical capabilities have not kept pace with the demands of military leaders on the ground: “if a peacekeeping commander called in from across the globe when it was nighttime here in New York, there was no one in the peacekeeping office even to answer the call. When lives are on the line, you cannot let the reach of the U.N. exceed its grasp.” Implicit in all this is the idea that if human life is a shared value, and that life is on the line – specifically because a group of nations has determined it should be there as part of a peacekeeping operation – that the community of nations had a responsibility to provide additional resources to improve mission success.

Next, the President aligned himself with the Secretary General to call for reforms: “As the Secretary-General and others have argued, if U.N. peacekeeping is to be a sound security investment for our nation and for other U.N. members, it must adapt to new times. Together we must prepare U.N. peacekeeping for the 21st century.” For example, the administration recognized the need to bolster the intelligence capabilities of the United Nations.¹² The call for

¹² This report supports the argument that the Clinton administration’s foreign policy was predicated on institution building. A report to Congress makes the case; “To the extent that a U.N. peacekeeping
reconstitution of peacekeeping went beyond providing the necessary funding and resources. Clinton argued that fundamentally, the international community required a new metric for analysis. “We need to begin by bringing the rigors of military and political analysis to every U.N. peace mission,” in order to assess whether the mission should be approved.

Clinton hoped that the United States could serve as a model for this type of reform. As Anthony Lake, National Security Council advisor to the President, noted, “I want to work to save every child out there,” continuing, “and I know the President does, and I know the American people do” (1994). However, “neither we [the United States] nor the international community have either the mandate, nor the resources, nor the possibility of resolving every conflict of this kind” (Lake, 1994). As a result, the President asked for a review that would “make distinctions,” and “ask hard questions about where and when we can intervene” (Lake, 1994). The problem, the administration had concludes, was that the international scene was stable at the superpower level, where multiple fissures at the local and regional level had pushed the international community and the institutions they established to provide for the peace far past its limits. The rhetoric of the administration, then, tries to define possible horizons for action and subject each of these normative guideposts to criteria potentially inappropriate to the situation but culminating in results favoring U.S. interests. Where actors are willing to help alleviate conflict, Lake (1994)

operation may involve armed conflict, there is a genuine need for sophisticated intelligence” (Best, 1994). This report further specifies that peacekeeping operations have rarely relied on intelligence in the past – they move in once conflict has ceased – and if peacekeeping operations are to be more interventionist or even to provide the same type of collective security in the past, there is a real need for intelligence that allows PKO’s to be aware of hostile forces around them. In other words, one of the big criticisms of PKO’s in the past is that the operational parameters prevented them from engaging hostile forces – particularly forces bent on ‘ethnic cleansing’. A secondary criticism was that PKO forces were unable to engage because they didn’t have the battlefield synergy between communications technology/intelligence/and ‘boots on the ground’ to engage hostile forces. Enemies could easily move around PKO’s and engage in attacks without fear of reprisal. By increasing intelligence capabilities, PKO forces could increase their effectiveness.
argued, “we cannot often solve other people’s problems”; in such cases the best outcome would be that the “international community can … offer a kind of breathing space for the people involved to make and preserve their own peace.” And in cases of more striking limitations on the efficacy of peacekeeping (including cases where outright failure was a risk, such as in the case of Rwanda), the National Security Council should conduct a review of all operational decision-making within the United Nations to approve or disapprove of supplying resources to peacekeeping operations.

Presidential Decision Directive 25 was the product of this top down review. While the mechanism of an American executive order did lead Clinton to dramatically step away from the United Nations, a careful reading in light of the factors just described can help demonstrate how PDD 25 actually reinforced U.S. commitments to the UN and peacekeeping while providing transparency that could bolster public deliberation. The document is also interesting because it points to something not much considered to this point in scholarship. The United Nations is capable of influencing the nation state, but lines of influence are multidirectional. Other international actors also influence the UN. Peacekeeping during the Cold War was relatively successful because it was extremely limited – Cold War constraints meant peacekeeping would only occur when all five Security Council powers agreed that it was necessary, a rare outcome under conditions of superpower conflict. As a result, these limited engagements meant that states did not often have to consider troop number, monetary allocations, or other logistical factors, since a limited number of operations with a high number of participating nations produced adequate burden sharing.

13 Once the decision making process and the directive were complete, a secret memo circulated which contained a series of annexes which specified interpretation and implementation (“Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-25,” May 3).
As the administration wound down, Bush noted with regret that the number of peacekeeping operations had doubled. The number only increases under the Clinton administration, and the number, scope and expectations for peacekeeping missions were increasingly dramatically; yet the bureaucratic structure to deal with these changes was simply not taking place in the DOPK (department of peacekeeping operations) at the UN.\(^{14}\) Hence, PDD 25 also sets out a number of conditions that the administration would like to see accomplished in terms of reform. Whereas calls for reform typically evoked negative criticism, in this instance, reforms are advocated as positively necessary to create a more competent, technically informed and logistically capable division.\(^{15}\)

Across his General Assembly addresses, President Clinton claims that preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping operations are the only policy tools the international community has to prevent conflict from escalation. The cosmopolitan appeals here are often thin and premised on ambiguous appeals to international order because only this order seems possible. Clinton (1997) notes,

At this very moment, the United Nations is keeping the peace in 16 countries, often in partnership with regional organizations like NATO, the OAS, ASEAN, and ECOWAS, avoiding wider conflicts and even greater suffering. Our shared commitment to more realistic peacekeeping training for U.N. troops, a stronger role for civilian police, better

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\(^{14}\) A memo guiding policy decisions notes, “The UN needs to improve significantly its capability manage peace operations effectively as an integrated whole. At present, each operation is created and managed separately by an understaffed UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. As a result, support to the field may suffer, economics of scale are lost and work is duplicated.” (“Policy Guidance: U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations”).

