Espionage can sometimes be considered unsavory and destabilizing, and when it is exposed it may enhance the risk of interstate conflict. However, I argue that states calibrate their reactions to the risk and contexts that are present when exposures occur. Succinctly, states respond to the exposure of espionage with restraint, caution, and control rather than retaliation. There are three mechanisms I introduce to explain why exposures do not lead to escalation: (1) states favor less risky, alternative policy options over escalation; (2) states employ or exploit plausible deniability; and (3) exposures may not rise to the level of a security threat, may dissipate before escalation is necessary, lost information cannot be reacquired by force, and the threat dissipates over time. To empirically explore the mechanisms presented, the Human Intelligence Exposure (HEX) dataset was created from 4,694 publicly accessible newspaper articles. It includes observations spanning the period beginning January 1, 1946, and ending December 31, 2010. HEX was then employed to evaluate a Random-Effects Within-Between (REWB) model to study whether exposures cause fatal conflicts. Results do not show a correlation between exposures and fatal conflicts. As a supplementary analysis, I also test whether displays or threats of force were correlated with exposures and if the profession of alleged spies correlated with the judicial sentence they received. I find some evidence that states are more likely to threaten or display force both 90 and 180 days after exposures but the likelihood of that dissipates over time, supporting the corresponding mechanism. The evidence also suggests that the profession of alleged spies may influence their judicial sentencing. I find that while espionage may sometimes be destabilizing, its exposure is not a catalyst for conflict. Indeed, I conclude that states are likely to respond to exposures with restraint and signaling rather than escalation.