Date of Award

Spring 5-8-2011

Degree Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Master of Arts (MA)

Department

History

First Advisor

Ian C. Fletcher

Second Advisor

Joe Perry

Abstract

This thesis examines the influences on and evolution of the Irish Republican Army‘s guerrilla war strategy between 1917 and 1921. Utilizing newspapers, government documents, and memoirs of participants, this study highlights the role of propaganda and political concerns in waging an insurgency. It argues that while tactical innovation took place in the field, IRA General Headquarters imposed policy and directed the conflict with a concern for the political results of military action. While implementing strategies necessary to effective conflict of the war, this Headquarters staff was unable to reconcile a disjointed and overburdened command structure, leading its disintegration after the conflict.

DOI

https://doi.org/10.57709/1956314

Included in

History Commons

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