Date of Award

8-2024

Degree Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Master of Arts (MA)

Department

Philosophy

First Advisor

Tim O'Keefe

Second Advisor

Allison Piñeros Glasscock

Third Advisor

Hal Thorsrud

Abstract

In Nicomachean Ethics X.7-8, Aristotle surprisingly claims that happiness is a contemplative activity. Commentators generally assume that he means happiness consists exclusively in theoretical contemplation. In this paper, I challenge that assumption by examining how Aristotle uses the term theōrein (“to contemplate”) to describe a practical kind of contemplation that is integral to virtuous action. Then, I argue that the contemplative activity Aristotle identifies with happiness in NE X.7-8 includes both practical and theoretical contemplation. This interpretation improves on existing explanations for why Aristotle thinks a life without theoretical contemplation can still be happy and why happiness requires moral virtue. Finally, I explain why Aristotle’s account of happiness is philosophically appealing by arguing that happiness can be understood as the contemplative recognition of the value of fine (kalon) objects in the universe and in practical affairs.

DOI

https://doi.org/10.57709/37141965

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