\(^{15}\) The list of technical reforms were quite extensive. As a demonstration of the depth of thinking on this issue, the third appendix to PDD25 seeks to, “require the UN to have a status of forces agreement that provides preferential host nation support to a peace operation with the exception of countries where there is no central government (e.g. Somalia),” as a means to reduce costs (“Annex III – Finance and Budget Management Reforms”).
integration between military and civilian agencies, all these will help the United Nations to meet these missions in the years ahead.

By directing the attention of the international community to local flashpoints of ethnic violence, President Clinton attempted to demonstrate at once the insufficiency of the United Nations as presently organized and to use this condition to argue for reform as necessary to reconstitute a more capable international response. Again, thin lines of cosmopolitanism underwrite such efforts. Recognizing that the United States cannot and will not operate as a ‘global policeman’ is an invitational gesture for other nations to participate in providing for the collective security. Additionally, the positioning of human life as a unit of ultimate concern – the purpose of peacekeeping missions – as a justification for increasing the operational capabilities of the United Nations works to instantiate a cosmopolitan perspective in security issues.

5.3 Conclusion

Bureaucratic inertia is difficult for any actor to overcome, particularly presidents who oversee entrenched institutions. The fact of the United Nations, with all its multilateral intrigue, only amplifies this problem. President Clinton was faced with an international political scene where globalization – already underway – was accelerating. As a result, the President often advocated for the potential opportunities to modify an existing cosmopolitan order in ways that would expand democracy and free markets, aspiring in turn for outcomes that would deliver stability and peace. But he also recognized that globalization produces fissures that threaten national destabilization, potentially regional chaos, requiring other actors and organizations to intervene. The contextual challenge for Clinton was that the United Nations was unprepared to deal with these changing conditions. Policies of containment had long kept in check simmering religious and ethnic tensions, but in the post-Cold War world, the number of operations
expanded dramatically (to thirty-eight by 1999) as the organization’s one best remedy was deployed again and again. Not only was the institution resource deprived, it was also unprepared from a technical perspective to manage the number of operations required to provide for the security of a collective of nations.

Given such constraints, the Clinton administration, while preserving its ability to act unilaterally (in some cases, executing unilateral action), often preferred multilateral diplomacy. And given that the National Security Strategy depended in part on the success of the United Nations to resolve global problems, the primary goal of Clinton as ‘negotiator in chief,’ was thus to motivate the international community to productively resolve institutional bulwarks that prevented action.

Clinton UN rhetoric thus assumed that the existing cosmopolitan order was desirable, while their goals routinely encountered the challenge of producing near-universal agreement. The limited archives available demonstrate that this order was essential to the establishment of foreign policy. Strategists within the Clinton administration deployed presidential speech to build foreign support for elements of the administration’s national security policy. In a memo prepared for the State of the Union Address which followed the 1993 UNGA address, Berger (no date) notes, “As you explained in your speech to the U.N., core elements of our foreign policy … each advance a distinct mission but also serve a common purpose: to secure and strengthen democracy, peace and free markets while turning back their enemies.” Additionally, we can note that specific speeches from year to year attend to different crises as they arise.

This approach, however, also often revealed the limits on American power. Acts premised on a coherent strategic worldview thus looked weak or unsuccessful, tropes that continue to today haunt President Obama’s more recent efforts to mobilize international action.
In Clinton’s time, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, the International Criminal Court Treaty, and the Second Optional Protocol to Ban the Death Penalty, among others, became law. The rhetorical trap, where cosmopolitan commitments produced strong outcomes but looked weak, was the only available option. Eric Schwartz, Senior Director and Special Assistant to the President for Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs, hints at the problem in a memo to Samuel Berger (1997), “our tactics vary from one situation to another, and … we will continue to grapple with issues such as sanctions versus engagement – making judgments on case-by-case basis, the President could emphasize a particular set of priorities/tools his Administration has emphasized in the effort to promote democratization.” The administration knew that domestic audiences found their foreign policy unclear. But it was also the case that the priorities and criteria for judgment that would be deployed were firmly established by both Presidential Decision Directive 25, and in a series of National Security Strategies of the United States. In each rhetorical situation, Clinton persistently relied on the functioning of a cosmopolitan international order to assist in achieving U.S. security and economic objectives.

In executing this approach, Clinton’s rhetoric was deeply pragmatic. He tended to argue from presuppositions that normalized the present situation as historically preordained (that democracy and free markets were universal aspirations, for instance). Rather than demonizing others (with his discourse on terrorism a notable exception), Clinton’s more usual tendency was to stipulate a specific problem resulting from globalization and then to pursue development of the international order as the solution. As such, his rhetoric tended to assume that there are universal values which can be used to constitute a political order based on existing institutions. Situated within a characterological family of expressed values (democracy, free markets and
renewal), Clinton’s proposals could reach multiple audiences with some success, in turn suggesting a vision of a United Nations as capable of responding to crises. And finally, Clinton worked to reassure the international community that his policy of engagement was not predicated on imperial ambition but rather resulted from a recognition of the special position that the United States occupied. And as evidence, he often pointed to cooperative multilateral efforts of the United States to support this position.

In contrast to a reading of the Clinton years that simply has him latching onto cosmopolitanism as a convenient cover, used when appropriate to American interests and ignored when inconvenient, I argue for a more nuanced account. It is certainly the case that diplomatic cosmopolitanism functioned to assist in creating assent for Clinton’s policies. But it is also likely that such appeals could only be successful because cosmopolitanism genuinely anchored his foreign policy. Writing during the time, David Deudney and John Ikenberry (1996) observed that communication was fundamentally important to processes of persuasion in the emergent scene of international hegemony:

Transnational connections between the actors in a hegemonic system constitute a complex communication system that is continuously shaping preferences and thus moderating the divergence of interests among actors in the system. Because of the accessible state structure and transnational state processes, the arrows of influence are not in one direction -- from the center to the periphery -- as in the hegemonic model, but rather run in both directions, producing a fundamentally reciprocal political order.

