Analysis of Resource-Sharing Decisions in Dyadic Collaborative Knowledge Creation: A Game-Theoretic Approach
Date of Award
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Dr. Subhashish (Sub) Samaddar - Chair
Dr. William Bogner
Dr. Arun Rai
Dr. Thomas Whalen
Knowledge is an asset that can give an organization competitive edge. However, knowledge creation is an expensive activity. One of the reasons organizations form knowledge creation collaborations is to share resources that are needed to create knowledge. This dissertation models the dyadic collaborations as games between the partners and arrives at resource-sharing schemes for them. Specifically, the collaborations are modeled as two games- Stackelberg Leader-Follower game and Partnership game. The types of collaborations are distinguished based on the nature of the marginal return functions with respect to knowledge creation investments for each of the collaborating organizations. Three essays are presented and discussed. In Essay 1, collaborations between organizations characterized by decreasing marginal returns with respect to investments are modeled as a partnership game. In Essay 2, collaborations between organizations characterized by increasing marginal returns with respect to investments are modeled as a Stackelberg Leader-Follower game. In Essay 3, collaborations where the leader organization is characterized by decreasing marginal returns with respect to investment and the follower organization is characterized by increasing marginal returns with respect to investments are studied. The solutions for the game in terms of the participation rate, knowledge creation investments, and the system gain are presented for each essay. The results are analyzed and the observations are stated as propositions. The propositions provide guidelines for collaborating organizations to arrive at a resource-sharing scheme. Additionally, the results suggest conditions under which the potential partners collaborate specifically with respect to the participation rate and the system gain. The results of Essays 2 and 3 provide conditions for participation rate. The results of Essay 3 provide the conditions of expected system gain under which the follower organization will collaborate with a potential leader organization. The results have implications for several stages of the alliance management process such as partner selection, gauging the behavior of potential and current partners, and renegotiation of alliance terms.
Namuduri, Savitha, "Analysis of Resource-Sharing Decisions in Dyadic Collaborative Knowledge Creation: A Game-Theoretic Approach." Dissertation, Georgia State University, 2006.