Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-31-2012
Abstract
This study sheds light on the difficulties people face in cooperating to resist coercion. We adapt a threshold public goods game to investigate whether people are able to cooperate to resist coercion despite individual incentives to free-ride. Behavior in this resistance game is similar to that observed in multi-period public goods games. Specifically, we observe “out-of-equilibrium” outcomes and a decrease in successful resistance in later periods of a session compared to earlier ones. Nevertheless, cooperation remains relatively high even in the later periods. Finally, we find that increasing the resistance threshold has a substantial negative effect on the probability of successful resistance
Recommended Citation
Ackert, Lucy; Gillette, Ann; and Rider, Mark, "Cooperating to Resist Coercion: An Experimental Study" (2012). ExCEN Working Papers. 67.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/excen_workingpapers/67
Comments
To learn more about the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies and ExCEN Working Papers Series, visit https://aysps.gsu.edu/ and http://excen.gsu.edu/center/.