Durable state rivals: Hezbollah and Lebanon

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DURABLE STATE RIVALS:
LEBANON AND HEZBOLLAH

by

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ABSTRACT

This research identifies the conditions that contribute to the rise of durable state rivals that persist over time and do not attempt to overthrow the state. I use a case study of Hezbollah in Lebanon and find that a weak state, foreign state sponsorship, and local support contribute to the rise of durable state rivals. The same conditions that enable the rise of a durable state rival make it more difficult for a durable state rival to overthrow the state. Durable state rivals exist within state borders, possess a high level of social control over a community within the state, and challenge the authority and legitimacy of the state, but they do not attempt to overthrow the state.

INDEX WORDS: Durable state rival, weak state, foreign support, local support
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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my mother Therese Saleh. Without your support and sacrifice, I wouldn’t be where I am today. Every decision you have ever made has been to make my life and future better. I hope to make you proud. To my country Lebanon, I pray that one day you will find peace and stability.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................... v

1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 1
  1.1 Purpose of the Study ....................................................................................................... 1
  1.2 Background ................................................................................................................... 4

2 RESEARCH DESIGN ........................................................................................................... 6
  2.1 Methods .......................................................................................................................... 6
  2.2 Theory ............................................................................................................................. 7

3 LITERATURE REVIEW ..................................................................................................... 9
  3.1 Weak State ..................................................................................................................... 9
  3.2 Local Support ................................................................................................................ 12
  3.3 Foreign State Sponsorship ............................................................................................. 17

4 CASE STUDY ..................................................................................................................... 24
  4.1 1982-1989 .................................................................................................................... 25
  4.2 1989-2000 .................................................................................................................... 31
  4.3 2000-2008 .................................................................................................................... 40

5 CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................... 51

REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................... 59
1 INTRODUCTION

How do non-state actors rise to become durable state rivals? Using a case study of Hezbollah in Lebanon, I argue that a state that lacks the ability to penetrate society, legitimize the use of force, and control its borders, provides an opportunity for a non-state actor to rise, provide social services, and monopolize the use of force. The Taif agreement of 1989 that ended the Lebanese civil war called for the disarmament of all militias. However, Hezbollah kept their arms in order to fight Israel’s presence in the southern border of Lebanon. The Lebanese army was deemed too weak to protect its borders after civil war. Hezbollah also provides social services to the Shia community who have been historically marginalized by the Lebanese government. Hezbollah has been able to participate in politics and carry weapons with no interference from the Lebanese state. Hezbollah’s presence in Lebanon challenges the legitimacy and authority of the Lebanese government by having monopoly over the use of force, and providing social services. Hezbollah, however, remained a state rival to Lebanon, and did not attempt to overthrow the state. Why did Hezbollah remain a durable state rival and didn’t become an insurgency movement? A Durable state rival is a non-state actor that exists within a state, has the legitimacy over the use of force, and enjoys a high level of control over a community within the state through the provision of services. A durable state rival challenges the role of the state, but doesn’t seek to overthrow the state.

1.1 Purpose of the Study

The puzzle this thesis seeks to address is what conditions allow a non-state actor to become a durable state rival that does not become an insurgency movements. The following variables within the literature are all linked together, but will be discussed separately in the literature review. The literature addresses how weak states provide an opportunity for non-state
actors to rise due to its inability to control its borders and legitimize the use of force (Migdal 1988; Fearon & Laitin 2003; Rotberg 2003), marginalize part of its population (Migdal 1988; Cedermn et.al 2013, 2010; Denny & Walter 2007), and how foreign state sponsors can provide the necessary tools for non-state actors to build military capacity and services (Saleyhan et.al 2011; Byman 2005, 2008; Weinstein 2006).

We have an understanding of how the situation rises and what we want to understand is why the situation stays that way. What contributes to non-state actors becoming durable state rivals? That is, rivals to the state that persist over time and do not attempt to overthrow the state. As I argued above, a weak state allows a non-state actor to arise and become durable state rival by its inability to control its borders, legitimize the use force, and penetrate society. The void left by a weak state provides an opportunity for non-state actors to provide social services and monopolize the use of force with the help of the financial and military support from a foreign state. Furthermore, the conditions that allow a non-state actor to become a durable state rival may limit them from becoming an insurgency movement. The state is weak when it is unable to reach all of society within its territory, however, the state may not be absent in all society. When the state is able to penetrate part of society, communities have no incentives to turn to other organizations for services. Furthermore, a non-state actor that receives support from a foreign state may lose freedom to pursue their own agenda if their interests conflicts with its sponsor. As Byman argues, a foreign state supports a non-state actor in order to advance its political or ideological agenda, and so in return for providing support, foreign sponsors seek some level of control within the organization (Byman et.al 2001). This usually limits a durable state rival in pursuing its own interest, especially if their agenda threatens the strategy of their foreign sponsor.
Durable state rivals may often find themselves unable to act independently from their foreign state sponsor.

I theorize that durable state rivals arise when non-state actors exist in a weak state, have a foreign state sponsor and are ethnically tied to a marginalized group within the state. Furthermore, I argue that the same conditions that create a durable state rival -- weak state, ethnic ties, and foreign state sponsorship -- make it difficult for a durable state rival to become an insurgency movement. Existing theories have emphasized either the strengths of the state, local support, or external support as variables that contribute to creating insurgency movements or strengthening other challengers to state authority. My contribution to the literature is combining all three variables together to examine how they produce a durable state rival in Lebanon, and how the same variables linked together may prevent the occurrence of a civil war between the state and its rival.

By definition, durable state rivals are not insurgencies because they are not trying to overthrow the government. Insurgencies are armed groups who aim to overthrow the state through warfare, whereas durable state rivals aim to exist and preserve their status within the state. They challenge the role of the state in society through the legitimacy over the use of force and the provisions of services, but they do not seek to take over the government. Theories that seek to explain how insurgencies arise focus too much on the military capabilities of a state rival and overlook other important factors necessary for a durable state rival; such as state capacity in allowing a state rival to endure and the provision of services. Providing services allows non-state actors to gain the support of a group within the state. That group has been historically marginalized by the state through political or economic exclusion. The group is linked to the non-state actor through race, religion, culture or ideology. Furthermore, durable state rivals must
have a foreign state sponsor at the beginning of their formation in order to build a strong military and provide services. As Fearon and Laitin argue, non-state actors are typically weak at the start, compared to the government. Foreign state sponsors provide the financial and military support necessary for non-state rivals to compete with the state. Durable state rivals exist within state borders, possess a high level of social control over a community within the state, and challenge the authority and legitimacy of the state; they do not attempt to overthrow the state.

1.2 Background

Hezbollah is both an armed group fighting a resistance against Israel and a political party representing the Shia in parliament. Hezbollah has only been around for about thirty years, but it has transformed itself into a strong, durable organization that has been able to operate freely within Lebanon. They were formed during Lebanon’s bloody civil war in 1982 when the state was in total collapse. With the Lebanese state in total turmoil during the war, Iran’s Shia leaders saw an opportunity to export their 1979 revolution to Lebanon. From their foundation, Hezbollah did not cooperate with the Lebanese government, especially in terms of their confessional system that goes against their ideology. Hezbollah was created in order to institute a resistance against Israel, and create an Islamic state in Lebanon. Iran’s revolutionary leaders supported Hezbollah financially and militarily. With Iran’s support, Hezbollah was able to build their military capacity to fight against Israel and provide services to the Shia community in Lebanon. The Shias, who have been historically marginalized by the Lebanese state, turned their loyalty away from the state and to Hezbollah.

The Taif Agreement ended the civil war in 1989, yet Hezbollah continued to grow as an organization despite the brief stability that Lebanon experienced after the conflict. Hezbollah was the only militia that did not disarm after the civil war. The main reason behind Hezbollah’s
refusal to disarm was Israel’s presence along the southern borders of Lebanon. Hezbollah argued that its military capacity far exceeded the Lebanese army’s capacity, therefore, they were the only organization capable of protecting Lebanon’s borders. Israel withdrew their forces from Lebanon in 2000, yet Hezbollah has kept its weapons. Hezbollah’s weapons have allowed them to assert their authority and strength against the government (Early 2006). Now, Hezbollah holds thirteen seats in parliaments where they represent the Shia community. Other than providing the Shias with a voice, participating in politics allows the organization to shape the policies of the state and challenge any policy calling for their disarmament. The Lebanese government has been unable to disarm and control Hezbollah, forcing the state to continually struggle for power and control.
2 RESEARCH DESIGN

2.1 Methods

I chose to explore Hezbollah as a case study because I have always been fascinated by their quick transformation into a strong power within Lebanon. I want to examine the factors that could bring such swift success to a group that formed less than 30 years ago. Hezbollah has been able to keep their weapons, practice politics, and even recently possess veto powers in the cabinet. They use both bullets and services to achieve their goals, and the Lebanese government does not interfere. The thesis will use process tracing to analyze Hezbollah’s growth from their inception in 1982 to 2008. Tracing the ties and structure that Hezbollah built during their formation will allow us to explore how Hezbollah has been able to challenge the Lebanese government’s authority and legitimacy without becoming an insurgency.

The data will be primary sources from news reports and interviews with Hezbollah leaders and government officials as well as secondary sources from historical accounts of the events from textbooks and academic journals. The problem that I will run into collecting data is the amount of documents that are classified in Lebanon about certain events. The Lebanese government and elites are very sensitive to certain events and information because some documents may reveal the corruption that occurs within the government. Therefore, it is difficult to obtain truthful reports and documents. For instance, the last time a census was taken in Lebanon was in 1932 by the French, who favored the Maronite sect, and declared them as the majority in Lebanon. Another problem is the lack of external validity my theory has. The theory may only apply to the case of Hezbollah in Lebanon because of Lebanon’s unique geographic location between Israel and Syria, the number of different religious groups that exist within Lebanon, and Lebanon’s confessional system. However, more and more non-state actors are
forming (Boko Haram), and the theory may help us understand their transformation, if they become durable state rivals, and why they did not overthrow the state. My theory of durable state rivals applies to cases where a non-state actor exists within a state, but has not attempted to overthrow the state. Furthermore, future research could apply the theory of durable state rivals to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka to find out why they did not become durable state rivals and were ultimately defeated the Sri Lankan government. It would be interesting to analyze which variables from the theory of durables state rivals were absent and present in the case.

2.2 Theory

The purpose of this study is to understand how a non-state actor can transform into a durable state rival without becoming an insurgency. Durable state rivals are more likely to arise and persist under the following conditions:

- Weak states that are unable to penetrate society fully.

- Appeal to a community that has been marginalized by the state, and are tied to that community through ethnicity, religion, race or culture. This community is significant in size but is not a majority.

- The support base of the durable state rival lives in an area not fully penetrated by the state.

- Receive financial, ideological, political and military support from a foreign state. During the development of the durable state rival, the foreign state sponsor has limited the durable state rival from pursuing their own agenda by threatening the rival’s status within the state. This occurs when the durable state rival’s actions or interests threaten the foreign state from pursuing their political or ideological agenda.
The implication of my argument is that weak states provide a space for non-state actors to rise and become durable state rivals through local and external support. A weak state lacks the capacity to provide basic services throughout its territory, and marginalize part of society. It is unable to control all of its territory, inviting foreign influence into its borders. Foreign states support non-state actors and facilitate their transition to durable state rivals through financial, political and ideological support. Durable state rivals challenge the authority and legitimacy of the state, but do not attempt to overthrow the state. Foreign state sponsors often restrict the actions of durable state rivals when the sponsor’s agenda is threatened. If a weak state is present in some part of its territory and has the loyalty of part of society, then it may make it difficult for a durable state rival to overthrow the state. The same variables that produce durable state rivals may limit durable state rivals from taking over the government.

