

ScholarWorks@GSU

Transnational Presidential Rhetoric and the Global Imaginary: George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama

Item Type	communication_diss/80
Authors	Carney, Zoe
Citation	Carney, Zoe (2017). "Transnational Presidential Rhetoric and the Global Imaginary: George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama." Dissertation, Georgia State University. https://doi.org/10.57709/10064570
DOI	https://doi.org/10.57709/10064570
Rights	Presidential rhetoric;Globalization;Transnationalism;Democracy;Universals;Imaginary
Download date	2026-04-10 22:15:23
Link to Item	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14694/3413

TRANSNATIONAL PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC AND THE GLOBAL IMAGINARY:
GEORGE H.W. BUSH, BILL CLINTON, GEORGE W. BUSH, AND BARACK OBAMA

by

ZOË HESS CARNEY

Under the Direction of Mary Stuckey, PhD

ABSTRACT

This dissertation analyzes moments in which presidents interact with transnational audiences, identifying and explaining their rhetorical strategies for developing a global imaginary. Specifically, I first consider how George H.W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev negotiate geo-political and spatial metaphors leading up to their joint press conference, symbolically ending the Cold War. Second, I discuss how Bill Clinton and George W. Bush universalize the trope of “democracy” in their speeches before the United Nations General Assembly. Third, I explain how Barack Obama figures transnational citizens and himself as a global leader in his transnational town hall meetings. Together, these case studies show the ways

contemporary presidents call forth particular understandings of “the global” through speech. Politically, this study is significant because it broadens our understanding of the institution of the presidency from the framework of a national institution to that of a global one. Rhetorically, this study illuminates the relationship between presidential speech, transnational audiences, and the rhetorical imaginary of the global sphere.

INDEX WORDS: Presidential rhetoric, Globalization, Transnationalism, Democracy, Universals, Imaginary

TRANSNATIONAL PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC AND THE GLOBAL IMAGINARY:
GEORGE H.W. BUSH, BILL CLINTON, GEORGE W. BUSH, AND BARACK OBAMA

by

ZOË HESS CARNEY

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in the College of Arts and Sciences

Georgia State University

2017

Copyright by
Zoë Hess Carney
2017

TRANSNATIONAL PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC AND THE GLOBAL IMAGINARY:
GEORGE H.W. BUSH, BILL CLINTON, GEORGE W. BUSH, AND BARACK OBAMA

by

ZOË HESS CARNEY

Committee Chair: Mary Stuckey

Committee: Nathan Atkinson

Darrel Wanzer-Serrano

Carol Winkler

Electronic Version Approved:

Office of Graduate Studies

College of Arts and Sciences

Georgia State University

May 2017

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my husband, Kyle, who has supported me, encouraged me, and poured me coffee throughout my seven years of graduate school.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Amy Poehler once said that it is easier to be brave when you are not alone. For me, finishing my dissertation was an act of bravery. I would not have completed it without the embarrassment of riches I have in friends, family, colleagues, and mentors.

To my advisor, Mary Stuckey, thank you for your sharp wit, your company, your quick responses, and your endless support. Thank you, along with my committee members, Nathan Atkinson, Darrel Wanzer-Serrano, and Carol Winkler, for making my work stronger and smarter.

To my parents, thank you for raising me to think critically and to believe in myself. Without that foundation, it would be difficult to write anything, much less to write it well.

To my husband, thank you for years of engaging my ideas until they became arguments. Thank you, mostly, for betting on me when I would not bet on myself.

To my colleagues at Georgia State, I am grateful to have walked beside you through this process. Emily Kofoed, thank you for your friendship, wisdom, late-night writing dates, and yoga breaks. Sara Baugh, thank you for being my banana counterpart, always up for an adventure, commiseration, and the lending of a keen editing eye. Stephen Heidt, thank you for being an example to follow throughout graduate school. Evan Johnson, Christian Norman, Milene Ortega, and Phil Kostka, thank you for the rich discussions and debates over the years.

Jennifer Mercieca, you have been a source of inspiration and guidance for the past decade. You make me a better scholar and citizen. Lauren Lemley, Katie Langford, and Elizabeth Thorpe, you have each shaped and challenged me in different ways. My life is richer and my mind sharper because of you. The friendship of Megan Irene Fitzmaurice, Elizabeth Gardner, Esther Liu, and Allison Prash has been a gift, and I will always be thankful for the

National Communication Association's Doctoral Honors Seminar for bringing us together. Our online writing dates and your prayers helped carry me through this dissertation.

Finally, some of the best advice I received in graduate school was to surround myself with people who do not care about my academic achievements or failures. So, to my community in Fort Worth, and to most of my family, thank you for keeping me grounded, often redirecting my gaze to that which is most important in life. This allowed me to write without a great fear of failure.

Thank you all for making me brave.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS		V
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS		X
1 INTRODUCTION		1
1.1 The Rhetorical Presidency		6
1.2 Globalization and Democratization		14
1.3 Global Imaginary as Rhetorical Lens		21
1.4 Project Details		27
2 PRESIDENTS AND FOREIGN LEADERS: BUSH AND GORBACHEV END THE COLD WAR		33
2.1 Cold War Global Imaginary		36
2.1.1 U.S. Liberty and Soviet Justice: Containing/Expanding Communism		38
2.1.2 “New Thinking” Under Gorbachev		42
2.2 Setting: Malta		43
2.3 East and West as Controlling Metaphors		47
2.3.1 Leadership and Security		52
2.3.2 Transnational and Global Identity		64
2.4 Conclusion		71
3 PRESIDENTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS: CLINTON AND BUSH UNIVERSALIZE “DEMOCRACY”		74

3.1	Role of U.S. Presidents and International Organizations	80
3.2	United Nation’s Legitimacy and the Universal Audience	84
3.2.1	<i>The President, The U.N., and the Universal Audience</i>	<i>89</i>
3.3	Clinton’s (Market) Democratic Enlargement	91
3.3.1	<i>Democracy as Global Market</i>	<i>91</i>
3.3.2	<i>U.S. as Synecdoche of Universal Audience</i>	<i>96</i>
3.4	Bush: U.S. “Democracy” and Universal Human Rights	99
3.4.1	<i>Consubstantiation through Founding Documents.....</i>	<i>100</i>
3.4.2	<i>“World Community” and “Strict Father” Metaphors.....</i>	<i>106</i>
3.5	Conclusion	110
4	PRESIDENTS AND FOREIGN CITIZENS: OBAMA’S TRANSNATIONAL TOWN HALL MEETINGS.....	113
4.1	Transnational Foreign Policy.....	118
4.1.1	<i>American Exceptionalism.....</i>	<i>120</i>
4.2	Obama as Global Representative	122
4.2.1	<i>Audience Response to Obama: Four Anecdotes.....</i>	<i>122</i>
4.2.2	<i>Obama’s Rhetorical Strategies</i>	<i>127</i>
4.2.2.1	Physical Presence.....	128
4.2.2.2	Definition of a Situation.....	133
4.2.2.3	Leader and Teacher of Democratic Practice.....	135

4.2.2.4	Transnational Identification	138
4.3	Obama Figures Foreign Citizens.....	139
4.3.1	<i>Citizens as Transnational/Global.....</i>	<i>139</i>
4.3.2	<i>Transnational Citizens as Exceptional</i>	<i>143</i>
4.4	Conclusion	146
5	CONCLUSIONS	149
5.1	Chapter Summary	152
5.2	The Rhetorical Presidency and the Global Imaginary	154
5.3	Implications	157
5.4	Backlash Against Globalization.....	159
	REFERENCES.....	164

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)

United Nations (UN)

United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)

World Trade Organization (WTO)

1 INTRODUCTION

On March 5, 1917, amidst the events of World War I, Woodrow Wilson stated in his second inaugural address: “We are provincials no longer. The tragic events of the thirty months of vital turmoil through which we have just passed have made us citizens of the world. There can be no turning back. Our own fortunes as a nation are involved whether we would have it so or not.”¹ In this declaration, Wilson constituted the American people in a new way; because of the interconnectedness of the world, he argued, the American people must act as “citizens of the world.”² Wilson’s speech indicates the ability of global contexts to press upon national identity, and that presidents respond by refiguring “the people,” to some degree, as extra-national entities. Still, even while constituting the people as “citizens of the world,” Wilson reminded his audience of its national “consciousness of standing in some sort of apart, intent upon an interest that transcended the immediate issues of the war itself.”³ In other words, Wilson asked the people to understand themselves as national citizens who were set “apart,” but because of external circumstances were thrust into the realm of world citizenship.

John F. Kennedy also addressed the complicated relationship between national citizenship and world citizenship in his January 20, 1961, inaugural addresses.⁴ In this speech, which occurred during the Cold War, Kennedy addressed “citizens of America” and “citizens of the world” separately. The most famous line in this speech called for “citizens of America” to

¹ Woodrow Wilson, “Inaugural Address,” March 5, 1917, in *The American Presidency Project*, eds. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25832>.

² Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, *Deeds Done in Words: Presidential Rhetoric and the Genres of Governance* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 34.

³ Wilson, “Inaugural Address,” March 5, 1917; for a discussion on national identity in relation to this speech, see Vanessa Beasley, *You the People* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press), 53-55.

⁴ John F. Kennedy, “Inaugural Address,” January 20, 1961, in *The American Presidency Project*, eds. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8032>.

“ask not what your country can do for you—ask what you can do for your country.” It is the relationship between this call to action for U.S. citizens and the following sentence, though, that is especially interesting. In the next line, Kennedy asked “fellow citizens of the world” to “ask not what America will do for you, but what together we can do for the freedom of man.”⁵ Here, Kennedy acknowledged world citizens and provided instructions for them alongside his instructions to American citizens. Kennedy continued, “Finally, whether you are citizens of America or citizens of the world, ask of us here the same high standards of strength and sacrifice which we ask of you.”⁶ In this line, Kennedy used “whether... or” to set a distinctive boundary between the two types of citizens, ending a speech steeped in Cold War-isms characterized by stark ideological division.⁷ For Kennedy, “citizens of America” were to defend “freedom,” and, by serving their country, labor alongside the president to “lead the land we love.” “Citizens of the world” were instructed to work together with “citizens of America” to achieve this “freedom.”⁸ It is clear that one could not be both a citizen of the world and a citizen of America. This speech suggests that presidents in the Cold War era understood themselves as the leaders of the free world, a world cleanly and clearly divided between “us” and “them.”

This dissertation begins several years later during George H.W. Bush’s presidential term, at a moment when global power structures were shifting and the global market was expanding. The nearly four-decade long narrative of a world pitted East against West fell apart. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the U.S. was no longer under a threat of Soviet attack, and there was no global hegemonic ideology to be protected or contained. It would follow that the

⁵ Kennedy, “Inaugural Address,” January 20, 1961.

⁶ Kennedy, “Inaugural Address,” January 20, 1961.

⁷ See also Sara Ann Mehlretter, “John F. Kennedy, ‘Inaugural Address’ (20 January 1961),” *Voices of Democracy* 4 (2009): 41-59; Sam Meyer, “The John F. Kennedy Inauguration Speech: Function and Importance of Its ‘Address System,’” *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 12 (1982): 239-250.

⁸ Kennedy, “Inaugural Address,” January 20, 1961.

president then would no longer need to “lead the free world,” which had been a guiding metaphor in U.S. political discourse since the Truman administration.⁹ Still, Bush positioned himself rhetorically as the “leader of the free world” to defend international intervention like the Cold War presidents who came before him.

In an early 1990 speech, Bush characterized U.S. involvement in the Cold War as “three generations” of people who have “stood steadfast in a hostile and tumultuous world” because of their “belief in America’s destiny as the leader of the free world.” This free world, according to Bush, was “growing bigger all the time” after the “watershed events of 1989.” He continued his speech by offering the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama as evidence of the good work the U.S. was doing as “leader of the free world.”¹⁰ Bush made two interesting rhetorical moves here. First, he helped his audience envision a larger, more interconnected “free world.” Second, he placed the U.S., and himself, as the leader of this world. Robert Litwak notes that Bush’s invasion into Panama was the first U.S. intervention since 1945 that was not explicitly connected to the Cold War.¹¹ Still, the U.S. president continued to position himself (and the U.S.) as the leader of the world and acted as such. While the phrase “leader of the free world” fell out of favor after the George H.W. Bush presidency, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama used rhetorical strategies to continue inhabiting an extra-national leadership role—instead of leading the “free world,” they figured themselves as global leaders. That is, their rhetoric suggests that the scope of the presidency expanded from leader of the allied powers (“free world”) to world leader after the Cold War.

⁹ John Fousek, *To Lead the free World: American Nationalism and the Cultural Roots of the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 146.

¹⁰ George Bush, “Remarks to the Chamber of Commerce in Cincinnati, Ohio,” January 12, 1990. In *The American Presidency Project*, eds. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=18027>.

¹¹ Robert Litwak, *Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment after the Cold War* (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000), 31.

This dissertation focuses on how post-Cold War presidents shaped this particular global imaginary. I evaluate how presidents create transnational and global identities among citizens, how they position themselves as global leaders, and how they interact with other global leaders and within supranational organizations. In doing so, I provide a way of understanding the role of the contemporary presidency and the rhetoric that shapes and upholds that role. This dissertation asks, “How do U.S. presidents position the U.S. within the rest of the world?” and “What is the president’s place in this world?” These questions stem from the notion that the U.S. president is an influential actor on the global stage. Few would argue that U.S. politics cease influence at the border of the nation-state. From U.S. participation and leadership in intergovernmental organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the World Bank, and the United Nations (UN) to their role in international interventions, including a “global war on terror,” it is clear that U.S. actions can have a tremendous effect on other parts of the world. And while all branches of government are responsible for national and extra-national influence, the office of the president, as the “focal point for foreign policy,” holds the most immediate and impactful control over U.S. engagement in inter- and trans-national affairs.¹²

Thus, the primary focus of this dissertation is the role that the U.S. president plays within the world, and specifically, the rhetoric that shapes this role. I understand rhetoric as public discourse that is both instrumental and constitutive. Presidents use rhetoric as an instrument by making specific discursive choices for the purpose of changing people’s minds about policy. Presidential rhetoric is also constitutive. Ronald Greene notes that a constitutive model of

¹² Dana D. Nelson, *Bad for Democracy: How the Presidency Undermines the Power of the People* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 3.

rhetoric “focuses on the role of public discourse in the process of world disclosure.”¹³ This project focuses on the ability of rhetoric to shape “subjects, personas, situations, and problems”¹⁴ as presidents construct an imaginary in which they are global leaders and representatives. As James Jasinski notes on constitutive rhetoric, these texts “enable and constrain subsequent practice,” as they exhibit “constitutive force through the cultural circulation and discursive articulation of their textual forms.”¹⁵ That is, rhetors draw upon rhetorical texts and practices to construct and alter reality. This dissertation shows that presidents do so through the construct of the global imaginary. This rhetorical construct includes speeches as well as other discursive forms, such as images and embodiment. It also includes speech contexts, such as the forums in which these speeches take place.

While presidential rhetoric is usually understood within the context of the executive office of a national institution, I argue that the contemporary presidency is better understood within an expanded model of the rhetorical presidency. This dissertation develops and applies a theoretical framework for understanding the rhetorical presidency that is grounded in the claim that presidents construct and negotiate global imaginaries for audiences. These global imaginaries are themselves a force of globalization. This framework offers a heuristic for presidential rhetoric as it attends to how the meaning of rhetoric changes as it crosses national borders, how presidents collaborate with other world leaders to restructure and define political realities, and how political and cultural representation occurs through the physical circulation of

¹³ Ronald Walter Greene, “The Aesthetic Turn and the Rhetorical Perspective on Argumentation,” *Argumentation and Advocacy* 35 (1998): 19.

¹⁴ Greene, “The Aesthetic Turn and the Rhetorical Perspective on Argumentation,” 19; Darrel Wanzer-Serrano, *The New York Young Lords and the Struggle for Liberation* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2015), 18.

¹⁵ James Jasinski, “A Constitutive Framework for Rhetorical Historiography: Toward an Understanding of the Discursive (Re)constitution of “Constitution” in *The Federalist Papers*, in *Doing Rhetorical History: Concepts and Cases*, Kathleen J. Turner, ed. (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 1998), 74.

the president as well as his discourse. An underlying thread of this dissertation is that while there are globalizing material realities—such as increased trade, a growing presence of international governing institutions, and widespread communication infrastructure—the concept of “globalization” is itself a construction. Instead of taking “globalization” as a neutral, objective concept that describes the world as it is, I understand globalization to be an imaginary—an imaginary that U.S. presidents help shape through speech.

In this introduction, I first discuss the rhetorical presidency model, explaining how it helps us understand presidential rhetoric as well as the ways in which it falls short. Then I discuss literature on globalization, showing that it is both an objective process and a subjective construct in which the president may intervene and shape. Third, I explain my use of the “global imaginary” as a rhetorical lens for analyzing contemporary presidential discourse. Finally, I discuss the case studies for this dissertation. My first case study examines George H.W. Bush’s interactions with Mikhail Gorbachev at the end of the Cold War. The second case study analyzes Bill Clinton and George W. Bush’s speeches before the UN. The third case study examines Barack Obama’s transnational town hall meetings. The concluding chapter discusses the implications of this study. This dissertation provides a deeper understanding of the role of the contemporary president and how he uses rhetoric to construct that role. Specifically, it shows how presidents rely on a global imaginary to relate to different transnational audiences, define global political realities, and extend U.S. interests abroad. Moreover, by focusing each chapter on a president’s interaction with a different transnational audience, this dissertation deepens our understanding of the relationship between rhetor and audience in transnational speech situations.

1.1 The Rhetorical Presidency

Scholars use the model of the “rhetorical presidency” for understanding how the

institution of the presidency shapes, creates, and restrains presidential rhetoric. The model stems from the work of political scientists James Ceaser, Glen Thurow, Jeffrey Tulis, and Joseph Bessette, who argue that twentieth century presidents, unlike the presidents before them, relied on popular rhetoric as “one of their principal tools in attempting to govern the nation,” which is a result of a “modern doctrine of presidential leadership, the modern mass media, and the modern presidential campaign,” effectively changing the way the constitution works.¹⁶ In relying on rhetoric, Ceaser et al. argue, presidential leadership is oriented to the people. Presidents increasingly “go public,” to use Samuel Kernell’s phrase, in order to bypass or put pressure on, Congress.¹⁷ Tulis argues that the reliance on going public marks a “profound development” in American politics in which “the promise of popular leadership [by the president] is the core of dominant interpretations of our whole political order.”¹⁸ In other words, this model of the presidency places rhetoric in the center of the relationship between the president and the people. Because it argues that a rhetorical presidency bypasses Congress, it also places rhetoric in the center of the relationship between the people and their government.

Using the rhetorical presidency as a model of presidential leadership, scholars have developed insights into the tradition of presidential speech. They note that presidents consistently rely on particular rhetorical tropes, figures, and myths in their speeches, and argue that the U.S. public responds to these generic prompts in consistent ways.¹⁹ Patterns arise in which comparable situations of rhetorical form, context, and content occur, with presidents responding

¹⁶ James W. Ceaser, Glen E. Thurow, Jeffrey Tulis, and Joseph M. Bessette, “The Rise of the Rhetorical Presidency,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 11 (1981): 161; See also, Jeffrey Tulis, *The Rhetorical Presidency* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987); Mary E. Stuckey and Frederick J. Antczak, “The Rhetorical Presidency: Deepening Vision, Widening Exchange,” *Annals of the International Communication Association* 21(1998): 405-442.

¹⁷ Samuel Kernell, *Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential leadership* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2006).

¹⁸ Tulis, *The Rhetorical Presidency*, 4.

¹⁹ See Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, *Presidents Creating the Presidency: Deeds Done in Words* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008).

in similar ways to similar situations. Presidential rhetoric is, thus, both enabled and constrained by the office of the presidency. As Mary Stuckey argues, the rhetorical presidency itself is an argument of the “requirements, limitations, and opportunities provided by the executive as an institution.”²⁰ Rhetorical scholars consider how presidents shape and define crises (national and international), how they define the national identity of Americans, how they persuade or “go over the heads” of Congress, how their success in leadership depends on prudence, and so on.²¹ Importantly to this dissertation, all of these studies consider the presidency and presidential rhetoric inherently within the bounds of the U.S. as a nation-state, focusing on the presidency as a national institution. The world and its actors, however, are not so cleanly separated. Whether the presidency actually developed its rhetorical elements in the late twentieth century or deepened elements that had always been present, the model of the rhetorical presidency usefully described the presidency and its relationship to the national polity at that moment in time.²² But it is increasingly clear that we need a new model, one that is more appropriate for this time. Such a model must combine the continuing elements of institutional practice with the contemporary context.

Several scholars have critiqued and advanced the rhetorical presidency model. First there

²⁰ Mary E. Stuckey, “Rethinking the Rhetorical Presidency and Presidential Rhetoric,” *The Review of Communication* 10 (2010): 39.

²¹ For example, for foreign crisis rhetoric, see Denise Bostdorff, *The Presidency and the Rhetoric of Foreign Crisis* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994). On the president’s power to define and shape situations, see David Zarefsky, “Presidential Rhetoric and the Power of Definition,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 34 (2004): 607-619. On the president’s ability to use rhetoric to define national identity, see Mary Stuckey, *Defining Americans: The Presidency and National Identity* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004). On the president and rhetorical leadership, see Leroy Dorsey, ed., *The Presidency and Rhetorical Leadership* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002).

²² For arguments on how more speech from the president and other political leaders is harmful to democracy, see Roderick Hart, *The Sound of Leadership: Presidential Communication in the Modern Age* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987) and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, *Eloquence in an Electronic Age: The Transformation of Political Speechmaking* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). For an argument on whether a rhetorical presidency has always been rhetorical and an examination of when the rhetorical presidency began, see Melvin Laracey, *Presidents and the People: The Partisan Story of Going Public* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002).

are those who argue that the rhetorical presidency has spiraled into something more dangerous than what Tulis originally described. For instance, John DiIulio argues that since the mid-1980s, presidential leadership would be better characterized as demagogic than deliberative” naming this the age of a “hyper-rhetorical presidency.”²³ While the rhetorical presidency, according to Tulis, provided the president “an increased ability to assess public opinion and to manipulate it,” the hyper-rhetorical presidency is aided by electronic mass communications media such that the presidency can manipulate public opinion “in its sleep,” as well as “routinely and reflexively defend presidential assertions regarding presidential powers.”²⁴ That is, in a hyper-rhetorical presidency, the president extends his executive power through constant mass mediated communication. Often this communication lacks reflexivity and “real legislative analysis.”²⁵ This, according to DiIulio, is an intensified and dangerous extension of Tulis’s rhetorical presidency because the role of the president is more concerned with speech and image than with policy. Stephen Hartnett and Jennifer Mercieca make a similar argument, but go a step further to describe this new age as a “post-rhetorical presidency.”²⁶ For them, George W. Bush, instead of defining the bounds of political discourse through traditional means of “eloquence, logic, pathos, or narrative storytelling,” which describes a rhetorical presidency, marshaled “ubiquitous public chatter, waves of disinformation, and cascades of confusion causing misdirection.”²⁷ According to Hartnett and Mercieca, George W. Bush used new means (constant communication through mass media instead of traditional speeches) to misinform and confuse, rather than teach, the

²³ John J. DiIulio Jr., “The Hyper-Rhetorical Presidency,” *Critical Review* 19 (2007): 316-317.

²⁴ DiIulio, “The Hyper-Rhetorical Presidency,” 323; Tulis, *The Rhetorical Presidency*, 185.

²⁵ DiIulio, “The Hyper-Rhetorical Presidency,” 323; Tulis, *The Rhetorical Presidency*, 322.

²⁶ Stephen John Hartnett and Jennifer Rose Mercieca, “‘A Discovered Dissembler Can Achieve Nothing Great’; Or, Four Theses on the Death of Presidential Rhetoric in an Age of Empire,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 37 (2007): 599-621.

²⁷ Hartnett and Mercieca, “‘A Discovered Dissembler Can Achieve Nothing Great’; Or, Four Theses on the Death of Presidential Rhetoric in an Age of Empire,” 600.

public. That is, they argue that both the method and the content of communication changed.

Both the “post-rhetorical” presidency theory and the “hyper-rhetorical” presidency theory are concerned with the relationship between increased unilateral power of the president and reliance on constant mass-mediated messages. Hartnett, Mercieca, and DiIulio’s assessments align in their evidence that the president’s communication strategy is more concerned with defending presidential action than with defining reality and encouraging public deliberation. Whether this means we have entered a “post-rhetorical” age or that the rhetorical presidency has spun into a “hyper-rhetorical presidency” depends on one’s definition of rhetoric. Hartnett and Mercieca argue that deceptive speech moves from the realm of rhetoric to that of demagoguery. If presidential speech is meant to confuse the public, it is no longer rhetorical but is instead demagogic (what DiIulio calls “hyper-rhetorical”). Presidential abuse of power through speech, of course, was a central concern in the rhetorical presidency model. Tulis argued explicitly that the balance of powers is disrupted when presidents take their agenda directly to the people.²⁸ Roderick Hart and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, likewise, separately argued that a rhetorical presidency is bad for democracy.²⁹ While the merits of the rhetorical presidency have often been questioned, with scholars focusing on how presidential speech might manipulate the people the other branches of government, these recent studies show that presidential rhetoric has expanded beyond the scope of the rhetorical presidency paradigm; whether the presidency is now “hyper-rhetorical” or “post-rhetorical,” these studies make it clear that presidents now face the challenge of transcending over the noise of mass media and speaking to disjointed publics.

A study by Susan Herbst and another by Joshua Scacco and Kevin Coe address the problem of disjointed audiences and messages suggested in previous studies. In doing so, these

²⁸ Tulis, *The Rhetorical Presidency*.

