This dissertation examines how institutional and policy designs influence individual behavior in settings where private incentives conflict with collective welfare. Across three studies, I analyze behavioral responses to incentive structures in common-pool resource environments, tobacco control policy, and social dilemma games, using both laboratory experiments and quasi-experimental methods.

In chapter one, I investigate a novel incentive-based mechanism, partial output-sharing, as a tool to mitigate over-extraction in common-pool resource (CPR) environments. Using a laboratory experiment, I compare CPR appropriation under different levels of mandatory output-sharing. I find that higher levels of sharing reduce appropriation effort, aligning individual behavior with the social optimum. These results demonstrate that free-riding, often viewed as problematic, can be leveraged as a corrective force in overuse dilemmas.

In chapter two, I evaluate the impact of comprehensive smoking bans implemented in South Korea in 2011. Using country-level panel data and the synthetic control method, I construct a counterfactual "Synthetic Korea" from OECD countries that did not adopt similar bans during the same period. I find that the smoking bans led to an 8.5% decline in smoking prevalence, equivalent to 1.2 million fewer smokers. This chapter contributes causal evidence of the effectiveness of non-price tobacco control policies in reducing harmful behaviors at the population level.

In chapter three, I explore how the origin of shared resources, endogenous versus exogenous, affects cooperation in a two-stage social dilemma game. Subjects who create a resource through collective provision are more likely to conditionally adjust subsequent behavior in response to group contributions, exhibiting negatively reciprocal preferences when initial cooperation is low. The findings suggest that people are more responsive to the history of cooperation when the resource is the product of their joint action.

Together, these chapters offer new insights into how incentive structures, institutional design, and the origin of resources can jointly shape cooperation, and sustainability. The results have implications for the design of more effective policies and institutions in resource management and public health.