This research is important because having a durable state rival hinders the state’s ability to mobilize society and build the capacity to control all of its territory. As long as a durable state rival enjoys a high level of social control, than the state will likely remain weak (Migdal 1988). Likewise, as long as the state enjoys a high level of social control in some of its territories, than the durable state rival will more likely remain a rival and not attempt to overthrow the state. Examining the conditions that allow a non-state actor to transform into a durable state rival without becoming an insurgency will help scholars and policy understand the factors that facilitate non-state actors’ transformation to durable rivals, and why durable rivals do not take over the state.
3 LITERATURE REVIEW

Durable state rivals influence and challenge the policies of the state. The state is often pressured to accommodate durable rivals in order to avoid a civil war. The presence of a non-state rival helps us understand the outcome of a state’s policy. Non-state rivals can be exploited by external actors in order to advance their interests within the state and the region. Overtime, external influence will hinder the state’s ability to effectively implement policies that best serve its interests. While weak states are understood to be breeding grounds for the rise of insurgencies, understanding the factors that contribute to their durability is important, because the capabilities and control they establish at the beginning of their formation determines their path to state rivals.

3.1 Weak State

A weak state is defined and explored in terms of the state’s inability to penetrate civil society throughout its territory. A capable state has both military and administrative capabilities. The role of the state is to protect its borders and citizens from internal or external threat, and provide services such as education, water, electricity, hospitals, etc… (Rotberg 2003). Mann and Migdal view the state through its ability to regulate every aspect of society and implement rules and policies throughout its territory. What sets the state apart from other social organizations is its ability to penetrate society from the “…centre but stop at defined territorial boundaries” (Mann 1984). Midgal states that society is a melange of different organizations that influences all aspects of society within a state, therefore, the state is not the only actor with authority over society. There are local leaders, chiefs, ethnic groups and other institutions that state leaders must compete with in order to gain social control (Migdal 1988). If the state is unable to provide
basic social services, it provides an opportunity for a non-state actor to step in and fill the void left by the state.

For example, people living in the peripheral areas in Pakistan pledged their loyalty to the Taliban, hindering the Pakistani government’s ability to assert control in that area. Local leaders, or what Migdal calls strongmen, compete with the state over social control. As Herbst argues, these strongmen hinder the state’s ability to function and assert its authority (Herbst 2000).

Migdal states that the degree of social control is measured by people’s compliance to rules, and the legitimacy of the organization in control. A state with a high level of social control has capabilities to mobilize its society, align society’s behavior with that of the state, and fight oppositional forces (Migdal 1988). When the state’s regulations and services do not reach all of its territory, people must choose which social organization meets their needs in order to survive (Migdal 1988; Rotberg 2003). When a state is unable to effectively reach society and control its territory, instability and conflict may ensue (Herbst 2000; Fearon & Laitin 2003). When the state is absent, it is more likely that an insurgency will break out to challenge authority. Once a non-state actor establishes social control over part of society, they refuse to give up control, and continue to challenge the authority of the state (Migdal 1988). Having both military and administrative capacity will facilitate deterrence of non-state actors.

The literature on civil war will be discussed throughout the literature review, because the same conditions that may lead to a civil war, can create a durable state rival. Furthermore, the civil war literature will help me identify which states are more likely to face a durable state rival. Mason and Fett examine the conditions that end civil wars using the utility theory in participants’ decisions to continue fighting or negotiate a settlement (Mason & Fett 1996). They find that military capacity works in favor of the state, and the stronger the army of the government, the
easier it is to deter any rebellion from forming and reducing the risk of durable state rivals. For example, India supplied thousands of military forces to deter insurgents fighting in Kashmir (Byman 2001). They conclude that it is essential for the state to build military capacity in order to avoid a long civil war. For example, in 2004 the Lebanese state’s military spending totals for only 4.6 percent of its GDP, compared to Israel’ 8.7 percent, and Jordan’s 6.0 percent (World Bank Data). Fearon and Laitin operationalize state capacity with GDP per capita to examine ethnicity and the chance of a civil war. They find that the presence of an ethnic and religious minority does not lead to civil war. Instead, they find that civil wars are more likely to occur in poor countries, where the state lacks control over its territories which provides an opportunity for an insurgency to mobilize (Fearon and Laitin 2003). A weak state with low military capacity is more likely to face a state rival.

The capability of the state to deter insurgency is not only dependent on its military capacity, but also its bureaucratic capacity to effectively monitor and collect information within its territory. Fearon and Laitin add that “Insurgents are relatively weak to the government at the start. If government forces knew who the rebels were and how to find them, they would be fairly easily destroyed or captured.” (Fearon and Laitin 2003 pg.7). Furthermore, if the state concentrates on increasing military capacity, it will ignore the bureaucratic capacity to provide public goods (Mason and Krane 1989). Mason and Krane argue that an increase in coercive capacity will not address the conditions that gave rise to the rebellion. Higher military spending may result in civil war when the state ignores the needs of society (Hendrix 2010). Bureaucratic capacity is defined as the state’s ability to provide services that reach throughout any given territory within the states borders, as well as extract revenue from society (Hendrix 2010). States with weak bureaucratic capacity are more likely to face oppositional forces. This is more
significant in territories where the state is unable to reach and penetrate society. Rebels become capable of providing public goods and gaining local support where the state is absent (Migdal 1988).

Since its independence in 1943, Lebanon has been unable to reach peripheral areas and provide public goods. Many areas in southern Lebanon do not receive necessary services like running water and electricity (Atzili 2010). The state does not have a sufficient taxation system, “In 2003, for instance, income, capital and property taxes amounted to only 18 percent of the total revenues of the government” (Atzili 2010). When the state fails to provide basic human needs such as water and does not extract revenue from society to have the capacity to build administratively and militarily, the presence of an oppositional group filling that void is more likely.

3.2 Local Support

When the state is ineffective, communities must turn to an organization or a leader to provide them with strategies of survival (Migdal 1988). Strategies of survival, according to Migdal are “Blueprints for action and belief;” they derive from “symbols, rewards, sanctions” (Migdal 1988: 27). People need security, shelter, jobs, hospitals, and water in order to survive. When the state fails to provide such basic services, a community turns its loyalty to an organization or a leader to provide them with strategies of survival (Migdal 1988; Rotberg 2003). The services provided by non-state actors allow them to gain legitimacy and undermine the state’s role in society (Migdal 1988). Non-state actors use the provision of services as a way to address the grievances of excluded groups (Falnigan 2006). The provision of services helps non-state actors become durable state rivals by shifting the loyalty of a community away from the state, thus challenging the state’s authority. The provision of services also facilitates the
recruitment of fighters and supporters. While Weinstein argues that insurgencies that receive money are less likely to invest in social services because they rely on military capabilities to mobilize; Migdal argues that if non-state actors do not provide services, then they will more likely be defeated (Weinstein 2006; Migdal 1988). The provision of services is important for non-state actors to establish themselves within a community for the long run, because when there is no longer a war to fight, non-state actors will lose support and the state will take over. However, if non-state actors continue to provide services, then they will keep the loyalty and trust of their supporters. As Herbst argues, authority over people is stronger than authority over a territory (Herbst 2000).

The exclusion and marginalization of a group within society breeds grievance and resentment, facilitating the shift in loyalty and support from the state to a non-state actor. By exploring the literature on civil war, I will be able to identify how the exclusion of a group by the state will shift that group’s loyalty to another organization willing to provide services. Furthermore, the civil war literature will allow us to see if ethnic linkage between a non-state actor and a community are important for durability of a state rival. In countries with low income, fighters are unemployed and do not have anything to lose by fighting, therefore, fighting becomes more profitable (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Collier and Hoeffler see greed rather than grievance as a motivation for rebellion. Like Collier and Hoeffler, Fearon and Laitin find that religious minority, or ethnicity does not lead to a civil war. Fearon and Laitin argue that states with weak military and administrative capacity provide the conditions for insurgency to occur. Similarly, Mueller looks into the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda, and argues that “ethnic war does not exist”. It is not grievances, or past histories that create the conditions for insurgency and war, rather it is individuals with political authority that prey and capitalize on society’s grievance
to wage war and benefit from resources (Mueller 2001). Ethnic divisions are apparent in every society; Fearon and Laitin argue that this division does not mean that a war will occur or a rebellion will rise (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Mueller 2001). For Fearon and Laitin, Collier and Hoeffler, there needs to be a condition such as failed states or resource benefits to create the opportunity for rebellion. However, when a state is weak, it means that it has failed to reach all of society within its borders (Mann 1984; Migdal 1988). This implies that part of society is excluded and does not receive basic services from the state. When the state fails to provide the strategies of survival to a group, they turn to another organization to fulfill that role (Migdal 1988). That organization or leader usually share the same ethnicity with the marginalized group. It is easier for an organization that shares the same ethnicity with a group to appeal its cause, therefore, ethnicity does matter for a non-state actor. Individuals that share the same identity sympathize towards each other. Byman states that non-state actors use group identity to gain support and recruit fighters.

For example, the minority Tamils in Sri Lanka identify themselves with the Tamils, not the Sri Lankan state. They pledge their loyalty and support to the insurgency LTTE. The Kurdish minority in Turkey does not identify with the Turkish state (Byman 2008). However, Non-state actors can’t rely on identity alone to motivate a group to take arms, unless that group is excluded from the state (Byman 2008; Falnigan 2006). Grievances along with identity facilitate recruitment. If a group has been historically marginalized by the state, either through lack of representation in the government or the lack of service provisions and rights, they will more likely rebel against the state (Byman 2008). In order to gain the support and loyalty of a community and recruit fighters, non-state rivals need both identity and grievances.
Challenging Collier and Hoeffler and Fearon and Laitin’s argument that ethnicity is not a cause of rebellion, Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug find that the exclusion of ethnic groups from a political system will facilitate mobilization. Cederman et.al argue that previous research has used country-level analysis and micro-level analysis to examine grievance, while ignoring group-level analysis. Cederman et.al state that measuring individual level inequality ignores the context of the different levels in a conflict. Measures of income only look at the individual within a state (Cederman et.al 2013). This measurement fails to take into account that rebellions involve groups, not just one person. For groups to mobilize, they need a common identity and shared grievances (Cederman et.al 2013). Since grievance is hard to measure, they look at whether a group has experienced exclusion from the state. Their statistical analysis shows that groups that do not enjoy access to the government are more likely to rebel (Cederman et. al 2013). When states exclude groups, this creates grievance amongst a community. The exclusion of ethnic groups strengthens recruitment and mobilization.

For example, Sri Lanka’s government consistently marginalized and excluded the Tamil population, this motivated the Tamils to join the LITE and rebel against the state (Hartzell et.al 2011). The higher the marginalization of a group from the state, the easier it is for non-state rivals to mobilize society and resources. Therefore, excluded ethnic groups play an important part in the transformation of durable state rivals (Cederman et.al 2010). Grievance becomes the means for recruitment by reinforcing the grievances ethnic minorities experienced (Vinci 2006). Like Cederman et.al 2010; 2013, Hartzell et.al argue that group exclusion from the political and economic aspect of the state creates aggression and tension towards that state. Ultimately, the excluded group loses trust and loyalty for the state. This facilitates rebels’ recruitment and support. The state loses social control, as argued by Migdal, and rebels take over to provide the
needs for the excluded society. When the state is absent, individuals look for groups that ensure their survival. The loyalty for the state diminishes, and individuals follow that organization’s rules. By continually providing services, non-state actors build and sustain support from the community, and limit the state’s ability to take control. The less local support a non-state actor enjoys, the easier it is for a state to take back control.