²⁹ Hart, *The Sound of Leadership*; Jamieson, *Eloquence in an Electronic Age*.

scholars also argue that the rhetorical presidency, as defined by Tulis, is dead.³⁰ For Herbst, the paradigm is no longer helpful for understanding the presidency because of the changing relationship between the presidency to the other branches of government and between the presidency and the public. She comes to this conclusion through observations that mass media makes presidential texts incoherent; that presidential proxies speak for the president, revising, re-interpreting, and re-making presidential speeches; that audiences are divided and elusive, making it impossible for presidents to address them; that audience-based media technologies such as YouTube create a situation in which statements on behalf of the president can be hacked up and revised; and, finally, that the president cannot adapt to the “intimate nature of contemporary media.”³¹ Thus, for Herbst, presidential rhetoric cannot achieve what it once could. The content of messages is incoherent, fragmented, and recycled. What remains from the rhetorical presidency model is the form of presidential speech. The president symbolically embodies the nation; thus the president’s voice still matters, even if the content is lost.³²

Joshua Scacco and Kevin Coe agree that the rhetorical presidency “struggles to adequately contextualize the notable changes the presidency is undergoing.”³³ They argue that a more helpful paradigm would acknowledge that presidents cultivate a highly visible and nearly constant presence in both political and nonpolitical arenas of American life via engagement in a fragmented media environment. So, like Herbst, Scacco and Coe agree that not only the content, but also the form of presidential rhetoric is important—that is, the ways in which the president

³⁰ Susan Herbst, “The Rhetorical Presidency and the Contemporary Media Environment,” *Critical Review* 19 (2007): 336-337; Joshua Scacco and Kevin Coe, “The Ubiquitous Presidency: Toward a New Paradigm for Studying Presidential Communication,” *International Journal of Communication* 10 (2016): 2015. Hartnett and Mercieca also argued that presidential rhetoric is dead. See Hartnett and Mercieca, “A Discovered Dissembler Can Achieve Nothing Great,” 600.

³¹ Herbst, “The Rhetorical Presidency and the Contemporary Media Environment,” 337-341.

³² Herbst, “The Rhetorical Presidency and the Contemporary Media Environment,” 342.

³³ Scacco and Coe, “The Ubiquitous Presidency,” 2015.

interacts with the people and with other branches of government. They argue that the contemporary presidency is ubiquitous—communication between the president and the people no longer exist as “texts.” Rather they are “intertextual,” being “promoted, challenged, and redefined by individuals.”³⁴ This is because presidents, as “strategic communication actor[s],” seek ways to identify with “an increasingly diverse segmented, and disinterested set of audience.”³⁵ The rise of mass media has changed audiences to the extent that the rhetorical presidency model is no longer sufficient. Presidents interact with the people in new ways, and the people themselves are organized differently.

All of these studies that critique the rhetorical presidency model recognize the rise of mass media has altered presidential speech in content and form, as well as the relationship between the president and the people. This is where my work begins. Accepting the premise that the relationship between the president and audiences has shifted, this dissertation takes up this question of the people. While scholars note ways in which the U.S. audience has changed, diversified, fragmented, and become more pluralistic, I contend that another important aspect of a contemporary presidency (be it hyper-rhetorical, post-rhetorical, or ubiquitous), is the relationship between the president and transnational audiences. Scacco and Coe note that presidential ubiquity “does not stop at the U.S. borders,” evidenced by the fact that other nations pay considerable attention the U.S. president,” which heightens “the stakes for how presidents talk with, and about, the international community.”³⁶ That is, the contemporary president plays a

³⁴ Scacco and Coe, “The Ubiquitous Presidency,” 2015.

³⁵ Scacco and Coe, “The Ubiquitous Presidency,” 2015.

³⁶ Scacco and Coe, “The Ubiquitous Presidency,” 2015; See also, Stephen J. Farnsworth, S. Robert Lichter, and Roland Schatz, *The Global President: International Media and the US Government* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2013).

role not only in U.S. politics and culture, but also throughout the world. Understanding the role of the president, through transnational speech situations, is the project of this dissertation.

Scholars of presidential rhetoric have done some work on the president as an international actor. Political scientist Michael J. Smith, for example, distinguishes between “going public” to the nation and “going public” internationally, and Robert Denton notes that globalization is a challenge for modern presidents because globalization complicates the notion of audience as the U.S.’s problems are intertwined with those throughout the rest of the world.³⁷ These studies conceive of the presidency and the rhetoric that flows from it as it is empirically—a national institution.³⁸ I propose the study of presidential rhetoric that expands the focus of presidential rhetoric to locate it within a network of global forces, orienting rhetorical analysis toward the movement of texts across national borders and directed toward global audiences. Politically, this project is helpful in understanding the presidency because it further contextualizes the contemporary president’s role, which extends past the nation-state. Rhetorically, this project helps us understand how a speaker—one who is the embodiment of the nation-state—communicates with transnational audiences. Further, this dissertation shows how some aspects of globalization are defined and created through speech.

³⁷ Michael J. Smith wrote about the “post-modern presidency” as one in which there is increased interdependence between nations with more need of the president to “go international.” See Michael J. Smith, “Going International: Presidential Activity in the Post-Modern Presidency,” *Journal of American Studies* 31 (1997): 219-233; Robert E. Denton, Jr., “Forum on the Future of the Presidency: Rhetorical Challenges to the Presidency,” *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 3 (2000): 445-51.

³⁸ Martin Medhurst distinguishes the rhetorical presidency model from the study of presidential rhetoric, arguing that while scholars of the rhetorical presidency are “concerned with the nature, scope, and function of the presidency as a constitutional office,” those who study presidential rhetoric are concerned with the “principles and practice of rhetoric” within the construct of the presidency. While I appreciate the distinction Medhurst makes between the “rhetorical presidency” and “presidential rhetoric,” this dissertation concerns both sub-disciplines. For the distinction between presidential rhetoric and the rhetorical presidency, see Martin Medhurst, *Beyond the Rhetorical Presidency* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1996), xi-xxv.

1.2 Globalization and Democratization

Scholars define globalization in various ways, meaning anything from the collapse of the nation-state, to global free market capitalism, to a hope and aim for the building of mutuality and eventual cosmopolitan citizenship.³⁹ Rhetoricians are most interested in globalization as an “ideology of worldwide communication”⁴⁰ and in how social relationships “become defined by specifically global contexts.”⁴¹ That is, globalization both affects, and is an effect of, discourses and identity formation. Globalization scholars argue that that globalization is bound with the idea, on the one hand, of organic relationships and flows between global units and, on the other hand, of Western imperialism.⁴² This tension is important in this study as I understand the rhetorical presidency as a global, rather than a purely national, institution.

One view of globalization is that it occurs at the systems level, affecting both the global political system and the identity of geo-political units, which is precisely the process we see in the creation of supranational institutions that declare universal laws and rights.⁴³ Anthony Giddens also argues, though, that globalization is a “complex set of processes, not a single one.”⁴⁴ During the process of globalization, he writes, not only is there a “pulling away of power or influence from nations into the global arena,” although this is one of its consequences, but globalization itself also pushes down onto geo-political units, “creating new pressures for local

³⁹ See, for instance, James Curran and Myung-Jin Park “Beyond Globalization Theory,” in *De-Westernizing Media Studies*, Curran and Park, eds., (2000), 5; See also David Held, “Cosmopolitan Democracy and the Global Order: A New Agenda,” in *Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal*, James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann (Cambridge: MIT University Press, 1997), 235-252.

⁴⁰ Armand Mattelart, “An Archeology of the Global Era,” in *International Communication: A Reader*, ed. Daya Thussu (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 313.

⁴¹ Martin Shaw, “The Theoretical Challenge of Global Society,” in *Media in Global Context Reader*, eds. Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammedi, Dwayne Winseck, Jim McKenna, and Oliver Boyd-Barrett (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 31.

⁴² See, for instance, Mattelart, “An Archeology of the Global Era,” 313; Shaw, “The Theoretical Challenge of Global Society,” 31.

⁴³ Jens Bartelson, “Three Concepts of Globalization,” *International Sociology* 15 (2000): 186.

⁴⁴ Anthony Giddens, *Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshaping our Lives* (New York: Routledge, 2000), 30-31.

autonomy.”⁴⁵ Additionally, globalization pushes sideways, creating “new economic and cultural zones within and across nations.”⁴⁶ That is, globalization de-centers the nation-state as the “primary locus of cultural meaning,” because national politics are “increasingly rendered in relation to transnational networks.”⁴⁷ Nation-states are not rendered obsolete or even lacking in power in this process.

Martin Shaw, similarly to Giddens, argues that globalization is a complex set of “distinct but related processes—economic, cultural, social, and also political and military—through which social relations have developed towards a global scale and with global reach, over a long historic period.”⁴⁸ Globalization, for Shaw, reflects a restructuring of power and governance that takes into account the superpowers that arose from the World Wars, but not to the point of dissolution of the state. In fact, he argues that the state plays a critical role in governance during globalization, ever-changing though this role may be. The “global dominant contemporary form of the state” is the Western conglomerate in the post-Cold War world.⁴⁹ This conglomerate, for Shaw, represents a new global state in which certain Western nation-states possess “global reach and legitimacy, and which function as a state in regulating economy, society and politics on a global scale.”⁵⁰ This new global state’s powers “crystallize as both imperialist and humanitarian,” as well as in other forms.⁵¹ Global states are no longer “nation-states” in the

⁴⁵ Giddens, *Runaway World*, 31.

⁴⁶ Giddens, *Runaway World*, 31.

⁴⁷ Kendall R. Phillips and G. Mitchell Reyes, “Surveying Global Memoryscapes: The Shifting Terrain of Public Memory Studies” in *Global Memoryscapes: Contesting Remembrance in a Transnational Age*, Kendall R. Phillips and G. Mitchell Reyes, eds. (University of Alabama Press: Tuscaloosa, 2011), 9.

⁴⁸ See Martin Shaw, “The State of Globalization: Towards a Theory of State Transformation,” *Review of International Political Economy* 4 (1997): 497-513. Bartelson categorizes Shaw in the former category (of transference), but this is a mistaken categorization. Shaw argues on the system level, not only the unit level. There might be need for an extra category for Shaw’s sense of globalization, but it is closer to “transformation” than to “transference.”

⁴⁹ Shaw, “The State of Globalization,” 504.

⁵⁰ Shaw, “The State of Globalization,” 504.

⁵¹ Shaw, “The State of Globalization,” 504-505.

classic sense; instead, they are “postmodern” states, which are articulated in transnational western and global networks.⁵² For Shaw, the organization and power-relationships of states are in the process of changing from nation-state to global states, but globalization still rests on statehood, not statelessness, and agency is found within these global states.

Nations and national problems are intertwined and mutually influencing, which is apparent, as rhetorical scholars Kendall Phillips and Mitch Reyes note, in supranational institutions such as the United Nations, European Union, Organization of American States, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and North American Free Trade Agreement.⁵³ What is less apparent is how presidents, whose power is grounded in the nation-state, deal with political issues of both national and global concern. While supranational institutions were created for this interaction, the role of the presidency is traditionally bound to the nation-state. Yet, because the world is interconnected, presidents make decisions that affect other parts of the world, for good or for ill. As this dissertation shows, they also regularly interact with, collaborate with, and seek to persuade transnational audiences. Presidents have notably interacted with audiences outside of the U.S. as part of the democratization process.

As Armand Mattelart argues, “National systems, whether technological, economic, cultural, socio-political, civilian or military, are all permeated by a logic that transcends and reconfigures them.”⁵⁴ That is, the global presses upon the national. One of these global forces is the project of democratization. When understood in the context of Shaw’s description of the global state, which is currently dominated by post-Cold War superpowers, it follows that powerful nations would rely on the appeal of democracy. The end of World War II brought about

⁵² Shaw, “The State of Globalization,” 511.

⁵³ Phillips and Reyes, “Surveying Global Memoryscapes,” 9.

⁵⁴ Mattelart, “An Archeology of the Global Era,” 313.

the construction of concepts “intended to announce, if not explain, that humanity had reached the threshold of a new information age and, hence, of a new universalism.”⁵⁵ Mattelart argues that with this universalism came the global democratic marketplace, the freedom of commercial speech, and the search for the “global standard,” among other traits.⁵⁶ The language used to promote mass media, in this age, was connected to the idea of liberal democracy. Mattelart notes that words to describe the emerging power of the Internet included “decentralizing,” “harmonizing,” and “empowering.”⁵⁷ Increased communication, and thus, the right to communication and the right to a free flow of information, reinforced—and at times became synonymous with—the concept of globalization. Communication development is, of course, only one aspect of global democratization. I offer it here as an example of how globalization can be, and has been, constructed and propelled by Western forces, particularly the U.S.

U.S. concern for global standards became salient during the World Wars and the following Cold War.⁵⁸ Modernization theory promised that democracy promotion—and communism fighting—would lead poor countries to economic growth, produce anti-Revolutionary spirits, and convert nations to Western democracy.⁵⁹ U.S. presidents were key actors in promoting Western liberal democracy. For instance, the Kennedy administration created the United States Agency for International Development and the Peace Corps.⁶⁰ In 1982, Ronald Reagan delivered a speech to the British Parliament in which he proposed an initiative

⁵⁵ Mattelart, “An Archeology of the Global Era,” 315.

⁵⁶ Mattelart, “An Archeology of the Global Era,” 322-323.

⁵⁷ Mattelart, “An Archeology of the Global Era,” 322-323.

⁵⁸ For early work on modernization theory, see Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (New York: Free Press, 1958); Wilbur Schramm, *Mass Media and National Development: The Role of Information in the Developing Countries* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1964).

⁵⁹ See Nicolas Guilhot, *The Democracy Makers: Human Rights and International Order* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).

⁶⁰ Thomas Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 20-21.

that aimed to “foster the infrastructure of democracy” and “assist in democratic development.”⁶¹ Then he created the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) to fight communism and promote the U.S. interpretation of democracy during the Cold War.

For the U.S., because of the close association of the free flow of information in the liberal conception of democracy, democracy promotion is linked to communication development. Karin Wilkins and Bella Mody define communication development as “strategic intervention toward social change initiated by institutions and communities.”⁶² That is, in practice, U.S.-led democratic development involves building infrastructures for communication (such as radio towers and cable lines) overseas and training communication experts. In addition to, alongside, and through the establishment of the United Nations, the American press and the U.S. government “launched their great international free-press crusade.”⁶³ Margaret Blanchard argues that this crusade began with the same ideology that encouraged the creation of the League of Nations and the United Nation—to prevent future bloodshed. American journalists, specifically, believed that their right to a free press “had prevented government leaders from propagandizing the country into war as Hitler and other WWII leaders had done in their prospective countries.”⁶⁴ Thus, if U.S. journalists could export this free-press system, the world could avoid another war. This free speech campaign drew upon rhetoric of human rights and the promotion of democracy. The crusaders were eventually granted Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;

⁶¹ Ronald Reagan, “Address to Members of the British Parliament,” June 8, 1982, in *The American Presidency Project*, eds Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=42614>.

⁶² Karin Gwinn Wilkins and Bella Mody, “Reshaping Communication: Developing Communication and Communicating Development,” *Communication Theory* 11 (2001): 385.

⁶³ Margaret A. Blanchard *Exporting the First Amendment: The Press-Government Crusade of 1945-1952* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 1986), 4-5.

⁶⁴ Blanchard, *Exporting the First Amendment*, 1.

this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”⁶⁵ As I show in this dissertation, U.S. presidents were instrumental in forming the United Nations and guiding projects like the UDHR. This example shows one way in which the U.S. helped create universal standards, which is a globalizing force upon other nations.

The promotion of liberal democratic principles is found not only in the form of journalists advocating for universal press freedom, but also in the discourse of U.S. political representatives. The way to peace, so Woodrow Wilson told Americans and the world, and as presidents after him agreed, was to “make the world safe for democracies.”⁶⁶ President George W. Bush echoed Wilson when he stated the following in a 2006 speech to war veterans:

The war we fight today is more than a military conflict; it is the decisive ideological struggle of the twenty-first century. On one side are those who believe in the values of freedom and moderation—the right of all people to speak, and worship, and live in liberty. On the other side are those driven by the values of tyranny and extremists—the right of a self-appointed few to impose their fanatical views on the all the rest. As veterans, you have seen this kind of enemy before. They’re successors to fascists, to Nazis, to Communists, and other totalitarians of the twentieth century.⁶⁷

Bush argued that the current war Americans must fight is against any ideology that constrains individual freedom. In this case, Bush used the liberal conception of the freedom of speech to justify military action in the “War on Terror.” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also employed

⁶⁵ United Nations. “Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/>

⁶⁶ Woodrow Wilson, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress Requesting a Declaration of War Against Germany,” April 2, 1917, in *The American Presidency Project*, eds. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=65366>.

⁶⁷ “Bush Speaks at American Legion Convention,” *Washington Post*, August 31, 2006, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/31/AR2006083100832.html>.

post-Cold War rhetoric of liberal democracy promotion in her 2010 speech on internet freedom. In this speech, Clinton argued that the U.S. must commit itself to the development of Internet freedom around the world—members of the “global community” have the right to the freedom of information and from government censorship and surveillance.⁶⁸ Clinton made clear that the principle of free speech and the access to information is a universal right that the U.S. must actively support.

In each of these examples—the United Nation’s discourse and speeches by a U.S. President and a U.S. Secretary of State—liberal democratic principles, such as autonomy of thought and freedoms of speech (both the freedom to speak and the freedom to access speech/information), are treated as universal. Liberal democratic rights are declared for all, though the supranational institutions are not legitimated to enforce these declarations. That is, neither political elites in the U.S. nor the United Nations have binding extra-national constitutional authority.

Political theorist John Keane argues that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) promoted a change from representative democracy to “monitory democracy,” further strengthening the conceptual bond between democracy and globalization. By making universal claims for humanity, the UDHR sidesteps who “the people” are. Defining “the people” is vital to representative democracy, and it is not at all vital to the emerging global democracy in which leaders do not represent their people, but instead, their universal values of rights.⁶⁹ These democracy promotion projects, which seek to “prevent social conflict, as an agent of political transparency and accountability,”⁷⁰ attempt to globalize democracy—potentially altering

⁶⁸ Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks on Internet Freedom,” *U.S. Department of State* (January 21, 2010), www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm.

⁶⁹ John Keane, *The Life and Death of Democracy* (New York and London: W.W. Norton, 2009), 735.

⁷⁰ Craig L. Lamay, *Exporting Press Freedom* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2009), xi.

democracy for the U.S. as much as it does for the rest of the world. This dissertation seeks to locate the “people” in a global society—at least in instances in which they address the U.S. president or the U.S. president addresses them.

Thus far, I have provided a description of globalization as both an objective process and a subjective one. Globalization is an “amalgam” of irreversible technological forces break “down barriers of time, space, and nation, ... fashioning the planet into a coherent global community.”⁷¹ But globalization is also subjective and rhetorically constructed. Ulrich Beck calls this aspect of globalization a “stage managed” political campaign for globalization, noting globalization’s malleable features.⁷² The latter process is, according to Janine Brodie, “a contestable political posture that promotes a transnational worldview, philosophy of governance and institutional structures.”⁷³ The two processes are interrelated, as political “postures” may stimulate the material process of globalization. This dissertation focuses on the rhetorical aspects of globalization within the context of its potential effects. I use Manfred Steger’s concept of “global imaginary” as a theoretical tool for analyzing this rhetoric.⁷⁴

1.3 Global Imaginary as Rhetorical Lens

One productive way to understand contemporary presidential rhetoric is to consider the ways in which presidents construct a global imaginary through rhetorical practice. This imaginary varies from audience to audience and have diverse material ends. The concept of global imaginaries used in this dissertation stems from Benedict Anderson’s “imagined

⁷¹ Janine Brodie, “Introduction: Globalization and Citizenship beyond the Nation State,” *Citizenship Studies* 8 (2004): 324; See also, Ulrich Beck, *What is Globalization?* (London: Polity Press, 2000), 11-15.

⁷² Beck, *What is Globalization?*, 1.

⁷³ Brodie, “Introduction.”

⁷⁴ Manfred B. Steger coined the term “global imaginary” in *The Rise of the Global Imaginary: Political Ideologies from the French Revolution to the Global War on Terror* (Oxford University Press, 2008).

communities,”⁷⁵ Charles Taylor’s “social imaginary,”⁷⁶ and, finally, Manfred Steger’s “global imaginary.”⁷⁷ Together, these concepts form a rhetorical lens for understanding the relationship between U.S. presidents and globalization.

Benedict Anderson’s much-cited theory posits that nations are imagined. Though every person in a nation imagines their communion with fellow members, these citizens will never know or meet most of their fellow citizens.⁷⁸ As Anderson notes, theorists of nationalism recognize the paradoxes that historians understand nationhood to be a modern, objective phenomenon while nationalists see themselves as having always been a subject of their nation; that the modern formal universality of nationality assumed that everyone has a nationality—that it is concrete; and that nationhood has political power despite “philosophical poverty and even incoherence.”⁷⁹ In positioning nationhood in the realm of a shared imaginary among a group of people, Anderson is able to account for these paradoxes. Nations, in addition to being communal, are also imagined to be limited and sovereign.⁸⁰ Thus, citizens both create nations and are defined by nations—citizens uphold a structure that both limits them and enables them access to other imagined nations. Since the nineteenth century, this idea of the “nation,” Mignolo notes, and the social role of “national citizen” has been the principal organizing structure for building new communities.⁸¹ Thus, it is important to understand how nations are created and perpetuated. The social, discursive aspect of nationalism is vital to its propagation.

⁷⁵ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (Brooklyn, NY: Verso Books, 2006).

⁷⁶ Charles Taylor, “Modern Social Imaginaries,” *Public Culture* 14 (2002).

⁷⁷ Steger, *The Rise of the Global Imaginary*.

⁷⁸ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.

⁷⁹ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 5.

⁸⁰ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 7-8.

⁸¹ Walter Mignolo, “The Allocation and Relocation of Identities: Colonialism, Nationalism, Transnationalism,” *Mester* 27 (1998): 2.

Charles Taylor builds on Anderson's work when he writes about the "social imaginary." The social imaginary, according to Taylor, refers to "the ways in which people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations."⁸² That is, the social imaginary is an understanding people have of who they are in relation with others and also how they ought to be in relation to others. Social imaginaries appear in stories, legends, and images, providing basis and legitimacy for common practices and institutions as well as for their transformation.⁸³ For example, Taylor explains that the Parliament's place beside the king "was one of the most widespread premodern concepts of order." This concept transformed into a foundation popular sovereignty among colonists, providing the basis for the Declaration of Independence and later the shifting of institutional powers "the people," newly realized, enacted in the Constitution.⁸⁴ The social imaginary consists of the "background" social knowledge that informs action, values, and identity of communities. This background knowledge guides actions among citizens, which sometimes extends past their nationality.

Manfred Steger brings Taylor's conception of the social imaginary into a global context. He argues that the end of World War II ruptured public consciousness. With technologies that increased and accelerated the circulation of "images, people, and materials" across national boundaries, a global imaginary was born. This global imaginary undermined the "normality" of the nation-state—especially its notions of community tied to sovereign, homogenous populations and the ideologies of those populations.⁸⁵ For instance, British Liberalism, French conservatism,

⁸² Taylor, "Modern Social Imaginaries," 106.

⁸³ Taylor, "Modern Social Imaginaries," 106.

⁸⁴ Taylor, "Modern Social Imaginaries," 117.

⁸⁵ Steger, *The Rise of the Global Imaginary*, 10-11.

and German socialism of the nineteenth century were replaced by totalitarianisms of the twentieth century—these totalitarian states ushered in World War and the global imaginary. Steger argues that the rise of the global imaginary occurred through such events as national interests being tied to events in distant locations during World War II, the importance of transnational alliances for military success, the defeat of Axis powers and thus their political belief system, the Allied war conferences in Teheran, Bretton Woods, and Yalta that “divided the planet into expansive spheres of influence” across national borders, and technological innovations such as jet airplanes, the atomic bomb, and communication infrastructure such as the Internet.⁸⁶

Thus, globalization is, on the one hand, a set of objective events. On the other hand, globalization is also subjective—invented and codified by intellectual and political elites.⁸⁷ Walter Mignolo notes that the “geopolitical imaginary nourished by the term and processes of globalization lays claim to the homogeneity... from above.”⁸⁸ That is, powerful figures and structures use “globalization”—as both a rhetorical and material force—to make universal claims. Globalization is, according to Mignolo, “a set of designs to manage the world.”⁸⁹ The president is one of those designers. I use the “global imaginary” as a theoretical tool for explaining how the president designs global political realities through rhetoric. I contribute to Steger’s concept of the global imaginary by showing that this imaginary is, in part, a rhetorical production.

I develop an understanding of the rhetorical presidency under conditions of globalization

⁸⁶ Steger, *The Rise of the Global Imaginary*, 134-137

⁸⁷ Steger, *The Rise of the Global Imaginary*, 11.

⁸⁸ Walter Mignolo, “The Many Faces of Cosmo-polis: Border Thinking and Critical Cosmopolitanism,” *Public Culture* 12 (2000): 721.

⁸⁹ Mignolo, “The Many Faces of Cosmo-polis,” 721.

by studying how presidential rhetoric functions transnationally as presidents use rhetoric to constitute particular understandings of how the world works, and who has political authority to make global decisions. Because of the “intensification of worldwide relations” that characterizes the process of globalization, the president’s concerns and influence center on both the nation-state and transnational entities and problems.⁹⁰ The interconnectedness of nation-states brings a crisis of authority—it is unclear which entities have the power to act, and to what extent.⁹¹ Heads of state, as this title reflects, have the authority to act on behalf of the country they lead. However, when nation-states are interconnected through both problems that are transnational or global in nature—such as immigration, world war, and environmental crises—and supranational governing institutions, a head of state’s authority changes. It expands when given the opportunity to impose unilateral action and it contracts when it must bend to the will of other nation-states in order to protect its own national interests.

Moreover, as rhetorical scholar Rebecca Dingo argues, the political, cultural, and economic interconnectedness of nation-states affects the way “texts are produced, circulated, and used.”⁹² Understanding presidential rhetoric within the context of globalization requires attention to the ways in which texts are created and how they move across national borders. That movement occurs through presidents themselves and through the circulation of the discourse by different forms of media. It also requires attending to the ways in which presidents use rhetoric to position themselves within interconnected global political systems, which sometimes reinforce national boundaries, and sometimes blur them. Presidents, who have some influence over

⁹⁰ Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 64.

⁹¹ I am relying on classic concepts of representation and authority from Thomas Hobbes’s *Leviathan*. In this text, Hobbes describes “authority” as the right of a person to act.

⁹² Rebecca Dingo, *Networking Arguments: Rhetoric, Transnational Feminism, and Public Policy Writing* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012), 8.

interpretation and definition of political national realities, also possess some rhetorical power to interpret and define global political realities.⁹³ They do so, largely, through what I call transnational presidential rhetoric.

