Document Type
Article
Publication Date
3-6-2013
Abstract
We conduct an experiment in which we auction the scarce rights to play the Proposer and Responder positions in subsequent ultimatum games. As a control treatment, we randomly allocate these rights and then charge exogenous participation fees according to the auction price sequences observed in the auction treatment. With endogenous selection into ultimatum games via auctions, we find that play converges to a session-specific Nash equilibrium and auction prices emerge which support this equilibrium by the principle of forward induction. With random assignment and exogenous participation fees, we find play also converges to a session-specific Nash equilibrium as predicted by the principle of loss avoidance. The Nash equilibrium observed within a session results in low ultimatum game offers, but the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is never observed.
Recommended Citation
Shachat, Jason and Swarthout, Todd, "Auctioning the right to play ultimatum games
and the impact on equilibrium selection" (2013). ExCEN Working Papers. 41.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/excen_workingpapers/41
Comments
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