For example, the Shining Path in Peru enjoyed the support of a poor community through the distribution of livestock (Flanigan 2006). However, the insurgency did not put any effort into providing services and building infrastructure within the community. The local community ended up shifting their loyalty back to the state, and helped the Peruvian government defeat the insurgency (Flanigan 2006). If the insurgency continually provided services and improved the condition of the community, then the state might have been less successful in deterring the Shining Path. The provision of services allows non-state actors to become durable state rivals through the support and loyalty from a community within the state.

Ethnic groups who are politically and economically marginalized by the state develop distrust, and aggression against the state. Addressing grievances makes it easier for rebels to mobilize, and recruit. Ethnic linkages between a grieved group and an insurgency facilitates the mobilization process (Denny & Walter 2007). For a rebellion to endure, it is important that it has the support of a group within the state. The support and loyalty of a community provides non-state actors social control, undermining the state’s authority (Migdal 1988). With social control, non-state actors are seen as legitimate actors within the state, and they are able to effectively mobilize resources and people. As long as a non-state actor enjoys a high level of social control, they will remain durable state rivals.
3.3 Foreign State Sponsorship

Foreign state sponsorship is the intentional assistance of a government to help a non-state actor grow politically, use violence, and endure its organization (Byman 2005). Furthermore, the support of a foreign state allows an insurgency to deter counterinsurgency efforts from the targeted state (Carter 2012). The resources provided to non-state actors provide the capabilities needed to grow and organize. Foreign state sponsorship can range from “Training and operations; money, arms and logistics; diplomatic backing; organizational assistance; ideological direction; and safe haven.”(Byman 2005). Training allows non-state actors to build strong troops, and build up its military capacity. The money and weapons provided to non-state actors will not only allow them militarily, but it also allows groups to garner local support through social services; and facilitate recruitment (Byman et al 2001; Byman 2005; DeVora et al 2004).

Foreign state sponsors support insurgent groups for a variety of reasons. Motivation often lies in strategic concerns or ideology. Byman argues that geopolitics is the most important reason states support insurgencies. Supporting an insurgency allows states to advance their security and project power (Byman 2005). States that support oppositional groups often want to weaken a neighboring rival state, change a regime, and ensure their interests are met in the targeted states through the opposition (Byman et al 2001). Ideology also motivates states to support groups, but it is often linked to strategic concerns. The decision to fund non-state actors is usually a policy tool for states to advance their interests, and defeat any rivals or threats to its security (Byman 2005; Salehyan et. al 2011). Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011 examine why certain rebel groups receive support, while others do not. They create an Expanded Armed Conflict Data set with support of a foreign state as the dependent variable, and conditions such as the strengths of the rebels, territorial control, strong leadership, transnational linkage, interstate rivalry, and
country characteristics of the targeted state as the independent variables. They run a logistic regression and find that regional rivalry, and transnational ethnic or religious ties are the strongest indicators in foreign state support for non-state actors (Salehyan et. al 2011). However, Byman et.al argue that even when a foreign state lends support for a non-state actor with a shared ethnicity or religion, the motivation is often concerned with advancing their interests.

For, example, Russia took advantage of its shared ethnicity with insurgencies in Moldova, and provided them with military support in order to expand its influence in the region (Byman et.al 2001). Pakistan has long supported Islamic groups such as Hizb al Mujahideen in Kashmir, in order to increase its influence in the region and destabilize India (Byman et.al 2001). Furthermore, many of Hezbollah’s founding members studied in Iran, and attempted to transfer Iran’s 1979 revolution to Lebanon. However, a similar ideology was not the only reason Iran supported Hezbollah. Iran also uses Hezbollah’s presence in Lebanon as a threat to Israel and the U.S. If Israel attempted a strike against Iran’s nuclear facility, Hezbollah would be ready to retaliate (Byman 2008). States can’t afford going into war with another state, therefore supporting insurgencies is more beneficial to the state. Military invasion of another state is more costly in terms of time, resources, and casualties (Salehyan et al 2011). Additionally, using military action against another state will risk the chance that the state will strike back, and the international community will more likely impose sanctions. Using insurgencies as a foreign policy tool is less costly, and easier to hide. For example, “Many Latin American states strongly condemned border violations by Colombia against Ecuador in 2008 to strike against FARC targets, but evidence of Ecuadorean and Venezuelan support of the FARC did not garner strong criticism.” (Salehyan et al 2011).
The materials provided from a foreign state sponsor allow a non-state actor to build a strong support base through recruitment and welfare services in areas where the state is absent. Often times in weak states, there is high level of unemployment, therefore, non-state actors invest the money they receive from an external state sponsor for recruitment by paying fighters salaries (DeVora et al 2004). The financial backing from a state sponsor allows non-state actors to build support and military in order to strengthen their organization in the long-term. Diplomatic backing by a state legitimizes the groups, and organizational assistance helps insurgencies to develop and build a strong base (Byman 2005). Ideological backing from a foreign state sponsor helps non-state actors define their agenda, and give them inspiration to recruit and fight. And finally, foreign state sponsors can provide safe havens for insurgencies which can help them facilitate operations, hide from states or aggressors, and freely recruit and train (Byman 2005). All of the following types of support increase a non-state actor’s ability to become a durable rival. External state support makes it much harder for targeted states to eliminate oppositional movements, because sponsorship allows groups to build strong military capabilities, and continually provide social provisions.

A non-state actor with strong financial support and military weapons has the ability to challenge and compete with the weak state. Foreign support aids in the development of non-state actors, as Daniel Byman argues “success breeds additional support, creating a positive cycle for the insurgent group” (Byman et al 2001). Unlike Byman, Weinstein views external state support as a curse rather than a positive cycle. Weinstein argues that an insurgency receiving money from a foreign state sponsor has fewer incentive to invest materials within a community and tends to use violence indiscriminately (Weinstein 2006). For Weinstein, when rebels have a constant flow of money from an external state, they attract opportunistic recruits who are more
concerned with short-term gains, and less concerned with long-term investment (Weinstein 2006). The nature of opportunists that have no social ties or commitment to a community results in the use of indiscriminate violence (Weinstein 2006). Externally supported groups become less interested in investing in a community, because they do not need to rely on civilians to build their capacity (Weinstein 2006). However, DeVora et.al argue that when an insurgency does not use the money provided by a foreign state effectively, in the long-term, they are more likely to be defeated. Foreign state sponsorship does not guarantee the success of an insurgency, it ultimately depends on how a group uses the resources. Some leaders in groups may take the money to use for their personal advantage, while others may not know how to use the weapons provided by the foreign state sponsor (DeVora 2004). If a non-state actor has military capabilities but lacks local support, it becomes much more difficult to maintain control over a community, and much easier for the state to reassert control.

Although foreign state sponsorship aids in the development of durable state rivals, it can also have a negative impact on a durable state rival’s freedom and legitimacy (Byman et.al 2001; Byman 2008). Foreign state sponsorship limits the freedom of action for a non-state actor because the foreign state will expect some level of control in return for the support it provides (Byman et. al 2001). Typically, foreign states support non-state actors to advance their own political or ideological agenda, therefore, if non-state actors act outside of the interest of their foreign supporter, then the foreign state may threaten to cut the aid. This usually limits the non-state actor in pursuing their own interest, especially if their agenda conflicts with their foreign provider. Furthermore, although Byman argues that foreign sponsors provide legitimacy to non-state actors, he also states that dependency on foreign state sponsors may decrease the legitimacy of an organization (Byman et.al 2001; Byman 2005). Leaders in religious or nationalistic
movements use self-reliance and struggle as a means to recruit fighters, therefore, being dependent on a foreign sponsor will undermine the legitimacy of the cause (Byman et.al 2001). External state support allow non-state actors to transform into durable actors by providing them with the materials necessary to build militarily and establish trust and loyalty within a community for long-term durability and support. However, external support can also limit the freedom of action for durable state rivals, and decrease the legitimacy of non-state actor if they rely too heavily on a foreign sponsor.

The lack of capabilities a weak state possesses to control its borders and population allow for a non-state actor to rise and challenge the state’s authority. Weak states also invite external actors who prey on the vulnerability of the state and try to exhort their influence into the policies of that state. Syria, for example, has taken advantage of the weakness of the Lebanese state by meddling in Lebanon’s policies to advance their interests in the region. Iran has also taken advantage of Lebanon during its most vulnerable period, the civil war, to export its 1979 revolutionary ideology by supporting Hezbollah militarily and financially. For a non-state actor to transform into a durable state rival by filling in the void left by a weak state, it must not only possess the military capacity to challenge any entity threatening its role within the state, but also provide services to gain local support. Foreign state support for an insurgency can help a group transform from a weak non-state actor to a strong and formidable state rival.

The civil war literature helped identify which states are more likely to face durable state rivals and the conditions that prevent durable state rivals from becoming insurrections. States that are more likely to experience civil wars are also more likely to face a durable rival. Civil wars and durable state rivals are both likely to occur in a weak state that lacks the military and bureaucratic capabilities to control its borders and reach all of society. Mason and Fett 1996 find
that higher military spending is associated with shorter civil wars. Similarly, a state with low military capabilities will less likely be able to stop a non-state actor from becoming a durable state rival. Cederman et al. 2013, find that the political and economic exclusion of a minority within a state creates grievance which leads to a civil war. Furthermore, ethnic linkages facilitate the recruitment for an insurgency. Migdal argues that when the state is absent from a community, that community turns their loyalty to a leader who usually shares the same ethnicity to provide them with services. In order for durable state rivals to endure, they must be linked to a community through ethnicity or ideology in order to gain legitimacy among that group.

The conditions that lead to a civil war can also help identify the conditions that prevent a durable state rival from becoming an insurgency. A weak state may not have the capabilities to reach all of society, but it does not necessarily mean that the state fails to reach all of society. The state may have a strong presence in other territories. It is only when the state is absent do communities turn to a leader. Furthermore, in a state with multiple religious groups, a durable state rival may find it difficult to appeal to a larger part of society. While some minorities experience marginalization, others may be well represented within state, therefore, their loyalty is with the state. If the state’s social provisions reach a community, then that community has fewer incentives to turn to a different organization for services. Durable state rivals need both identity and grievance to appeal to a community. Durable state rivals may face limitations if the state is able to reach part of society and provide services. Furthermore, foreign state sponsorship can limit a durable state rival’s freedom of action and legitimacy (Byman et al. 2001; Byman 2008). Foreign state sponsors expect some level of control in return for the support it provides to non-state actors (Byman et. al 2001). If a non-state actor’s action conflicts with the interest of their foreign sponsor, then the foreign state will threaten to cut aid (Byman et.al 2001). This
usually limits a durable state rivals from pursuing their own interest. These conditions could help identify why Hezbollah remained a durable state rival and did not try to overthrow the Lebanese.
4 CASE STUDY

A brief historical background on Lebanon and the marginalization of the Shias is important before proceeding with the case study. It will give the reader a better understanding of the factors that led up to the emergence of Hezbollah. Lebanon gained its independence from the French in 1943, where a National Pact was created to accommodate the different sectarian communities in Lebanon. Political positions were divided amongst the three largest sects in Lebanon. The Maronites were the majority at the time and were given the presidency, which held the most power. The Sunnis held the seat of the prime minister, and the Shias were given the speaker of the house; a much weaker position than that of the Maronites and Sunnis (Norton 2007). The Shia community had little influence within the government, and they were economically marginalized.