President Clinton recognized the globally complex system of interaction between states and deployed a cosmopolitan rhetoric to seek out where lines of assent could be formed that
aligned with national interest. It thus comes as no surprise that Clinton’s discourse is the one that feels the most amorphous, but it also pushes the limits of the real necessity of the United Nations and what the UN as an institution can do within a moment of genuine complexity. A clever or particularly sophisticated version of cosmopolitanism is not at work in these texts. Rather, the value of analyzing President Clinton derives from noting how apparent swings from one urgent issue to another nonetheless reveal the near-total conceptual flexibility of cosmopolitan rhetoric as a doctrinal assistant.

6 Conclusion

One year and a day after September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush delivered an address to the General Assembly of the United Nations. Given the setting, and globally pluralistic audience in attendance, early passages in the speech paid respect to the institution of the United Nations by recognizing the mission to chart a path for global peace. He noted, “The United Nations was born in the hope that survived a world war, the hope of a world moving toward justice, escaping old patterns of conflict and fear. The founding members resolved that the peace of the world must never again be destroyed by the will and wickedness of any man.” Bush briefly elaborated the efforts of the United States and its responsibility to build a better world by “joining with the world to supply aid where it reaches people and lifts up lives, to extend trade and the prosperity it brings, and to bring medical care where it is desperately needed.” To that end, the president announced that the United States would also be joining UNESCO, an agency dedicated to educational, scientific and cultural outreach.¹

¹ After helping to establish the organization in 1948, President Reagan announced a decision to withdraw U.S. membership in December 1983, a decision that took full effect one year later. Preston, et. al.
But the Bush speech is more commonly remembered for the deliberative case it makes for enforcement of UN resolutions against Iraq and the specific recalcitrance of Saddam Hussein. Bush argued the Iraqi regime was a “grave and gathering danger” based on its history of using chemical warfare against its own population and because of its collusion with Iran in attempting to develop biological and nuclear weapons. To that end, Bush posed the question: “Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?” He concluded by arguing that resolutions must be enforced, that the United States was willing to enforce those resolutions unilaterally if the rest of the world was not prepared to join, but that the U.S. would give the world another chance at collective by affirming a new United States-sponsored resolution, against Iraq, through the UN Security Council.

The address was critiqued and praised by all sides, and, interestingly enough, on similar grounds. Conservatives commentators agreed with Bush that the legitimacy of the United Nations was at risk. Brett Shaefer and Bake Spring, research fellows at the Heritage Foundation, argued that “Unless the United Nations wishes to follow the League of Nations into irrelevance, U.N. member states must support a more aggressive policy toward Iraq to demonstrate the organization’s resolve and to make evident that its Security Council resolutions must be observed” (2002). Centrists argued that if the United States was going to move militarily against Iraq, only a multilateral strategy of collaborative military action would succeed and be perceived legitimate by the wider international community. Michael O’ Hanlon, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, noted that “by presenting Hussein with a strong international coalition, it increases the odds that he will relent and allow disarmament of his dangerous weapons to resume

al. (1989) provide a fuller accounting of the long and complicated political relationship between UNESCO and the United States.
— while also increasing the odds that, if we have to fight him, we will do so with solid allied support” (2002).

And yet if the right and the center read the speech as inherently multilateralist and applauded passage of the new resolution, the left read the speech as being utterly unilateral. Stephen Zunes, a professor of politics at the University of San Francisco, argued, “The US insistence on the right to attack unilaterally could seriously undermine the principle of collective security and the authority of the UN and, in doing so, would open the door to international anarchy” (2002). And, the editor of The Progressive claimed that President Bush’s speech would “go down in history as one of the most arrogant speeches ever given,” because “one country cannot put itself above all others, above the Security Council, and above the U.N. Charter. That is no system of international law; that's the law of the jungle” (2002). While many audiences heard the speech as offering a stringent case against the Hussein regime in Iraq, reading the responses to George W. Bush’s speech at the General Assembly demonstrates the complex spectrum by which we apprehend and process cross-cultural messages where frameworks of state power are at work. The same appeal is not only differently read, but attaches to no guarantee that audiences will even find its claims comprehensible.

The General Assembly and Security Council can be relegated into insignificance when presidents assert unilateral power as the interests of the United States. Both bodies have been consulted when presidential strategy might benefit from international approval – thereby providing political cover at home and abroad – for military intervention, and this is even true when unilateral U.S. interests seek mostly to manufacture the impression of coalition. In cases where others do not follow America’s lead, the President demonstrates a willingness to defy international opinion and at times international law. Because these efforts can enact high drama,
they often capture the public’s imagination and bolster critics eager to downplay the United Nations’ relevance. Despite the obvious constraints on the United Nations when it tries to contain hegemonic ambitions, the United Nations still figures prominently in U.S. foreign policy thinking. Additionally, as a forum to which every nation sends representatives, it has provided immense opportunities, particularly when unilateral action is neither politically desirable nor sufficient to solve a local, regional or global problem.

6.1 The Cosmopolitan Condition and Constructivist Politics

A persistent theme in the analysis undertaken here is that globality – the saturation of interconnectivity which in turn makes interdependence permanent – is the primary marker of the contemporary international political moment. It is likely that globality will only decrease the ability of unilateral action to solve the most pressing problems of the day. The Islamic State, an adventurist Russia in Ukraine, Ebola and other diseases, and global warming with its myriad economic and human costs, will dominate the agenda of international institutions such as the United Nations. A key challenge for American presidential leadership is to effectively partner with other nations to overcome cross-cultural, economic or political differences to solve problems truly global in scope.

A key academic marker of the contours of globalism was publication of the edited volume *Debating Cosmopolitics*, which asked a group of scholars to interrogate whether the world would be a better place, or at least how it might look, if full democratization were to take hold and an end state of universal “cosmopolis” were to be achieved. What sort of public spheres exist? Are those spheres amenable to the formation of cosmopolis? And if public spheres are necessarily exclusionary, then by what means can access to political life be assured for the average citizen? Taken together, the main question becomes: is there a cosmopolitan public
sphere? Who can participate? And are these participants different from those who participate in the liberal internationalist public sphere?

