This dissertation evaluates the effects of three distinct health and education policies.

In the first chapter, leveraging Tennessee's 2005 Medicaid contraction, I study the impact of losing public health insurance on body weight and relevant health behaviors. Using Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) data from 1997 to 2010, I estimate comparative case study models with data-driven control groups. The preferred synthetic difference-in-differences estimates suggest that the reform increased Body Mass Index by 0.38 points and the overweight or obesity prevalence (BMI>=25) by ~4% among Tennessean childless adults. My findings on potential mechanisms suggest that worsening unmanaged health conditions may be a key pathway through which coverage loss affected physical activity and weight gain. Additionally, my analysis offers practical guidance for analyzing single treated clusters using comparative case study methods, highlighting the advantages of placebo-based standard errors for valid inference.

In the second chapter, I (with Cade Lawson) examine the impact of North Carolina's Advanced Placement (AP) exam fee waivers on exam participation and potential college credit attainment. Using course level administrative data and multiple quasi-experimental strategies, we find that fee waivers significantly increased exam participation and potential college credit attainment among high school students, particularly in underutilized AP courses, defined by below-median exam participation rates prior to the implementation of fee waivers. Although we find evidence that fee waivers reduce the exam participation gap between the underserved and more advantaged students, we do not find robust evidence that they narrow the disparity in college credit attainment. Finally, our main findings help reconcile the seemingly disparate findings from prior research on AP exam funding.

In the third chapter, I (with Ian Callen) study the effects of North Carolina’s Advanced Placement (AP) teacher bonus program, which rewards AP teachers $50 bonus for each student in her class achieving a passing score in the corresponding AP exam, with annual bonuses capped at $3,500. Leveraging course-level student-teacher linked data and teacher fixed effects model, we provide evidence that the bonus program significantly increased the probability of a course leading to a passed exam by approximately 2 percentage points.