The Shias resided in Southern Lebanon, and were the poorest community in the country. Their community was underdeveloped with no aid from the government to build infrastructure (Hamzeh 2004). The community in Southern Beirut depended on agriculture as a means for income. From 1940 until 1970, Lebanon’s industrial sector was growing, while its agricultural division was failing (Abboud & Muller 2012). Tourism was on the rise and the government was focused on services and trade, and failed to implement effective policies to support farmers (Norton 2007). The Lebanese government’s neglect of the South left many Shia’s unemployed and excluded. Feelings of deprivation and marginalization grew within the community, and Musa Al-Sadr emerged as a leader and voice for the Shias. Iman Musa Al-Sadr was an Iranian cleric from Lebanese descent who became aware of the socio-economic inequalities of the Shia community. Musa Al-Sadr used religion to mobilize the Shia community and define their struggle. In 1974, Al-Sadr mobilized a group of Shias ready to fight for a better socio-economic
status. The organization lead by Al-Sadr became known as Amal (The movement of Hope) (Abboud & Muller 2012).

With the failure of the National Pact to fully represent the demographics politically and economically, and with the presence of Palestinian refugees and militias in Southern Lebanon, a civil war erupted in Lebanon in 1975 (Abboud & Muller 2012). The civil war was a fifteen year violent conflict between different political and religious groups and external actors such as Syria and Israel. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) took refuge in Southern Lebanon, where the Shias suffered the most from Israel’s attacks. In 1978, Musa Al-Sadr disappeared in Libya and Nabih Berri took the position of Amal’s leader. Many Shias accused him of working with the Lebanese government, and religious clerics opposed his leadership and called for a more religious organization (Hamzeh 2004; Abboud & Muller 2012). With the success of the revolution in Iran in 1979, religious leaders thought to transform the Lebanese state into an Islamic Republic (Abdul-Hussain 2009). It wasn’t however until Israel’s invasion in 1982 that Hezbollah emerged. Now that I have presented a brief historical background on Lebanon, my case study will begin in the following section.

4.1 1982-1989

Israel’s invasion in 1982 during the civil war set the stage for the formation of Hezbollah. The Iranian Revolution that occurred in 1979 served as a successful model for the Shia community, however, Hezbollah did not mobilize until Israel’s invasion in Southern Lebanon (Abboud & Muller 2012). The Shia community first welcomed Israel’s presence in the South in hopes that they would drive out the PLO, however, the Shias resentment and anger grew in the face of Israel’s constant indiscriminate attacks (Norton 2007). Neither Israel nor the Lebanese government took any action to protect the Shias (Norton 2007). As Norton argues, with or
without Israel’s invasion, Iran’s revolutionary leaders would have pursued their goal for an Islamic Republic in Lebanon, however, Israel’s invasion further drove the formation of Hezbollah (Norton 2007). Former prime minister of Israel Ehud Barak said: “When we entered Lebanon…there was no Hezbollah. We were accepted with perfumed rice and flowers by the Shia in the South. It was our presence there that created Hezbollah” (Newsweek, July 18, 2006; Norton 2007). Israel’s presence gave Hezbollah a cause to mobilize fighters.

Hezbollah did not define themselves as an independent movement; they were a product of Iran’s Revolution (Abdul-Hussain 2009). The organization was led by young revolutionary leaders that were once part of Amal, leaders such as Al-Musawi, Al-Tufayli and Nasrallah who saw Amal as another Lebanese political party filled with corruption (Norton 2007). They were dedicated to Iran’s revolutionary leader Ayatollah Imam Khomeini, who supported the organization ideologically and financially in hopes of transferring the Islamic revolution to Lebanon (Norton 2007). As Norton states: “Iran and Syria share credit for sponsoring these young revolutionaries, although Iran certainly played the leading role” (Norton 2007). For Iran, it was important to spread the message of its revolution regionally, and collapsed state during the civil war provided an opportunity (Alagha 2006; Norton 2007). Iran lent its support to Hezbollah ideologically, diplomatically and financially. In fact, Byman states that without Iran’s support, it would have taken Hezbollah fifty years to achieve the capabilities it possesses today. Iran’s financial backing is estimated around $100 million a year since Hezbollah’s inception (Byman 2005). This support allowed the organization to provide services and build military capabilities. On the other hand, Syria’s support for Hezbollah is purely geopolitical and a means to maintain regional influence. In fact, Syria clashed with the organization at the beginning of their inception. Syria did not agree with Iran’s plans for Lebanon, because an Islamic state would
threaten Syria’s hegemonic pursuit in Lebanon (Byman 2005). However, Hezbollah resistance would allow Syria to effectively deter Israel and influence negotiations over the Golan Heights without direct involvement (Hamzeh 2004).

In 1985, Hezbollah published an Open Letter defining its objectives as a movement. In the letter, Hezbollah addresses all the oppressed in the world to take a stand against the oppressor. The oppressors are the Western countries, Israel, and any Lebanese party that has ties with the West (Norton 2007; Hamzeh 2004). Hezbollah calls for an Islamic state based on Wilayat Al- Faqih, which defines Islam as a struggle against the West and any domestic government associate with the West (Hamzeh 2004). “We, the sons of Hizbullah’s Umma, who’s vanguard God has given victory in Iran and which has established the nucleus of the world’s central Islamic State, abide by the orders of a single, wise and just command represented by the guardianship of the jurisprudent (Waliiyy al- Faquih), currently embodied in the supreme Ayatullah Ruhallah al-Musawi al-Khumayni…who has denoted the Muslim’s revolution, and who is bringing about the glorious Islamic renaissance” (1985 Open Letter; Alagha 2011).

According to the letter, people will eventually realize that Islam is the right path for order. Hezbollah clearly states their resistance against Israel and any party involved in mediating an agreement between Israel and Palestine, “We vehemently blast all attempts of mediation between us and Israel. We consider the mediating parties as aggressors because their mediation will only serve to legitimize the Zionist occupation of Palestine” (1985 Open Letter; Alagha 2011).

Furthermore, Hezbollah viewed the Lebanese government as corrupt and illegitimate due to their ties to the West, and refused any cooperation with the government (Norton 2007).

Since Hezbollah’s inception, the group focused on building their military capabilities and training fighters, in order to carry out their armed resistance against Israel and the West and build
an Islamic rule. Norton states that Iran supplied, trained, and sent as many 1,000 Revolutionary Guards to aid Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon (Norton 2000). The organization carried out different terrorist operations such as kidnapping Israeli soldiers, targeting Israeli military headquarters, and aiding underground groups in the attack on the U.S Embassy in Beirut in 1983 (Hamzeh 2004). Hezbollah also sought to assert its control of the South in order to begin its Islamic rule within Lebanon. Their strong military capabilities and hold allowed them to defeat the Lebanese Army in 1983, when President Amin Gemayel tried to limit Hezbollah’s violent operations by sending the Lebanese Army into Ba’albek (Hamzeh 2004). The total collapse of the Lebanese state during the civil war along with Iran’s assistance, allowed Hezbollah to carry on attacks, and assert its military power in the South. Hezbollah’s main focus during its early years was training fighters, carrying out attacks, and seizing control of the South.

Hezbollah did not directly become involved in the civil war until 1987. The organizations’ main rival during the civil war was Amal. Both Amal and Hezbollah wanted control of the South, and the loyalty of the Shia community. Tension between the two movements began when several leaders left Amal to form Hezbollah due to Berri’s less ideological stand and cooperation with the Lebanese government (Norton 1999). From 1987 until 1989, the two Shia movements clashed in an armed battle in Southern Beirut over the contested area and Amal’s action against Palestinian militias. In 1985, Amal waged the War of Camps in order to drive out Palestinian militias from the refugee camps in Beirut (Norton 2007). Hezbollah condemned Amal’s actions, because supporting the Palestinian cause is part of the resistance. Hezbollah has defended and provided assistance to the Palestinians when the Lebanese government resisted their stay. Norton states: “The Lebanese government forced the expelled Palestinians to stay in a contained area in the South that became, as many Palestinians
later called it, Hezbollah University” (Norton 2007). Hezbollah defeated Amal and took control of the south. A cease fire mediated by Iran and Syria in 1989 ended the violence between Hezbollah and Amal (Hamzeh 2004).

Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, who is a respected religious leader and the most influential cleric after Musa Al-Sadr, supported Hezbollah’s stand against Amal’s actions during the War of Camps (Norton 2007). As Norton states, this support from a high religious authority allowed the shift in loyalty amongst the local Shia from Amal to Hezbollah (Norton 2007). What makes Hezbollah different from Amal is their ideology. Hezbollah refused to cooperate with the Lebanese government. Amal’s leader Nabih Berri began to work with the Lebanese state, thus accepting the corruption within the confessional system (Alagha 2006; Norton 2007). For Hezbollah and Iran’s revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini, working with the Lebanese government was deviant from Islam, due to the corruption and the model of the confessional system (Alagha 2006; Norton 2007). The support of religious Shia leaders increased the legitimacy and support for Hezbollah amongst the Shias in Lebanon. Amal was strong organization, however, it was ideologically weaker compared to Hezbollah. Furthermore, Hezbollah was committed to building infrastructure, providing schools and hospitals for the Shias, and while Amal had a similar system, it was filled with corruption and poorly handled (Norton 1999). Even though Amal and Hezbollah did not see eye to eye, under Syria’s watch the two movements have put their disputes aside for what Norton describes it best, a political modus vivendi (Norton 2007).

Throughout the 1980s, Hezbollah’s main focus was to build and strengthen their military capabilities and legitimate the use of force in the South. In 1989, the Lebanese government made another attempt at diminishing Hezbollah’s power in the South by sending troops to the Southern
suburbs of Beirut (Hamzeh 2004). A Hezbollah fighter reports that: “Hezbollah fighters surrounded the barracks and requested that the army’s commander capitulate. As the army was overpowered by Hezbollah fighters, the soldiers surrendered to Hezbollah, who confiscated their arms and ammunition” (Al-Dyyar newspaper) (Hamzeh 2004). Lebanon’s army was not well funded and it was weak compared to Hezbollah’s well trained and equipped fighters (Byman 2005). The civil war led the state to total collapse, unable to control its territory providing an opportunity for militias to rise and challenge its legitimacy. Since the organization’s formation, Hezbollah has refused to recognize or work with the Lebanese government. As mentioned in their 1985 Open Letter, working with such corrupt confessional system is deviant from Islam. However, Hezbollah was faced with a dilemma as the fifteen year long civil war was coming to an end.

Under the mediation of Saudi Arabia, members of the 1972 Lebanese parliament met in Taif to negotiate the 1989 Taif Agreement that ended the civil war. The agreement sought to address the sectarian imbalance and flaws of the 1943 National Pact that led to the civil war. However, only minor changes were made in the confessional system to address the roots of sectarian divide and political imbalance in Lebanon. The agreement decreased the power of the Maronite president and increased the power of the Sunni prime minister, while granting the Shias the position of the speaker of the house, a position much weaker than that of the Maronites and Sunnis (Abboud and Muller 2012). Hezbollah saw the Taif Agreement as another National Pact and refused to acknowledge it. The agreement would demolish Hezbollah’s hope of an Islamic state in Lebanon (El-Hokayem 2007). However, after Ayatollah Khomeini’s death in 1989, Iranian leaders came to the reality that an Islamic Republic in Lebanon was impossible. Hezbollah’s 1985 Open Letter sought to accomplish two goals, an Islamic rule in Lebanon and
an armed resistance against Israel. While the former was impossible, Hezbollah fought to keep its resistance efforts.

