Author ORCID Identifier
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2544-6984
Date of Award
8-8-2023
Degree Type
Thesis
Degree Name
Master of Arts (MA)
Department
Philosophy
First Advisor
Juan Piñeros-Glasscock
Second Advisor
Neil Van Leeuwen
Abstract
Susanna Rinard (2017, 2019, 2022) offers a refined pragmatist view of how to theorize normatively about beliefs. However, David Christensen (2020) disputes Rinard’s claim on rationality by presenting some seeming counterexamples of her theory. In this paper, I challenge Christensen's objections to Rinard's theory. First, I introduce Rinard's theory of belief rationality. Second, I introduce Christensen’s cases that allegedly debunk Rinard’s thesis. Third, I refine Rinard’s theory of rationality by arguing that the rationality of an agent's belief can be based on what is best for them given their existing beliefs, emotions, and perceptual experiences. Last, I will redescribe the cases Christensen presents to capture how people ordinarily deliberate in everyday life when undergoing tensions between their mental states. I will contend that the refined version of Rinard’s theory that I propose can offer a clearer picture of why Christensen fails in his attempt to reject Rinard’s original theory.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.57709/35850250
Recommended Citation
Rivas Tinoco, Marlon, "Believing rationally given your actual beliefs: on Susanna Rinard’s pragmatism." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2023.
doi: https://doi.org/10.57709/35850250
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