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Learning about Learning in Games through Experimental Control of Strategic Interdependence

Shachat, Jason
Swarthout, Todd
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Abstract

We report experiments in which humans repeatedly play one of two games against a computer program that follows either a reinforcement learning or an Experience Weighted Attraction algorithm. Our experiments show these learning algorithms detect exploitable opportunities more sensitively than humans. Also, learning algorithms respond to detected payoff-increasing opportunities systematically; however, the responses are too weak to improve the algorithms’ payoffs. Human play against various decision maker types doesn’t vary significantly. These factors lead to a strong linear relationship between the humans’ and algorithms’ action choice proportions that is suggestive of the algorithm’s best response correspondence. These properties are revealed only by our human versus comp

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To learn more about the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies and ExCEN Working Papers Series, visit https://aysps.gsu.edu/ and http://excen.gsu.edu/center/.
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2008-08-25
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Research Projects
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Learning; Repeated games; Experiments; Simulation
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