Although the 1989 Taif Agreement called for the disarmament of all militias involved in the civil war. Hezbollah refused to accept the agreement unless the organization was allowed to keep their weapons. Hezbollah argued that the Lebanese state was incapable of defending its territories, and they were the only strong organization capable of defending Lebanon from Israel. With Syria’s presence during negotiations, Hezbollah was able to keep their arms. For Syria, the presence of Hezbollah’s arms would be an effective tool in deterring Israel and obtaining the Golan Heights (El-Hokayem 2007). Hezbollah’s participation in the Taif Agreement meant that for the first time, the organization acknowledged the Lebanese government and its confessional system (Abboud and Muller 2012). Furthermore, the Lebanese government’s approval of Hezbollah’s arms legitimized Hezbollah as a resistance movement. The Taif agreement set the stage for Hezbollah’s durability, because they were the only group in Lebanon with weapons, and through arms, Hezbollah gained monopoly over the use of force.

4.2 1989-2000

Lebanon came out of the civil war weak, divided and incapable of making decisions. In fact, many would argue that the Lebanese government had little to do with the Taif negotiations (Abboud & Muller 2012). Lebanon’s post-civil war politics and security were placed under Syria’s control (Abboud & Muller 2012). “The major positions in the Army and Lebanese security services were mostly purged and replaced with pro-Syrians who could be counted on to follow Syria’s security orders, which included co-existing with Hizballah and its resistance activities” (Abboud and Muller 2012). Syria’s domination of Lebanon’s security meant that the state was unable to effectively control its army. This meant that Lebanon’s policies were geared
towards serving Syria’s regional interests, rather than the Lebanese state. Syria’s hegemony in Lebanon allowed Hezbollah to maintain their arms, while Hezbollah’s presence in Lebanon allowed Syria to use Hezbollah as its proxy for deterring Israel. With Hezbollah in the South Lebanon, Syria is able to reduce the number of its own forces along the border (Samii 2008).

Hezbollah had always rejected participation in Lebanese politics, however, in 1992, elections for parliament were held for the first time in 20 years (Norton 2007). The elections spurred debates amongst Iran’s leader and Hezbollah about whether Hezbollah should participate in the Lebanon’s corrupt confessional system. Recognizing that an Islamic state was impossible, Sheikh Muhammad Hussain Fadallah, the most influential cleric in Lebanon, along with Iran’s Ali Khamenei who succeeded Khomeini, gave Hezbollah their blessings to participate in the elections (Norton 2007). Both Iran and Hezbollah concluded that becoming part of the political system would allow them protect their interests. The Shia community also supported Hezbollah’s entry to politics, where Hezbollah would have access to government resources, which are divided along sectarian lines (Azani 2012). In Hezbollah’s newspaper Al- Ahed, Hezbollah’s second-in-command, Naim Qassem, states:

Hezbollah has decided that it must represent those of us who are fighting the Israeli enemy, that [it must] be a pioneering force of “The Resistance” against the Israeli occupation, and [that it must] gather around it all those fighting the Zionist enemy....Our participation in parliament will not change our principles, and we will continue to fight...we will fight within parliament even as we continue to fight outside of it. I wish to stress that our participation in elections will not cause us to abandon our principles, so there is nothing to worry about in this regard. (Al-Ahed 1992; Azani 2012).

Syria’s hegemony in Lebanon, as well as the change in Iran’s regime after Khomeini’s death meant that Hezbollah had to face reality and adopt a new ideology (Norton 2007). The establishment of an Islamic order in Lebanon stated in the 1985 Open Letter was no longer a reality. Hezbollah addressed their new ideology and goal in another Open Letter in 1992. Unlike
the 1985 Open Letter, the letter in 1992 does not emphasize on religion as an end to a just political system. Hezbollah states that sacrificing the goal of an Islamic state was necessary for resistance in order to bring justice for all those who lost their lives defending themselves against the oppressors (Hezbollah 1992 Parliamentary Elections Program, Alagha 2011). Hezbollah addresses its resistance on a national level, labeling themselves as the protectors of Lebanon (Alagha 2011). Additionally, Hezbollah replaced their “Islamic Revolution in Lebanon” message on their yellow flag to “Islamic Resistance in Lebanon” (Abdul-Hussein 2009).

Syria’s dominance in Lebanese politics at the time meant insuring Syrian allies in parliament, “Syria’s covert manipulation of these elections included interference in the composition of candidate lists and drawing up electoral districts with a view to isolating opposition voices and insuring the victory of Syria’s allies” (Norton 2007). Hezbollah formed a parliamentary bloc called “Loyalty to the Resistance”, and won eight out of the 128 seat legislature (Norton 2007). Hezbollah justified their entry into Lebanon’s confessional system as a necessary step to ensure their security and protect their resistance framework. A Hezbollah representative in parliament, Muhammad Fneish, commented on their decision to participate in politics in Al-Luua newspaper: “Our entry into parliament is one form of resistance, on the political plane; it is natural for members of ‘The Resistance’ to have a political base of support, because armed resistance requires political assistance...our entry into parliament is [thus] an aid to our armed resistance against the [Israeli] occupation” (Al-Luua 1992; Azani 2012).

Syria protected Hezbollah’s operations, and with allies in the parliament Hezbollah was able to control security zones and maintain the flow of weapons from Iran with no interference from the government (Abdul-Hussain 2009). With Syria controlling the politics in Lebanon, Hezbollah was able to focus on building their military capabilities and fighting their resistance
against Israel (Abdul-Hussain 2009). Participating in politics was mainly a tool for the resistance to be able to oppose any reform or policy from the government calling for their disarmament, Hezbollah’s second in command, Naim Qassem states: “Those who think we will agree to give up ‘The Resistance’ in exchange for sitting in parliament are mistaken; we have not reached any agreements with anyone on that score” (Al-Nahar 1992; Azani 2012)

In 1992, Hezbollah led a protest in the streets of Beirut against the Gaza-Jericho agreement between Israel and Palestine. Prime Minister Rafik Hariri sent the Lebanese troops to stop the protests, which led to a standoff between Hezbollah and the Lebanese government (Hamzeh 2004). Hezbollah viewed Hariri’s actions as a plan to get rid of the organization, warning the government that their resistance has no end in sight (Hamzeh 2004). Hezbollah made it clear that it will act independently from the government’s policies and interfere with any peace agreements between Palestine and Israel, where violence was a means to an end. Indeed, the aggression between Hezbollah and Israel escalated with rockets flying back and forth across borders. Each time one side attacks, the other side would strike back. When Israel assassinated Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Abbas Musawi in 1992, his successor Hasan Nasrallah retaliated by killing Rida Yassin, an Israeli military official (Norton 2000). The tension between the two parties escalated, resulting in the death of hundreds of civilian and an estimated $300 million dollars in damage (Norton 2007).

The Israeli government’s frustration over failed efforts to deter Hezbollah, resulted in the 1993 Operation Accountability and 1996 Operation Grapes of Wrath. The operations were aimed at eliminating Hezbollah’s camps, supply routes and access to weapons in order to stop Hezbollah from attacking (Abboud & Muller 2012). Israel began indiscriminately launching missiles throughout Beirut attacking not only Hezbollah fighters, but also civilians (Abboud &
Muller 2012). Israel hoped that by indiscriminately attacking civilians and damaging infrastructure, it would pressure the Lebanese government to deter Hezbollah’s actions (Norton 2000). However, Israel’s indiscriminate attacks only justified Hezbollah’s actions and increased their support. Aggravated by the consequences of Hezbollah’s actions, Prime Minister Hariri called for Hezbollah to align their actions with the policies of the states, however, Hezbollah opposed any coordination from the government stating, “We have declared our willingness to discuss joint planning and coordination with any who are willing to cooperate with us. But we are not willing to cooperate with those who sit in the corner and tell us what to do” (Al-Tila’at 1993; Azani 2012). Qassem further reiterated that the party would not cooperate with any government or state regarding its resistance (Azani 2012).

Hezbollah’s military capabilities and support increased over the years. In the past, Hezbollah would lose five fighters to one IDF soldier, however, since 1995 Hezbollah casualties decreased to 2 to 1 (Norton 1999). Israel’s actions not only strengthened the resistance, but it also allowed Hezbollah to demonstrate their reconstruction efforts. Although Hezbollah’s social provisions in the South were evident during the civil war, they really accelerated their services during the 1990s. The party was losing support due to the damages inflicted by their actions, therefore, to regain support Hezbollah had to act quickly in reconstruction efforts. Hezbollah played the game of protector and provider. Hezbollah attacks Israel, Israel attacks back, Hezbollah provides shelter and infrastructure. With Iran’s financial assistance, Hezbollah has built and renovated 10,606 projects ranging from schools, homes, Mosques, cultural centers, agricultural centers, shops and hospitals (Hamzeh 2004).

Hezbollah’s social services were more effective than that of the Lebanese government. In Ba’albak, Biqaa and the suburbs of Beirut, where the Shia community resides, Hezbollah opened
hospitals that were much more impressive than the government’s hospitals, where about half a million people receive reduced or free medical attention (Norton 1999; Hamzeh 2004). Hezbollah opened their own construction company called Jihad al-Bina’ (Holy Struggle Construction Foundation) that helps with reconstructing homes, hospitals, schools destroyed by Israeli attacks (Norton 1999). Their construction firm has built and renovated 9,643 homes, 35 schools, and 5 hospitals from 1988 to 2002 in Ba’albak, Bqaa and Beirut (Hamzeh 2004). The party provides a food distribution center for the needy, as well as public assistance facilities, education, electricity and clean water (Norton 1999). Furthermore, the families of Hezbollah fighters receive regular assistance and money from the party through The Martyrs Foundation that was founded in 1982 under Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini (Norton 1999; Hamzeh 2004). The party also established the Khomeini Support Committee in 1982 when Israel invaded, to help needy families effected by Israeli attacks (Hamzeh 2004). The families receive health care, education, and monthly payments (Hamzeh 2004). Hezbollah also has an education unit called al-Tabia al-Tarbawiyya, which provides scholarships to the students of Hezbollah supporters. Their education unit has provided about $14 million dollars to students from 1996 to 2001 (Hamzeh 2004). Needless to say, Hezbollah has a strong presence and a tremendous amount of support in Southern Lebanon. Since their inception in 1982, they have provided effective services to the Shia community where the government lacked any type of social provision or presence in that area.

Hezbollah views their social service provisions as one of the factors that helped them win seats in the 1992 parliamentary elections, and continuing their services is vital for the party’s growth (Azani 2012). The other important factor that Hezbollah capitalized on was their resistance against Israel. Hezbollah leaders view themselves as the only capable party to provide
security for not only the Shia community, but also for the Lebanese society (Azani 2012; Norton 2007). In fact, in the 1996 parliamentary elections, Hezbollah used their resistance against Israel to gain support, with posters reading: “They resist with their blood, resist with your vote” (Norton 2007). However, in the 1996 parliamentary elections, Hezbollah saw a drop in the number of seats in the legislature from eight to seven (Hamzeh 2004). The results of the elections could be attributed to Syria’s influence in Lebanon’s domestic politics. Syria feared Hezbollah’s growing autonomy and power in Lebanon, because the party could eventually challenge Syria’s position in Lebanon (El-Hokayem 2007). Hezbollah and Syria have different policies and views in Lebanon and the region. Hezbollah’s goals for transforming Lebanon’s political system into an Islamic state would interfere with Syria’s control over the state and decrease its influence in the region. By controlling the politics in Lebanon, Damascus is able to influence Lebanon’s domestic and international policy to advance its interests. Hezbollah’s strengths also imposed a challenge for Syria’s beloved Amal. For Syria, maintaining the relationship with both was important, because Amal provides its political agenda, while Hezbollah fights its war. In order to tame Hezbollah, Damascus pressured Hezbollah into forming a joint list with Amal for the South during the 1996 elections, which resulted in a decrease in the number of seats for Hezbollah (Samii 2008).