While this dissertation does not offer a means to answer these questions in full, for students of presidential power, the aim has been to track the relationship between public communicative effort and the possibilities for a wider democratic international polity. No American President can convey a total measure of identification with universal audiences in such a way as to be plausibly and fully cosmopolitan; even if a President wished to do so, he or she will be institutionally and politically constrained. And yet, I have argued, the United Nations and its representatives do constitute a meta-interpretive community where symbolic action can share worldviews and, one might hope, the possibilities for collective action. On the world stage, no figure exerts more influence, nor a greater capacity to stage and enact agonistic and dramatic conflict, than the American President. Moments of cosmopolitan conflict, where local and global interests are deliberated and potentially reconciled, thus open grounds for controversy and interpretation.

Invoking the concept of cosmopolitan crisis is to invoke the work of Ulrich Beck (1992, 2002, 2004a, 2004b, 2006, 2011). For Beck, there are two sides to the coin of crisis. On one side of the coin is the interconnectedness related to processes of globalization, which in turn establishes the grounds for what he labels ‘shared risk.’ The opposite side of the coin from shared risk is the idea of a shared collective future. For Beck, articulations of a shared collective future contradict state-centric versions of the future (Beck, 2002). And while there is some debate over the accuracy and desirability of such observations (Calhoun, 2003, 2007), Beck’s persistent focus on risk does point to a key inventional resource able to open possibilities for thin lines of cosmopolitan argument to forge stronger identificatory bonds over time.
Perhaps it is a truism that any President of the United States will certainly come to understand the concept of shared risk. Operating from the principle that presidential speech maintains particularly efficacy in the forum of the United Nations, my goal has been to conceptualize how presidents have positioned themselves for identification with others and how presidential speech at the United Nations might work at the very least to provide a vision for international order, either in generic or particular terms or through attempts to influence the agenda of the General Assembly.

To make claims about the efficacy of discourse in relation to international policy is to tread into the terrain of international relations scholarship. Realism as a persistent intellectual paradigm of political scientists continues to resist scholarship focused on discourse. But realism may now be understood as on the theoretical defensive. In the aftermath of the Cold War, international relations theorists began to question whether realism had ongoing conceptual staying power given profound changes in the international system, including the more complicated interactive dynamics entailed by multipolarity. The development of international law and norms, the proliferation of international and non-governmental institutions and the growing interdependence of nations that resulted from globalization have presented serious challenges to theories of state power that rest mainly on the assertion of hegemonic military capabilities.

Constructivist alternatives have gained a following, even if only starting with consensus built around the simply proposition that “anarchy is what states make of it.” This idea, in turn, draws attention to the notion that international political behavior is influenced by the sociability of interlocutors: members of the international epistemic community have ability to influence others while also being influenced by others. Among the unique tasks set for this project has
been the goal of mapping some of the most influential differing articulations of cosmopolitanism within the General Assembly and, secondly, to explain how those articulations might influence and be influenced by other nations and actors.

The horizon for criticism is limited by the subject position of the critic. As an American, traditionally trained at various stages in political science and rhetoric, in conjunction with lived experience, a focus on the presidency of the United States while maintaining attention to shared risk has seemed the more profitable path. Premised on a social constructivist reading of language, the invention of symbols can define the ‘social imaginary’ and that these imaginaries organize and categorize the world (Castriota, 1992). In this way then, imagination invents the symbols that in turn provide meaning to the local world. A cosmopolitan imagination is necessary to balance inevitable friction between local and global interests.

To be clear, a cosmopolitan imagination requires presidents to inhabit a specific subject position. Gerald Delanty argues that to inhabit this position requires a “sense of openness as opposed to a closed or particularistic view of the world” (2009, p. 14). Openness in a cosmopolitan imagination is the result of slippage between understandings of oneself, understanding of others, and understanding of the world. This slippage produces a subject position that recognizes the value of a multiplicity of social imaginaries, which also contributes to self-reflexivity. And it is this self-reflexivity that empowers the imagination to push past existing social constructions and their constraints on what can or should be done.

Put differently, “cosmopolitanism understood in terms of immanent transcendence refers to an internally induced social change whereby societies and social agents undergo transformation in their moral and political self-understanding as they respond to global challenges” (Delanty, 2009, p. 251). Delanty concludes that globalization provides the external
preconditions for the emergence of a cosmopolitan imagination. Applied to this study, emerging risks shared by the community of nations provides the precursor by which a cosmopolitan imaginary might emerge within presidential rhetoric. For example, the threat of mutually assured destruction was the defining risk of Kennedy’s presidency, the splintering of the Soviet Union the shared risk of the H.W. Bush presidency for Clinton, renewed ethnic conflict, genocide and terrorism in failing states constituted threats to the United States and for George W. Bush terrorism was the marker of shared risk. These moments of risk within globalization should produce rhetorical interventions that seek to reshape the international imaginary.

Reading presidential rhetoric through the lens of the cosmopolitan condition provides additional benefits as well. First, cosmopolitan crisis provides an empirically more precise framework for understanding context. Rhetorical critics have long attended to the symbiotic relationship between text and context (Lucas, 1988, p. 20). And rhetoricians have persistently elaborated theories specifying this relationship through situation. But neither Bitzer nor Vatz could map the multiplicity of territorial or culturally bound contexts and where they might overlap (Bitzer, 1968; Vatz, 1973). What constitutes a risk and the manner in which risk is shared as a result can specify a particular set of overlapping connections.

