This dissertation examines opposition political parties’ electoral strategies in authoritarian settings. To understand how and when opposition political parties pave the way for autocratic reversal, I build on research showing that the opposition can more effectively challenge the autocratic incumbent through electoral strategies, and I examine the opposition coalitions formed to remove the incumbent. Thus, I investigate an understudied aspect of autocratic reversal: “Under what conditions do some opposition parties in electoral authoritarian regimes successfully form a pre-electoral coalition (PEC), while others fail to coordinate?” I theorize on two factors: internal organization and cohesiveness of each party, and ideological polarization of parties. More importantly, I argue that these two factors are not independent of each other and that different combinations of these two factors matter in coalition-building.

Relying on a mixed-methodological approach, I offer cross-sectional and cross-temporal evidence on PEC formation. My research shows that party institutions matter. Particularly, I find that highly polarized opposition parties can come to an agreement only if they have a strong internal structure. Using case studies, I explain this counterintuitive finding by focusing on opposition learning under democratic erosion and institutional setting. I contribute to the emerging literature on opposition coordination and provide critical insights for opposition actors at the normative level. In the first empirical chapter, I use an original dataset to test the implications of the theory. In the second empirical chapter, I assess the validity of my analysis using a diagnostic causal case approach and focus on influential and pathway cases. In the final empirical chapter, I investigate the proposed question using the case of opposition political parties in Turkey.