Syria’s presence in Lebanon and influence in Hezbollah’s affairs was not welcomed by Hezbollah’s former secretary general Subhi Tufayili. On July 4, 1997, Tufayili led the thawrat al- jiyya, the revolution of the hungry against the government and Hezbollah (Norton 1999). Syria used their dominance in Lebanon and took advantage of the free access by exporting cheap produce (Norton 2007). Lebanon’s agriculture was deteriorating and the farmers in the Biqaa valley who depend on agriculture to feed their families grew with frustration (Norton 2007).
Tufayli accused Hezbollah of failing to stand up for the needy, calling them a puppet for Syria’s foreign policy (Norton 2007). This was not the first time Tufayli had criticized Hezbollah’s actions. When Hezbollah decided to participate in the 1992 elections, Tufayli opposed their participation accusing the party of abandoning the roots of the revolutions in order to become another corrupt political party (Norton 1999). Tufayli was expelled from the party, however, his revolt for the hungry gained him supporters in Biqaa during the 1998 municipal elections, resulting in a split of representation with Hezbollah (Norton 2007).

In 1998, for the first time in thirty five years, municipal elections were held. The Lebanese government tried to keep Hezbollah’s actions from influencing the state’s domestic and regional policies (Hamzeh 2004). Hezbollah found another way to gain power over local cities by lobbying for municipal elections (Hamzeh 2004). Local governments in Lebanon are not as effective in influencing the state as parties who are part of the federal system, however, Lebanon’s central government is weak where the state is unable to directly influence some areas within its borders (Hamzeh 2004). The municipal elections were held in 1998, and for the first time Hezbollah and Amal competed against each other. Hezbollah beat its rival Amal in the predominately Shia towns in the southern suburbs of Beirut (Borj al-Barajneh, Ghobairi) with ninety seats, where Amal received no seats (Hamzeh 2004). It is no surprise that Hezbollah was victorious in southern Beirut where the party has proven to be a provider through its social services, and a protector through its resistance against Israel. Hezbollah emphasized on economic and social inequality calling for development, whereas Amal did not provide a vision for their services (Hamzeh 2004).

Although Hariri attempted to decrease Hezbollah’s influence within Lebanon, Syria made sure that the 1998 parliamentary elections would improve Hezbollah’s role (Azani 2012). The
Syrian government influenced the 1998 parliamentary elections by supporting pro-Syrian Emile Lahoud to the presidency, and Selim Al-Hous who became prime minister. The Syrian government wanted to maintain the grip on Lebanon’s domestic and foreign policy. With both the President and Prime Minister Syrian allies, Hezbollah began abandoning its oppositional approach towards the Lebanese government (Azani 2012). Hezbollah’s actions were met with support within parliament, and their legitimacy increased.

In 1999, Ehud Barak became Israel’s Prime Minister and promised to end Israel’s occupation in Southern Lebanon through bilateral negotiations with Syria (Norton 2007). After the negotiations between Israel and Syria failed, Barak promised to unilaterally withdraw troops by July of 2000 (Norton 2000). When an organization’s existence and legitimacy depends on a resistance, Hezbollah could not pass up a chance to claim success for Israel’s withdrawal. Hezbollah continually used violence against the IDF in the South in hope to expel troops earlier than July (Norton 2007). Indeed, Hezbollah forced Israel to withdraw its troops on May 24th, 2000. That day was welcomed with celebration in Southern Lebanon, where thousands of people who fled their homes during the occupation returned to their villages (Norton 2007). Hezbollah’s legitimacy in the South grew with thousands of people celebrating Nasrallah. Israel’s withdrawal proved Hezbollah’s military capabilities and became a significant moment for the party’s resistance (Azani 2012). Hezbollah took control of the area that was occupied by Israel, where the Lebanese army was nowhere in sight (Norton 2000).

Israel’s withdrawal from Southern Lebanon increased the support and legitimacy to Hezbollah’s resistance. Their successful resistance against Israel translated into the 2000 parliamentary elections (Norton 2000). Every single Hezbollah candidate that was represented for elections won and Hezbollah held twelve seats (Norton 2000). Hezbollah would have
captured more seats if it wasn’t for Syria’s grip on the party, limiting the party’s number of seats by forming a joint list with Amal (Norton 2007). Syria convinced Iran that an alliance between Hezbollah and Amal within the government would provide both states a stronger influence within Lebanon (Samii 2008). Iran agreed that two parties aligned together would be more effect. With pressure from Iran and Syria, Hezbollah agreed to run a joint list with Amal where they won all of the twenty three seats in Southern Lebanon (Norton 2007).

Hezbollah’s partial cooperation with the Lebanese government came to an end when Rafik Hariri returned to parliament in 2000 where he regained Prime Ministry. Hezbollah had always opposed Hariri’s plans for Lebanon. For example, Hezbollah objected each budget Hariri represented in 1992, 1996, and again in 2000, accusing Hariri of running Lebanon like a corporate company and not caring for society (Hamzeh 2004). Hariri has always supported negotiations for peace with Israel, whereas Hezbollah views any steps taken to an agreement as legitimizing Israel and neglecting the Palestinian cause (El-Hokayem 2007). Furthermore, any peace agreements with Israel would threaten Hezbollah’s arms calling for its disarmament. Whenever Hariri and Hezbollah got into a dispute, Syria played mediator. Although the Syrian government’s policies for Lebanon differentiate it from Hariri’s vision, Hariri was an important player for Syria, as El-Hokayem states: “Damascus relied on Hariri to project a reassuring image to the West, other Arab states, and much of the Lebanese public and to generate revenue and growth in Lebanon, which would sustain Syria’s own economy” (El-Hokayem 2007). Every aspect of Lebanon’s economic, political and social affairs related back to Damascus.

4.3 2000-2008

Israel’s withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in 2000 saw Hezbollah victorious. The party enjoyed legitimacy and support in the South. Hezbollah’s popularity amongst the Shia
community was evident in the 2004 municipal elections. The party defeated Amal in the local elections of the Southern suburbs of Beirut and the Biq’a, and won the majority of municipalities in Southern Lebanon and Nabatiyeh where Amal used to reign (Hamzeh 2004). Hezbollah enjoyed support amongst the Shia for not only their successful resistance against Israel, but also for the generous services they provided for the community. While conducting field research in Lebanon, Norton converses with a Shia who states, “There are no needy people in al-dahiyyaa (village)” (Norton 2007). Hezbollah has been able to successfully reach and meet the needs of his supporters (Norton 2007). Amal also provides services similar to Hezbollah’s, however, Amal relied on donors for finances, while Hezbollah had a constant flow of money from Iran (Norton 2007). It is estimated that 90 percent of Hezbollah’s social services are funded by Iran (Byman 2005).

The absence of IDF soldiers in the south raised questions concerning Hezbollah’s arms. Hezbollah had no reason to continue with their resistance, and keep their weapons. Liberating the South from Israel was important for the party, however, Hezbollah leaders knew that there would be pressure from the government for the party to disarm. Syria was also not too happy about losing its proxy along the border, because Hezbollah’s resistance and aggression against Israel serves as a reminder that the Golan Heights remains unsolved (Norton 2000; Norton 2007). In order for Syria to keep Hezbollah’s presence along the border and for Hezbollah to refute any arguments calling for their disarmament, Syria and Hezbollah called for the liberation of the Shebaa Farms. The Shebaa farms is a 10 squares mile land along the Israeli occupied Golan Heights (Norton 2007). The farms are said to belong to Syria, however, the Syrian government argued that they now belong to Lebanon (Norton 2000). Consequently, Israel has not fully withdrawn from Lebanon and Hezbollah still has a job to liberate the territory (Norton 2007).
Iran’s Khamenei also reiterated Syria and Hezbollah’s claim that Israel has not fully withdrawn from the territory (Norton 2007). Hezbollah’s leader Nasrallah adds: “The Resistance will continue and we will remain in our positions even after the completion of the withdrawal because a new file will be opened, which is the file of Palestine and holy Jerusalem, which concerns the entire Islamic world” (al-Mustaqbal 2000; Samii 2008).

The following years, Hezbollah and Israel exchanged small attacks against one another. The two played by the “rules of the game”, where neither party would launch an attack outside the contested territories. Hezbollah engaged in several kidnappings of Israeli soldiers, then exchanged prisoners with Israel (Abdul-Hussain 2009). Hezbollah enjoyed victory and success by returning fighters through prisoner swap deals. While Syria, Iran and the Shia community supported Hezbollah’s continued resistance against Israel, many Lebanese viewed Hezbollah’s constant aggression along the farms as unnecessary and unjustified (Norton 2007). Gibran Tueni, Lebanese politician and publisher of Lebanon’s leading newspaper, An-Nahar, criticized Hezbollah’s resistance stating, “Who authorized Nasrallah to represent all the Lebanese, to make decisions for them and to embroil them in something they don’t want to be embroiled in? Did Nasrallah appoint himself secretary general of all the Lebanese and the whole Arab world?” (An-Nahar 2003; Norton 2007). Despite vocal opposition against their actions, Hezbollah continued its resistance.

Syria enjoyed a strong influence over Lebanon’s domestic and foreign affairs. The Syrian government meddled in elections to ensure pro-Syrian candidates within parliament by influencing the results of the elections. As Norton states, “Syrian manipulation included composing candidate lists and drawing electoral districts with a view to isolating opposition voices and ensuring the victory of allies” (Norton 2007). In both presidential elections since the
end of the civil war, Elias Hrawi and Emile Lahoud, both Syrian allies were elected presidents; hence Syria’s control since the end of the civil war. By 2004, The Syrian government wore out their welcome when they extended Lahoud’s presidential term. According to the constitution, presidential terms are limited to a single six year term, however, (Norton 2007). However, with allies in the parliament, the Syrian government’s request for an extension was approved (Norton 2007).

Emile Lahoud was not very popular amongst the Lebanese; He was viewed as Syria’s puppet (Norton 2007). Prime Minister Hariri was not too happy with Lahoud’s presidency and opposed Syria’s plan for an extension. In October 2004, Hariri resigned as Prime Minister in opposition to Lahoud’s extension and Damascus’s growing influence within the Lebanese government (Abboud & Muller 2012). Hariri than requested an approval for a U.N resolution to end Syria’s occupation in Lebanon and call for the disarmament of all militias in Lebanon (Abdul-Hussain 2009). U.N Security Council Resolution 1559 was the first international effort to call for Hezbollah’s disarmament (Abboud & Muller 2012). As Abboud & Muller argue, Lebanon finally had a chance to assert its authority and legitimacy throughout its territory, especially in Hezbollah controlled territory where Lebanese forces are absent. However, since the government was controlled by Syria, the state was too weak to reassert control within its territory and pressure Syria out. Consequently, U.N Security Council Resolution 1559 failed to implement its objectives; however, the events of 2005 following Hariri’s assassination, changed the course of Lebanese politics and saw a revival in the resolution (Abboud & Muller 2012).

