Date of Award
8-12-2016
Degree Type
Thesis
Degree Name
Master of Arts (MA)
Department
Philosophy
First Advisor
Neil Van Leeuwen
Second Advisor
Eddy Nahmias
Third Advisor
Nicole Vincent
Abstract
Many contemporary philosophers are committed – either implicitly or explicitly – to Propositionalism about thought-experimental intuitions. According to this view, thought-experimental intuitions are (1) phenomenally conscious, (2) spontaneous, (3) and non-theoretical; most importantly, Propositionalists claim that intuitions (4) bear consciously accessible propositional content. The negative project of this essay is a critique of (4), the rejection of which is tantamount to rejecting Propositionalism. In addition, I propose an alternative position – namely, Interpretationalism. According to Interpretationalism, intuitions possess the features ascribed in (1)-(3); however, they do not bear consciously accessible propositional content. Instead, intuitions acquire cognitive significance by virtue of being interpreted in light of a subject’s background beliefs.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.57709/8644420
Recommended Citation
McGahhey, Marcus, "Thought Experiments and the Myth of Intuitive Content." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2016.
doi: https://doi.org/10.57709/8644420