Minority Party Strategy in the House of Representatives: Cross-Pressuring and the Motion to Recommit
Date of Award
Fall 12-7-2012
Degree Type
Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Department
Political Science
First Advisor
Jeffrey Lazarus
Second Advisor
Amy McKay
Third Advisor
Amy Steigerwalt
Abstract
The minority party in the House of Representatives possesses few procedural advantages. As a result, it is typically dominated by the majority party. I argue that the minority controls the use of one procedure in the House, the motion to recommit, and that it uses this control to strategically cross-pressure members of the majority party. Ultimately, this cross-pressuring places the minority in a win-win situation where they either receive a policy victory or better election results. The results of this project overwhelming support the theory of cross-pressuring and indicate that the minority is able to design, implement, and reap the benefits of its own strategy in the House.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.57709/3318967
Recommended Citation
Webb, Brian M., "Minority Party Strategy in the House of Representatives: Cross-Pressuring and the Motion to Recommit." Dissertation, Georgia State University, 2012.
doi: https://doi.org/10.57709/3318967