On February 14, 2005, Rafik Hariri was assassinated in a car bomb in Beirut. Immediately after, Sunnis and Christians took the streets in protest over Hariri’s assassination, pointing the fingers at Syria (Abdul-Hussain 2009). Hariri had been vocal about Syria’s
occupation and Hezbollah’s arms, and his attempt to implement UNSCR 1559. The protests took the name The Cedar Revolution, and consisted of anti-Syrian Lebanese Sunnis and Christians, led by Hariri’s son Saad, Amin Gemayel, and other politicians (Abboud & Muller 2012). In response to the Cedar Revolution, on March 18th, 2005, Hezbollah took the streets with their supporters to “Thank Syria” with a speech reminding the Lebanese that Syria has protected Lebanon from Israel’s aggression (Abboud & Muller 2012). As Abboud and Muller argue, Hezbollah feared that if Syria’s hegemony disappeared, the party would lose a strong ally in Lebanon that has helped Hezbollah maintain their weapons. Frustrated over Hezbollah’s autonomy, and sympathy towards Syria, the Cedar Revolution took the streets on March 14th, 2005, calling for Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon and an investigation into Hariri’s assassination (Abdul-Hussain 2009). The Syrian oppositional group became known as the March 14th coalition, while Hezbollah and Amal’s pro-Syrian supporters became known as March 8th.

On April 2005, the UNSC 1559 reemerged and Syria was pressured out of Lebanon. The alliances made after Hariri’s assassination further divided Lebanon’s society. The March 14th group created a new alliance within parliament, leaving Hezbollah alienated (Abdul-Hussain 2009). However, just before the 2005 parliamentary elections, former commander-in-chief of the Lebanese army, Michel Aoun returned from exile in France and struck an alliance with Hezbollah (Norton 2007). General Michel Aoun was vocal about Syria’s occupation in Lebanon after the civil war ended, and with Syria’s dominance at the time, he was forced into exile in France (Norton 2007). Aoun returned to Lebanon in hopes of joining the government and eventually taking presidency, however, it was clear that his Christian rivals within the March 14th alliance would never allow him to become president (Norton 2007). Syria was aware of the rivalry and Aouns intentions to seek presidency, therefore, in order to ensure allies within
government, Syria managed to get Aoun on their side (Abdul-Hussain 2009). For Aoun, joining the March 8th alliance increased his chance of advancing within the government.

In May 2005, for the first time in thirty years, parliamentary elections were held without Syrian interference. The U.N observed the process in order to ensure a free and fair election. The March 14th alliance won majority within parliament with 72 seats out of 128. The March 8th alliance headed by Amal, Hezbollah and Aoun’s Free Patriotic movement, won 56 seats in total (Norton 2007). Fouad Siniora was elected Prime Minister, and turned his focus towards the UNSCR 1559 to address Hezbollah’s position and arms within Lebanon (Azani 2012). A national dialogue regarding Hezbollah’s arms took place, where former president Amin Gemayel stated: “The issue of Hezbollah’s weapons is a controversial issue between the Lebanese people and their solution necessitates great responsibility. Any armed force that doesn’t yearn for the Lebanese State’s authority or doesn’t abide by the national accord pertaining to the decision of peace and war, should not remain on the Lebanese territories. The peace and war decision is among the precautionary decisions over which a dialogue should be held” (Lebanese News Agency 2007; Abboud & Muller 2012). However, Hezbollah rejected any dialogue concerning its disarmament, arguing that the state is too weak to defend their borders from Israel’s threat, and that their military capabilities far exceed the state’s forces (Leenders 2006; Norton 2007). Nasrallah added: “We have 24 years of experience; we have long and real experience on land. We have high and efficient fighting capabilities, good armed capabilities and good reserves” (Al Jazeera 2006; Leenders 2006). The national dialogue concerning the issue of Hezbollah’s arms failed to produce any results. Frustrated with the Hezbollah growing autonomy and the government’s weakness to implement any effective policies, Gibran Tueni, a member of the parliament and the March 14th alliance became a vocal critic of the government’s inability to
assert its sovereignty and enforce Hezbollah to disarm (Azani 2012). Gibran Tueni was assassinated in a car bomb (Azani 2012). Due to a lack of public records, it is difficult to obtain information about the assassination, therefore, it is unclear which organization carried out the attack.

In an attempt to revive their resistance and prove their strong military capabilities, Hezbollah launched an attack on Israel on July 12th, 2006. Hezbollah abducted two Israeli soldiers and killed a few soldiers (Norton 2007). Hezbollah hoped that if they were able to negotiate a prisoner swap for the remaining Lebanese prisoners in Israel, it would be able to gain the support of the Lebanese, and silence the cabinet members calling for their disarmament (Norton 2007). However, Hezbollah’s plans for a prisoner exchange escalated into a violent war when Israel retaliated. Olmert, Israel’s Prime Minister called Hezbollah’s actions an act of war, and vowed to eliminate Hezbollah (Norton 2007). Israel began launching violent attacks targeting Hezbollah officials. The war lasted for thirty four days, resulting in the loss of civilians and infrastructure on both sides. The war ended in a cease fire on August 14th under the U.N, with a U.N Security Council Resolution 1701, calling for an increased presence in U.N peacekeepers in Southern Lebanon (Norton 2007).

Hezbollah declared victory during the war, however, the party drew criticism from their supporters and non-supporters regarding the consequences of their actions. The war resulted in the death of 1,109 civilians and destroyed the homes of 15,000 families (Norton 2007). The war damaged Lebanon’s tourism season, and the reconstruction was estimated at $4 billion dollars (Norton 2007). In order to regain support, Hezbollah immediately began reconstruction. The party gave $12,000 to each family that lost their home. Iran’s financial backing allowed Hezbollah to rebuild quickly and efficiently, compared to the Lebanese government’s slow
reconstruction efforts. Hezbollah leaders accredited Iran and Syria’s help, thanking them for their financial support (Samii 2008).

In the following months, the majority in parliament requested a U.N investigation regarding Hariri’s assassination. Tensions escalated between Hezbollah and the government, where Nasrallah demanded a national unity government from the state. Nasrallah warned the government that they were not afraid of a civil war, and if they did not comply with the demands, then protests would ensue (Azani 2012; Norton 2007). Five Shia members resigned from parliament, stalling the government for two months (Azani 2012; Norton 2007). Hezbollah argued that under the Taif agreement, every sect must be present within the government, therefore, when Amal and Hezbollah members walked out, the government was no longer a legitimate entity to impose and implement policies (Norton 2007). Azani states that Hezbollah’s resignation was seen as a play from Syria to prevent any investigation regarding the assassination, and remove Siniora from power (Azani 2012). If the Syrian government was to be accused of Hariri’s assassination, then it would no doubt damage their image domestically and internationally. Furthermore, seeing that Hezbollah is an ally of the regime, their legitimacy would decrease as well within Lebanon.

In an attempt to block the international investigation regarding Hariri’s assassination, Speaker of the House Nabih Berri opposed any meeting regarding the establishment of an international tribunal (Norton 2007). Meanwhile, given that President Lahoud is Syria’s ally, he also disapproved of an international tribunal in Lebanon. Regardless of legality, Prime Minister Siniora was able to get an approval from the U.N Security Council, and the international tribunal was established in May of 2007 (Norton 2007). The Special Tribunal for Lebanon was approved under U.N Security Council Resolution 1757. Hezbollah called the tribunal illegitimate, because
it was not approved by all members within parliament (Abboud & Muller 2012). The March 8th
calendar and their supporters rallied in the streets of Beirut, and called for the resignation of
Prime Minister Siniora. Tensions between Sunnis and Shias escalated (Abdul-Hussain 2009).

In November 2007, Emile Lahoud’s presidential term ended, and disagreements between
the government and Hezbollah regarding a successor stalled the state (Azani 2012). Hezbollah’s
objective was to make sure that another Syrian ally would become president, and prevent the
March 14th coalition from choosing a president (Abdul-Hussain 2009). Nasrallah and Berri
restrained from voting each time the government would find a suitable candidate (Azani 2012).
The inability to reach an agreement on a new president resulted in a governmental deadlock for
six months (Abdul-Hussain 2009). Hostility between the government and Hezbollah escalated
when the Lebanese government discovered a surveillance camera belonging to Hezbollah at the
airport in Beirut, and threatened to dismantle it and remove the Security Chief of the airport,
Wafiq Choucair, who’s been linked to aiding Hezbollah (Azani 2012). The government’s
decision resulted into the most intrastate violent clash since the end of the civil war.

The Lebanese government’s decision to dismantle Hezbollah’s telecommunication
networks is a step to take back control from Hezbollah. The government called Hezbollah’s
surveillance a threat to the state’s security and sovereignty (Bakri, New York Times 2008).
Hezbollah’s leader Nasrallah responded to the government in a news conference, claiming that
their telecommunications network is part of the party’s resistance against Israel, stating that the
government’s decision is an act of war, “The decision is tantamount to a declaration of war ... on
the resistance and its weapons in the interest of America and Israel” (Attar, USA Today 2008).
Nasrallah further added, “We have said before that we will cut the hands that will target the
weapons of the resistance” (Bakri, New York Times 2008). Immediately after Nasrallah’s speech,
an armed clash broke out in the streets of Beirut between Sunni and Shia, where the Lebanese army attempted to stop the fighting (Bakri, *New York Times* 2008). Hezbollah fighters took over Sunni neighborhoods, attacked media offices belonging to Saad Hariri, leader of the March 14th alliance, setting the offices of his TV station and newspaper on fire (*BBC News* 2008). Hezbollah temporarily took control of Beirut, and blocked the only road leading to Beirut’s International Airport, in retaliation to the government’s decision to replace the commander of the Airport security (*BBC News* 2008).

The Lebanese government described Hezbollah’s actions as a rebellion aimed at restoring Iran and Syria’s influence in Lebanon, "The armed and bloody coup which is being implemented aims to return Syria to Lebanon and extend Iran's reach to the Mediterranean" (*BBC News* 2008). Nasrallah stated that it would end the violence only after the government retracted its decision to dismantle the telecommunications network (Bakri, *New York Times* 2008). Saad Hariri asked Hezbollah to negotiate with him in order to save Lebanon, stating in a televised interview, “My appeal to you and to myself as well, the appeal of all Lebanon, is to stop the slide toward civil war, to stop the language of arms and lawlessness” (Bakri, *New York Times* 2008). Hariri called on Hezbollah to withdraw their fighters from Beirut, and lift the blockade leading to the airport. Furthermore, Hariri called for the election of the army commander Michel Suleiman as president, ultimately leaving the decision to remove Hezbollah’s networks in the hands of the Lebanese army (Bakri, *New York Times* 2008). Hezbollah rejected Hariri’s proposal, because it did not meet the party’s demands for the government to back down. Meanwhile, the Lebanese army tried to stay neutral and demanded both sides to stop the aggression, warning all parties involved that, “The continuation of the situation as is, is a clear loss for all and harms the unity of the military institution” (Attar, *USA Today* 2008).
The clash between Hezbollah and the government showcased Hezbollah’s military strengths and the government’s weakness. After five days of violence, the Lebanese Army finally deployed soldiers to Beirut in attempt to stop the fighting. However, the army was incapable of removing the Blockades placed by Hezbollah (Azani 2012). Under Qatar’s mediation, the political deadlock and the violent clash ended resulting in the Doha Agreement. Under the Doha agreement, Hezbollah’s demands for a national unity government were granted, securing a third of the cabinet. This grants Hezbollah veto rights, enabling the party to block any policy set forth by the government (Azani 2012). Furthermore, under the agreement, the Lebanese government would recognize and support Hezbollah’s resistance. The obvious issue of Hezbollah’s arms in regards to UNSCR 1559 and 1701 were left unsolved (Azani 2012). Commander of the Lebanese Army Michel Suleiman was elected president, Sinora’s term ended, and the governmental deadlock that began after Hezbollah’s members walked out of the cabinet ended with Hezbollah victorious.
5 CONCLUSIONS

The Lebanese civil war in 1975 brought the state to total collapse. External states took advantage of Lebanon’s failure to advance their interests ideologically and geopolitically. The state’s long history of marginalizing the Shia community and its inability to control and penetrate its borders provided an environment for a non-state actor to rise. Lebanon’s failed efforts to provide the Shia community with basic services allowed Hezbollah to gain the support and loyalty of the Shias. The National Pact created in Lebanon after its independence from the French in 1943 did not represent the Shia community. In fact, the Shia community has always felt marginalized historically within Lebanon. They lived in the ghetto of Beirut with no infrastructure, running water, or electricity. The government’s neglect of providing basic social services and political representation created resentment and a loss of legitimacy for the state amongst the Shia. As Cederman et.al argue, the political or economic exclusion creates grievances amongst a minority and facilitates recruitment and mobilization (Cederman et.al 2013). Hezbollah was able to step in and fulfill the state’s role in the community. Its ethnic linkages with the Shia community, along with social services, gave it the ability to build a strong local support base and facilitate recruitment efforts. Once a non-state actor gains local support and legitimacy of the use of force, they refuse to give up their power and become durable state rivals. Durable state rivals challenge the state’s legitimacy and authority. As Migdal states, the state finds itself competing with the non-state actor over social control (Migdal 1988).