I define transnational presidential rhetoric as rhetoric by the president that crosses national borders. This means that a speech is either circulated beyond the U.S. through presidential travel or through media technologies such as television, radio, or the internet. Or, taking a symbolic view of the presidency—wherein the president performs his representative role—transnational presidential rhetoric exists between the U.S. president and a leader or citizen of another nation despite the location or circulation of that particular speech event. That is, a speech may cross national borders even if the speech takes place within the U.S., because the president, as a “focal point” of U.S. values, policy, ideals, and the U.S. public, crosses borders in interacting with a representative of another nation.⁹⁴ In these cases, the president is engaged in transnational speech events.

This dissertation explores how U.S. presidents also shape and are shaped by a global imaginary. I delineate three audiences with which the global president engages: other national leaders, intergovernmental organizations, and transnational citizens. In each of these cases, presidents use “democracy” to shape the global imaginary and to strengthen their role within it. I begin my study with the fall of the Berlin Wall, which, as historian Timothy Garton Ash argues, “has become a kind of master metaphor” to represent and predict the “forward march to freedom.”⁹⁵ Presidents mention the fall of the Wall in their public address as a symbol for unity,

⁹³ See Mary E. Stuckey, *The President as Interpreter-in-Chief* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1991); David Zarefsky, “Presidential Rhetoric and the Power of Definition,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 34 (2004): 607-619.

⁹⁴ Walter R. Fisher, “Rhetorical Fiction and the Presidency,” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 66 (1980): 119.

⁹⁵ Timothy Garton Ash, “The Fall of the Berlin Wall: What it Meant to be There,” *The Guardian*, November 6, 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/06/-sp-fall-berlin-wall-what-it-meant-to-be-there>.

the promise of democracy, and global progress.⁹⁶ Mikhail Gorbachev, Manfred Stegar argues, was the first major political leader who “connected the necessity for a new political thinking to globalization,” and Thomas Friedman named this moment the “birthday” of the globalization system.⁹⁷ Globalization has arguably always been happening—with every new transportation and telecommunication system, with world religions, and trade markets wider than one’s own community. This moment of unification, though, symbolizes, in both Mikhail Gorbachev’s and George H.W. Bush’s words, a “new world order.”⁹⁸ And thus, it is with the moments just before the fall of the wall and its actual fall that my dissertation begins. I draw upon moments/events within the presidencies of George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama to understand presidential rhetoric under conditions of globalization.

1.4 Project Details

This project is organized both topically and chronologically. It consists of three analytical chapters, each chapter attending to the presidents in the order that they held office and each chapter focusing on the president’s engagement with a different transnational audience. First, I examine the joint press conference between Bush and Gorbachev at Malta, as well as the meetings that led up to it. Second, I examine Clinton and George W. Bush’s speeches before the UN. Third, I analyze Obama’s transnational town hall meetings. By shifting audiences in each case study, this study reveals different facets of the president’s relationship to the rest of the world, and the rhetoric that creates and sustains it.

⁹⁶ For examples of how U.S. politicians invoke “the fall of the wall,” see Ash, “The Fall of the Berlin Wall.”

⁹⁷ Steger, *The Rise of the Global Imaginary*, 179-185.

⁹⁸ George Bush, “Address Before the 45th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, New York,” October 1, 1990, in *The American Presidency Project*, eds. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=18883>.

Audience is important for understanding the president's global role, and his construction of global imaginaries, because, as John Murphy notes, the linguistic potentiality of rhetoric "can only be actualized in a collaborative performance of speaker and audience."⁹⁹ In other words, audiences shape rhetoric; the interaction between the speaker and the audience is a necessary component for rhetorical effect. As Aristotle wrote, "For of the three elements in speech-making—speaker, subject, and person addressed—it is the last one, the hearer, that determines the speech's end and object."¹⁰⁰ Audiences, then, determine the object of speeches differently from one another. Moreover, rhetors shape speeches for particular audiences, potentially revealing both the rhetor's motive and the audience's character.¹⁰¹ By shifting from one audience to another, these studies reveal three important aspects of the role of the global role of the president. First, this study shows how presidents interact with, not only speak to, other powerful world leaders capable of shaping global imaginaries. While most studies of presidential rhetoric focus on a president's speech text, I also analyze how presidents negotiate and collaborate in deliberative speech situations with other world leaders. Second, it deepens our understanding of how presidents relate to extra-national institutions and citizens, thus revealing how presidents help create transnational and global identity formations. Third, it reveals similarities and differences of presidential speech across different audiences and over time. Thus, it tells us something about the presidency as an institution.

⁹⁹ John Murphy, "Inventing Authority: Bill Clinton, Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Orchestration of Rhetorical Traditions," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 83 (1997): 72.

¹⁰⁰ Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, ed. Rhys Roberts, <http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/rhetoric.1.i.html>.

¹⁰¹ Philip Wander, "The Third Persona: An Ideological Turn in Rhetorical Theory," *Communication Studies* 35 (1984): 197-216.

1.4.1 Presidents and Foreign Leaders

The first speaker-audience relationship I study is the that between the president and another world leader—in this case, George H.W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev. Restructuring global politics marked George H. W. Bush’s presidency, partially because he was president at the end of the Cold War, and partially because of how he chose to engage with supranational institutions and international political leaders—notably, Mikhail Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping. This project only focuses on the collaboration between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, because it was the heads of the U.S. and the Soviet Union who met together in Malta, created a narrative of the nations’ pasts, and constructed the idea of a new world order, rhetorically ending the Cold War.

Mikhail Gorbachev was one of the primary leaders of “globalization.” Steger argues that Gorbachev tied globalization with a new political thinking—in his words, a “New World Order.” Gorbachev spoke and wrote about the “objective process” of globalization that made our “complex and diverse world more and more interrelated and interdependent.”¹⁰² In other words, Gorbachev treated “globalization” as an external material force that explained social change. In treating globalization as empirical fact, Gorbachev promoted the material trend and its ideological counterpart. The two are co-constitutive. As the world becomes more interconnected, so does the “subjective recognition of a shrinking world.”¹⁰³ This “recognition” by political and intellectual leaders in turn spurs on globalization; for example, leaders enact neo-liberal trade agreements, create transnational governing bodies, and engage in “global” wars. Each of these promotes “globalization” while figuring the ideological underpinning of what it means for the

¹⁰² Steger, *The Rise of the Global Imaginary*, 179-180; Mikhail Gorbachev, “Underpinning a Secure World,” in *Perestroika: Global Challenge*, eds. Ken Coates and Michael Barratt Brown (Nottingham, UK: Spokesman, 1988).

¹⁰³ Steger, *The Rise of the Global Imaginary*, 11.

world to be “global.” Gorbachev’s role in promoting a globalization makes him a particularly compelling subject to study alongside Bush—his discourse about globalization reveals intentional construction of a global imaginary.

This chapter examines George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev’s rhetoric leading up to their joint press conference, which symbolically ended the Cold War. I argue that the two leaders were able to end the Cold War in part through their negotiation geopolitical and spatial metaphors. Gorbachev and Bush teased out the international identity of their nations, breaking down the division between “Eastern” and “Western” values. In doing so, they came to terms with certain “universal” values, such as self-determination and pluralism, which then guided their unifying decision-making. Still, there were differences between the global imaginaries of the two leaders—namely, Gorbachev imagined a multi-lateral world driven by these universal values, while Bush imagined one led by the U.S.

1.4.2 Presidents and Transnational Governments

Bill Clinton’s presidency was also marked by the restructuring of global politics—in part because his presidency followed Bush’s and in part because of his own insistence on “democratic expansion.”¹⁰⁴ For Clinton, expansion was directly connected to the international spread of democracy, which is exhibited in his work with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). George W. Bush’s presidency also sought the international spread of democracy, as he used the trope of democracy to defend both the Iraq War and the War on Terror. This chapter focuses on how Clinton and Bush constructed “democracy” as a universal—a rhetorical process that relies upon the transformative process of

¹⁰⁴ William J. Clinton, “Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City,” September 27, 1993, in *The American Presidency Project*, eds. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=47119>.

national institutions interacting with global forces. While political leaders in the United States have arguably been constructing democracy as a universal since the Declaration of Independence, understanding how they do so in the contemporary context is especially important when interrogating how presidential rhetoric functions in a globalized world. The methods for constructing a universal, and the global impact of this construction, has undoubtedly changed since the Founders drafted the Declaration. The purview of the rhetorical and political audience has widened since the Americans first began invoking “democracy,” as a universal, thus demanding a new method for understanding this rhetoric. Because of the expansive nature of the war on terror, the ever-increasing use of communication technology, and the rhetorical and political collaborations between nations as explicated in speeches for the United Nations, Bush’s rhetoric circulated throughout the globe.

In this chapter, I argue that U.S. presidents use the U.N. to inform the global imaginary through a universalization of the trope of “democracy.” Presidents Clinton and Bush universalized “democracy” in at least two ways. First, they did so through the symbolic work of their speech setting at the UN, which was most often before the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). The rhetorical act of speaking before the UNGA, specifically, illustrated democratic action, aligning the ideologies of the U.S. and the UN through collective political approval. Second, the speech texts universalized “democracy” by conflating “democracy” with “global market” and “human rights.” In their speeches before the UN, presidents drew upon a particularly American understanding of these terms that benefitted the U.S. and its allies.

1.4.3 Presidents and Foreign Citizens

Finally, while Obama’s discourse was circulated in many of the same ways as Bush’s, Obama also created situations, such as transnational town hall meetings, in which he enacted

global representation. He participated in rhetorical circulation as he traveled to foreign countries, there appropriating a forum for discourse that has historically been used in the process of direct democracy to speak with non-U.S. citizens about transnational issues. This chapter focuses on these hall meetings, arguing that the circulation of this U.S. democratic practice along with the president's presence provided an opportunity for the president to define the transnational identity of foreign citizens while presenting himself as their leader, thus contributing to a global imaginary. This study reveals, first, that Obama used American exceptionalist rhetoric and practices to position himself as a global leader, teacher, and representative. And second, that he paradoxically dropped this exceptionalism as he called forth a transnational and global identity among these citizens. These two aspects of Obama's rhetoric display the complicated dynamic of representation and citizenship under conditions of globalization.

1.4.4 Backlash to Globalization

In the final chapter, I discuss the rhetorical and political context at the end of, and just after, Obama's presidency. This dissertation shows how post-Cold War presidents contributed to globalization through their construction of global imaginaries defined by the trope of democracy. In doing so, they garnered their role as global figures and, to some extent, intensified U.S. engagement in the rest of the world. Recent years have ushered in a backlash against globalization, and against specific acts of global engagement by U.S. presidents. This chapter, along with reviewing the through lines of the dissertation, delves into the political and rhetorical implications of the burgeoning global role of the presidency. Specifically, I consider anti-globalization discourses around the world as they relate to the U.S. presidency alongside the anti-globalization discourses of Donald Trump.

2 PRESIDENTS AND FOREIGN LEADERS: BUSH AND GORBACHEV END THE COLD WAR

On December 3, 1989, U.S. President George Bush and Soviet Chairman Mikhail Gorbachev, aboard a Soviet passenger liner in Malta, held a joint press conference—the symbolic importance of which was not lost on the two leaders. “Ladies and gentlemen, comrades,” announced Gorbachev at the beginning of the press conference, “there are many symbolic things about this meeting, and one of them—it has never been in the history that the leaders of our two countries hold a joint press conference.”¹⁰⁵ This joint press conference was important because the leaders of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, for the first time, were ready to make a united appearance before the press.

This chapter examines how these two leaders arrived at that point, and, particularly, how their rhetoric reveals global imaginaries of the two nations. I argue that this meeting is representative of the discourse that ended the Cold War, and that this rhetoric reflects two distinct global imaginaries. George Bush constructed a post-Cold War global imaginary led by the West, and specifically the U.S. Mikhail Gorbachev’s global imaginary consisted of multilateral leadership in an increasingly interconnected world. This chapter shows that their negotiation of the “East-West” discursive and conceptual frame reveals and constructs these imaginaries. The global imaginary, as Manfred Steger conceives it, is the “shared sense of a thickening world community, bound together by processes of globalization that are daily

¹⁰⁵ George Bush, “Remarks of the President and Soviet Chairman Gorbachev and a Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters in Malta,” December 3, 1989, in *The American Presidency Project*, eds. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17900>.

shrinking our planet.”¹⁰⁶ It is articulated in part, in the “ideological claims of political leaders and business elites who reside in privileged spaces around the world.”¹⁰⁷ The end of the Cold War was brought on by a change in understanding of how nations are connected. The “new thinking” in the USSR, specifically, presented a shift in ideology. Two of the mouthpieces for reconciling this “New World Order” were Bush and Gorbachev.

Bush and Gorbachev were leaders struggling to not only end the Cold War, but to do so in a way that fit into their polarized national narratives and geopolitical frameworks that characterized Cold War discourse. By the time the two met in Malta, the Berlin Wall had fallen and the Soviet Union had removed troupes from Afghanistan. The ideological discourses had also shifted on both American and Soviet sides. German Chancellor Helmut Kohl had given his 10-point address, and Gorbachev had made a speech at the UN pledging significant arms cuts and endorsing the “common interests of mankind” rather than the class struggle.¹⁰⁸ These events and accompanying discourses provided a context for the Malta meetings and the end of the Cold War. In this chapter, I show that Bush and Gorbachev’s rhetoric at the end of the Cold War was characterized, though not always consistently, by a push toward pluralistic political identity and away from bilateral enemyship.¹⁰⁹ In other words, the two nations came to terms with one another as adversaries who were able to cooperate with one another, though they did so for different ideological reasons with different political processes. As the two world leaders envisioned the political path of the world, discussing Central and South America, the Middle

¹⁰⁶ Manfred B. Steger, “The Rise of the Global Imaginary and the Persistence of Ideology,” *Global-E* 3 (2009), <http://www.21global.ucsb.edu/global-e/july-2009/rise-global-imaginary-and-persistence-of%C2%A0ideology>.

¹⁰⁷ Steger, “The Rise of the Global Imaginary and the Persistence of Ideology.”

¹⁰⁸ Thomas Blanton, “U.S. Policy and the Revolutions of 1989, in *Masterpieces of History: The Peaceful End of The Cold War in Europe, 1989*, eds. Svetlana Savranskaya, Thomas Blanton, and Vladislav Zubok (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2011), 58.

¹⁰⁹ For more on the rhetorical construction of enemyship, see Jeremy Engels, *Enemyship: Democracy and Counter-Revolution in the Early Republic* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2010).

East, Eastern and Western Europe, and the Middle East, they sometimes had dissimilar ideas of how to proceed—it should come as no surprise, then, that Bush and Gorbachev figured diverse global imaginaries through their discourse. While Gorbachev’s rhetoric evinced a global society in which nations had the right to self-determine its political process, Bush advocated a vision of market democratic enlargement. In other words, Gorbachev’s “global” vision was multipolar, whereas Bush’s vision was that of a world led by the U.S. and was cohered by “Western values.” This shows one aspect of the global role of the presidency—negotiating different imaginaries with foreign leaders.

I begin with a contextual overview of Cold War rhetoric, highlighting key characteristics of foreign policy on both the U.S. and Soviet sides, and paying particular attention to the rhetoric that upheld these foreign policy decisions and ensured that that each side understood the other as enemy rather than adversary. Second, I discuss the historical and rhetorical context of the Malta summit, explaining the importance of both the bilateral meetings between Gorbachev and Bush as well as their joint press conference. Third, I examine the shift in Cold War ideology and discourse that occurred in 1989–1990 through an analysis of Bush and Gorbachev’s discussions and speeches, leading up to, during, and just after the Malta conference. In this analysis, I specifically focus on the ideological and foreign policy shifts that ended the Cold War discursive framework, which I argue was through a management of the pervasive “East-West” frame. In these speeches and discussions, Bush and Gorbachev both presented and negotiated their ideas of global leadership and the characteristics of the amalgam “international community.” Stated simply, Bush shifted from a foreign policy of containment to imagine the international community led by the U.S. through NATO. Gorbachev rejected the Brezhnev Doctrine, arguing for self-determination and multilateral leadership of the international community. By analyzing

their conversations and joint press conference through the lens of the “East-West” frame, I show how spatial and geopolitical metaphors undergirded conceptual differences of the world and, because of their abstraction, also provided a way for the two visions to cohere. I conclude with the implications of how global imaginaries shape foreign policy. While Bush and Gorbachev held different views of the global, they were both concerned with world peace and some level of self-determination among nations, allowing the two to make a showing of solidarity in a joint press conference that symbolically ended the Cold War. This shows one way presidents navigate their role in an inter-connected world.

2.1 Cold War Global Imaginary

The U.S. and Soviet Union were both nations founded on ideas. According to historian Odd Arne Westad, the U.S. was founded on the idea of liberty which manifested in democracy while the Soviet Union was founded on the idea of justice which it found in communism.¹¹⁰ These two sometimes-opposing ideologies became the foundation of the Cold War. Ideological polarization of the world into “Eastern” and “Western” Blocs and the tension between the two characterized the Cold War. The conceptual division of two distinct global spheres created and sustained an Other with distinct values, traditions, and identity. This rhetorical distinction of the two sides generated incompatible global imaginaries during the Cold War. This incompatibility was bound to the rhetoric that sustained it.¹¹¹

The naming of this state of relations between the U.S. and Soviet Union as the “Cold War” exemplifies the centrality of rhetoric for this era. “Cold War” is a metaphor that, as Robert

¹¹⁰ Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

¹¹¹ See Philip Wander, “The Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy,” *The Quarterly Journal of Speech* 70 (1984): 339-361.

Scott explains, positioned the Soviet Union as an enemy of war, on the one hand; on the other, it encouraged state actors to keep confrontations nonviolent.¹¹² Moreover, it was a choice to exclude combat that influenced, and resulted from, the state of affairs between the two nations as a legitimate part of the war.¹¹³ Soviets, in fact, refused to use the term “Cold War” in an official capacity until Gorbachev’s era, during which the war ended. The U.S. used the phrase “Cold War,” and in doing so framed the Soviet threat and the U.S.’s mission to contain this threat; the Soviet’s disregard for the word was just as rhetorically significant, as doing so implied that their country was “peaceful” unlike U.S. imperialists.¹¹⁴ The name “Cold War” thus presents a microcosm of the rhetorical difficulty of the “East” and the “West” to form a compatible global imaginary.

Rhetoric was, as Martin Medhurst aptly notes, “the issue” of the Cold War. It was, in Medhurst’s phrase, a “war of words.”¹¹⁵ Thus, rhetorical scholars have developed methodologies for understanding Cold War rhetoric. We know that U.S. public discourse upheld tension between the two states and shaped and justified U.S. foreign policy decisions. Scholars have used close-text analysis to understand Cold War metaphors and they have traced discourses to myths of national identity.¹¹⁶ Soviet public address, of course, also reveals national ideology. This ideology, characterized by a commitment to social justice, compelled Soviet leaders to protect communist nations, just as the commitment to liberty and democracy compelled U.S. presidents to create foreign policy to protect democratic nations. Extending previous studies of

¹¹² Robert L. Scott, “Cold War and Rhetoric: Conceptually and Critically,” in *Cold War Rhetoric*, 5.

¹¹³ Both “Cold War” and “Third World” are late twentieth century neologisms. George Orwell first used “Cold War” in 1945 in a critique of the worldviews and tenuous relationship between the Soviet Union and the U.S. See Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 2.

¹¹⁴ Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 2.

¹¹⁵ Martin Medhurst, *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology*, eds. Martin J. Medhurst, Robert L. Ivie, Philip Wander, and Robert L. Scott (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1990), xiv.

¹¹⁶ *Cold War Rhetoric*, eds. Martin J. Medhurst, Robert L. Ivie, Philip Wander, Robert L. Scott (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1990).

Cold War discourse, I analyze Gorbachev’s rhetoric in addition to, and in comparison with, Bush’s speech. The rhetorical choices of state actors in the U.S. and the USSR, such as in the anecdotal “Cold War” metaphor or the “East-West” frame that guides my analysis, help explain the events of the Cold War as they reveal the motives of the agents of the Cold War and tie their discourses to deep cultural and national identity.

In this section, I provide the rhetorical and historical context in which Bush and Gorbachev’s Malta meetings took place. I use the lens of U.S. and Soviet ideologies—liberty through democracy and justice through communism, respectively—to examine Cold War foreign policy discourses before these discourses shifted, and ended, the Cold War.

2.1.1 U.S. Liberty and Soviet Justice: Containing/Expanding Communism

Both the U.S. and Soviet Russia were nations founded on universal ideals—the U.S., liberty, and the Soviet Union, justice¹¹⁷—which informed their foreign policy during the Cold War. The Soviet’s Brezhnev Doctrine was established to uphold the Soviet ideal, justice, by expanding communism. The Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, on the other hand, which Truman described as “two halves of the same walnut,” were established as agents of liberty in an effort to protect the world from communism.¹¹⁸ To do so, the U.S. would “contain” communism. “Containment” became a master metaphor of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. Metaphors are inherent in language, so they are inescapable. They are also linguistic choices, so they can reveal motive.¹¹⁹ Metaphorical choices both exaggerate and literalize, thus enabling and constraining how we imagine the political situation and shaping foreign policy.

¹¹⁷ Westad, *The Global Cold War*.

¹¹⁸ Denise Bostdorff, *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 2008), 143.

¹¹⁹ See Kenneth Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969).

“Containment” derives from the container metaphor, which Paul Chilton argues is the main source domain “for the metaphorical conception of international relations.”¹²⁰ In other words, the container schema is a descriptor for a cluster of metaphors commonly used in international political discourse. As George Lakoff and Mark Johnson note, we conceive through metaphors, and “we act according to the way we conceive of things.”¹²¹ The container schema provided a way to understand international relations and a way for presidents to enact international policy during the Cold War. Truman sought to contain communism with the Marshall Plan by providing monetary support for Europe, arguing that “the seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died.”¹²² Here, Truman used the container metaphor (in combination with a plant metaphor) to illustrate the need for financial assistance—when people are poor, the evil of communism “spreads” and “grows.” This quotation also exemplifies how the conceptualization of the body contains metaphors also within the container schema. When hope “has died,” communism can grow. Here, the “disease” metaphor is clustered with the “body” metaphor. These metaphors worked within the container schema to justify foreign policy.

U.S. politicians also used metaphor to create an enemy Other; it, too, was bound to the container schema. Several rhetorical scholars note that presidents use the “disease metaphor” in relation to international politics, enemies, and the “spread” of communism, specifically.¹²³ In

¹²⁰ Paul Chilton, “The Meaning of Security,” in *Post-realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations*, eds. Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1996), 197.

¹²¹ George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), 5.

¹²² Harry S. Truman, “Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine,” March 12, 1947, in *The American Presidency Project*, eds. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12846>.

¹²³ See, for instance, Bostdorff, *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine*; Heidt, “Presidential Rhetoric, Metaphor, and the Emergence of the Democracy Promotion Industry”; Robert L. Ivie, “Fire, Flood, and Red Fever: Motivating

these instances, a disease is a foreign Other—either in the form of an ideology, a nation, or an enemy people—and it infiltrates and spreads through the “body politic.”¹²⁴ These examples Other the Soviets by describing them, and their ideologies, as infectious diseases that could “spread” through the rest of the world (a container). Thus, the container schema helped figure both the enemy and the solution to the enemy. Robert Ivie provides more examples of how U.S. discourse constructed an enemy Other. For instance, Cold War rhetors shaped perceptions of Soviets when they treated “Soviet” and “savage” as identical terms instead of as distinct terms. Other metaphors that structured the understanding of the Cold War include Soviets as a “germ infecting the body politic, a plague upon the liberty of human kind, and a barbarian intent upon destroying civilization.”¹²⁵ Each of these metaphors contributed to the need and justification for war, and each of them are part of the “containment” schema. Whether Soviets were framed as savages bent on destroying the American way of life or germs that could poison the rest of the world, this discourse provided a reason to “contain” them.

While “containment” characterized the foreign policy of all Cold War presidents, each president after Truman differed in the ways they went about “containing” the Soviet threat. For instance, Truman intervened with the Marshall Plan, which provided financial assistance for rebuilding European economies after World War II; Eisenhower increased nuclear weapons; and Johnson focused on blocking communism from Latin America (specifically the Dominican Republic).¹²⁶ These presidents presented justifications for their actions by using the metaphor of

Metaphors of Global Emergency in the Truman Doctrine Speech,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 29 (1999): 570-591.

¹²⁴ Chilton, “The Meaning of Security,” 198.

¹²⁵ Robert Ivie, “Cold War Motives and Rhetorical Metaphor,” in *Cold War Rhetoric*, 72.

¹²⁶ Jason A. Edwards, *Navigating the Post-Cold War World: President Clinton’s Foreign Policy Rhetoric* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008); Chester Pach, “The Reagan Doctrine: Principle, Pragmatism, and Policy,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36 (2006): 75-88; Stephen G. Rabe, “The Johnson Doctrine,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36 (2006): 48-58; Jeffrey Kimball, “The Nixon Doctrine: A Saga of Misunderstanding,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36 (2006): 59-74.

preventing communism from “spreading” throughout the globe. Moreover, their rhetoric hinged on an understanding of the “West” as democratic, free, and civilized and the “East” as savage. U.S. discourse, specifically, was based in the ideology of liberty and democracy as superior ideologies to communism, warranting “containment” of communism, which sometimes required intervention.

U.S. foreign policy was concerned with more than the Soviet Bloc. The unaligned, formerly colonized Third World became an ideological and territorial battleground between the Soviet “East” and the U.S. “West.” Truman explicated the U.S. position in what became known as the Truman Doctrine, saying, “One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the U.S. is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion.”¹²⁷ That is, Truman believed that the role of the U.S. was to protect other nations from non-democratic government. One justification for this foreign policy objective, which demanded U.S. intervention and global leadership, was the most ubiquitous Cold War phrase, according to Robert McMahon—its “defense of peace and freedom abroad.”¹²⁸ Presidents tied this defense of democratic expansion and protection directly to domestic security. Truman said, for example, “The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. This imposed aggression undermines the foundations of international peace and the security of the United States.”¹²⁹ In other words, communism abroad directly affected international security and peace as well as domestic security and peace. Communism, for U.S. presidents, was the ideological threat that warranted

¹²⁷ Truman, “Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine,” March 12, 1947.

¹²⁸ Robert J. McMahon, “‘By Helping Others, We Help Ourselves’ The Cold War Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy,” in *Critical Reflections on the Cold War: Linking Rhetoric and History*, ed. Martin Medhurst (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), 235.