Focus on the cosmopolitan imagination also enables a specific reading of public communication able to yield insight into the self-reflexivity of the rhetor and in this case, the President of the United States. Competing speech provides a means through which one might evaluate different imaginations and how those imaginations constitute what the world could and should be like, and identification is thus enabled. The cosmopolitan condition then provides markers of a rhetoric where a horizon for ‘good decision-making’ incorporates notions of shared risk, an openness towards others and a reflexivity about one’s own position in the world.
6.2 What the Kennedy, Bush and Clinton Cases Reveal

The Kennedy, first Bush, and Clinton presidencies were chosen because they demonstrate the variability of diplomatic cosmopolitanism. Each presidency begins on uncertain terms, especially as the world aims to understand the emergence of new foreign policy directions. Each president enters offices with a different level of foreign policy expertise: some enter office with long experience and the work of the early presidency is the work of applying a predetermined worldview to global problems (e.g., Eisenhower). Others enter as foreign policy novices, elected on platforms or under circumstances more attentive to domestic matters (e.g., Truman, Johnson, Carter, Clinton, G.W. Bush). And still others bring well-developed geopolitical perspectives to bear, but into situations of upheaval that modify even records of long experience (Nixon, G.H.W. Bush). These varying levels of entering experience raise a number of questions about the possibilities for the expression of globalized or cosmopolitan perspectives. Among the benefits of a cross-presidential perspective is that it provides an opening to examine cases where a new president may start with cosmopolitan preferences that may then soften over time (arguably, this is the Kennedy case). In others instances, a new president enters office and ends up reverting to cosmopolitan talk as a way to frame emerging matters of geopolitical change (the Bush case). And in others, inexperience may invite a new president to sustain a discourse of cosmopolitan invitation that nonetheless is significantly nuanced by the passage of time and press of events (e.g., Clinton).

While other international leaders are most likely appraised of positions taken during the campaign we need no reminder that governing is different than campaigning and the emergence of a new presidency often forces changes, sometimes drastic ones (such as the sharp change in focus in the G.W. Bush presidency pre- and post-9/11), onto administrative discourses. As a
result, every president struggles to establish or to adhere to a paradigm or doctrinal worldview (and I would argue this is true even if an emerging geopolitical perspective is read as opaque or unclear to outside audiences and media interpreters) in order to demonstrate an ability to lead while signaling intent and interest to others.

Each of the cases examined here are similar in that Kennedy, Bush, and Clinton all found the United Nations General Assembly an opportune forum for the articulation of a vision of the United States position in the world and within the broader international order. John F. Kennedy, facing the prospects of a bullying Khrushchev in light of the intervention at the Bay of Pigs sought to tip the balance of power in favor of the United States by positioning himself for identification with those nations emerging from colonialism which were receiving recognition as independent countries and thus receiving a vote on all resolutions in the General Assembly. George H. W. Bush, seeking to differentiate himself from his predecessor and careful not to upset democratic transitions already under way in Soviet client states, found the United Nations a productive location whereby a ‘new world order’ could be established and defended which would serve the interests of all nations thereby serving the interests of the United States. And William Jefferson Clinton, lacking entirely in foreign policy credentials and faced with spiraling ethnic tensions, sought to establish international leadership by extending institutional peacekeeping capacity. In each case, addresses to the United Nations were significant moments to articulate a foreign policy vision and in each case, these visions would frame each return trip with two exceptions: the invasion of Kuwait and the terrorist bombings of embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. Presidents then seek to reify the fantasy of global leadership by establishing themselves as having a vision that demonstrates prudence.
Presidents also differently articulate their own versions of a diplomatic cosmopolitanism. For Kennedy, the operating parameters for the Cold War were entrenched. It was not possible to impose freedom or an American vision of international order through a projection of American power: this vision and order could however be maintained by American power. The challenge then for Kennedy was to assure the allies that the competing order would not win the day and to demonstrate to the non-aligned nations why they should side with the United States. In essence, diplomatic cosmopolitanism engaged along the lines of strategic coercion envisioned by Medhurst and Krebs/Jackson. They read Cold War presidential discourse as positioning the Soviet Union as a scapegoat, while providing justifications for American power projection around the world (Medhurst, 1987; Krebs & Jackson, 2007).

The terrain was changing by the time George H.W. Bush assumed office. While the underlying Cold War logics persisted, the enemy in Bush’s talk is less likely to be a competing order (the Soviets), but, rather, tectonic shifts then underway within the international order. The dramatic Gorbachev reforms and later, the entire collapse of the Soviet Union, provided a kairotic moment for Bush to offer an interpretation of history that if accepted would justify both the position of the United States during the Cold War while providing the notional ground by which the permanence of a democratic and economically liberal order could be made permanent. The United Nations provided a venue for Bush where diplomatic cosmopolitanism could counterpose America’s interest in stable democratization with the interests of other nations, in a rhetoric that recognized them as actors possessing agency and thus sharing in the responsibility to solve global problems.

The highly varying and contingent nature of this transitional geopolitical order also shaped the Clinton foreign policy. The problem, as Clinton saw it, was neither tyranny nor
lawlessness but the possibility for chaos opened up by the collapse of the bipolar world and American reluctance to step forward to solve every problem (a reluctance shared by Clinton himself). Within this problematic, and given more important domestic priorities and emergent Republican opposition, Clinton’s rhetoric worked to establish and extend international norms capable of regularizing behavior by reconstituting the United Nations as a more capable actor. Such a strategy relied in part on the negotiation of treaties that could provide a collective architecture for security and economic stability.

