Document Type

Article

Publication Date

1-1-2010

Abstract

Centipede games and Dutch auctions provide important instances in which game theory fails empirically. The reasons for these empirical failures are not well understood. Standard centipede games and Dutch auctions differ from each other in terms of their Institutional Format (IF), Dynamic Structure (DS), and Information Environment (IE). This paper introduces new games that are constructed from centipede games and Dutch auctions by interchanging some of their IF, DS, and IE characteristics. The new games are introduced in isomorphic pairs. Experiment treatments with pairs of new isomorphic games provide data that yield insights into the effects on behavior of games’ IF, DS, and IE characteristics.

Comments

To learn more about the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies and ExCEN Working Papers Series, visit https://aysps.gsu.edu/ and http://excen.gsu.edu/center/.

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