The civil war ended with the 1989 Taif Agreement calling all militias to disarm. However, Hezbollah refused to disarm, questioning the ability of the Lebanese state to control its borders from Israel. The Taif agreement placed Lebanon under Syria’s control, and the Syrian government was more than happy to accommodate Hezbollah’s demands, using the party as a
proxy in deterring Israel. Since all other parties disarmed and lost military power, Hezbollah was the only organization with monopoly over the use of force. Lebanon did not have the military capacity to protect its borders, and as Mason and Fett argue, states with low military capacity will have difficulty deterring non-state actors (Mason & Fett 1996). Foreign state sponsors allow non-state actors to build the capacity necessary to become durable state rivals. Iran provided Hezbollah with well-trained fighters and advanced weapons which allowed the organization to build military capabilities. Iran also funded Hezbollah’s social services program and the organization began reconstructing and providing shelter, water, and electricity in the South. Hezbollah’s social services within the Shia community garnered popular support. As Migdal argues, when the state fails to provide “the blueprint for survival” to a community within its territory, that community must look elsewhere to survive (Migdal 1988). Hezbollah was able to provide to the Shias, and the Lebanese government lost authority and control over the Shias. Along with Migdal, Herbst argues that authority over people is stronger than authority over territory (Migdal 1988; Herbst 2000). Therefore, through the provision of services, Hezbollah gained authority over the Shia community, and turned their loyalty away from the state.

As Fearon and Laitin argue, non-state actors are usually weak compared to the state, therefore, the financial and political support from a foreign state is important. Syria’s control over the government allowed Hezbollah to keep their weapons and fight their resistance even after Israel’s withdrawal in 2000. On the other hand, Iran provided the money needed to reconstruct the damages done by Israel’s attacks and provide social services. In contrast to Weinstein’s theory linking external support to rebels using indiscriminate violence, Hezbollah received financial support from Iran, and never attempted any indiscriminate acts against the Shia community. Weinstein argues that rebels will rely on external support to build military
capabilities, however, as Migdal and Herbst argue, a non-state actor needs both in order to gain social control and become durable. As long as a durable state rival provides social services, the state will remain absent within that community.

Lebanon was on the brink of an internal conflict during the 2008 event between the Lebanese government and Hezbollah, however, a civil war did not occur. Hezbollah promised that their weapons would only be used against Israel, yet in 2008 when the government threatened to remove Hezbollah’s telecommunication network from the airport, the organization pointed their weapons in the direction of the state. The Lebanese army was incapable of removing Hezbollah’s blockades, and the Shia community stood behind Hezbollah against the government. However, Hezbollah did not attempt to overthrow the state. The reason Hezbollah did not attempt am overthrow of the government may be linked to the fact that Hezbollah’s followers are mainly Shia, whereas the Lebanese government has the support of both the Sunni and Christian community combined. Hezbollah understands that a coup against the Lebanese government will not be successful since the majority supports the state. The Lebanese state is weakest in the Southern region where the Shias reside, but not throughout all of its territories. The states services may not reach all of society, however, in Lebanon’s parliamentary system, resources are distributed along confessional lines. Since the Sunni and the Maronite enjoyed the majority, their community received social services. When the state is present in society and provides social services, there is no need for society to look for another leader to survive (Migdal 1988). Furthermore, Hezbollah’s resistance is aimed at protecting Lebanon’s borders from Israel. It would be counterintuitive for Hezbollah to be the protector of Lebanon and attempt to overthrow the state.
The Doha agreement in 2008 further proved Hezbollah’s resilience and power. Hezbollah’s demands for a national unity government were met, granting the party veto power. This further stalled any government effort to assert control and disarm the party. The Lebanese government was pressured to accept Hezbollah’s demands in order to avoid a civil war. Migdal states that once strongmen establish a high level of social control, the government begins accommodating to their requests in order to avoid violence or a civil war. Although Hezbollah has the capabilities to go to war with the state, they did not try to gain control of the government. Hezbollah is concerned with preserving their status in terms of their weapons and control in Shia dominated communities. The organization demanded veto power in order to reject any request calling for their disarmament. Throughout Hezbollah’s history, the organization remained as a durable state rival challenging the legitimacy of the state. After Syria’s withdrawal in 2005, Hezbollah stalled the government for almost a year when Lahoud’s term was ending. When Hezbollah leaders walked out of the government, their actions delegitimized the Lebanese government, as the parliament was unable to implement any policies or take actions without the representation of all sects. Durable state rivals aim to preserve their status within the state, possess a high level of social control over a community within the state, challenge the authority and legitimacy of the state, but they do not attempt to overthrow the state.

The conditions that may have prevented Hezbollah from becoming an insurgency were the same conditions that allowed Hezbollah to become a durable state rival. Although Lebanon was in total collapse during the civil war, the state witnessed stability after the war. While the Shias were politically and economically excluded from the government, the Maronite and Sunni were represented in the state. Hezbollah also appeals to the Shia because of ethnic linkage, whereas other sects in Lebanon do not agree with Hezbollah’s ideology and resistance. When
Hezbollah was formed, they hoped to transform Lebanon into an Islamic state, however, the organization quickly realized that an Islamic state will not succeed in a state with different religions. Furthermore, foreign sponsorship from Syria and Iran limited Hezbollah’s actions. It was only when Iran granted Hezbollah permission did the organization enter politics in 1992. Hezbollah’s agenda for an Islamic state in Lebanon would threaten Syria’s own agenda in Lebanon and the region. As Byman argues, a foreign state supports a non-state actor in order to advance or preserve its interests (Byman 2008). If Hezbollah created an Islamic state in Lebanon, then the Syrian government would lose influence in Lebanon. Therefore Syria limited Hezbollah from pursuing their own agenda by requesting a joint list between Hezbollah and Amal in the 1996 and 2000 parliamentary elections. Although Hezbollah was uncomfortable with Syria’s manipulation of elections and cooperation with Lebanese officials such as Hariri, the Syrian presence helped to protect Hezbollah’s weapons and as such they were willing to comply. If a durable state rival’s actions conflict with its sponsor, then the foreign sponsor may threaten their status.

Byman argues that excessive dependency on a foreign sponsor impacts the legitimacy of a religious or nationalist organization (Byman et.al 2001). Non-state actors lose legitimacy when they recruit on the bases of self believe and struggle, yet they rely heavily on a foreign sponsor (Byman et.al 2002). Hezbollah relied financially and ideologically on Iran, as 90% of their social provisions are funded by Iran. However, Hezbollah was a product of the 1979 Iranian revolution that stood for ending the struggle and marginalization for the Shias. The support of religious Shia leaders increased the legitimacy and support for Hezbollah amongst the Shias in Lebanon. If Iran’s support was not also ideological, then Hezbollah might have had a difficult time defining their agenda and struggle.
After analyzing the case study, it becomes clear that capacity matters. Military capabilities and social provisions allowed Hezbollah to become a durable state rival. Once a non-state actor establishes a high level of social control, in terms of force and social services, they become too strong for the state to control. Weak states with low capacity provide an opportunity for non-state actors to emerge. Foreign state sponsorship allows non-state actors to provide services and acquire weapons. Support and loyalty from a community allows non-state actors to gain social control. Even when the state no longer needs protection, and the danger passes, durable state rivals continually refuse to give up control of the state. Military and bureaucratic capacity matters for a durable rival. Foreign state sponsorship however, does not guarantee the durability of a non-state actor. We can’t measure external financial support as a causal variable for durability because as DeVora argues, it is all dependent on how a non-state actor uses the money to their advantage. Hezbollah invested Iran’s finances to appeal to the Shia community, which contributed to their durability. Hezbollah’s supporters have stood behind Hezbollah against the state. When a non-state actor uses external support to only focus on military capabilities, they are more likely to be defeated. One could argue that the LTTE in Sri Lanka were defeated because they used external support for military and did not provide services. Furthermore, it is important for the state to have capacity in some areas within its borders. If the state has the capacity to reach some of its territory, then it will limit durable state rivals from extending their control to other communities.

An important variable that was missing from my theory and played a big role in Hezbollah’s durability was their resistance against Israel. Hezbollah’s resistance against Israel allowed them to keep their weapons by using Israel as a national threat, build strong military capacities from fighting Israel all these years, and gain the support of Syria who used the
organization to deter Israel and advance its geopolitical interests in the region. As Norton argues, Israel’s presence created and strengthened the organization. It gave them an excuse to exercise force and keep their weapons. Israel’s presence allowed them to showcase their military and social services capabilities. Israel is known for its strong military and for Hezbollah to be able to stand up to such a strong military power proved that the organization has the capabilities. Furthermore, Israeli presence also showcased Hezbollah’s social services, by allowing them to quickly reconstruct infrastructure damaged from the attacks. Hezbollah played the game of protector and provider, and continued to build their legitimacy from Israel’s presence. Future research should explore Hezbollah’s resistance as another variable effecting their durability variable.

If a non-state actor within a state possesses weapons, then the state will more likely remain weak and incapable of asserting control. Policy makers should pay a great deal of attention to non-state actors that rise in weak states, because once a non-state actor become a durable rival, it will be difficult to deter them in the long run. Policy makers should focus on helping weak states build military and administrative capacity, because in the end, capacity is the single most important variable in deterring non-state actors. Policy makers should also turn their attention to foreign state sponsors, and find ways to minimize their influence and control within weak states. Lebanon will always remain a weak state as long as Hezbollah possesses weapons. In order for Lebanon to build capacity, politicians should define their interests for all Lebanese, rather than sectarian lines. As long as Lebanon remains divided, the state will be unable build bureaucratic and military capabilities.

Durable state rivals exist within state borders where they enjoy social control over a community. Durable state rivals influence and challenge the policies of the state in order to
preserve their status, but they do not attempt to take over the government. By analyzing Lebanon as a case study, it becomes clear that a weak state’s inability to control its borders and provide social services throughout all of its territory creates a space for a non-state actor to rise. The assistance from a foreign state provides a non-state actor with the capacity to build military capabilities and provide services to a community that has been politically and economically excluded from the state. The Lebanese case also showed how Hezbollah persisted as a rival and did not try to overthrow the government. The conditions that allowed Hezbollah’s durability may have also limited Hezbollah from taking over the Lebanese government. However, it is important to note that after presenting the case study in chorological order we find that history played an important role in Hezbollah’s path to becoming a durable state rival. The path to durability and persisting as a durable state rival is fluid where situations may change over time. Iran’s strategy within the region may change or Lebanon could become a strong state and threaten Hezbollah’s role within the state.
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