¹²⁹ Truman, “Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine,” March 12, 1947.

international intervention for the sake of global and domestic peace, an urge present in U.S. rhetorical history since manifest destiny.¹³⁰

U.S. Cold War foreign policy discourse created an enemy Other through metaphor. This discourse also used metaphor to solve the problem of this enemy Other as the U.S. sought to “contain” Soviet communism. These metaphors constructed and reflected the U.S. Cold War global imaginary that was pervasive when Bush and Gorbachev met in Malta—that the world was divided into an objective “East” and “West,” and that the “West” was superior to the “East.”

2.1.2 “New Thinking” Under Gorbachev

By the end of 1989 when Gorbachev and Bush met in Malta, Soviets had begun to shift their global imaginary away from the “East-West” paradigm. Before Soviet intellectuals’ “new thinking” in the Soviet Union, which was eventually headed by Gorbachev, the 1968 Soviet foreign policy was characterized by the Brezhnev Doctrine. The Brezhnev Doctrine was remarkably similar to U.S. Cold War foreign policy in form. Instead of arguing that capitalist and democratic nations must make the world safe for democracy, Leonid Brezhnev argued, “When forces that are hostile to socialism try to turn the development of some socialist country towards capitalism, it becomes not only a problem of the country concerned, but a common problem and concern of all socialist countries.”¹³¹ This doctrine justified the invasion of communist countries for the sake of keeping them communist, supporting the principle of the limited sovereignty of the Soviet Union. The principle of limited sovereignty meant that nations in the Eastern Bloc were to act cohesively, and thus were not fully independent states.

¹³⁰ Bostdorff, *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine*.

¹³¹ Andrei Tsygankov, “From International Institutionalism to Revolutionary Expansionism: The Foreign Policy Discourse of Contemporary Russia,” *Mershon International Studies Review* 41 (1997): 252.

Around the same time that Leonid Brezhnev popularized what became known as the Brezhnev Doctrine,¹³² an intellectual elite was emerging in the Soviet Union. These intellectuals ushered in a new global imaginary characterized by international integration and rooted in “the cultural thaw, domestic liberalization, and burgeoning foreign ties of the early post-Stalin era.”¹³³ By the early 1970s, before the worsening of relations between the U.S. and Soviet Union, this minority group of elites was promoting foreign and domestic policy reforms, paving the way for Gorbachev’s *perestroika*.¹³⁴ When Gorbachev came to power, he brought “new thinking” with him, shifting the Cold War paradigm of previous Soviet leaders during the Cold War. Instead of positioning the Soviet Union against the “West,” “new thinking” positioned the Soviet Union’s national identity as members within the international community and in cooperation with the “West.”¹³⁵ This “new thinking” is apparent in the discussions between Bush and Gorbachev in Malta, and it aided in ending the Cold War.

2.2 Setting: Malta

Bush and Gorbachev’s meeting at Malta was surprisingly significant, even to the two leaders who arranged it. The meeting was intended as an “interim” session before a full-scale summit in 1990. But as Sventlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton note, it took on a “life of its own, symbolically bringing the Cold War to a close.”¹³⁶ In part, this was because of radical reform in the Soviet Union. As revolutionary changes were taking place in Eastern Europe, for instance, Gorbachev refused to use force to suppress them, even providing explicit permission to

¹³² Sergei Kovale originally wrote the policy in the September 26, 1968 issue of *Pravda*. See Mark Kramer, “Beyond the Brezhnev Doctrine: A New Era in Soviet-East Relations?” *International Security* 14 (1989-1990): 25-67.

¹³³ Robert English, *Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War* (Columbia, NY: Columbia University Press, 2000), 2.

¹³⁴ English, *Russia and the Idea of the West*, 2.

¹³⁵ English, *Russia and the Idea of the West*, 6.

¹³⁶ Sventlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton, *The Last Superpower Summits* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2016), 485.

Hungary in March 1989 to open its borders.¹³⁷ Additionally, Gorbachev pledged to drastically reduce arms and his stated commitment to Bush that the Soviet Union would “never start a hot war against the United States of America.”¹³⁸ Together, Gorbachev’s words and actions exemplified a global imaginary of a world in which self-determined nations worked in cooperation with one another.¹³⁹ While this global imaginary was not the same as Bush’s—as Bush was committed to a world led by NATO and “Western values,” there was also overlap between these two visions. For instance, Bush and Gorbachev agreed on many values—what Bush called “Western,” Gorbachev insisted were “universal.” And “self-determinism” to some extent aligned with the U.S.’s call for “democracy.” During their time at Malta, the two were able to collaborate at the points where these visions intersected. This is interaction and the resulting vision that, to a certain extent the two leaders shared, is important for understanding the contemporary role of the president as it shows how presidents manage interpersonal relationships with people who have the power to affect the globe.

Gorbachev and Bush first held several private meetings over the course of two days. The meetings were deliberative, each exchanging their views for how the two nations should move forward. This was the first substantial amount of time the two leaders had spent together since Bush became president. Those meetings marked the beginning of “actual diplomacy” between the two leaders.¹⁴⁰ The transcripts of these meetings reveal two leaders coming to terms with one another and creating a plan for a cooperative future. The success of the meetings is evident in the joint press conference that took place at the end of their time in Malta. At this point, the

¹³⁷ Savranskaya and Blanton, *The Last Superpower Summits*, 485.

¹³⁸ George Bush, “Remarks of the President and Soviet Chairman Gorbachev and a Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters in Malta,” December 3, 1989, in *The American Presidency Project*, eds. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17900>.

¹³⁹ In 1989, Bush was much less enthusiastic than Gorbachev about reducing arms.

¹⁴⁰ Savranskaya and Blanton, *The Last Superpower Summits*, 488.

rhetorical context shifted from an interpersonal collaboration of global visions between two world leaders and the enactment of that vision before a global audience.

The rhetorical and political functions of a joint press conference are complex. A joint press conference is both performative and epideictic, evincing the transnational role of national leaders as well as some degree of solidarity between the two. It is also deliberative, requiring accountability of both leaders to the cross-section of national audiences in attendance of the event as well as the transnational and global audiences who consume mediated versions of the event. These speech acts accomplish the rhetorical work of enacting a pluralistic, antagonistic global community, qualities that were only sometimes within the scope of the leaders' global visions.

Moreover, joint press conferences are transnational presidential rhetorical events, and they are moments in which presidents enact their global role. George H. W. Bush was the first president to regularly hold joint press conferences with foreign leaders.¹⁴¹ Since then, joint press conferences have been a standard event for presidents, both in the White House and during presidential trips. Now joint press conferences account for over half of all press conferences for modern presidents.¹⁴² The role of these press conferences, according to Aditi Bhatia, is the presentation of a "joint and united front between two leaders."¹⁴³ For Bush and Gorbachev to decide to have a joint press conference shows that the relationship between the two nations were stronger than ever before, and it signaled a cooperative future.

Bhatia also finds a generic sequence of the joint press conference. First, the host welcomes the guest politician, usually noting the previous meetings of the two leaders before

¹⁴¹ Martha Kumar, *Managing the President's Message: The White House Communications Operation* (Baltimore, MD: JHU Press, 2010), 268.

¹⁴² Kumar, *Managing the President's Message*, 268.

¹⁴³ Bhatia, "Critical Discourse Analysis of Political Press Conferences," *Discourse & Society* 17 (2006): 195.

moving on to the topics discussed in the present meeting. Second, there are individual statements by each leader, with the host providing the first statement. Third, the politicians answer questions by the press. Finally, each speaker provides a closing statement.¹⁴⁴ Bush and Gorbachev's press conference followed this sequence. Though press conferences are formulaic, they make possible an "increased intimacy between the people and their leader" because the press conference, unlike formal public address, create the potential for dialogue.¹⁴⁵ Presidents and foreign leaders are to some extent prepared to answer questions by the press; still, the question-and-answer part of the joint press conference brings a degree of "mutuality and spontaneity," forcing the leaders to interact with citizens.¹⁴⁶ In short, presidential press conferences are opportunities for democratic talk. In December 1989, as representatives of ideologically opposed nations, Bush and Gorbachev showed a somewhat unified image of national leadership, while also being held accountable to transnational press. In doing so, they figured themselves, to some extent, as global leaders.

Presidential press conferences are, as Roderick Hart and Joshua Scacco note, a collision of institutions—the presidency and the press—and occasions that neither institution particularly enjoys. While most presidents prefer to avoid press questions and maintain their own rhetorical agenda, members of the press are often disappointed with their interactions with presidents because press members have to be so easy on them.¹⁴⁷ Still, press conferences persist. They are a reminder that the president is held accountable to the people. Joint press conferences between the U.S. president and the leader of another nation are, arguably, a collision of at least four

¹⁴⁴ Bhatia, "Critical Discourse Analysis of Political Press Conferences," 179.

¹⁴⁵ Jill McMillian and Sandra Ragan, "The Presidential Press Conference: A Study in Escalating Institutionalization," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 13 (1983): 233.

¹⁴⁶ McMillian and Ragan, "The Presidential Press Conference," 233.

¹⁴⁷ Roderick Hart and Joshua Scacco, "Rhetorical Negotiation and the Presidential Press Conference," in *Communication and Language Analysis in the Public Sphere*, ed. Roderick Hart (IGI-Global, 2014), 59.

institutions—the U.S. presidency, the office of the international leader, the U.S. press, and the international press. Joint press conferences are both institutional speech acts and opportunities for transnational democratic talk. Just as the presidential press conference brings to bear the relationship between the president and the people, joint press conferences are driven by the relationships between the two leaders and the immediate transnational audience, the two secondary national audiences, and a larger global audience.

This joint press conference exemplifies at least three important aspects of the Malta meetings. First, by holding a joint press conference with Gorbachev, Bush enacted the democratic values that the “West” espoused, thus continuing the role of U.S. president as “leader of the free world.” Second, Gorbachev’s enthusiastic participation in the press conference reveals another instance in which Bush’s “Western values” and Gorbachev’s “universal values” overlap, showing a shift in global politics. It is because of this overlap that Bush and Gorbachev were able to make interpersonal and transnational progress at Malta. Third, Gorbachev and Bush enacted joint leadership, symbolizing drastic political realignment. This joint press conference was possible because of the preceding discussions between the two leaders, and specifically, their negotiation of the “East-West” frame. Thus, the next section analyzes all of the meetings at Malta along with the joint press conference.

2.3 East and West as Controlling Metaphors

In Cold War discourse generally, and Bush and Gorbachev’s talks specifically, it was a common rhetorical strategy to use the terms “East” and “West” to distinguish between people groups, ideology, and, of course, geopolitical spaces. Specifically, in U.S. Cold War discourse, “East-West” was used as a geo-political abstraction that essentialized and homogenized the

“East.”¹⁴⁸ I use quotation marks around “East” and West” to signify that these terms were most often used symbolically in political discourses as relative terms that promoted a political agenda, often representing or upholding “past and present divisions.”¹⁴⁹ In other words, “East-West” was “symbolic geography”—a metaphorical, historical, and political distinction, not always related to cardinal directions at all.¹⁵⁰ The discursive treatment of the East and West can be traced back to Edward Said’s well-known theory of Orientalism. Said argues that Western Europeans, and later Americans, distributed “geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and philological texts” which elaborated on both “basic geographical distinction” (that the world is divided between the Orient/Occident, or East/West) and knowledge about the East that the West both creates and maintains. This knowledge about the East exists within “an uneven exchange with various kinds of power,” including political power (“as with a colonial or imperial establishment”), intellectual power (“as with reigning sciences like comparative linguistics or anatomy, or any of the modern policy sciences”), cultural power (“as with orthodoxies and canons of taste, texts, values”), and moral power (“as with ideas about what ‘we’ do and what ‘they’ cannot do or understand as ‘we’ do”).¹⁵¹ Orientalism, the study of the East by the West, created and sustained an division between “us” (European and later U.S. imperial powers) and “our” culture, values, knowledge, and ideology, against that of “them” (the East). In doing so, Orientalism has provided an important aspect of the Western modern

¹⁴⁸ See Christopher L. Connery, “Pacific Rim Discourse: The U.S. Global Imaginary in the Late Cold War Years,” *Boundary 2* (1994): 30-56.

¹⁴⁹ Sibelan Forrester, Magdalena J. Zaborowska, Elena Gapova, *Over the Wall/After the Fall: Post-Communist Cultures through an East-West Gaze* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), 2; Alexander Maxwell, *East-West Discourse: Symbolic Geography and its Consequences* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2011), 31.

¹⁵⁰ Maxwell, *East-West Discourse*, 31.

¹⁵¹ Edward Said, *Orientalism* (London: Penguin Books, 2003 [1978]), 1.

political-intellectual culture of normative judgments that has less to do “with the Orient than it does with ‘our’ world.”¹⁵²

Said observes that Britain and France, and, since World War II, the U.S., circulated particular “knowledge” about the East that positioned the West as superior in relation to the East. This relationship between the West and the East is made possible because “East-West” is a spatial metaphor.¹⁵³ “East” and “West” do not exist outside of discourse. Holly Taylor and Barbara Tversky explain that “knowledge about space is one of the earliest forms of knowledge people use.” This knowledge is critical to our interpersonal interactions as well as our interactions with our environment. Spatial language is so common, in fact, “that it is used to describe non-spatial things as well.”¹⁵⁴ That is, spatial language is used metaphorically. The metaphor “East-West” invents likenesses and differences. It creates an “us” through the exclusion of a “them,” functioning within the container schema. The container schema, according to Paul Chilton, “constitutes the basis for understanding the words *inside* and *outside*, and enters so fundamentally into our conceptual and linguistic systems we do not normally attend to it.”¹⁵⁵ In the context of the Cold War, there were those on the inside, “us” or “the West,” and those who the U.S. tried to keep out, separated from the rest of the world—“the East.”

While Said’s theory of Orientalism focused on discourses of the “Near” or “Middle East” in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and not the Communist Bloc during Cold War, there

¹⁵² Edward Said, *Orientalism*, 1; See also, Gertjan Dijkink, *National Identity and Geopolitical Visions: Maps of Pride and Pain* (London and New York: Routledge 1996), 7; Maxwell, *East-West Discourse*, 9.

¹⁵³ On spatial metaphors, see Michael Osborn, “Rhetorical Distance in ‘Letter from Birmingham Jail,’” *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 7 (2004): 23-36.

¹⁵⁴ Holly A. Taylor and Barbara Tversky, “Perspectives in Spatial Descriptions,” *Journal of Memory and Language* 35 (1996): 371.

¹⁵⁵ Chilton, “The Meaning of Security,” 197.

are clear discursive continuities between the two.¹⁵⁶ Western Europe, as several scholars have noted, has viewed Eastern Europe through a lens of Orientalism shaped by conquest and colonialism.¹⁵⁷ During the Cold War, U.S. discourse was similar to that of Western Europe as both regions found its Other in the Soviet Union. Specifically, William Pietz observes, the Western alliance categorized communism as “traditional Oriental despotism.”¹⁵⁸ The communists were totalitarians, which Orientalists assumed was a natural part of what it meant to be Eastern. Nazi Germany was merely an accident explainable by the West’s invention of technology that made totalitarianism first possible in Europe. George Kennan, a prominent Cold War diplomat, policy strategist, and intellectual, wrote that while Germany “relapsed” into “barbarism,” Russians were engaged “natural and instinctive urges” that caused the Russian government to be pervaded by an “atmosphere of oriental secretiveness and conspiracy.”¹⁵⁹ That is, Soviets, like other “Orientals” were inherently barbaric and savage, and they did not hold the same values of the West. The Soviet Union, like the “Middle East” was discursively, culturally, and politically separated from Western Europe and the U.S. through the use of “East-West” and related spatial metaphors such as “Iron Curtain” and the Berlin Wall (which was, of course, also a physical boundary).¹⁶⁰ The use of “East-West” by U.S. politicians traced back to this distinction between the Orient and the Occident.

¹⁵⁶ Connery, “Pacific Rim Discourse”; William Pietz, “The ‘Post-Colonialism’ of Cold War Discourse,” *Social Text* 19/20 (1988): 55-75.

¹⁵⁷ Sibelan Forrester, Magdalena J. Zaborowska, Elena Gapova, *Over the Wall/After the Fall: Post-Communist Cultures through an East-West Gaze* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), 18; Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994).

¹⁵⁸ Pietz, “The ‘Post-Colonialism’ of Cold War Discourse,” 58.

¹⁵⁹ Pietz, “The ‘Post-Colonialism’ of Cold War Discourse,” 58.

¹⁶⁰ For more on spatial metaphors and the Cold War, see Zoë Hess Carney and Allison M. Prasch, “A Journey for Peace”: Spatial Metaphors in Nixon’s 1972 “Opening to China,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* (forthcoming, 2017).

Just as other Cold War policy thinkers relied on the “East-West” frame and its normative judgements about the Communist Bloc, Bush’s rhetoric, throughout his discussions with Gorbachev, hinged on the polarity of the “East” and the “West.” Gorbachev’s did not. Instead, Gorbachev’s speech relied on the spatial and orientational metaphor of “openness.” This is not to say that Gorbachev’s intentions were more closely bound to a more united worldview than Bush’s, but it does suggest a strong cognitive distinction between the “East” and “West” on Bush’s part, as his rhetoric worked to sustain that distinction. When Bush presented a New World Order, it was one led by “Western values” as “leader of the free world”—a nomination bound to the Western Bloc. Bush’s “East-West” distinction and Gorbachev’s “openness” are both spatial metaphors, and understanding them as such reveals how the two leaders negotiated their global imaginaries and defined a new political reality. “Openness,” as a spatial metaphor, suggests the opposite of the “East-West” metaphor. While “East-West” divides nations and connotes differences, “openness” works to undo those boundaries and divisions. Furthermore, “openness” recalls Gorbachev’s commitment to *glasnost*. *Glasnost*, a Russian word translated in English as “openness,” was a Soviet policy Gorbachev instituted related to “Soviet patterns of communication control.”¹⁶¹ *Glasnost*, according to the 1989 edition of a Soviet political reference work, required “maximum openness and truthfulness in the activity of state and public organizations.”¹⁶² The term Gorbachev used to increase transparency between the Soviet Union’s government and the people translates into the same word he used repeatedly in his talks with Bush. Just as *glasnost* was tied to Soviet restructuring, so was “openness” connected to global political restructuring.

¹⁶¹ Joseph Gibbs, *Gorbachev's Glasnost: The Soviet Media in the First Phase of Perestroika* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1999), 4.

¹⁶² Gibbs, *Gorbachev's Glasnost*, 13-14; See also, Leonid Vladimirov, *The Russians* (New York: Praeger, 1968), 97-98.

Bush and Gorbachev's uses of spatial metaphors such as "East-West" and "openness" demarcate clear differences in global visions. In this section, I discuss how the two world leaders negotiated their visions through these metaphors, eventually bringing about the end of the Cold War. These global visions, I show, were concerned with leadership and security as well as national identity.

2.3.1 Leadership and Security

By the time Gorbachev and Bush met in Malta, the U.S. and the Soviet Union had two very different global imaginaries, though with Gorbachev's "new thinking," they were more compatible than ever before. Still, Bush did not drastically alter Cold War foreign policy. Bush's hesitancy is tied to several factors. For one, the administration did not trust the Soviet Union's sudden shift in thinking.¹⁶³ For instance, NATO created proposals on the assumption that the Soviet Union would never agree to them. When it did, "some of the allies began to wonder if they could live with their own proposals."¹⁶⁴ Second, the White House was anxious that Gorbachev was more popular than Bush on a global scale, which they believed might give Gorbachev more initiative on proposing new departures in security policy.¹⁶⁵ Still, Bush and Gorbachev's rhetoric both reflected the importance they place on international and global security, which required a level of cooperation—cooperation that the East and West were finally able to consider despite continued efforts of the U.S. to contain communism.

¹⁶³ For a discussion on Bush's hesitancy with Gorbachev, see William Forrest Harlow, "Bush's Rhetoric of Silence during German Reunification," in *The Rhetorical Presidency of George H.W. Bush*, ed. Martin J. Medhurst (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2006).

¹⁶⁴ Sventlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton, *The Last Superpower Summits* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2016), 483; Jack F. Matlock, *Autopsy on an Empire: The American Ambassador's Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (New York: Random House Incorporated, 1995), 192.

¹⁶⁵ Savranskaya and Blanton, *The Last Superpower Summits*, 482.

The global imaginary, in part, is about framing problems as global instead of national and, in turn, declaring who should solve those problems. The visions for leadership varied between the two leaders, though they were able to both agree on the metaphor of a “New World Order.” Gorbachev argued that the world was undergoing a natural process of globalization that necessitated cooperation between national leaders. Bush, following the presidents before him,¹⁶⁶ envisioned a world becoming more interconnected through, and led by, organizations such as NATO (and thus the United States). Paying specific attention to how the two leaders use conflicting spatial metaphors of “East-West” and “openness,” I show how these national leaders negotiated the end of the Cold War—their different visions of the global shaping their speech on leadership and security of the world, attending to how the two leaders propose to work with one another and their positions toward the “Third World,” the nations outside of the Eastern and Western Blocs. While the U.S. continued its Cold War foreign policy of democratic expansion, the Soviet Union, under Gorbachev, shifted to a policy of self-determination and multilateral leadership.

2.3.1.1 Bush’s U.S.-Led Democratic World Order

Bush opened the joint press conference by stating that he “first approached Gorbachev about an informal meeting of this kind” after his July trip to Europe. While this particular meeting was Bush’s idea, Gorbachev had requested a summit-type meeting with Bush just after Bush was elected, during Gorbachev’s trip to speak before the United Nations in 1988.¹⁶⁷ Despite Bush’s hesitancy to meet with Gorbachev during the beginning of his presidency, Bush’s discourse reflected a global imaginary that positioned the U.S. as a global political leader. Part of

¹⁶⁶ Stuckey, *Defining Americans*, 293.

¹⁶⁷ Bush, “Remarks of the President and Soviet Chairman Gorbachev and a Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters in Malta,” December 3, 1989; Christopher Maynard, *Out of the Shadow: George H.W. Bush and the End of the Cold War* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), 27.

this leadership was rooted in the idea that the U.S. was a democratic exemplar—a key ideological reason for the tension between the U.S and the Soviet Union. Thus, Bush’s discourse was consistent with that of past presidents, which was steeped in American exceptionalism and the promotion of universal democratic practices.¹⁶⁸ Bush’s proclamation that the meeting at Malta was his idea exemplifies how Bush positioned himself as a global democratic leader. Throughout Bush’s discussions with Gorbachev, and within the joint press conference at the conclusion of the Malta Summit, Bush cultivated the U.S. presidential persona as global leader by drawing upon the “East-West” metaphorical frame. This frame elevated the moral and political status of the U.S. and its NATO allies, thus providing justification for the U.S. to lead the post-Cold War world while sustaining the “knowledge” that the West is superior to the East.

Bush employed the “East-West” frame in his claims that the West had held historically correct positions, according to “Western” (democratic) values to which the East was beginning to align itself. For example, Bush explained that the Western alliance had been working for “freedom” for forty years, expressing that “now, with reform underway in the Soviet Union, we stand at the threshold of a brand-new era of U.S.-Soviet relations.”¹⁶⁹ In this instance, and throughout his discourse at Malta, Bush implied that the Soviet Union was joining in with what the West had already been doing. There are different ways Bush could have framed the developing relationship between the Soviet Union and the U.S. It would have been possible, for instance, for Bush to stress the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the U.S. that began before his presidency as instrumental to progress. Instead, Bush focused on the longstanding position of the “Western alliance” and its work for “freedom.” He also referenced democratic

¹⁶⁸ See Siobhán McEvoy-Levy, *American Exceptionalism and US Foreign Policy: Public Diplomacy at the End of the Cold War* (New York: Palgrave Press, 2001); Medhurst and Brands, *Critical Reflections on the Cold War*.

¹⁶⁹ Bush, “Remarks of the President and Soviet Chairman Gorbachev and a Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters in Malta,” December 3, 1989.

changes in Poland and Hungary—another example of the East joining the position the West already inhabited. In doing so, Bush created a warrant for U.S. leadership.

In Bush's speeches, NATO embodied "the West." Thus, Bush used NATO to establish his own authority as its leader. By establishing that NATO (the West) had always been on the right side of history, it would follow that Bush would be the appropriate leader for a post-Cold War world. This leadership role extended into the "Third World," another geopolitical metaphor made necessary with the use of "East-West." Unaligned nations (and some Communist nations) remained outside of the "East-West" binary and were thus part of a "Third World," existing as ideological and geographical battlegrounds of the Eastern and Western Blocs. Without the political binary of the "East-West," there would be no need to imagine a "Third World." When speaking about Cuba, Bush used his position as leader of NATO to claim authority in the "Third World." Bush argued that the U.S., more so than any other NATO member, cared about communism in Latin America. He said, "If we take our NATO allies, including Thatcher, Kohl, [and] Mitterrand, in general they do not care about Central America. Of course, they say good words about democratization and free elections, but they have no vital interests in what is going on there." This is unlike "the overwhelming majority of the American people, who he said "take this issue very close to heart" along with "young fledgling democracies to the south of the Rio Grande."¹⁷⁰ Here, Bush argued that, at times, even NATO did not meet the democratic exceptional standard of the U.S. Still, it was the "Western alliance" that would work "patiently together" to "realize a lasting peace."¹⁷¹

¹⁷⁰ "Soviet Transcript of the Malta Summit, December 2-3, 1989," *National Security Archive*, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB298/Document%2010.pdf>, 14-15.

¹⁷¹ Bush, "Remarks of the President and Soviet Chairman Gorbachev and a Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters in Malta," December 3, 1989.

Gorbachev challenged Bush's position as the leader of NATO, an institution, he noted, that was "created in another age." Gorbachev argued that "existing instruments for supporting the balance must not be shattered but modified in accordance with the demands of the age." NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, Gorbachev pressed, must be political, more than military, and "must change their confrontational nature."¹⁷² For Gorbachev, while NATO was an important institution, the world was changing, and NATO, thus, needed to change as well. In challenging the practices of NATO, Gorbachev pushed back on a structure that upheld the "East-West" polarized blocs. This marks a clear difference of global imaginaries between Gorbachev and Bush, the latter never changing his position that NATO would be vital in a post-Cold War world. Immediately following the Malta conference, Bush went to Brussels for a NATO meeting. He reported that he had "made clear" to Gorbachev that the U.S. supported *perestroika*, and credited all "positive developments" between the Soviet Union and the U.S. to the "enduring foundation of the North Atlantic alliance."¹⁷³ NATO, Bush claimed, was the "bedrock of peaceful change in Europe," and thus should be credited for the burgeoning reunification of Europe, the protection of the "freedom for the peoples of the West" and the "hope of a better future for the peoples of the East."¹⁷⁴ The second part of Bush's quotation reflects the view of the "West" that "'Eastern Europe' had become a lifeless, monochrome realm where people walked bent under the leaden weight of an awful System."¹⁷⁵ Bush, as a leader of democratic

¹⁷² "Soviet Transcript of the Malta Summit, December 2-3, 1989," 29.

