Date of Award
Summer 8-13-2013
Degree Type
Thesis
Degree Name
Master of Arts (MA)
Department
Philosophy
First Advisor
Daniel Weiskopf
Second Advisor
George Graham
Third Advisor
Andrea Scarantino
Abstract
Proponents of mechanistic explanation have argued that dynamical models are mere phenomenal models, in that they describe rather than explain the scientific phenomena produced by complex systems. I argue instead that dynamical models can, in fact, be explanatory. Using an example from neuroscientific research on epilepsy, I show that dynamical models can meet the explanatory demands met by mechanistic models, and as such occupy their own unique place within the space of explanatory scientific models.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.57709/4432837
Recommended Citation
Nolen, Shannon B., "In Defense of Dynamical Explanation." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2013.
doi: https://doi.org/10.57709/4432837