Date of Award
Spring 4-22-2011
Degree Type
Thesis
Degree Name
Master of Arts (MA)
Department
Philosophy
First Advisor
Andrew J. Cohen
Second Advisor
Christie Hartley
Third Advisor
Tim O'Keefe
Fourth Advisor
Sebastian Rand
Abstract
In this thesis, I argue against a claim about pain which I call the "Minimization Thesis" or MT. According to MT, pain is objectively unconditionally intrinsically bad. Using the case of grief, I argue that although MT may be true of pain as such, it is not true of particular pains. I then turn to an examination of the justification provided by Thomas Nagle for offering the MT and find that his argument is inadequate because it depends on an implausible phenomenology of pain experience. I argue it is more plausible to claim, as Kant does, that pain has desire-conditional badness. Finally, I present a Nietzschean argument for the irreducible complexity of badness. I suggest we may be willing to concede pain's badness so readily only because it has not been specified what kind of badness it actually has.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.57709/1953705
Recommended Citation
Hookom, Andrew L., "But What Kind of Badness?: An Inquiry into the Ethical Significance of Pain." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2011.
doi: https://doi.org/10.57709/1953705