¹⁷³ George H.W. Bush, "Remarks at the Welcoming Ceremony in Brussels," December 3, 1989, in *The American Presidency Project*, edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17902>.

¹⁷⁴ Bush, "Remarks at the Welcoming Ceremony in Brussels," December 3, 1989.

¹⁷⁵ Eva Hoffman, *Exit into History: A Journey through the New Eastern Europe* (London: Minerva, 1994), xii; Forrester, Zaborowska, and Gapova, *Over the Wall/After the Fall*, 18.

principles, established by his position as president of the U.S. and thus also a leader of NATO, would bring these poor, barbaric Others out of the Communist “East.”

In his conversations with Gorbachev, Bush revealed his global vision, which continued to rely on a polarized “East-West” understanding of the world. Because the “East” and “West” were inherently different, the world needed protection from institutions like NATO, and especially the U.S. Because the Western alliance was concerned with the freedom of citizens throughout the world, it was in the best position to lead and intervene in the world, not the Soviet Union. In fact, when asked in the press conference about joint efforts in the Middle East, Bush responded that:

It doesn't require joint initiatives to solve the Middle East question. But we have found that the Soviet Union is playing a constructive role in Lebanon and trying throughout the Middle East to give their support for the tripartite agreement, which clearly the U.S. has supported. And so, there's common ground there. That may not always have been the case in history. And that may not always have been the way the United States looked at it as to how constructive the role the Soviets might play.

Bush's response here exemplified his position that the U.S. should intervene and lead in international problems. If the Soviet Union happened to be on the side of the U.S., perhaps the Soviets could assist, but the U.S. would not assume any long-term partnership or multilateral leadership. Throughout Bush and Gorbachev's discussions in Malta, Bush drew global authority from U.S. moral exceptionalism and through the institution of NATO. In each of these cases, Bush reflected a global imaginary unilaterally controlled by the U.S. This is distinctive from Gorbachev's global imaginary which was decidedly multilateral.

2.3.1.2 Gorbachev's Multilateral World Order

Gorbachev's vision for a post-Cold War world was quite different from Bush's. Bush used the "East-West" metaphorical frame to position himself as a representative of the West, and thus a unilateral leader of the world. Gorbachev, on the other hand, resisted the "East-West" framework, and thus presented a multilateral perspective. In this section, I discuss how Gorbachev challenged the "East-West" framework in at least two ways. First, he relied on "openness," a spatial metaphor that framed geopolitical realities as having a global, boundary-free orientation, thus conceptually different from the "East-West" division. Second, and relatedly, Gorbachev denied being a representative of Eastern Europe (the "East" of the Cold War). In doing so, he contributed to a global imaginary that was not cleanly or clearly divided between East and West and its representatives, as it had been throughout the Cold War. Gorbachev's discursive move away from "East-West" as a framework for understanding the contemporary political situation was undergirded by his belief that globalization was a natural, inevitable process. Gorbachev's speech suggests that he viewed multilateral leadership and cooperation as the best way for nations to engage in an increasingly global world.

The first way Gorbachev resisted "East-West" metaphorical frame was by employing a different geopolitical and spatial metaphor altogether— "openness." "Open" is such a common metaphor, it seems inconspicuous. As Ilana Frederick Silber notes, spatial metaphors are "insidious and almost invisible" because they are more abstract than other metaphors. Consider, for instance, economic metaphors such as "market" or "capital," which are more concrete than spatial and orientational metaphors such as "up/down" or "open/closed."¹⁷⁶ In addition to being more abstract than some metaphors, spatial metaphors are "deeply intertwined with and thus

¹⁷⁶ For more on orientational metaphors, see Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*.

harder to distinguish from their equivalents in ordinary language” that “inform our taken-for-granted, daily lexicon.”¹⁷⁷ The pervasive and abstract nature of spatial and orientational metaphors makes them often go unnoticed as they shape our discourse and understanding.

“Open” works in distinction to its dialectical spatial opposites such as “close” and “divide.” Gorbachev used “openness” to refer to a possible relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union as well as the means to that relationship, which he proposed was “open” conversation. During the press conference, for instance, when asked about the end of the Cold War, Gorbachev stated that he had “assured the President of the United States that the Soviet Union would never start a hot war against the United States of America,” but rather that he would like their “relations to develop in such a way that they would open greater possibilities for cooperation.”¹⁷⁸ In order to “open” this cooperative potential, Gorbachev said that he and Bush had a “wide” discussion that was “straightforward” and “characterized by openness, by a full scope of the exchange of views.”¹⁷⁹ Gorbachev repeatedly used “openness” throughout the Malta meetings in similar ways. Spatial metaphors, such as “open,” proved useful to Gorbachev, in part because spatial metaphors can transcend “the limits of bounded polities... in a globalized framework.”¹⁸⁰ That is, spatial metaphors helped end the Cold War by reflecting and constructing a new imaginary—a world undivided between “East” and “West.”

The use of “openness” recalls Gorbachev’s policy of *glasnost*. *Glasnost*, most often translated as “openness” in English, also meant “publicity,” revealing another valence of

¹⁷⁷ Ilana Friendrich Silber, “Space, Fields, Boundaries: The Rise of Spatial Metaphors in Contemporary Sociological Theory,” *Social Research* 62 (1995): 326-327.

¹⁷⁸ Bush, “Remarks of the President and Soviet Chairman Gorbachev and a Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters in Malta,” December 3, 1989.

¹⁷⁹ Bush, “Remarks of the President and Soviet Chairman Gorbachev and a Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters in Malta,” December 3, 1989.

¹⁸⁰ Silber, “Space, Fields, Boundaries,” 347. See also, Jonathan Friedman, “Order and Disorder in Global Systems: A Sketch,” *Social Research* 60 (1993).

Gorbachev's political agenda. *Glasnost* affected "pervasive Soviet patterns of communication control." Before *glasnost*, Joseph Gibbs notes, Soviet mass media channels were required to transmit "goal-oriented" news, "formulated to influence the receiver in certain ways."¹⁸¹ With *glasnost*, these communication outlets produced messages that offered more government transparency. In other words, Soviet media could publicize selected government activities. Still, *glasnost* did not equate to freedom of speech. Instead, it allowed mass media to provide "the public with information it need[ed] to make the economy work better."¹⁸² Speech about the government, according to Gorbachev's policy, was therefore instrumental—it should work on behalf of socialist ideals. Understanding Gorbachev's use of "openness" through this larger political lens reinforces the idea that Gorbachev hoped for "open" discussion with Bush for instrumental political purposes. The context of his use of "openness" suggests that Gorbachev attempted to flatten global authority in this transitional era, which leads me to how Gorbachev framed global leadership outside of an "East-West" frame.¹⁸³

The second way Gorbachev rejected the "East-West" metaphorical frame was by denying that he was a representative of the East. When asked by a reporter during the press conference if he "assure[d] President Bush that the changes in Eastern Europe...[were] irreversible," Gorbachev responded:

I wouldn't like you to consider me here or to regard me as a full-fledged representative of all European countries. This wouldn't be true. We are a part of Eastern Europe, of Europe. We interact with our allies in all areas, and our ties are deep. However, every

¹⁸¹ Gibbs, *Gorbachev's Glasnost*, 4.

¹⁸² Gibbs, *Gorbachev's Glasnost*, 4.

¹⁸³ "Openness" could also be read as a visual metaphor, especially in the case of *glasnost*. "Openness" as a visual metaphor for "transparency" offers different implications than "openness" as a spatial metaphor that works to undo boundaries between nation-states.

nation is an independent entity in world politics, and every people has the right to choose its own destiny, the destiny of its own state. And I can only explain my own attitude.¹⁸⁴

In this statement, Gorbachev distanced himself from the role of global representative for Eastern Europe while also stressing his commitment to self-determination. For Gorbachev, these two concepts were interrelated. Throughout the Cold War, Third World nations were presented as ideological battlegrounds—the U.S. seeking to “protect” the nations from communism and the Soviet Union trying to “defend” communist nations. Bush and Gorbachev’s discussion in Malta reveals a shift in ideology for the Soviets. Instead of protecting and spreading communism as social justice, Gorbachev defended “self-determination” as a human right. Self-determination worked as a superficial point of stasis between the two leaders. The U.S. also defended “self-determination,” but for the U.S., self-determination was bound to the concept of democracy; for the Soviet Union, self-determination meant the ability of each nation to choose its own form of governance, democratic or otherwise.

Gorbachev, Bush, and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, discussed self-determination directly. Gorbachev said:

The main principle which we have adopted and which we are following in the framework of the new way of thinking is the right of each country to a free election, including the right to reexamine or change its original choice. This is very painful, but it is a fundamental right: the right to elect from within without interference. The U.S. adheres to a certain social and economic system, which the American people chose. So let other people decide for themselves which God, figuratively speaking, to worship.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁴ George Bush, “Remarks of the President and Soviet Chairman Gorbachev and a Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters in Malta,” December 3, 1989.

¹⁸⁵ Soviet Transcript of the Malta Summit, December 2-3, 1989, 32.

Baker, though, said he would like to “clarify” the U.S. approach to self-determination. “We agree that each country must have the right to free elections. But all this makes sense only when the people in the country are really in a position to choose freely. This also falls under the concept of ‘Western values,’ and by no means is it a right to thrust one’s ways upon others.”¹⁸⁶ If citizens cannot participate in free elections, a component of American values, Baker clarified, they are not truly self-determined. Thus, it would be appropriate and necessary for the U.S. to intervene. Gorbachev, on the other hand, believed that this intervention would be violating the very self-determinism the U.S. vowed to protect.

These two ways of understanding self-determination flow from the two global imaginaries. In Bush’s global imaginary, it was the exceptional role of the U.S. to lead the world toward global peace. For Gorbachev, on the other hand, the world was becoming more interconnected on its own, providing an impetus for global cooperation and the rejection of polarizing ideologies. Bush responded to Gorbachev that he did not differ on this subject, while Gorbachev further explained his view of globalization, saying that Europeans were figuring out new and different ways of doing things in the fields of economics and technology and that this was “natural.” Gorbachev often stated the belief that globalization is an objective process “making our world more and more interrelated and interdependent.”¹⁸⁷ This organic view of globalization supported Gorbachev’s call for nations, including the Soviet Union and U.S., to work together to problem-solve for the sake of world peace. Gorbachev’s understanding, and public discussion, was a major factor in ending the Cold War, shifting from Soviet foreign policy from communist expansion and defense to global collaboration and, specifically, transnational dialogue. Gorbachev spoke extensively about globalization and the changing political spaces

¹⁸⁶ Soviet Transcript of the Malta Summit, December 2-3, 1989, p. 32.

¹⁸⁷ Steger, *The Rise of the Global Imaginary*, 179; Gorbachev, “Underpinning a Secure World.”

during his 1988 speech before the United Nations. He said that “changes in philosophical approaches and in political relations form a solid prerequisite for imparting, in line with worldwide objective processes, a powerful impetus to the efforts designed to establish new relations among States.”¹⁸⁸ Nations, in other words, were not leading a process of globalization; instead, worldwide processes of globalization made it imperative for nations to begin working together. He noted that politicians who had been critically invested in the Cold were even “now drawing appropriate conclusions” of the interconnectedness of the world. They, who “find it particularly hard to abandon old stereotypes and past practices” are “changing course because they understand the need for peace.” This change in attitude, according to Gorbachev, was the first step toward a “healthier international environment and towards disarmament.”¹⁸⁹ The very people who had upheld the Cold War polarization, in other words, understood that they needed to change their mindset for the sake of the world.

In the bilateral meetings with Bush, Gorbachev said, “And what lies ahead in terms of economics, the environment, and other problems? We must think about this together. . . . For a long time the Soviet leadership has pondered this. And we are coming to the conclusion that the U.S. and the USSR are simply doomed to dialogue, joint action, and cooperation. It cannot be otherwise.”¹⁹⁰ If they are “doomed” to talk to one another because they are interconnected, leaving little room for empire. Here, Gorbachev’s speech exemplified pluralistic politics in a democratic context. As Charland Mouffe argues, a pluralistic polity “consists of people . . . who are stuck with one another,” who address one another not as an evil enemy, but as an

¹⁸⁸ Mikhail Gorbachev, “From the Address to the 43rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” in *The Road We Travelled, the Challenges We Face* (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Ves Mir for the Gorbachev Foundation, 2006), 33.

¹⁸⁹ Gorbachev, “From the Address to the 43rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” 33; At this meeting, Gorbachev announced a significant unilateral arms cut.

¹⁹⁰ “Soviet Transcript of the Malta Summit,” December 2-3, 1989, p. 9

adversary.¹⁹¹ Gorbachev offered a rhetorical way out of the “enemy” metaphors in Cold War rhetoric. As people affected by the objective process of the Cold War, they needed merely to let go of polarized ideology and work together for peace.

Gorbachev’s discussion with Bush echoed his speech before the United Nations when he also focused on open communication between adversaries. “Of course,” he said, “I refer, above all, to political dialogue— a more intense and open dialogue aimed at the very heart of problems instead of confrontation, at an exchange of constructive ideas instead of recriminations. Without political dialogue, the process of negotiations cannot advance.”¹⁹² Gorbachev’s objective view of the global neutralized the rhetorical frame for the U.S. and Soviet leaders, inviting open dialogue among agonistic equals.

2.3.2 Transnational and Global Identity

The “East-West” frame, in addition to structuring discourse about leadership and security, also framed discussion about international and global identity. The global imaginary is, in addition to transnational leadership and security, about the construction of transnational and global identity.¹⁹³ In other words, it is concerned with how citizens relate to one another across national boundaries and imagine themselves as part of the global. Because this study is concerned with the presidency, I consider the role Bush played in this particular moment in time—as geopolitical powers realigned—in framing U.S. national identity within the larger global context. Additionally, I consider how Bush understood the role of other nations within this global context, and how he negotiated this vision with Gorbachev. “Globality,” according to Ulf Hedetoft and Mette Hjort, “changes contexts (politically, culturally, geographically) for . . .

¹⁹¹ See Robert L. Ivie, “Rhetorical Deliberation and Democratic Politics in the Here and Now,” *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 5 (2002): 277.

¹⁹² Gorbachev, “From the Address to the 43rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” 33.

¹⁹³ Steger, *The Rise of the Global Imaginary*, 11.

[nation states], situates national identity and belonging differently, and superimposes itself on ‘nationality.’”¹⁹⁴ Bush and Gorbachev were both concerned with how national identity fit within the context of a changing global political reality. And because globalization (or the construction of a global imaginary) “lays claim to the homogeneity of the planet from above,” as Walter Mignolo writes, the way Bush and Gorbachev framed the relationship between nation-states influenced identity-formation.¹⁹⁵

Bush and Gorbachev’s visions for transnational and global identity are reflected in the leaders’ geopolitical metaphors, specifically in their constructs negotiations of the terms “Western values” and “common European home.” Geographic and spatial metaphors were important throughout Cold War rhetoric—the division of the “East” from the “West” a standard metaphor important for upholding the geographic and ideological division of the polarized super powers. This “East-West” metaphorical frame persisted throughout the two leaders’ global visions, extending past leadership of nations and into how nations and their peoples ought to relate to each other. In this section, I first show that Bush began the meetings by framing values as “Western” before eventually adopting Gorbachev’s descriptor of “universal values.” Second, I discuss Gorbachev’s metaphor of the “common European home” as an alternative to the “East-West” frame that guided discourse and policies in Eastern and Western Europe. This section shows how Gorbachev and Bush negotiated their global imaginaries through geopolitical metaphors.

¹⁹⁴ Ulf Hedentoft and Mette Hjort, eds., *The Postnational Self: Belonging and Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), xv; Steger, *The Rise of the Global Imaginary*, 14.

¹⁹⁵ Mignolo, “The Many Faces of Cosmo-polis: Border Thinking and Critical Cosmopolitanism,” 721.

2.3.2.1 Western Values

A major theme in both bilateral sessions between Gorbachev and Bush at Malta was that of the descriptor of “Western values.” Critical geographers Gearóid Ó. Tuathail and John Agnew note that Cold War discourse consisted of a “regularized set of geographical descriptions by which it represented international politics.”¹⁹⁶ “Western” and “Eastern” were foreign policy operators—representations that enabled foreign policy decisions. Paul Chilton observes that political discourse invokes geographical frames not simply as “objective geographical knowledge, but as deictically organized *geopolitical* knowledge.”¹⁹⁷ These frames often trigger separate mental spaces, or discourse worlds, which are “the ‘reality’ that is entertained by the speaker, or meta-represented by the speaker as being someone else’s believed reality.”¹⁹⁸ That is, speakers who discuss foreign policy invoke geographical frames that function as geopolitical knowledge. These geopolitical designators trigger discourse world for speakers and audiences, which rely on the “recurrence of, and links between different discourse referents of the discourse world” to achieve coherence.¹⁹⁹ In the case of Bush and Gorbachev, the geopolitical frame “Western” triggered different discourse worlds. For Bush, “Western values” operated as an objective framework for understanding values such as “liberty” and “democracy.” For Gorbachev, these values were universal, and thus Bush’s framing of them as “Western” was problematic.

Gorbachev arrived at Malta already concerned with Bush’s framing of agreed-upon values as “Western.” In early December, 1989, before the Malta summit, Gorbachev met with

¹⁹⁶ Gearóid Ó Tuathail and John Agnew, “Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy,” *Political Geography* 11 (1992): 190.

¹⁹⁷ Paul Chilton, *Analysing Political Discourse* (London: Routledge, 2004), 138.

¹⁹⁸ Chilton, *Analysing Political Discourse*, 54.

¹⁹⁹ Chilton, *Analysing Political Discourse*, 54.

Pope John Paul II, to whom he expressed his concerns, saying, “It is already being said that Europe should only be renewed on the basis of Western values and anything differing from these values should be cut off. This is no way to treat nations, their history, traditions, and identity.” In this statement, Gorbachev connected values to national identity, arguing that nations should not be required to uphold “Western values” in order to fully participate in the global community.²⁰⁰ To this, the Pope replied that “It would be wrong for someone to claim that changes in Europe and the world should follow the Western model.” According to the Pope, “Europe, as a participant in world history, should breathe with two lungs.”²⁰¹ The Pope, too, invoked the “East-West” frame here. Significantly, though, his use of the frame was inclusive, rather than exclusive. Instead of positioning Western values as superior, as is pervasive in “Western” political discourse, the Pope advocated for a reality in which “Eastern” and “Western” values contributed to European identity.

Gorbachev introduced his concern about “Western values” in the second expanded bilateral session at Malta, saying:

Now let me mention a concept of U.S. origin: The division of Europe should be overcome on the basis of Western values. If policy is made on that assumption the situation could become quite messy. You used to make similar accusations against the USSR the export of revolution.²⁰²

Here, Gorbachev criticized the framing of solutions to Europe’s division as being “Western.” In doing so, he invoked and challenged the Cold War narrative that these geopolitical descriptors activate— “the simple story of a great struggle between a democratic West against a formidable

²⁰⁰ Savranskaya and Blanton, *The Last Superpower Summits*, 528-529.

²⁰¹ Savranskaya and Blanton, *The Last Superpower Summits*, 530.

²⁰² “Second Expanded Bilateral Session,” *Memorandum of Conversation*, ID# 041944. Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library, 7.

and expansionist East.”²⁰³ Gorbachev argued instead that “Western values” signified American imperialism and should be treated as no different than Eastern revolutions. By equating the exportation of Western values with that of communism, Gorbachev challenged the superiority of the “West” and thus the usefulness of an “East-West” discursive frame.

Bush responded that it is natural for members of NATO and Western Europe to “talk of Western values.” In fact, Bush argued, *glasnost* is also a Western value because “we value lively debate, pluralism and openness. Western values are free markets and openness.” These values, Bush said, are particularly Western because “these common values have been there in U.S.-Western European relations for a long time.”²⁰⁴ Bush’s claim to Western and democratic values situated himself alongside Gorbachev’s Western European counterparts, the same people in the same geopolitical area with whom Gorbachev sought to reunite.

Gorbachev insisted that openness and pluralism were shared, common values, and that to speak of them in geopolitical terms like “Chinese or Eastern values” was ideological.²⁰⁵ Bush responded that these values were the “solid foundation” of the West, but that it is “much more important” that the West and the Soviet Union “share those values today than twenty years ago.”²⁰⁶ In this part of the dialogue between Gorbachev and Bush, we see a contest over values that, seemingly, both parties want the other to possess. But because Bush called these “Western,” he excluded Gorbachev from being identified with them.

David Zarefsky argues that one way presidents frame a situation is by creating associations with other terms, “expanding the meaning of a term to cover the new case at

²⁰³ Tuathail and Agnew, “Geopolitics and Discourse,” 190.

²⁰⁴ “Second Expanded Bilateral Session,” 8.

²⁰⁵ “Second Expanded Bilateral Session,” 8.

²⁰⁶ “Second Expanded Bilateral Session,” 8.

hand.”²⁰⁷ In this interaction, Gorbachev demanded that *glasnost* and pluralism, openness, and democracy be considered “shared, common values” instead of “Western values.”²⁰⁸ The risk of expanding the frame of these values to one that encompassed the Soviet Union would be taking away the U.S.’s claim of moral superiority—and a justification for the Cold War. As Tuathail notes, “it is through discourse that leaders act, through the mobilization of certain simple geographical understandings that foreign-policy actions are explained and through ready-made geographically-infused reasoning that wars are rendered meaningful.”²⁰⁹ Thus, when the two dropped “Western values,” settling on the Western-privileging, but not geopolitically framed designator of “democratic values” to describe common ground between the Soviet Union and the U.S., the U.S. lost justification for continued polarization and othering of the USSR. More importantly, it provided a way for the U.S. and the Soviet Union to cooperate with one another.

2.3.2.2 Gorbachev and the “Common European Home”

The second spatial and geo-political frame important to the conversations between Gorbachev and Bush was that of Europe and the “common European home.” While political figures before Gorbachev had used the term, Gorbachev publicized the metaphor in 1985, challenging Cold War discourse structures that continued to shape Europe.²¹⁰ The concept was based on universal values, collective security and economic integration in Europe. It incorporated a vision of a continent without borders, where people and ideas would move freely without fear of war or hunger.²¹¹ In Gorbachev’s vision, the militarization of the Eastern and

²⁰⁷ Zarefsky, “Presidential Rhetoric and the Power of Definition,” 612.

²⁰⁸ “Second Expanded Bilateral Session,” 8.

²⁰⁹ Tuathail and Agnew, “Geopolitics and Discourse,” 191.

²¹⁰ Paul Chilton and Mikhail Ilyin, “Metaphor in Political Discourse: The Case of the ‘Common European House,’” *Discourse and Society* 4 (1993): 8.

²¹¹ Svetlana Savranskaya, “The Logic of 1989: The Soviet Peaceful Withdrawal from Eastern Europe,” in *Masterpieces of History: The Peaceful End of the Cold War in Europe, 1989*, eds. Svetlana Savranskaya, Thomas Blanton, and Vladislav Zubok (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2011), 19.

Western Blocs would “gradually dissolve,” the security function being left to a unified Europe and the United Nations.²¹² The idea of the common European home rested on the notion that the Soviet Union is part of Europe, and that Europeans, together, were changing.

The two leaders spoke explicitly about the geopolitical frame of Europe when Bush stated that the Soviet Union was “closer to Europe” than the U.S. Gorbachev responded:

I do not agree that we are “closer to Europe.” The USSR and the U.S. are equally integrated into European problems. We understand very well your involvement in Europe. To look at the role of the U.S. in the Old World any differently is unrealistic, erroneous, and ultimately unconstructive. You must know this; it is our basic position.²¹³

Bush clarified that the U.S. is not “historically... as close to Eastern Europe. Of course we are close—and will be close—to Europe; we are vitally interested and involved in NATO. The U.S. is, properly speaking, the leader of NATO.”²¹⁴

In this interaction between Bush and Gorbachev, we see a confusion of spatial designators and geopolitical designators. While Soviets, Gorbachev said, “consider... [themselves] European,” and thus a part of the envisioned common European home, there was disagreement about the U.S.’s role in Europe. Of course, the U.S. is not part of Europe, but Bush had already established their unified identity based on common “Western values.” These spatial and geopolitical designators are important because they play a legitimizing function in political action.²¹⁵ When Bush then used the deictic indicator “closer” to describe the relationship between the Soviets and Europe, he moved the U.S. further away from Gorbachev’s plea that the two leaders work

²¹² Savranskaya, “The Logic of 1989,” 19.

²¹³ “Soviet Transcript of the Malta Summit,” 27.

²¹⁴ “Soviet Transcript of the Maltat Summit,” 27.

²¹⁵ Chilton, *Analysing Political Discourse*.

together to help build a common European home.²¹⁶ Gorbachev corrected Bush by arguing that the Soviet Union and the U.S. are equally involved in European political affairs, once again using the geopolitical frame for “Europe” rather than the spatial one.

The two leaders eventually agreed that they were both responsible for events in Europe—the U.S. because of its leadership in Western Europe, and the Soviet Union because of their geographical relativity as well as their political identity as Europeans. The discussion of Europe and the common European home shows how transnational leaders can toggle between spatial and geopolitical deictic indicators to implicate or disassociate themselves and each other from political action. These geopolitical frames also reveal the negotiation of the global imaginary, as ties between countries evince authority.

By the end of their discussions, Bush and Gorbachev had agreed that their nations were both interconnected with Europe. This represented a shift in their global imaginaries in so far as these global imaginaries related to national and international identity formations. By this time, Bush had also agreed to drop the “Western” designator from the values that he, and the U.S., represented. By negotiating these geopolitical and spatial metaphors, Bush and Gorbachev shifted away from a strict “East-West” metaphorical frame that vilified the Other, thus moving toward global cooperation and ending the Cold War.

