Date of Award
12-2021
Degree Type
Thesis
Degree Name
Master of Arts (MA)
Department
Philosophy
First Advisor
Dr. Dan Weiskopf
Second Advisor
Dr. Neil Van Leeuwen
Abstract
Propositionalism is the widely held view that intentional attitudes are fundamentally and predicatively propositional. In contrast, objectualism is the view that a particular class of intentional attitudes—for example, love, fear, like, and hate—bears no relation to a proposition or state of affairs nor does their content make reference to objects by predicating something of them. This paper challenges the objectualist view. While I do not deny that non-propositional attitudes are real mental states, I do deny that they are metaphysically independent from propositional ones. To that end, I proffer an account whereby non-propositional attitudes supervene on possible disjunctive complexes of propositional attitudes, and I defend its merits over objectualism. I argue that my propositional account provides an intuitive framework to index polysemous attitudes and explain a variety of intentional behaviors whereas objectualism does not.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.57709/24315863
Recommended Citation
Guillemette, Steven, "Non-Propositional Attitudes Supervene on Disjunctive Propositional Attitude Complexes." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2021.
doi: https://doi.org/10.57709/24315863
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