Title
Ways to Skin the Zombie Cat: A Look at the Problems Associated with Chalmers's Zombie-Argument
Date of Award
6-9-2006
Degree Type
Thesis
Degree Name
Master of Arts (MA)
Department
Philosophy
First Advisor
Reina Hayaki - Chair
Second Advisor
George Rainbolt
Third Advisor
Robert Almeder
Abstract
In contemporary philosophy of mind, the issue of consciousness has taken center stage. Broadly speaking, those who deal with consciousness fall into two camps: those who prioritize empirical work and those who favor conceptual investigation. One prominent argument has served to deepen the divide: the argument for the possibility of zombies. In this paper I intend to examine closely this argument, as it’s presented by David Chalmers, and some of the attempts to discredit it. In so doing, I present some of my own arguments against it, as well as the claim that if it’s sound, then materialism is false. Finally, I present a sketch of a new way of thinking about consciousness that would, I argue, guard against the threat—real or merely apparent—of arguments such as the zombie-argument.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.57709/1059736
Recommended Citation
Clifton, Walter Scott, "Ways to Skin the Zombie Cat: A Look at the Problems Associated with Chalmers's Zombie-Argument." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2006.
doi: https://doi.org/10.57709/1059736