2.4 Conclusion

Walter Fisher wrote that the presidency is a “symbolic, suasive force, a source of inducement to belief, attitude, value, and action... [and] a focal point of national reason and rationality.”²¹⁷ The president is also a focal point of global reason and rationality. This chapter

²¹⁶ For more on deictic indicators, see Allison M. Prasch, “Toward a Rhetorical Theory of Deixis,” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 102 (2016): 166-193.

²¹⁷ Fisher, “Rhetorical Fiction and the Presidency,” 120

shows that one way presidents shape national and global reason is through geopolitical and spatial metaphors. In negotiating the “East-West” metaphor, Bush and Gorbachev were able to bring to fruition complementary, though not identical, global imaginaries. These global imaginaries, in turn, helped facilitate the end of the Cold War.

Gertjan Dijkink offers a similar concept to global imaginaries, which he calls “geopolitical visions.” These geopolitical visions, he argues, are used by political and foreign policy elites to explain how states relate to one another in a global system. They are formed to cope with “threats arising from the environment, in order to maintain pride, or just to legitimate aggression.”²¹⁸ The changing political context of the Cold War presented layers of threats to national identity. In Bush and Gorbachev’s conversations, we see each of them grasping to keep retain or change the conception of their nation’s identity. Bush did so by relying on the “East-West” frame, a socio-political and geographical understanding of the world that is so normalized it is almost invisible, yet so poignant as to be drawn upon to rationalize an enemy Other. The frame provided the “knowledge” of superior Western values and thus provided justification for U.S. leadership. Gorbachev, on the other hand, sought to attain an agreed-upon understanding of the Soviet Union as a nation that supported self-determination and universalization. To do so, he had to resist the normative “East-West” discursive frame of the Cold War. Territorial bases, Dijkink notes, provides the vantage point for constructing visions of the world. It was no small feat, then, for Gorbachev and Bush to come to some understanding of each other and future global realities through their meeting at Malta.

The meetings, of course, did not solve every problem, and there was not an insubstantial amount of diplomatic appeasement. Gorbachev joked during the joint press conference that “the

²¹⁸ Gertjan Dijkink, *National Identity and Geopolitical Visions*, 146.

President wrote a note to me in English. I don't read English, but I answered in Russian—he doesn't read Russian—but we agreed on it anyway.”²¹⁹ While clearly said in jest, this statement does suggest that the two leaders did not end the meetings completely like-minded. Another example of this is when Bush opened the press conference noting that the meeting with Gorbachev was his idea while Gorbachev closed the press conference noting that their “share is 50-50.”²²⁰ These statements align with the global imaginaries projected by the two leaders throughout their meetings—Bush’s position being that the U.S. is the leader and Gorbachev’s that nations should work together multilaterally.

This chapter is significant in at least three ways. First, it provides historical insight into meetings that symbolically ended the Cold War. Second, it contributes to rhetorical theory by explaining how geopolitical and spatial metaphors can be used by political elites to reframe contexts and assist in ending wars—at least wars of words. Finally, it shows how presidents interact with foreign leaders both privately and in a joint press conference. While studies in presidential rhetoric usually attend to speeches before audiences, this chapter shifts the locus of study to transnational presidential interactions with foreign leaders. The next chapter will focus on presidential interactions with another transnational audience—the United Nations General Assembly.

²¹⁹ Bush, “Remarks of the President and Soviet Chairman Gorbachev and a Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters in Malta,” December 3, 1989.

²²⁰ Bush, “Remarks of the President and Soviet Chairman Gorbachev and a Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters in Malta,” December 3, 1989.

3 PRESIDENTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS: CLINTON AND BUSH

UNIVERSALIZE “DEMOCRACY”

As discussed in the previous chapter, George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev ended the Cold War in part through their negotiation of the global imaginary. The global imaginary, of course, is the consciousness of belonging to a global community.²²¹ The two world leaders met in Malta and teased out their international identity in private meetings, breaking down the division between “Eastern” and “Western” values and the role of the “East” and the “West” in global affairs. In doing so, Bush and Gorbachev came to terms with certain “universal” values, such as self-determination and pluralism, that guided their unifying decision-making. Still, there were differences between the global imaginaries of the two leaders—namely, Gorbachev imagined a multilateral world driven by these universal values, while Bush imagined one led by the U.S. This moment was significant politically because it symbolized the end of the Cold War. Rhetorically, it provided insights for how the two leaders negotiated national identity in a global context—which they did mostly through geo-political metaphors that signified values. This chapter also reveals an important aspect of global presidentiality, which is interpersonal collaboration with other world leaders.

This second case study moves from the interpersonal dialogue followed by a joint press conference as forums for transnational discourse to U.S. presidential speeches before the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). In shifting the focus to the UN as a discursive arena, I show how U.S. presidents use different political structures to shape the global imaginary in a post-Cold War world. The choice to focus on the UN serves both theoretical and methodological ends.

²²¹ Manfred Steger, *The Rise of the Global Imaginary: Political Ideologies from the French Revolution to the Global War on Terror* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

Because one purpose of this project is to create a framework for understanding different facets of presidential transnational discourse, I shifted from interpersonal interaction between world leaders to interaction between the president and an audience made up of representatives across the globe. Moreover, by homing in on the United Nations, I show how international organizations contribute to the global imaginary. Methodologically, this dissertation takes an historical perspective to understanding world politics at the end of, and after, the Cold War. As this chapter reveals, the United Nations became increasingly important in post-Cold War international politics, beginning with Clinton and Bush. Thus, studying Clinton and Bush's interactions with the UN provides insight into the global role of the president.

U.S. presidents were instrumental in forming the United Nations and its predecessor, the League of Nations, which was the world's first intergovernmental organization.²²² These organizations are manifestations of a global imaginary. That is, they were created because a significant number of nation-states acknowledged transnational interdependence and were willing to participate in a kind of global community. This is evidenced in the constitutions of the two organizations, which are written agreements between independent nations to submit themselves to joint goals in an effort to create and sustain universal peace, human rights, and international law, as outlined in the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Charter of the United Nations.²²³ The constitutions of these organizations indicate a sense of global consciousness among participating nations. Part of this consciousness is the adherence to belief, if not the practice, of "universal" human rights.

²²² See Alynna Lyon, *U.S. Politics and the United Nations: A Tale of Dysfunctional Dynamics* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2016).

²²³ See A. Walter Dorn, "The League Covenant and the U.N. Charter: A Side-by-Side (Full Text) Comparison," <http://www.rmcc-cmrc.ca/en/defence-studies/walter-dorn>.

The United Nations is the only organization that has a type of global constitution, and the only one that seeks to protect universal rights. As articulated in the first article of the UN Charter, signed by member nations in 1946, the purposes of the UN are four-fold: (1) “to maintain international peace and security”; (2) “to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace”; (3) “to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion”; and (4) “to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.”²²⁴ Each of these purposes universalizes values for both nation-states and individuals—fifty-one nation-states collaborated and consented to these purposes in 1945; in 2017 there are 192 countries that have signed the Charter. This means that 192 countries have entered into a type of constitutional agreement that coheres and grounds some elements of their global imaginary. language of the Charter encompasses more than the people in these nation-states, though. The United Nations seeks to attain “universal” peace and to achieve “fundamental freedoms for all.” Of course, the member states of the United Nations are the arbiters of what constitutes “universal peace” and “fundamental freedoms” despite their aspirations that these purposes be for all of humanity. The UN Charter both acknowledges and calls forth a global consciousness, setting into action guidelines for participation on the global scale.

Universalization and the global imaginary are an inseparable pair. Theories of globalization are concerned with universals because to universalize is to globalize; to imagine on

²²⁴ United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations,” <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index.html>.

the scale of the global is to imagine the universal.²²⁵ As societies become more interconnected, cultural artifacts—such as artistic, religious, and political texts— increasingly flow between nations. These flows create a need for universals. That is, in the event that nations are so interconnected that global issues become just as important to the nation-state as national issues, the leaders of nation-states are compelled to collaborate to find supranational solutions. In doing so, they must identify and propound universal values and systems of governance.²²⁶ Because transnational flows are uneven, the ideas and values that elites universalize affect nations and peoples disproportionately.²²⁷

With universalization comes the problematic of authority. While nation-states have somewhat clear boundaries and leaders that represent its interests, there are no supranational leaders except those in intergovernmental organizations, such as the UN. Still, their authority derives only from the will of the participating nation-states. This chapter considers the ways in which Clinton and Bush gained authority from the UN while also compounding the UN's authority. They did so by connecting with the UNGA through discourse on universals.

Specifically, I argue that U.S. presidents use the UN to inform the global imaginary

²²⁵ Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing explains that universals “offer us a chance to participate in the global stream of humanity.” The universals, created in cultural dialogue since the end of the Cold War, she argues, have “enlivened liberal politics as well as economic neoliberalism as they have spread around the world.” These universals are “aspirations” that one cannot not want. See Tsing, *Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 1; Afsaneh Najmabadi and Gayatri Spivak, “Interview with Gayatri Spivak,” *Social Text* 9 (1991): 122-34.

²²⁶ See, among others, Nancy Fraser, “Transnationalizing the Public Sphere: On the Legitimacy and Efficacy of Public Opinion in a Post-Westphalian World,” *European Institute for Progressive Culture Policies* (2007), http://eicpc.net/transversal/0605/fraser/en/#_ftn1; Jürgen Habermas, *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991); Jürgen Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998); Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995).

²²⁷ For discussions on uneven transnational flows and their effects, see Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Raka Shome and Radha S. Hegde, “Culture, Communication, and the Challenge of Communication,” *Critical Studies in Media Communication* 19 (2002): 172-189.

through a universalization of the trope “democracy.” I use quotation marks to signal that “democracy” is a controlling rhetorical trope that promotes U.S. interests and a particular way of understanding “democracy.” I refer to the active meaning of “trope,” taken from the Greek root *tropos*, which means “to turn.” Tropes work discursively by bringing new meaning of an idea through the repetition of a figure. That is, as new figurations are repeated, the tropes bring with them particular, thematic understandings of that concept.²²⁸ As Diane Marie Keeling notes, tropes are “figures of entanglement,” and include all “concepts, apparatuses, and material-discursive practices.”²²⁹ That is, rhetoric itself is tropic, always reconfiguring through practice. This is important to note because it allows us to consider tropes not only as literary figures (i.e., Burke’s four master tropes of metonymy, synecdoche, metaphor, and irony), but also as part of rhetorical *processes* in particular rhetorical contexts.²³⁰ In this case, the tropic process refers to how Clinton and Bush became one with the UNGA, consubstantiating the universal values proclaimed by their audience and those of the U.S. Through this process, presidents (and particular nations aligned with their values) gain power and authority in a global context.

Presidents Clinton and Bush universalized the trope of “democracy” in at least two ways. First, they did so through the symbolic work of their speech setting at the UN—which is most often before the UNGA. The UNGA is the world’s largest transnational body of representatives, a group of people representing 193 nations who engage in deliberation as equal voting members.²³¹ The act of speaking before the UNGA, specifically, illustrates democratic action,

²²⁸ Michael Carrithers, Louise J. Bracken, and Steven Emery, “Can a Species Be a Person? A Trope and Its Entanglements in the Anthropocene Era,” *Current Anthropology* 52 (2011): 661-662; Diane Marie Keeling, “Of Turning and Tropes,” *Review of Communication* 16 (2016): 317-333.

²²⁹ Keeling, “Of Turning and Tropes,” *Review of Communication* 16 (2016): 327.

²³⁰ Kenneth Burke, “Four Master Tropes,” *The Kenyon Review* 3 (1941): 421-438.

²³¹ United Nations, “Functions and Powers of the General Assembly,” <http://www.un.org/en/ga/about/background.shtml>.

aligning the ideologies of the U.S. and the UN through collective political approval. Second, the speech texts universalized “democracy” by conflating “democracy” with “global market” and “human rights.” In their speeches before the UN, presidents universalize a particularly American understanding of these terms that benefits the U.S. and its allies. Both the setting and the speeches themselves construct a global imaginary in which the U.S. is a participant, leader, and arbitrator of what it means to be “democratic” and work with other nations; all the while, the frequent disregard of the UN’s recommendations by U.S. presidents shows the instrumentalism of their participation.

This chapter proceeds in five parts. First, I discuss the role of U.S. presidents in creating and directing the League of Nations and the United Nations. Second, I explain the role of the “universal” in the creation of a global imaginary. I do so through Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s theoretical concept of the “universal audience.” In this section, I introduce the idea that presidents build their own global authority by establishing both the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and the U.S. as arbiters of universals. Third, I show how Bill Clinton links U.S. interests in the form of “global democracy” to the universals established through the UNGA. Fourth, I explain how George Bush made the U.S. consubstantial with the UNGA through the universal of “human rights,” connecting “human rights” to U.S. “democracy.” Both Presidents Clinton and Bush universalized the trope of “democracy” by drawing upon the UNGA as a rhetorical resource. They did so symbolically by reducing the “universal audience” to that of the United States, in the person of the president. They did so discursively by appealing to the founding documents of the U.S. and UN, equating the universal values of the two, and, thus, compounding the synecdochal relationship of the U.S. to the UN. Finally, I discuss the significance of this chapter. Scholars of political communication have

explored the ways in which “democracy” functions in U.S. presidential discourse. These scholars note that presidents, especially since Wilson, argue that the only way to secure peace is through ensuring the success of worldwide democracy.²³² Presidents in these instances use “democracy” as a way to name different nation-states and their leaders as friends or enemies, good or evil, civilized or savage.²³³ They also use terms such as “human rights,” “freedom,” and “liberty” in their public discourse to allude to the American myth of democracy.²³⁴ This study extends the line of research that explains how presidents use “democracy” to justify national and foreign policy by taking a step back and attending to the specific ways in which presidents constitute “democracy” as a universal, and thus as a way of ordering a global world—the world order being unequal among nations, as there is an unequal power distribution. In studying Clinton and Bush’s interactions with the UN, I find a continuation of Bush Senior’s understanding of a post-Cold War world characterized by universal values and led by the U.S. Together, my study shows how presidents use the audience of the UNGA and the trope of democracy to create a particular global imaginary.

3.1 Role of U.S. Presidents and International Organizations

Woodrow Wilson delivered the last speech of his Western Tour, in which he traveled the U.S. to persuade the people to support the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations, proclaiming, “There is only one power to put behind the liberation of mankind, and that is the power of mankind. It is the power of the united moral forces of the world. And in the Covenant

²³² Shawn J. Parry Giles, “Constituting Benevolent War and Imperial Peace: U.S. Nationalism and Idyllic Notions of Peace and War,” 161-201, in *Public Address and Moral Judgment* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2009).

²³³ See, for instance, Robert L. Ivie, “Images of Savagery in American Justifications for War,” *Communication Monographs* 47 (1980), 279-291; Robert L. Ivie, “Savagery in Democracy’s Empire,” *Third World Quarterly* 26 (2005): 55-65.

²³⁴ Mary E. Stuckey and Joshua R. Ritter, “George Bush, <Human Rights>, and American Democracy,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 37 (2007): 646-666.

of the League of Nations, the moral forces of the world are mobilized.”²³⁵ Wilson’s tour began a month after the end of World War I, and these words portrayed his vision for avoiding a second such war. Wilson failed in his attempt to persuade the isolationist and nationalist Senate to vote in favor of joining the League of Nations, which he proposed in his Fourteen Points speech before a joint session of Congress in 1918.²³⁶ Forty-two nations agreed to sign the Covenant to “promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security,” forming the League on January 10, 1920.²³⁷ Of course, the League did not find longstanding success. By 1937, most of the permanent members had abandoned the League, causing it to be insufficiently supported by world powers.

Wilson’s role in creating the League is important, despite the U.S.’s ultimate refusal to join, for at least two reasons. First, Wilson’s foreign policy vision continues to influence presidential policy decisions today. Jason Flanagan notes, for instance, “almost every American president since Franklin Roosevelt has claimed to be ‘Wilsonian’ in foreign policy.”²³⁸ What is meant to be Wilsonian, of course, is contested, with scholars arguing it means world-wide democracy promotion or liberal internationalism concerned with “building rules and institutions that advance collective security and cooperation among democracy.”²³⁹ These descriptions show

²³⁵ Woodrow Wilson, “An Address in the City Auditorium in Pueblo, Colorado,” September 25, 1919, in *Woodrow Wilson’s Western Tour: Rhetoric, Public Opinion, and the League of Nations*, ed. J. Michael Hogan (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2006), 4.

²³⁶ Woodrow Wilson, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress on the Conditions of Peace,” January 8, 1918, in *The American Presidency Project*, eds. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=65405>; See also, Lyon, *U.S. Politics and the United Nations*, 39; Wilson, “An Address in the City Auditorium in Pueblo, Colorado.”

²³⁷ “The Covenant of the League of Nations,” *Yale Law School*, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp.

²³⁸ Jason C. Flanagan, “Woodrow Wilson’s ‘Rhetorical Restructuring’: The Transformation of the American Self and the Construction of the German Enemy,” *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 7 (2004): 115; See also, Robert W. Tucker, “The Triumph of Wilsonianism?” *World Policy Journal* 10 (1993): 83.

²³⁹ G. John Ikenberry, “Woodrow Wilson, the Bush Administration, and the Future of Liberal Internationalism,” in *The Crisis of American Foreign Policy*, eds. G. John Ikenberry, Thomas J. Knock, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Tony Smith (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 2.

varied degrees of imperialism, though they are consistent in that they center on international liberal, democratic ideals. Both, in fact, provide support for U.S. participation and leadership in the UN, which brings me to the second reason Wilson's role in the creation of the League remains significant—the League was the blueprint for the UN.

The emergence of World War II presented the final event that proved the League's failure as an international peacekeeping organization, and was also the impetus for its successor, the United Nations.²⁴⁰ The League provided the foundation for this new organization. In fact, the League and the United Nations were so closely tied together in the minds of the U.S. public that one *New York Times* reporter opened a 1944 article with the line, "As things stand now with the new League of Nations, which will probably be called The United Nations, is off to a good start."²⁴¹ For this reporter, the only distinguishing mark between the two organizations was in name. Debate over this new League, the United Nations, occurred during the presidential election season between incumbent Franklin Roosevelt and Republican challenger Thomas Dewey—each of whom supported initial plans for the United Nations. By June 1944, the idea of the U.S. joining a new League was supported by both Democrats and Republicans, with seventy-two percent of the public answering "yes" to the question of whether they favored the U.S. "joining a League of Nations after the War."²⁴² Of course, Roosevelt won the 1944 election, and just as President Wilson was intimately tied to the League of Nations in U.S. public discourse, the United Nations was a part of President Franklin Roosevelt's legacy.²⁴³ In 1945, at the end of

²⁴⁰ See United Nations, "League of Nations," <http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/history/index.shtml>.

²⁴¹ Edwin L. James, "New League Starting with Good Prospects" *New York Times*, October 15, 1944.

²⁴² Lyon, *U.S. Politics and the United Nations*, 53; Stephen B. Withey and William A. Scott, *Public Reactions to the United Nations 1945-1954* (New York: Manhattan Publishing Co., 1958), 15-24.

²⁴³ James, "New League Starting with Good Prospects."

World War II, the U.S. and fifty other nations ratified the UN Charter, which promised the same universal peacekeeping mission of the League.²⁴⁴

The UN was created through a treaty in the form of an ambiguously worded UN Charter in 1945—though President Franklin Roosevelt made its first Declaration in agreement with twenty-six other nations in 1942.²⁴⁵ Since its founding, U.S. presidents have continued to spend time and energy shaping messages to the UN. They have exerted influence over and through the United Nations since its creation, which is evidenced by the centrality of presidential messages in the agenda of the UN. Each institution—the U.S. presidency and the UN— garners global authority from the other, with U.S. presidents at the forefront of some of the UN’s most effective resolutions and activities, for good or for ill. For instance, as Johannes Morsink notes, the drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights “paid tribute” to Franklin Roosevelt and, specifically, his 1941 State of the Union speech, when they wrote “the freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want ha[ve] been proclaimed as the highest aspirations of the common people.”²⁴⁶ Harry Truman played “the decisive diplomatic role,” in conjunction with the UN, in the creation and recognition of the nation-state of Israel.²⁴⁷ Dwight Eisenhower wrote a resolution for the Security Council calling for a cease-fire at the Suez Canal, which became the first UN peacekeeping operation to monitor a cease-fire.²⁴⁸ George H.W. Bush worked with the

²⁴⁴ Peter Malanczuk, *Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law* 7th rev. edition (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 364.

²⁴⁵ United Nations, “History of the United Nations,” <http://www.un.org/en/sections/history/history-united-nations/index.html>.

²⁴⁶ Johannes Morsink, *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 1.

²⁴⁷ Michael Joseph Cohen, *Truman and Israel* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990), xi; See also, Moore and Pubantz, *To Create a New World? American Presidents and the United Nations* (New York: Peter Lang, 1999), 11; Elizabeth Spalding, *The First Cold Warrior: Harry Truman, Containment, and the Remaking of Liberal Internationalism* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2006), 97.

²⁴⁸ Lyon, *U.S. Politics and the United Nations*, 69.

UN to secure logistical and financial support for the Persian Gulf War.²⁴⁹ As these examples indicate, while support for the UN has waxed and waned over the years, the U.S., and the president in particular, has had a significant role in the creation of the UN and its initiatives.

The efficacy of the UN is debatable. Even so, as John Gastil notes, “whatever its failings,” the UN managed to endure the Cold War, arguably prevent a third world war, and has established effective global aid programs such as the Food and Agriculture Organization. Perhaps most importantly, it provides a forum for member nations to deliberate within one another—maintaining an “ongoing conversation within the larger world community.”²⁵⁰ That is, member nations participate in, and thus help constitute, a global imaginary. The president is a prominent leader in this worldwide conversation.

3.2 United Nation’s Legitimacy and the Universal Audience

The legitimacy, and even existence, of the United Nations is evidence of the rise of a global imaginary—the UN’s globalism inherent in both the consciousness that led to its creation and in its founding constitutive documents. As Manfred Steger argues, World War II, and the Cold War after it, brought forth realizations that nations and peoples organized in vast transnational networks. The end of World War II legitimized the creation of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, each of which is predicated on background social knowledge that “the global” exists, and that it contains universal ideals.²⁵¹ So the UN is legitimized, in part, because of increased global consciousness to recognize the global—it is an apparatus through which states engage in this global consciousness. States gain legitimacy for

²⁴⁹ Lyon, *U.S. Politics and the United Nations*, 96.

²⁵⁰ John Gastil, *Political Communication and Deliberation* (Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications, 2008), 257.

²⁵¹ Steger, *The Rise of the Global Imaginary*, 129-138.

their actions in relation to the United Nations in two ways. One is from adherence to international law. The other is from collective political approval.²⁵²

First, by engaging, and subjecting to, the UN, states gain legitimacy to act in accordance to international law, codified in the UN Charter. According to Peter Malanczuk, until the period between World War I and World War II, legal scholars largely agreed that international law, that which would direct the logics of a global constitution, referred to law that governed relations between and among states.²⁵³ That is, international laws were meant for states, not for organizations or individuals. Between World War I and World War II, the concept of international law became more complicated as states began to establish and govern over non-state entities, such as intergovernmental organizations and transnational companies.²⁵⁴ Legal scholars debated whether laws formed by these intergovernmental and transnational organizations were in fact legitimate “laws” — the complication being that, because they were inter- and trans- national, laws were difficult for nation-states to enforce. As Malanczuk argues, though, this is inconsequential, for even if international law is not often enforced, its role is still significant. With increased globalization and international interdependence, the role these world organizations play also increase, and their laws structure relationships between nations. Thus, when disputes arise, nations comply and refer to international law. This reciprocity lessens the significance of the lack of enforcement for its effectivity.²⁵⁵ Regardless of whether the Charter is binding, when states act, they choose to do so in compliance or out of compliance with the UN, thus taking a political stance toward the UN and its member states. Thomas Weiss, David

²⁵² Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, Roger A. Coate, and Kelly-Kate Pease, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2016), 15.

²⁵³ Malanczuk, *Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law*, 1.

²⁵⁴ Malanczuk, *Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law*, 1.

²⁵⁵ Malanczuk, *Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law*, 6.

Forsythe, and Roger Coate note that the importance of the UN is often missed in “thinking too statically about international law.” The UN shapes global politics, largely, by providing collective political approval.²⁵⁶

Collective political approval is the second and most important way states gain legitimacy through the United Nations. This political approval, according to Weiss, et. al, “may induce recalcitrant political authorities to accept a UN policy or program” because “it is better to have UN approval than otherwise.”²⁵⁷ That is, the UN holds relational, symbolic power that directs the actions among nation-states. William Starosta notes two examples in which states acted in accordance with the UN because of collective political approval, or what he calls “symbolic solutions to world crises.” During the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviets used the “semantic forum of the United Nations,” turning around the ships that were bound for Cuba “under the cover of words”—the UN Secretary General had called for the Soviets to return in the name of world peace. This offered the Soviets a face-saving semantic reason to stop their mission.²⁵⁸ In another instance, the U.S. was let off the hook, so to speak, for not helping Hungary after the Soviets invaded. In this instance, the U.S. did not engage the Soviets, despite its commitment to support Hungary. Instead, the U.S. responded that they were unable to come to the aid of Hungary because the UN would not provide a mandate for the venture. Thus, as Starosta argues, the nations for whom it was important to remain an ally of the U.S. could “believe the excuse offered through the scapegoating of the United Nations.”²⁵⁹ In these two cases, semantics transcended the political situations, allowing continued alliances between nations. Nations used

²⁵⁶ Weiss, Forsythe, Coate, and Pease, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*, 15.

²⁵⁷ Weiss, Forsythe, Coate, and Pease, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*, 15.

²⁵⁸ William J. Starosta, “The United Nations: Agency for Semantic Consubstantiality,” *Southern Speech Journal* 35 (1971): 246.

