This dissertation explores the phenomenon of "civic capture," wherein organized criminal groups infiltrate and monopolize municipal governments through non-coercive means. Unlike the widely studied techniques that involve threats and violence or collusive bargains, civic capture is achieved through criminal clans developing monopolistic control over territories and leveraging grey market synergy within a contained commercial environment. Grey market synergy leads to acquiescence, dependency, and in some instances outright legitimacy for the criminal organization that manifests itself in local governance. This study introduces the concept of civic capture to describe the subtle yet pervasive influence these groups exert on municipal governments.

Employing a qualitative approach, this research combines firsthand interviews with legal officials, former mafiosi, and anti-mafia activists with investigative reports and public decrees to map the dynamics of state capture throughout Southern Italy, Northern Italy, and Sicily. The findings reveal that criminal clans use economic incentives, social influence, and culturally relevant market sectors to instigate synergy between itself and commercial actors. This synergy manifests itself in a municipal government body accountable to the local criminal clan, duly elected not despite these relationships but, often, because of them.

By advancing the concept of civic capture, this dissertation provides a new lens through which to understand the infiltration of governments by organized crime. It offers a novel understanding of an evolved and more sophisticated criminal element that has adapted to a modern and globalized economy, leveraging democratic norms and principles to achieve illicit goals.