Each presidential case reiterates the paradoxical nature of diplomatic cosmopolitanism. The United Nations General Assembly offers a staging ground for American power in the world while diplomatic cosmopolitanism, I have argued, provides its ongoing rationale. The contingency of situation allows for presidents to interpellate the international order as being supportive of U.S. interests and democracy. But historically reiterated symbols and representation leaves always open the possibility that other geopolitical contenders will come forward and sometimes successfully offer a competing vision that operates at the expense of American power projection. In other words, even when presidents seem to most fully rely on cosmopolitan rhetorics as a simple cover for imperial interests (Reagan was straightforward in this regard), cosmopolitanism discourses do not always serve empire, since they open spaces of controversy and opposition that might over time shift underlying relations of power. President’s never hesitate to declare the prominence of U.S. power and rarely apologize for the exercise of that power. But these case studies do suggest discursive logics that can be utilized over time to reshape global affairs as new states ascend on the world stage.
6.3 Diplomatic Cosmopolitanism(s): A Rhetorical Approach to Presidential Ordering of International Politics

Presidential address at the United Nations General Assembly reveals rhetorical modes where the mechanics of power are constrained by the need to reach out to international allies and perhaps the world. At cosmopolitan moments, as opposed to moments of bilateral crisis where presidential administrations backslide into positions that are nationally familiar, rhetoric is used to construct a set of facts that are wielded to shape context and leverage support for policy options. Fissures that produce ethnic conflict at the local level require explanatory accounts that provide a foundation for articulating appropriate political responses. When economic activity disrupts local or national economies with potential spillover effects, the need arises to understand the motivations that direct capital flows. Discourses about these activities typically take the form of narrative; for example, war provides different readings of protagonists and antagonists with specific motivations and economic flows, and the struggle of competing business interests provide different readings of plot and drama. The United Nations General Assembly as a meta-interpretive community tasked with maintaining global order necessarily renders judgment about globally competing narratives that explain our world. As such, presidential speech, while not necessarily exhibiting narrative features, can be read as intervening into these broader narrative discourses.

I have argued that public address produced under such conditions is usefully read as a diplomatic cosmopolitan rhetoric. Cosmopolitanism is a productive lens through which rhetoric can be apprehended because it anticipates the possibility of polysemic coherence (even if such a possibility is predicated on very thin dimensions of communicative solidarity, speaker to audience and the reverse) in messaging for the divergent globally composite and domestic
audiences of presidential address. Diplomatic cosmopolitanism will thus tend to reflect specific values, including but not limited to: equal worth and dignity, active agency, personal responsibility, consent, collective decision-making, inclusiveness, avoidance of serious harm and sustainability. This rhetoric foregrounds the paradox between the need to act globally to protect collectivities of humans and the need to respect state sovereignty as a condition for moving beyond a system rooted in anarchy. The paradox reveals itself when one nation interprets the norms and principles of international ordering to support a case for action that can be described as defensive and the international community disagrees, calling for international action against the offending state. Another contextual marker of diplomatic cosmopolitanism centers on the need for enforcement at the institutional level of global policy. Yet enforcement is unevenly applied, and deliberative communication practices are critical to underwriting international action. International norms, then, are the strongest case for the constitutive ordering effects of diplomatic cosmopolitanism, and the persistence of anti-global movements (demonstrations against capitalism or the persistence of jihad that fuels Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, Boko Haram and al-Shabab) demonstrate the limitations of this rhetorical approach. These findings point to broader implications for understanding constitutive rhetoric.

Constitutive rhetoric allows for the powerful formation of thick lines of identification precisely because those identifications are local. They call a people to join a community and are often premised on conceptions of homelands, spilled blood, shared kin and shared cultures. Maurice Charland’s (1987) contribution to constitute rhetoric maps narrative effects to explicate the ideological structuring of an individual’s subjectivity. For him, three narrative effects are present in constitutive rhetoric: 1) a collective subject is established, 2) the collectivity is premised on a trans-historical subject which forms a consubstantial bridge to the present and 3)
this collectivity provides an ‘illusion of freedom’ – individuals view themselves as having agency to act, yet ideological structure informs what actions should be taken, thereby limiting agency. Review of these parameters through the findings of diplomatic cosmopolitanism point to deficiencies in the existing account of constitutive effects that produce a global subject thereby suggesting avenues for future research.

6.3.1 The Constitutive Collective

The local subject already constituted would presumably inhibit the ability of a president to persuade, particularly in moments where presidents attempt to re-constitute international order through the United Nations. International order at once requires individual subjects to interpellate themselves as belong to a global collective – potentially in opposition to their pre-existing local affiliations – while also requiring nation states to certify political acts that might require a violation of sovereignty. Political order (democratic or otherwise) requires interpellation of local subjectivities to influence agential action conducive to governing, but this requires individual subjects to recognize themselves as the object of discourse. Rhetors seeking to establish a global order face two challenges: first, the local subject might not recognize themselves as the object of discourse; second, the interpellation of a local subject to a global collective requires an ideological positioning that at once transcends the conditions of the local while imposing obligations for action at the level of the local. Michael Calvin McGee (1980) argues that audiences can be united or separated through the use of “high order abstractions” dedicated to “normative goals” trafficked to sustain adherence to particular types of ideologies. Further, the rhetorical work of these ideographs is “culture bound.” So while the ideograph might help scholars to understand fissures that emerge between audiences situated to receive a global message from a U.S. president, it is precisely these locally powerful ideographs that may shut
down possibilities for identification on a wider or global scale. Even in cases where an ideograph might travel well across cultural lines, the polysemic dimensions of ideographic expression may prevent a consistent or coherent path to identification. In other words, a president can deploy <freedom> as an ideographic construct, and it is likely that many, if not all, cultures will have a way of understanding that term. But interpretations of <freedom> as the absence of government, or a view of <freedom> as only possible through the protection of government, will lead to contradicting impulses that will in turn be deepened by local affective affinities; the outcome is as likely to produce fragmentation or polarization as it would to produce the emergence of a global family. Given the challenge for identification amongst a globally pluralistic audience, the prospects for rhetoric are perhaps exclusively constituted in the moment of the address.