²⁵⁹ Starosta, “The United Nations,” 247.

the collective approval of the United Nations to legitimate its inaction. These examples show that all nations participate within a network. The UN is an important apparatus in that network, particularly because it provides a mediation between states in the form of symbolic collective approval of political actions.²⁶⁰

The UNGA is the symbolic center for the creation of transnational political approval because it is the body that represents all the nation states, whose main responsibilities hinge on democratic deliberation and consensus among nations. According to the Charter, the role of the Assembly is to, among other things, “discuss and make recommendations” on “general principles of cooperation for maintaining international peace and security” and any other issues “within the scope of the Charter.”²⁶¹ That is, the Assembly’s role is broad, and it is centered around deliberation among all member states. Moreover, according to the United Nations website, the Assembly seeks to not only make decisions based upon formal votes, but to also reach consensus on issues.²⁶² The Assembly’s representative structure and its duty to a deliberative process, along with what it produces—namely, universal claims formalized as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—makes it an appropriate audience for U.S. presidents to draw upon universal values. U.S. presidents use this forum to engage an audience that already seeks “the universal,” and, because of the structure of the General Assembly, perform the universal value it seeks to promote—a U.S. version of democracy. This relationship between U.S. president and the UN exacerbates inequality between nations as the U.S. establishes more global authority.

²⁶⁰ Of course, states do not always comply with the United Nations. The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq provides an apt example.

²⁶¹ United Nations, “Functions and Powers of the General Assembly,” <http://www.un.org/en/ga/about/background.shtml>.

²⁶² United Nations, “Functions and Powers of the General Assembly.”

From its inception as a project driven by U.S. presidents, presidents have continued to invest in the UN, and especially in its General Assembly. For instance, Harry Truman set the precedent for speaking before the UNGA at the Assembly's first meeting in 1946. Between 1946 and 1982, presidents addressed the UNGA regularly, and since 1982, each president has spoken before the Assembly every year.²⁶³ The U.S. Department of State website states that the UNGA “has been an important platform for U.S. Presidents to address the world's most challenging issues, from poverty and development to peace and security.”²⁶⁴ It is important, in part, because the UNGA is the only forum “that the United States President has the opportunity to raise U.S. foreign policy priorities and global issues of concern to heads of state and national leaders that represent all 193 member states at the same time.”²⁶⁵ That is, from the perspective of the U.S. government, an important aspect of the Assembly is its function as a forum to engage with representatives from each member state. It is politically significant for the presidents to speak before the UNGA more often and regularly than he does with other, more powerful organs, such as the Security Council, because the UNGA is the organ most concerned with representation. The representational aspect of the Assembly is connected to the UN's most significant source of legitimacy—collective political approval. It is rhetorically significant for the president to speak before the UNGA because, as I show in this section, presidents use this platform to reduce the “universal audience” to that of the U.S., synecdochically represented by themselves. This increases their legitimacy as global leaders.

²⁶³ U.S. Department of State, “Presidential Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly,” <http://www.state.gov/p/io/potusunga/>.

²⁶⁴ U.S. Department of State, “Presidential Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly.”

²⁶⁵ U.S. Department of State, “Presidential Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly.”

3.2.1 *The President, The U.N., and the Universal Audience*

Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca's conception of the "universal audience" connects universal values—most often an idea within the realm of philosophy—to rhetoric, a study of judgments made within particular situations for particular audiences.²⁶⁶ The universal audience can be understood in two ways. First, the universal audience is the judge and arbiter of "what counts as a shared and accepted reality." This means that the universal audience establishes what is characterized as fact.²⁶⁷ Second, the audience is the judge of the strength of the arguments and whether to accept, adhere to, and act upon the conclusion of those arguments.²⁶⁸ As James Crosswhite notes, an "appeal to universal values" is "always an appeal to a universal audience."²⁶⁹ Thus, the response by the universal audience is the litmus test for the universals produced by the argument.

A truly universal audience would be unable to respond to a speaker's universal claims. That is, an abstract and transcendent arbiter of universal truths do not materially exist in space and time. But that is not Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's definition of a universal audience. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's universal audience is grounded in particular speech situations and particular audiences. As John Louis Lucaites and Celeste Condit note, a universal audience

²⁶⁶ See James Crosswhite, "Universality in Rhetoric: Perelman's Universal Audience," *Philosophy & Rhetoric* (1989): 157-173, which explains the relationship between Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's universal audience and the disciplines of rhetoric and philosophy. Perelman's theory of the rhetorical audience can be found in Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation*. Trans. John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969); Chaim Perelman, *The New Rhetoric and the Humanities*, trans. William Kluback (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979); and Chaim Perelman, *The Realm of Rhetoric*, transl. William Kluback (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982). For more on the disagreement between Perelman's conception of the universal audience and rhetoric as the study of particulars, see Thomas B. Farrell, "Reason and Rhetorical Practice: The Inventional Agenda of Chaim Perelman" in *Practical Reasoning in Human Affairs*, ed. James L. Golden and Joseph J. Pilotta (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1986): 259-286.

²⁶⁷ Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric*, 67; James Crosswhite, "Universalities," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 45 (2010): 437.

²⁶⁸ James Crosswhite "Universalities."

²⁶⁹ James Crosswhite, "Universality in Rhetoric: Perelman's Universal Audience": 171; Perelman, *Realm of Rhetoric*, 27.

is “the intersubjective imagination of a particular speaker and a particular audience in a particular historical moment.”²⁷⁰ This audience is created when a speaker successfully relies upon the “audience’s recognition and acceptance of specific and concrete rhetorical characterizations of the various acts, scenes, agents, and agencies employed to make the [speaker’s] narrative coherent.”²⁷¹ In other words, speakers call forth universal audiences by connecting with the particular audience’s understanding of a situation and, through persuasion, transforming these particularities into universal dimensions.²⁷² For presidential speech before the United Nations General Assembly, part of the speaker’s work to persuade a universal audience is already accomplished—the audience has decided upon what it believes to be universal values, as established in both the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The concept of the universal audience helps us understand the relationship Clinton and Bush created between the U.S. and the realm of the universal, which is embodied in the UN. Presidents Clinton and Bush drew upon the explicit universals proclaimed by the UNGA and connected them with U.S. values and interests around the world, which, of course, do not always align with the interests of other nations.

In closely identifying the universal values as presented by the UN with those stated by the U.S., Clinton and Bush increased legitimacy for U.S. actions abroad. Clinton did this by conflating the presidency with the universal audience, while Bush appealed to the similarities of the UN and U.S. founding documents. In each case, the presidents closely identified the UN with

²⁷⁰ John Louis Lucaites and Celeste Condit, “Universalizing ‘Equality’: The Public Legacy of Martin Luther King, Jr., in Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Sermonic Power of Public Discourse, eds. Carolyn Calloway-Thomas and John Louis Lucaites (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1993), 96.

²⁷¹ Lucaites and Condit, “Universalizing ‘Equality,’” 100.

²⁷² Chaim Perelman, “The New Rhetoric and the Rhetoricians,” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 84 (1984): 192 quoting from a discussion on the universal audience in *The Prospect of Rhetoric*, ed. Lloyd F. Bitzer and Edwin Black (Edgewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1971), 235.

the U.S. until the two were consubstantial with one another.²⁷³ With consubstantial audiences, closely identified by their shared understanding of universal values, the U.S. took on the authority of the UN, while also providing the UN with its own global power. In cases like this, presidents become arbiters of what is universally true, universalizing the trope of democracy. When a powerful nation decides what the values of all other nations should be, there are global consequences.

3.3 Clinton's (Market) Democratic Enlargement

There are two complementary parts to Clinton's process of linking U.S. interests (using the trope of "democracy") to universal values expressed by the UNGA. For one, Clinton makes a realist-materialist argument for democracy. His "democracy" is inherently market-based, which Clinton provides as a way to attain universal rights. Second, Clinton figures himself as a representative of the universal audience, thereby arbitrating the universal value of his own claims. Thus, when the U.S. intervenes throughout the world on behalf of the global market, these actions are justified by the UN's universal values. It is important to understand that global capitalism produces winners and losers. By acting on behalf of the best interests of the U.S. in a global market, some nations do not fare well. Therefore, the "universal" good of market democratic enlargement is not universal at all.²⁷⁴

3.3.1 Democracy as Global Market

In August 1993 President Clinton asked his national security advisor, Anthony Lake, to select a word or slogan that would signify Clinton's foreign policy vision and priorities—much like "containment" had represented the foreign policy goals of the U.S. during the Cold War.

²⁷³ Kenneth Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1969), 20-21.

²⁷⁴ For a more in-depth discussion, see Robert Gilpin and Jean Millis Gilpin, *The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 21st Century*, Vol. 5 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

Lake and his colleagues settled on the phrase “democratic enlargement,” which would encompass Clinton’s foreign policy priorities he had articulated during his campaign.²⁷⁵ Indeed, the phrase guided his foreign policy for the rest of his presidency.²⁷⁶ “Democratic enlargement” made a clear post-Cold War shift from “containment.” While “containment” is a metaphor that divides nations from one another, “democratic enlargement” suggests just the opposite.

Democracies would not, according to this policy, be separated from nations with different ideologies, like communism, but rather democracy would spread throughout the globe. Clinton disconnected “democracy” from a system of governance and shifted “democracy” into the realm of the market. That is, Clinton was concerned with market, or “neo-liberal” globalism.²⁷⁷ In making “global market” inherent to the meaning of “democracy,” Clinton combined a god-term (democracy) with a global U.S. interest (global capitalist market).²⁷⁸ Moreover, Clinton connected with the universal audience by tying the material necessity of market democracy to universal values.

Clinton was the first president elected after the Cold War. As such, his foreign policy rhetoric differentiated from that which dominated the Cold War—what Philip Wander named “prophetic dualism” and “technocratic realism.” His foreign policy rhetoric also differed from Bush’s New World Order drama.²⁷⁹ Mary Stuckey describes Clinton’s rhetoric as “dominated by

²⁷⁵ Douglas Brinkley, “Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine,” *Foreign Policy* (1997).

²⁷⁶ Brinkley, “Democratic Enlargement”; Kathryn M. Olson, “Democratic Enlargement’s Value Hierarchy and Rhetorical Forms: An Analysis of Clinton’s Use of a Post-Cold War Symbolic Frame to Justify Military Interventions,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 34 (2004): 307-340; Michael Doyle, “Peace, Liberty, and Democracy: Realists and Liberals Contest a Legacy” in *American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts*, ed. Michael Cox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 21-40.

²⁷⁷ Manfred B. Steger, *Globalization: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

²⁷⁸ For “god terms,” see Kenneth Burke, *A Grammar of Motives* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969). See also Robert L. Ivie, “Presidential Motives for War,” *The Quarterly Journal of Speech* 60 (1974): 337-345.

²⁷⁹ Philip Wander, “The Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy,” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 70 (1984): 339-61; Thomas Hollihan, “The Public Controversy Over the Panama Canal Treaties: An Analysis of American Foreign Policy Rhetoric,” *Western Journal of Speech Communication* 50 (1986): 368-87; Mary E. Stuckey, “Competing

Power Politics,” explaining that he engaged the U.S. in the world “predominantly for practical, not moral reasons” such as economic reforms.²⁸⁰ Kathryn Olson agrees that Clinton was mostly concerned with the market, which he used to warrant U.S. involvement in world conflicts. Olson notes that Clinton would juxtapose a chaotic world with American market democracy, which justified his plan for democratic enlargement.²⁸¹ Clinton’s 1993 speech to the Assembly, like his body of foreign policy rhetoric, pointed to a quest for enlargement, but not as a moralist or an idealist, but as a realist.²⁸² He spoke of U.S. values, but mostly insofar as they related to the global market—for the purpose and benefit of the U.S. and world economy. For instance, the four components of the strategy for enlargement, according to Lake, was to “strengthen the community of major market democracies” including that of the U.S.; “foster and consolidate new democracies and market economies”; “counter the aggression and support the liberalization of states hostile to democracy and markets”; and “help democracy and market economies take root in regions of greatest humanitarian concern.”²⁸³ In each of these points, enlargement was rooted in the marketplace, avoiding any claims of the moral good of democracies.²⁸⁴ Even so, Clinton’s rhetoric on democratic enlargement entered the realm of the universal.

Clinton’s “democratic enlargement” universalized “democracy” by positioning it as a necessary material condition for human flourishing, or even existence. Celeste Condit argues that material conditions exert a “semi-universal force” upon human existence, thereby also exerting

Foreign Policy Visions: Rhetorical Hybrids after the Cold War,” *Western Journal of Communication* 59 (1995): 214-27.

²⁸⁰ Stuckey, “Competing Foreign Policy Visions,” 222.

²⁸¹ Olson, “Democratic Enlargement’s Value Hierarchy and Rhetorical Forms,” 316-318.

²⁸² For more on Clinton’s “realism” see Brinkley, “Democratic Enlargement” and Lyon, *U.S. Politics and the United Nations*.

²⁸³ Anthony Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement,” John Hopkins University, Washington D.C. (September 21, 1993); See also Brinkley, “Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine.”

²⁸⁴ For an explanation of differences between idealism and realism in U.S. political thought, see Moore and Pubantz, *To Create a New World?* 13.

“objective force upon human language structures.”²⁸⁵ That is, human material conditions bind language to itself, constraining it to its meaning within human relationships to material. When a universal experience exerts itself upon humans, language is bound to that experience. Condit’s example of this is food—because of the “physiological process of starvation,” food is usually a positive term. That is, because all humans have felt hunger, which is a negative experience, the term food is constrained to be a positive term.

Condit’s argument assumes an effective constraint of universal experience on language. Clinton’s rhetoric shows that material conditions *associated with* universal experiences are also constrained by language. For instance, Clinton used the word “democratic” or its cognate nineteen times. Twelve of these times, he paired the word with an economic term such as “market-based” or “free market.”²⁸⁶ Free markets are not, of course, universal material experiences; therefore, they lack a connection to objective truth. In these instances, Clinton associates the “market-based democracies” with dialectical pairs of universal material experience. For example, Clinton said the “overriding purpose” of the United Nations “must be to expand and strengthen the world’s community of market-based democracies. During the Cold War we sought to contain a threat to the survival of free institutions. Now we seek to enlarge the circle of nations that live under those free institutions.”²⁸⁷ Here, the universal human experiences of “threat,” “survival,” and desire for “freedom” impress upon the term “democracy” as well as its descriptor, “market-based.” In this process, the deregulation and globalization of the free market elevates to the category of universal ideal, and in doing so is inherently linked to the

²⁸⁵ Celeste Condit Railsback, “Beyond Rhetorical Relativism: A Structural Material Model of Truth and Objective Reality,” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 69 (1983): 355

²⁸⁶ Clinton, “Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City,” September 27, 1993.

²⁸⁷ Clinton, “Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City,” September 27, 1993.

concept of “democracy.” In this way, Clinton demonstrated a need for global capitalism, U.S. interest, through the trope of democracy.

In a similar vein, Clinton argued that an “expanded community of market democracies not only serves our own security interests, it also advances the goals enshrined in this body's Charter and its Universal Declaration of Human Rights. For broadly based prosperity is clearly the strongest form of preventive diplomacy.”²⁸⁸ Here, we see the connection between the universal human experience of wealth/poverty and “market democracies” in which prosperity is attributed to a market-based democracy, warranting its category as a human right. As previously discussed, the UNGA proclaimed universals, including that of human rights. Universals are claims about either that which is inherent or that which is ideal for all. In either case, it is a claim of absolute truth. Western democratic culture is not inherent to human nature or it would not need to be argued. Whether it is ideal for all is, of course, is contentious. President Clinton universalized U.S. (or Western) conceptions of democracy by linking the type of democracy he wanted to promote with universal human conditions. These universal human conditions transformed “democracy” into a universal because of the way language is constrained by human conditions. Some experiences are universal and this universality informs language—thus, as Condit argues, language and truth are not “merely intersubjective.”²⁸⁹ As we have seen in Clinton’s application of the human condition onto market democracy, this material-linguistic constraint offers the president creative potential for the universalization of particulars.²⁹⁰

²⁸⁸ Clinton, “Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City,” September 27, 1993.

²⁸⁹ Railsback, “Beyond Rhetorical Relativism,” 356.

²⁹⁰ For more on the relationship between universals and particulars, see Tsing, *Friction*.

Usually, the universalization of U.S. values is made through arguments “based on self-evident human virtue” of an exceptional nation.²⁹¹ In this case, Clinton took a different approach, connecting universal *material* conditions to connect universal values with the U.S. aspiration to enlarge global democratic markets. Thus, Clinton used the trope of “democracy” to persuade the UN to act in a way that would benefit the U.S.

3.3.2 *U.S. as Synecdoche of Universal Audience*

In discursively universalizing global democracy, Clinton used the specific audience of the UNGA to align U.S. interests abroad with the United Nation’s universal values. Clinton did this by using the “United Nations” and the “United States” interchangeably throughout his speech, creating the opportunity for his own enactment of his argument to the UN to be proof of the Assembly’s agreement to its universal correctness. Clinton’s audience was the UNGA—an audience that Perelman himself considered to be universal.²⁹² Perelman argued that shared beliefs across nations and cultures, culminating in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, was “a statement that captured the values of forty-eight nations [and which] was in part a function of an actual universal audience.”²⁹³ The forty-eight participatory nations judged arguments on human rights and acted upon their agreement by generating the Declaration of Human Rights. The universal audience, in this case, both accepted certain arguments as facts and then acted upon them, thus generating more universal claims.

The speaker’s task, according to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, is to inspire the audience to action through argument.²⁹⁴ Clinton inspired the audience to act by showing that he

²⁹¹ Moore and Pubantz, *To Create a New World?* 13.

²⁹² David Frank and Michelle Bolduc, “From Vita Contemplativa to Vita Activa: Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca's Rhetorical Turn,” *Advances in the History of Rhetoric* 7, no. 1 (2004): 65-86.

²⁹³ Frank and Bolduc, “From Vita Contemplativa to Vita Activa”: 65-86.

²⁹⁴ Frank and Bolduc, “From Vita Contemplativa to Vita Activa.”

was a part of the universal audience, sometimes reducing the universal audience, of which he was a part, to the United States. Through his speech, he stood in for the universal audience by alternating between speaking for the United Nations and speaking for the United States such that there was at times no discernable distinction between the two. For example, for the first section of his 1993 speech, Clinton used “we” to refer to the United States. Later, Clinton spoke specifically about the role of the United Nations, saying, “Ultimately, the key for reforming the United Nations, as in reforming our own Government, is to remember why we are here and whom we serve. It is wise to recall that the first words of the UN Charter are not ‘We, the government,’ but, ‘We, the people of the United Nations.’”²⁹⁵ Here, he spoke for the United Nations, continuing with “That means in every country the teachers, the workers It is their futures that are at risk when we act or fail to act, and it is they who ultimately pay our bills. As we dream new dreams in this age when miracles now seem possible, let us focus on the lives of those people.”²⁹⁶ Without specifying a shift in identity, Clinton continued a few lines later saying “During the course of our campaign in the United States last year, Vice President Gore and I promised the American people major changes in our Nation's policy toward the global environment. Those were promises to keep, and today the United States is doing so. Today we are working with other nations to build on the promising work of the UN's Commission on Sustainable Development.”²⁹⁷ Here, Clinton took back on the role of U.S. representative, speaking directly about the leadership of the United States in the workings of the United Nations. Throughout the speech, Clinton seamlessly moved from “we” as a member of the United Nation

²⁹⁵ Clinton, “Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City,” September 27, 1993.

²⁹⁶ Clinton, “Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City,” September 27, 1993.

²⁹⁷ Clinton, “Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City,” September 27, 1993.

and “we” as the representative of the United States. According to Perelman, the universal audience a speaker seeks to convince “must necessarily include himself, who is the principal judge of the value of his arguments.”²⁹⁸ By shifting back and forth between the two roles as speaker for the United States and as a member of the United Nations, Clinton took on the subject position of UN audience—that is, the universal audience—as well as representative of the United States. In this melding of personas, Clinton placed himself in a synecdochal relationship with the United Nations and the United States. Both were reduced (the function of synecdoche) to Clinton, the speaker and audience member, arbiter of universal truths.

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca argued that the proof of an effective argument before a universal audience is in the way the audience grapples with and enacts (or fails to enact) the conclusions of an argument.²⁹⁹ Clinton’s argument universalizing market democracy was effective, because Clinton, as a stand-in for the universal audience, acted upon the aspiration of “market democracy” throughout his presidency. Clinton acted upon these facts—specifically expanding NATO, signing NAFTA into law, and deregulating financial markets. Clinton foreshadowed these presidential actions in his speech: “We will work to strengthen the free market democracies by revitalizing our economy here at home, by opening world trade through the GATT, the North American Free Trade Agreement and other accords, and by updating our shared institutions, asking with you and answering the hard questions about whether they are adequate to the present challenges. We will support the consolidation of market democracy where it is taking new root, as in the states of the former Soviet Union and all over Latin America. And we seek to foster the practices of good government that distribute the benefits of

²⁹⁸ Perelman, “The New Rhetoric and the Rhetoricians,” 194.

²⁹⁹ Frank and Bolduc, “From Vita Contemplativa to Vita Activa.”

democracy and economic growth fairly to all people.”³⁰⁰ Clinton used the words “we” and “shared institutions,” hinting that the universal desires shared by the U.S. and the UN could come to fruition through other collective security venues, such as NATO. Clinton, who produced the argument for the universalization of market democracy, acted on behalf of the universal audience to judge his argument as good and act upon it through enlarging market-base democracies.³⁰¹ In effect, Clinton constituted himself (and the United States) as the universal audience; thus, the U.S. and the UN were consubstantial. This speech expanded Clinton’s global authority and thus to legitimate his actions that would affect the world.

3.4 Bush: U.S. “Democracy” and Universal Human Rights

Clinton stood in for the universal audience as both a representative of the U.S. and the UN. George W. Bush, too, conflated the U.S. and the UN by appealing to the universal value of human rights claimed by both institutions. He did so in two ways. First, he first appealed to the founding documents of the U.S., arguing that the U.S. and the UN promote the same universal value of human rights, which he connected to American democracy. In doing so, he consubstantiated himself, and the U.S., with the UN. Second, he used a combination of the “nation as family” metaphor and the “world community” metaphor to exert himself in the position of the moral and authoritative “father” of the member nations who would protect human rights through democracy. By positioning himself as part of the universal audience, Bush’s was able to figure himself as a global leader in his speeches addressed to the UN.

³⁰⁰ Clinton, “Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City,” September 27, 1993.

³⁰¹ In side-stepping public opinion and judgment in the process of universalizing democracy, Clinton could be considered, in this case, a post-rhetorical president. See Hartnett and Mercieca, “‘A Discovered Dissembler Can Achieve Nothing Great’; Or, Four Theses on the Death of Presidential Rhetoric in an Age of Empire,” 599-621.

3.4.1 *Consubstantiation through Founding Documents*

Bush's first speech before the UN General Assembly was November 10, 2001. President for less than a year, and only two months after 9/11, Bush's administration was already known for being less than enthusiastic about multilateral cooperation.³⁰² The administration had removed the position of U.S. ambassador to the UN from the cabinet, for instance. The UN seemed to have a similarly negative stance toward the U.S., voting the nation off the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva earlier that year.³⁰³ His address to the UNGA had the tone of a lecture as he spoke of the UN's "obligations" as he implied that the UN had failed to live up to them. In his second speech to the UN, a year later, Bush took a different approach. He appealed to the founding of the UN and its connection to the U.S, a rhetorical tactic he repeated in several of his later speeches before the UNGA. In doing so, he identified the two entities with one another, calling forth a universal audience consubstantial to himself—and thus the U.S.

Kenneth Burke argues that individual motives become shared through a process of identification. Identification occurs when one a person can "talk...[the] language" of another person, the two sharing motives.³⁰⁴ The effect of such identification, for Burke, is consubstantiation. When two people are consubstantial, they are not identical, but their interests are joined so that they identify with one another. They are at once distinct substances while also consubstantial with the other.³⁰⁵ Though Burke does not bring consubstantiality into the realm of the universal, identification and consubstantiality are helpful concepts for analyzing the relationship between a speaker before the UN. Through identification and consubstantiation, a president can persuade the UN to promote U.S. interests.

³⁰² Lyon, *U.S. Politics and the United Nations*.

³⁰³ Lyon, *U.S. Politics and the United Nations*, 130.

³⁰⁴ Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1969), 55.

³⁰⁵ Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, 20-21.

In order to become consubstantial with the audience, the president would need to “talk...[the] language” of the United Nations. Bush did so by appealing to the founding documents of the U.S. and the UN, showing that he and the nation he represented have always supported the universal truths espoused by the UN. Bush attended to this similarity in his 2003 speech before the UN, saying:

The founding documents of the United Nations and the founding documents of America stand in the same tradition. Both assert that human beings should never be reduced to objects of power or commerce, because their dignity is inherent. Both require— both recognize a moral law that stands above men and nations, which must be defended and enforced by men and nations. And both point the way to peace, the peace that comes when all are free. We secure that peace with our courage, and we must show that courage together.”³⁰⁶

Bush pointed to joint interests in human rights, appealing to the authority of the constitutive documents of the U.S. and the UN. An appeal to founding U.S. documents brings with it paradoxical U.S. values. National memory, as passed down through public address, suggests that the U.S. was founded both through democratic dialogue and an “unquestionable and unauthored divine-right narrative.”³⁰⁷ That is, circulated narratives of the founding of the U.S. contain signature elements of both democracy, which is dialogic and dependent on the choices of the people, and exceptionalism, which is predestined and directed by God. Bush used these paradoxical understandings of the founding of the U.S. to promote identification among members of the UN. The UNGA, as a deliberative and representative body, is similar to the

³⁰⁶ George W. Bush, “Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City,” September 23, 2003, in *The American Presidency Project*, eds. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58801>.

³⁰⁷ Jennifer Mercieca, *Founding Fictions* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2010), 213-214.

democratic beginning of the U.S., on the one hand, and the universal aspect of America’s divine rights narrative is attributable to the UN (and all persons) on the other. As Stuckey notes, some American values in founding documents, such as equality, are presented as universal principles— “all men are created equal.” If all men possess this trait, equality is independent from nationhood.³⁰⁸ This leaves an opening for Bush to associate the universal values dispelled in the founding documents of both the UN and the U.S. Both were founded on universal rights, making the UN and the U.S. consubstantial. Because the U.S. claims that these rights are simultaneously uniquely American, Bush could also position himself as an authority on these human rights.

Though the word “democracy” is not found in the Charter of the UN (nor the Covenant of the League of Nations), both Clinton and Bush claimed upholding democracy was the primary purpose of the United Nations.³⁰⁹ While Clinton usually tied democracy to market freedom, Bush connected democracy with social and political freedom, or “liberty,” and “security.”³¹⁰ This difference is, of course, related to both the ethos of the two presidents and the different political contexts. In each case, democracy was universalized for the good of the U.S. through the institution of the UN.