It is important to recognize that actually existing audiences at the level of the local are not the only audiences targeted by presidential address at the General Assembly. History demonstrates the difficulty in precisely locating the originary constitutive act for a global collective. Chapter two points to international conferences in the late 1800’s as precursors to political imaginaries capable of constituting an international organization such as the League of Nations. The dangers of war, the need to provide for collective security, and the prominence of diplomacy were all lines of thought with long lineages. The negotiations at San Francisco and the production of the Charter are discreet acts which called into being not just an international organization but also hailed to all globally minded political elites the need to form a collective capable of sustaining the organization imagined. Charland (2001) observes that, “Rhetorical address implicitly (and often explicitly) cites or replays the moment of an original constitutive act” (p. 618). Given the history of the United Nations, the originary trauma of both World Wars, and the onset of mutually assured destruction would theoretically provide a source of rhetorical
invention for presidents needing to reconstitute the United Nations as response to evolving political contingencies. So while we can recognize this originary trauma, the conference at San Francisco, and the Charter that emerged as providing the moment that an audience was interpellated into being, we can also recognize the timely limits of the interpellative act. The first challenge to constitutive rhetoric as theorized is exemplified by President Clinton, born after the formation of the organization, who sought to overcome what he perceived to be institutional limits resulting from that originary moment.

Rather than rely on the moment of creation to further ideological goals, it might be necessary to reject origins to deepen global ideological structures. National interest is indeed at work, but it might also be the case that the originary moment of the United Nations itself provides limits to what can be achieved politically. Nonproliferation as an issue of global significance has received extended consideration across the life of the organization. Treaties have been crafted, come into force and been renewed, and nations that have defied the normative order have been confronted by even their closest allies. However, as interdependence and the cosmopolitan condition create fissures between the global and the local, political pressure arises for the United Nations to act. The Clinton case aptly points to moments and issues where the United Nations needs to be reconstituted anew in order to maintain a position of influence and agency within the world; yet such reconstitution requires a reconstitution of audience. An audience built upon the idea that mutually assured destruction can be held in check always already exists, but when contingency demands action to prevent genocide or ethnic conflict, it becomes harder to constitute an audience capable of providing for the collective security because national interest, nationalism and other pre-existing collectivities prevent a subject from becoming consubstantial.
In each case, I have argued that diplomatic cosmopolitanism in its differing iterations across presidencies has sought to create identification with an audience. Freedom as a political concept is shared across all three; Kennedy argued that freedom would win; H.W. declared that freedom had won; and Clinton declared that freedom – under attack in specific locales – would require the institutional intervention to ensure its local survival. “Constitutive rhetoric will not necessarily require a deity,” Charland argues, “but will require its proxy figured as the laws of history or of nature” (2001, p. 618). Freedom as a political construct can be traced back to particular readings of natural law, but these readings are not universally shared. Nor is freedom found to exist as a constant throughout history or nature. This study points to another avenue for future study; if trans-national rhetoric is to offer an account of identification, it will need to understand what substitutions for deity, law or nature are sufficient to form thick lines of identification readily observable.

6.3.2 A Trans-Historical Subject

Interpellation as an act of constituting an audience is made possible by an individual’s ability to become consubstantial with a previously existing collectivity. For Charland, the “peuple quebecois” could become consubstantial because they had ancestors with shared cultural history that occupied the same land. The challenge for constituting a trans-national subjectivity is that the connection between the “dead and the living” necessary for an audience to become consubstantial is not readily apparent. Humanity as the trans-historical subject (as opposed to myriad collectivities premised on a trans-historical and localized subjectivity) operates most notably in scientific discourse. For example, anthropology and studies of genetics work to reveal common evolutionary ancestry. Politically, however, localized trans-historical subjectivities have
been bolstered through dualistic or binary thinking where the ideology necessarily constructs an inside (local) and outside (global) in order to sustain ideological adherence.

At the level of the global, national and even regional trans-historical subjectivities have been figured, but each of these work to create challenges for a global trans-historical subjectivity. While rhetoricians have long since accepted that an individual can inhabit multiple subject positions - an individual can belong to a people, a congregation, a political party, a labor union and more - it is also the case that the ideological demands of those subjectivities cannot always be aligned. The question becomes, does the trans-historical subject that facilitates consubstantiality by all humans exist?

Presidents at the United Nations General Assembly have attempted to constitute humanity as the trans-historical subject in ways not dissimilar to science; we have a shared genetics, but we also have a shared condition. For U.S. presidents, that shared condition is a yearning to be free: an ideological positioning of the individual with rights and responsibilities and the necessity of a government responsive to those conditions. It is also clear that at different moments, even in the relatively short history of the United Nations, others have challenged that ideological structuring of humanity. Some interpretations have stressed the collective over the individual, while others have stressed an economic relationship that is implied by individualistic notions of humanity. In other words, the ways in which the political has produced varieties of democratic governance (direct v. representative democracy, a Congress v. a Parliament, a president v. a prime minister, etc.) and non-democratic governance undermines the ability of all humans to become consubstantial with articulations of humanity as the trans-historical subject.

Interestingly, the absence, and at times conflict, between competing subjectivities has not always prevented a coming together. Examples abound where this is not the case, yet we still see
peacekeeping measures regularly sanctioned by the General Assembly and Security Council. Nonproliferation efforts abound despite the absence of progress towards disarmament. And while local politics have hamstrung negotiations towards a new international treaty to limit carbon emissions, progress in that direction continues.

Future research is necessary to understand whether the establishment of a trans-historical subjectivity is even desirable. Burke’s theory of identification maintains a place for the negative, and Robert Mills (2014) argues the positioning of Barbary pirates as the anti-sovereign allowed for the formation of the sovereign as the basis for law. Contextualized to the cosmopolitan condition, however, this move would not be productive for presidents; a rhetorical approach to the trans-historical subject that positions the global as anti-local would be untenable for a domestic population that imbues the local with value. Chris Rumford (2008) offers a potential path forward when he observes that, “cosmopolitanism requires us to recognize that we are all positioned simultaneously as outsiders and insiders, as individuals and group members, as Self and Other, as local and global” (p. 14). From this vantage point, presidential rhetoric is much more promising. It is clear that presidents in moments of international trauma have attempted to hail an audience that always already transcends the local as members of the meta-interpretive community without displacing the local or its significance. What marks the recognition by global elites that they have been hailed?

Genre studies points to rhetorical performance as satisfying audience expectations, which implicitly assumes that audience expectations are rendered intelligible to the rhetor. As such, genre might suggest how an audience that self identifies as part of a global collective can be read out of presidential speech at the General Assembly. However, this study finds that public address by presidents at the United Nations is not a genre. Genre theory applied to the presidency
requires a particular performance that satisfies a constitutional function, in a manner recognizable to audiences, so the constitutional function itself provides some generically predictable elements that structure how the address will be understood. The constitution itself – and the performance of prior presidents – establishes audience expectations that must be accounted for by those crafting public address. But speeches delivered to the whole world may lack these normal generic conditions. When histories are not shared, when audiences do not necessarily agree on collective values, and when language itself is universally diversified, the possibility that identification can be evoked and then manipulated is, in important senses, lacking. A critic thus encounters presidential discourse at the United Nations that may appear to contain generic elements (platitudes, appeals to a higher moral order or to seek perfection in the global pursuit of human rights and peace), and yet even these elements can be fleeting and contingent upon other situational factors. Meanwhile, institutional changes in the United Nations mean there are important differences between the way Presidents Truman, Kennedy and Nixon addressed the General Assembly during the height of the Cold War as well as how the post-Cold War presidents of H.W. Bush and Clinton addressed the General Assembly. The role of the institution has changed over time, and as a result so too have expectations about rhetorical response to the contingency of international politics.

While genre studies fails to provide the necessary means by which to recognize the ways in which global elites interpellate themselves as an audience for presidential address, style may supply the answer. Presidents faced with appeasing domestic political pressures often make the seemingly alienating move of suggesting a willingness to act unilaterally without approval from the international community, but if that same address exhibits cosmopolitan stylistic features, an identificatory hail might also be recognizable to a global audience of savvy political elites.
Domestically, we think of communicatively competent presidents as deploying a style they can own. Reagan was folksy, and George W. Bush spoke in plain terms. Reagan’s folk charm was rooted in a mythologized version of the American West that clearly did not resonate with Western European audiences. A plain speaking style by President George W. Bush likely did not gain adherence from audiences who trafficked in sophisticated analysis and gamesmanship. What is as yet undeveloped is an analysis of how style in a domestic setting might translate to the global context. Domestically, Clinton could “feel your pain,” and perhaps this affective engagement might be read as sincere, particularly when deployed to justify humanitarian interventions or calls for the extension of human rights. Robert Hariman (2010) has illustrated many of the ways in which rhetorical style can significantly influence social and political processes: it can establish rules of decorum, inform communicative practices, structure rhetorical choices by establishing aesthetic parameters, and establish a power hierarchy through construction of a social identity. George H.W. Bush’s 1989 address works to demonstrate the point. The prior experience of the President as ambassador opened up avenues for identification because he was able to use a humorous anecdote to demonstrate that he was ‘one of them’; he identified with the global construction of social identity fostered through membership at the United Nations. Future research, then, might work to untangle the polysemic nature of presidential style (depending on audience) and its ability to situate the president as a member of the pre-existing meta-interpretive community.

6.3.3 Illusion of Freedom

Finally, this project, while suggesting potential opportunities for diplomatic cosmopolitanism to constitute international order also needs to recognize the potential limitations of presidential agency. That is, while presidents might recognize their inability to control events
on a global level, domestic audiences still operate on the assumption that the president is the “leader of the free world,” and as such, the hegemonic status of the United States should provide tremendous agential latitude. However, a common prediction among international relations scholars has been the anticipated decline of the United States, if not in absolute then in relative terms as other nations ‘catch up’ economically and militarily. The Obama presidency and the Arab Spring clearly demonstrate that American presidents in the post-Cold War are less able to influence international events than ever before. David Zarefsky (2014) has noted that domestic upheaval at home and an inability to dictate favorable global political outcomes is undermining the construct of American exceptionalism. American policymakers assumed in the aftermath of World War II that nations would consent to U.S. policy not only because they needed us, but also because we imagined they would be irresistibly attracted by American ideals. American confidence on the world stage was partly driven by a self-righteous sense that we were both powerful and morally exemplary, obvious problematic behaviors notwithstanding. If presidents can no longer use exceptionalism as an inventional resource for public address, then what are the remaining resources? As the gravitational vectors of empire change, this in turn will certainly impact public address.

The terrain for articulating a global politics is also increasingly contested as other nations begin to assert themselves, given the evolving nature of interdependent politics. That is, the saturation point of globality today provides smaller nations with influence that might seem oversized compared to previous epochs. Political systems provide advantages to particular entities, and global politics is no different. Presidents will not be able to assume that they can operate as a hegemon as they previously might have, or at the very least they will not be able to assume that because they speak others will follow. In cases where the United States has lost a
particular battle (e.g., the debate over “Zionism as racism” resolutions), it might be the case that pressing for a list of agenda items will be less and less successful. Consider the rise of dark money groups and their influence on domestic politics: a parallel phenomenon may occur on the international scene (e.g. non-governmental organizations and charities often target different procedural votes and particular agencies for their campaigns). Administrations might better follow a model where a president attempts to sketch out a vision for the international order, seeking to establish the grounds for debate, because this move will at least produce debates less hostile to American strategic interests. Given this problematic, rhetoricians who can offer prescriptions for successful public address at the level of the international are well positioned to influence presidential speech.

My purpose here has been to offer a modest theoretical contribution. Conceding the larger rhetorical force of presidential address operating today within a period of world historical transformation, I have attempted first to animate the limitations of previous rhetorical efforts – particularly those grounded in realism – and to begin to sketch the ways in which a constructivist reading of international politics best accounts for specific efforts to rhetorically engage the world.
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