For instance, in 2003, after the U.S. invasion of Iraq and Saddam Hussein’s removal, Bush said that the Iraqi people’s “future promises lives of dignity and freedom” because “across Iraq, life is being improved by liberty.” Because of the certain and impending success of Iraq’s

³⁰⁸ Stuckey, *Defining Americans*, 13. See also Kenneth L. Karst, *Belonging to America: Equal Citizenship and the Constitution* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 67-84.

³⁰⁹ See Dorn, “The League Covenant and the U.N. Charter.”

³¹⁰ Bush also tied democracy to capitalism throughout his presidency. See, for instance, Mary Stuckey and Joshua R Ritter. “George Bush, < Human Rights>, and American Democracy,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 37 (2007): 646-666. However, in his speeches before the United Nations, all of which were in the aftermath of 9/11 surrounding the invasion of Iraq, he focused on the relationship between democracy, freedom/liberty, and human rights.

democracy, according to the Bush, Iraq would “inspire the Middle East,” and set “an example that others... would be wise to follow.”³¹¹ This better life, according to Bush, would affect the peace of people beyond Iraq and into the rest of the world. “Across the Middle East,” Bush said, “people are safer because an unstable aggressor has been removed from power. Across the world, nations are more secure because an ally of terror has fallen.”³¹² Bush expressed the universality of democracy (here, “liberty”) by explaining how democracy in one place (Iraq) is connected to the well-being of the rest of the world—in other words, the universal good.

This idealist/moralistic rhetoric can be seen throughout Bush’s speeches before both U.S. audiences and the UN. This is because Bush applied U.S. exceptionalism to the UN member states that align with the U.S. In Bush’s 2007 speech to the UN, he focused on education as a human right, which he connects with democracy promotion. He said:

The mission of the United Nations requires liberating people from the chains of illiteracy and ignorance. Article 26 of the Universal Declaration states, ‘Everyone has the right to education.’ And when nations make the investments needed to educate their people, the whole world benefits. Better education unleashes the talent and potential of its citizens and adds to the prosperity of all of us. Better education promotes better health and greater independence. Better education increases the strength of democracy and weakens the appeal of violent ideologies. So the United States is joining with nations around the world to help them provide a better education for their people.³¹³

³¹¹ Bush, “Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City,” September 23, 2003.

³¹² Bush, “Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City,” September 23, 2003.

³¹³ George W. Bush, “Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City,” September 25, 2007, in *American Presidency Project*, eds. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=75848>.

This quotation shows that Bush conflated human rights—as defined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—with democracy. Education, in this instance, was connected to democracy with the logic that through education, democracy will be strengthened and violent ideologies will be weakened. Bush juxtaposes “violent ideologies” and “democracy” in this sentence, implying that democracies are peaceful. In this way, Bush connected democracy back to the stated goal of the UN, to “maintain international peace and security”³¹⁴ and to the Declaration of Human Rights. Bush could have connected any of the human rights to democracy, because for Bush, human rights cannot fully exist without democracy, or vice versa. This was a signature argument for Bush, not only before the UN, but throughout his presidency. After 9/11, Bush’s presidency was defined by, as Jason Berggren and Nicol Rae argue, “democratic evangelism.”³¹⁵ That is, Bush combined religious conviction with political decision-making. This came through his speeches before the UN when he focused on the need to stand up for human rights and liberty in non-democratic nations throughout the world. Notwithstanding his political intentions, Bush’s speeches reflected a belief in the power of the U.S. (and by extension the UN) to grant universal values, in the form of democracy, to the rest of the world. His speeches were particularly impactful before the UN, because he attached the U.S.’s founding to that of the UN, increasing the U.S.’s legitimacy as a global leader—at least insofar as the UN is concerned.

In associating the UN’s Declarations of Universal Human Rights with American values, Bush also increased his authority as the leader of the U.S. “The United States helped found the United Nations,” Bush said. “We want the United Nations to be effective and respectful and

³¹⁴ United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations.”

³¹⁵ Jason D. Berggren and Nicol C. Rae, “Jimmy Carter and George W. Bush: Faith, Foreign Policy, and an Evangelical Presidential Style,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36 (2006): 620.

successful.”³¹⁶ Just as presidents often invoke the moral leadership of the U.S., based on its self-proclaimed constitutive and historical commitment to human rights and democracy, by aligning U.S. and UN values and interests, its moral authority could also align. Bush said that the world needs “principled leadership.” The United Nations, thus, must act in accordance to its founding documents, as a protector of human rights, to defend and preserve “its moral authority.”³¹⁷ Bush attempted to constitute an audience of UN members that would act in alignment with the U.S. through identification their universal oneness as exceptional moral leaders and protectors of human rights.³¹⁸

The case that there are similarities between the founding documents of the UN and the U.S. is not a complicated one to make. The language of the UN founding documents mirrors important U.S. rhetoric. For instance, Archibald MacLeish, a U.S. poet and public intellectual, helped compose the preambles to the UN Charter and the UN Declaration of Human Rights.³¹⁹ As Moore and Pubantz, note, the language is reminiscent of both U.S. founding documents and more recent language of the New Deal.³²⁰ And we know that presidents played a key role in the development of both the United Nations and its predecessor, the League of Nations. This does not mean that presidents *should* have the authority to lead the global institution. It does mean that there is a foundational premise to the argument that the U.S. and the UN share a basic foundational character. Bush appealed to the past in order to persuade the UNGA that it should

³¹⁶ George W. Bush, “Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City,” September 12, 2002, in *The American Presidency Project*, eds. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64069>.

³¹⁷ George W. Bush, “Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City,” November 10, 2001, in *The American Presidency Project*, eds. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58802>.

³¹⁸ For a helpful conversation on how a confusion of national interests and universals results in imperialism, see José-Manuel Barreto, ed., *Human Rights from a Third World Perspective: Critique, History and International Law* (Newcastle Upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014).

³¹⁹ Hadji Bakara, “Poetry in the Shadow of Human Rights,” *American Literary History* 28 (2016): 512-541.

³²⁰ Moore and Pubantz, *To Create a New World?* 13.

also act a certain way in its future. This is one way in which presidents create and express a global role.

3.4.2 “World Community” and “Strict Father” Metaphors

In addition to appealing to the founding ideologies of the U.S. and UN, connecting the UN’s goal to protect the universal of human rights to a U.S. understanding of democracy, Bush’s speeches also constructed identities of the U.S. and UN using metaphor. Specifically, Bush used what George Lakoff calls “world community” and “nation as family” metaphors to establish the relationship between the U.S. and the UN, and thus the U.S. and the rest of the world. In the “world community” metaphor, nations are understood as individual people connected to one another within a global sphere.³²¹ That is, nations are personified. Each national territory is a home. International relationships, in this metaphorical model, are social relationships with friends, enemies, and rogue individuals (nations) that do not abide by the norms of the world community.³²² The world community metaphor is often used in discourse about the UN, as UN documents center on the values of universal human rights and equality.³²³ Bush adjusted this metaphor by blending it with the “nation as family” metaphor, a metaphor that positioned Bush as the head of the family unit—in this case, the UN.

When U.S. politicians use the “nation as family” metaphor, “the government is parent, self-reliant citizens are mature children, and non-self-reliant citizens are dependent children.”³²⁴ U.S. presidents usually draw upon the “nation as family” metaphor to speak specifically about

³²¹ George Lakoff, “Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy: Why Strategic Framing Matters,” *The Frameworks Institute* (1999), 11.

³²² Lakoff, “Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy,” 11.

³²³ See United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations”; United Nations, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” <http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/index.html>; See also, Lakoff, “Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy,” 12.

³²⁴ Lakoff, “Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy,” 7.

the U.S., and the president himself represents the government/parent. According to Lakoff, a conservative president usually places himself in the subject position of the “strict father,” concerned with moral authority, moral strength, moral self-interest, moral order, and moral health, while a liberal president often positions himself as a “nurturant parent” who is empathetic, but who also wants to protect the child from danger.³²⁵ Lakoff argues that these metaphors are often used in domestic discourse to promote conservative or liberal ideology as it relates to policy. For instance, a conservative president might use the narrative that children must be disciplined to advocate for harsher criminal punishments, whereas a liberal president might speak about the dangers of drugs in communities to advocate for these punishments. Bush’s speeches before the UN show that these metaphors are also useful within the context of global institutions.

In Bush’s speeches before the UN, Bush positioned the UN as the family (so “supranational institution as family” instead of “nation as family”) with Bush as the “strict father.” Iraq, and sometimes other rogue nations are the badly behaved children. Only by coming alongside Bush in his views of how to handle Iraq could UN member nations keep their rightful place as members of the family/world community. The “strict father” metaphor promotes U.S. interests by relying on the identification Bush established between the U.S. and UN, and then extending the “strict father” role to the UN. Bush’s use of the metaphor in the context of the UN is premised on the idea that the U.S. and the UN are founded on like-values. Through the “strict father” and “nation as family” metaphors, Bush argued that because the UN’s values are universal, and in alignment with the UN’s founding values, the UN should engage in the world for the same purposes as the U.S. This is politically significant because if the UN were to act as a

³²⁵ Lakoff, “Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy,” 5.

“strict father” aligned with the U.S. president, the UN would legitimize and promote U.S. interests abroad, with unequal consequences for other nations throughout the world.

Throughout his speeches, Bush figured the UN as a person within the larger unity of world community or family. For instance, Bush said, “The United Nations was born in the hope that survived a world war, the hope of a world moving toward justice, escaping old patterns of conflict and fear.”³²⁶ Only living organisms can be “born.” In this instance, he used the “nation as family” metaphor for the UN. Other nations fit in his metaphor as either “partners” or children. Bush said, “Right now ...[UN] resolutions are being unilaterally subverted by the Iraqi regime. Our partnership of nations can meet the test before us by making clear what we now expect of the Iraqi regime”³²⁷ Here, we see that good nations—those that work with the U.S.—are “partners,” which is part of the world community metaphor. Bad nations—or those who go against the will of the U.S.—on the other hand, are spoken of as if they are children. Bush said, “In 1991, Iraq promised UN inspectors immediate and unrestricted access to verify Iraq's commitment to rid itself of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles. Iraq broke this promise, spending seven years deceiving, evading, and harassing UN inspectors before ceasing cooperation entirely.”³²⁸ In the nation-as-family metaphorical system, the father (president) should not meddle in the lives of self-reliant citizens, but should punish those who break the moral order.³²⁹ Because this metaphor is working on the supranational scale, it follows that the father (UN) should not meddle in the lives of self-reliant nations, but should punish those who break the moral order (Iraq). It is bad children/citizens/nations who “deceive” and “evade” the strict father/UN Bush uses the “strict father” and “nation as family” metaphor to position the UN

³²⁶ Bush, “Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City,” September 12, 2002.

³²⁷ Bush, “Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City,” September 12, 2002.

³²⁸ Bush, “Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City,” September 12, 2002.

³²⁹ Lakoff, “Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy,” 7.

as the head of the family. By using examples of nations that act against U.S. interests, Bush used the “strict father” to conflate the roles of the U.S. president and the UN.

Bush said, “The United States helped found the United Nations. We want the United Nations to be effective and successful. We want the resolutions of the world’s most important multilateral body to be enforced.”³³⁰ Here, Bush positioned himself/the U.S. as the father of the United Nations. The U.S., like a parent, helped create the United Nations. This parent also knows what is best for the child/member states. What is best, of course, is for the member states to take on the strict father ideology of the U.S. When “partner nations” abide by Bush’s will, they too, are positioned as good/strict/moral fathers. “The founding members resolved that the peace of the world must never again be destroyed by the will and wickedness of any man. We created a United Nations Security Council so that ... our deliberations would be more than talk, our resolutions would be more than wishes. After generations of deceitful dictators and broken treaties and squandered lives, we dedicated ourselves to standards of human dignity shared by all and to a system of security defended by all.”³³¹ That is, when member nations behave in the way the U.S. president believes they should behave—in this case acting against Iraq—they become partners and fellow creators of the UN, and defenders of that which is moral and universally good.

Bush combined the “world community” metaphor and “nation as family” metaphor, saying, “The conduct of the Iraqi regime is a threat to the authority of the United Nations and a threat to peace. Iraq has answered a decade of UN demands with a decade of defiance. All the world now faces a test and the United Nations a difficult and defining moment. Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced or cast aside without consequence? Will the

³³⁰ Bush, “Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City,” September 12, 2002.

³³¹ Bush, “Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City,” September 12, 2002.

United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?”³³² Here, Bush positioned the UN as the strict father, as fathers should be “honored.” Iraq is positioned as the rogue child. Bush further characterized Iraq as a child when he said, “The Security Council renewed its demand three more times in 1997, citing flagrant violations, and three more times in 1998, calling Iraq's behavior totally unacceptable.”³³³ In these examples, Iraq is not a part of the world community; Iraq is a child who behaves badly, and it is up to the strict father (Bush/aligning member states) to take care of the situation because of their exceptional, but universal, values.

By positioning himself as the father of the United Nations, Bush drew upon the rhetoric of American exceptionalism. U.S. citizens have drawn upon this rhetoric to justify U.S. worldwide engagement (and isolationism) since the founding of the nation.³³⁴ Presidents have also used this discourse throughout their speeches for and against their participation in world organizations. Wilson argued, for instance, that “the Mission of America in the world is essentially a mission of peace and good will.”³³⁵ Bush’s rhetoric, which positioned Bush as the authority figure for the UN in a foreign policy speech about Iraq, continued this note of exceptionalism, magnifying the global role of the president.

3.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, Clinton and Bush both established authority through the trope of “democracy.” Clinton did so by positioning market democracies as a universal material requirement. Bush did so by conflating democracy with human rights. This was persuasive, in

³³² Bush, “Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City,” September 12, 2002.

³³³ Bush, “Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City,” September 12, 2002.

³³⁴ For a discussion on American exceptionalism see Jason A. Edwards and David Weiss, *The Rhetoric of American Exceptionalism: Critical Essays* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2011).

³³⁵ Quoted in Lyon, *U.S. Politics and the United Nations*, 42.

each case, because the presidents closely identified their roles as the president of the U.S. with the role of the UN in engaging with the world. While Clinton did so by offering himself as a synecdoche for the universal audience, Bush appealed to the likeness of the foundational universal values of the U.S. and UN Bush also appropriated U.S. exceptionalism to paradoxically claim these universal values as unique to the U.S., establishing himself as a rightful global leader. Each president magnified the importance of democracy as a universal good, which strengthens the role of the U.S. in the world.

Both presidents built upon a U.S. conception of the global imaginary using the trope of “democracy.” Because this trope was exclusively Western and neo-liberal, they failed to consider or acknowledge how “democracy” or “human rights” could function outside of the Western frame. As Raka Shome notes, nations such as China operate from an authoritarian regime, but also fully participate in global capitalism. Dubai’s citizenship is cosmopolitan, though not democratic.³³⁶ Democratic countries, including the United States, violate the Universal Declaration of Human rights.³³⁷ In other words, there is no inherent link between democracy and material prosperity or between democracy and human rights. Still, the U.S. presidents continue taking action that affect the world. They do so with or without the approval of the United Nations, though this analysis shows that they try to cultivate the authority provided by collective approval.

The presidents’ speeches before the UN are less helpful for understanding *if* the U.S. president should play a global role, and more helpful for understanding *how* the president plays a

³³⁶ Raka Shome, “Mapping the Limits of Multiculturalism in the Context of Globalization,” *International Journal of Communication* 6 (2012): 146.

³³⁷ See, for instance, “Companies Commit Human Rights Abused in America, Too,” *Atlantic*, May 28, 2014, <https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/05/human-rights-abuses-happen-in-america-too/371702/>; “United States: Events of 2015,” *Human Rights Watch*, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/united-states>.

global role. One aspect of the contemporary president's role is communicating with members of the UN, and establishing authority from, and for, the UN. This chapter provides a way of understanding the relationship between U.S. presidential discourse and the UN by offering Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's concept of the "universal audience." Presidents engage with the UN as a universal audience, thus connecting U.S. interests to the universals established by the UN. The next chapter analyzes Barack Obama's transnational town hall meetings, shifting focus from the audience of the UN to audiences of transnational citizens.

4 PRESIDENTS AND FOREIGN CITIZENS: OBAMA'S TRANSNATIONAL TOWN HALL MEETINGS

In the previous chapters, I examined interpersonal dialogue between a president and another world leader; an international joint press conference; and presidential speeches before the United Nations General Assembly. In those chapters, I showed that presidents use different techniques for developing a global imaginary that are specific to particular speech situations and audiences. For instance, George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev negotiated geopolitical metaphors representing regional/national values privately before holding a joint press conference in discursive solidarity about universal values, symbolically ending the Cold War. Bill Clinton and George W. Bush used the trope of “democracy” to identify with, and persuade, a universal audience embodied by the United Nations General Assembly to pursue U.S. interests. These two case studies provide a deeper understanding of the role of the contemporary U.S. president outside the bounds of the nation-state. Presidents consistently negotiate the role of the U.S. within the rest of the world, competing with other leaders and representatives for dominance in the global imaginary. Central to this imaginary are questions of national interests, universal values, and leadership.

I explained that U.S. presidents use rhetorical strategies to tie “democracy” to these three elements of their global role. The first chapter showed that “democracy” can help presidents argue for the exceptional status of the U.S. (or the West), thus making a case that U.S. leadership is natural. The second chapter explained that “democracy” can also be tied to “universal values,” thus making a case for other nations to engage in the world in a way that will promote U.S. interests. This chapter extends the argument and argues that presidents circulate certain

democratic practices to transnational citizens, thereby negotiating the president's national and transnational identity as well as that of the foreign citizens. This reveals another facet of the global presidency— identity formation.

Each case study also shows how different audiences shape presidential speech. Previous chapters investigated transnational audiences— institutional leaders and representatives, respectively. Negotiations with a world leader followed by a joint, globally broadcast press conference shaped George H.W. Bush's discursive world vision from being U.S. and Western-centric toward inclusivity. The United Nations General Assembly provided a foundation for Bill Clinton and George W. Bush to draw upon universal values, thereby creating a consubstantial identity between the U.S. and the UN. In this final analysis chapter, I focus on a third institutional dimension of the global presidency— transnational town hall meetings. This brings the locus of study to citizens, a central element of the global imaginary.

Throughout his presidency, Barack Obama, in an unprecedented presidential move, hosted regular transnational town hall meetings. These speech events comprised audiences of young citizens from countries other than the United States. The meetings primarily took place in international settings, but a few were hosted in Washington D.C. with only foreign participants permitted to interact with the president.³³⁸ These town hall meetings provide insight into how presidents as global leaders interact with foreign citizens. While Obama did not technically represent the audience members at these town hall meetings, in that they are not citizens of his nation, his presence in the democratic forum suggested otherwise, and his position as the U.S. president afforded him the opportunity to navigate an emerging transnational citizenship. These

³³⁸ Obama also hosted town hall meetings using social media. For the purposes of this study, I am only including meetings in which President Obama physically stood in front of an international audience and used the phrase “town hall meeting” to describe the event.

town hall meetings, in addition to offering a site at which to compare the elements of identity formation in speeches directed toward foreign citizens, included dialogue between the presidents and the audience members. This dialogue provides evidence for how citizens interact with and negotiate these extra-national identities.

Rhetorical scholars have long been interested in how presidents call forth national identities in U.S. citizens. Usually these studies begin with Benedict Anderson, who argues in *Imagined Communities* that citizens understand themselves to be in communion with all other members of their nation even though they will never know or meet most of their fellow citizens. Thus, according to Anderson, one aspect of nationhood is that it is imagined.³³⁹ There are myriad ways people could organize themselves. Through historical necessity and rhetorical practice, one way they choose to do so is through nationhood.³⁴⁰ Scholars of presidential rhetoric embrace this understanding of the nation and argue that presidents have a role in creating this social and political imaginary. Presidents help to create the national imaginary by telling the people who they are (often by way of who they are not) and by acting as representatives of the people.³⁴¹

Arguments concerning national identity are present in all presidential speech. Presidents portray ideal American values through both ceremonial and deliberative speech, in well-attended and circulated speech occasions, and in small local speeches, through the inclusion and exclusion of particular citizens and issues surrounding them.³⁴² Inaugural addresses and state of the union

³³⁹ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.

³⁴⁰ Ernest Gellner, *Nationalism* (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 10-11; Stuckey, *Defining Americans*, 9.

³⁴¹ Beasley, *You, the People*; Mary E. Stuckey, "One Nation (Pretty Darn) Divisible: National Identity in the 2004 Conventions," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 8 (2005): 639-656.

³⁴² Mary E. Stuckey and Karen S. Hoffman, "Constituting 'The People': National Identity Under William H. Taft and Richard M. Nixon," *Congress & the Presidency: A Journal of Capital Studies* 33 (2006): 72.

addresses, specifically, provide opportunities for presidents to portray ideal American values and to “reassure the people that they are a people after all.”³⁴³ When presidents discuss foreign policy in any of these speech settings, national identity is sometimes revealed in the ways presidents explain the role of the U.S. within the context of the rest of the world. “The people” are often framed by who they not. That is, there can be no “us” if there is not also a “them.”³⁴⁴ The people are also framed in the terms of American exceptionalism, which positions the U.S. as superior and unique to all the other nations and peoples, thereby justifying how the U.S. engages with the rest of the world.

In addition to constructing and reflecting national identity, political scientists Kevin Coe and Rico Neumann find that modern presidents also help shape international identity—the relationship U.S. citizens have with the rest of the world—through the discursive treatment of foreign entities in their State of the Union Addresses.³⁴⁵ Because one of the challenges of the global imaginary is the need to situate citizens simultaneously as both national citizens and citizens of the world, I build off of Coe and Neumann’s work to find extra-national identity construction by U.S. presidents.³⁴⁶ Instead of studying speeches directed toward U.S. audiences to understand how presidents define international identities of U.S. citizens, I turn to speeches directed toward non-U.S. citizens. In doing so, I look for how presidents provide answers to the questions “Who am I?” and “Where do I belong?” to foreign citizens.³⁴⁷

³⁴³ Beasley, *You, the People*, 10.

³⁴⁴ Stuckey, *Defining Americans*, 9.

³⁴⁵ Kevin Coe and Rico Neumann, “International Identity in Theory and Practice: The Case of the Modern American Presidency,” *Communication Monographs* 78 (2011): 139-161.

³⁴⁶ For a discussion on the complexities of national, transnational, and global citizenship, see Brodie, “Introduction.”

³⁴⁷ On the definition of national identity see Huntington, *Who Are We?: The Challenges to America's National Identity* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004).

Specifically, I consider ways in which Obama figures citizens in these transnational town hall address, using the lens of American exceptionalism. The rhetoric of American exceptionalism can make sense of policies that set the U.S. apart from the world, such as isolationism; policies that impose upon the world, such as imperialism and manifest destiny; or policies that “lead” the world in democracy enlargement and a new world order. Reading U.S. foreign policy through the lens of American exceptionalism enables us to understand how presidents construct and reflect the national identity of U.S. citizens. Presidential speech on foreign policy directed toward international audiences, likewise, can provide insight into how the president evokes a sense of extra-national identity to non-U.S. citizens. Thus, in this chapter, I analyze a set of speech occasions in which President Obama interacted exclusively with foreign audiences. This chapter makes two theoretical contributions by both describing elements of transnational foreign policy and by delineating how this rhetoric constructs transnational and global identity of both foreign citizens and Obama.

This chapter begins with an overview of transnational foreign policy speech and American exceptionalism, as well as a justification for using this lens to understand how the president builds transnational and global identity among citizens, figuring himself as a global representative. Second, I focus on Obama as a representative of transnational citizens. In this section, I provide four anecdotes in which foreign citizens asked Obama to embrace the hypothetical that he represents them and tell them what he would do differently in their nation-state or region. I then discuss the rhetorical strategies Obama used during his town hall meetings that might have encouraged this understanding of Obama’s global role. This section broadens our understanding of the president’s global role in practice. Third, I show how Obama figured transnational citizens. He positioned these citizens with at least two character markers. First, that

they were transnational and global entities, rather than national. Second, that they were exceptional, and worthy of emulation. While in the first section, I discuss how Obama revealed U.S.-centric and exceptionalist rhetoric as he positioned himself as a global leader, in the second section I show that Obama paradoxically built transnational identity among citizens while denying American exceptionalism. This is significant in understanding the rhetorical and political complexities of citizenship and representation in a global era.

4.1 Transnational Foreign Policy

Foreign policy is, most simply, the strategy of a nation for dealing with other nations. Matters of foreign policy are technically split between the executive and legislative branches, but modern presidents both create and administer foreign policy, even sending troops into foreign conflict without the approval of Congress.³⁴⁸ It is also the role of the president to define foreign policy and frame the situation surrounding the policy to the public. These definitions shape how the public understands the policy and the national conversation about the policy.³⁴⁹ Moreover, and importantly to this study, the way the president talks about foreign policy relates to the national identity of citizens.

Transnational policy is the strategy that deals with issues between and across nations. The president's role in transnational policy is less clear than it is within the U.S., and he does not have a ceremonial occasion, such as a State of the Union address, to define these policies and the situations that surround them. The new town hall meeting is a forum for discussing transnational policy issues between nations. At the Southeast Asian town hall meetings, Obama and the audience members discussed the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade agreement among twelve

³⁴⁸ Bostdorff, *The Presidency and the Rhetoric of Foreign Crisis*, 27.

³⁴⁹ On presidential definition see Zarefsky, "Presidential Rhetoric and the Power of Definition."

Pacific Rim countries.³⁵⁰ With the Young Leaders of the America, Obama and the foreign citizens spoke about the legalization of trading marijuana with the U.S., the U.S. opening relations with Cuba, and a transnational education and economic development plan.³⁵¹ With the Young African Leaders, Obama and the audience discussed anti-terrorist strategies, the Food Security Initiative, and the Global Health Initiative.³⁵² In every town hall meeting, issues of transnational policy were central to both Obama's introductory speech and the following dialogue.

In the same way that we locate appeals to, and the construction of, national identity within U.S. foreign policy speech, Obama both appealed to and constructed transnational—and, at times, global—identity between citizens at these town hall meetings. One significant difference between presidential transnational policy speech and foreign policy speech is the president's treatment of American exceptionalism. In Obama's transnational policy speech, other nations were elevated as exemplary and, relatedly, the president sometimes used the U.S. as a model to avoid. In these cases, Obama transformed the American exceptionalist vocabulary to benefit the nations these citizens represented. This speech was characterized by an explicit rhetoric of partnership among nations, though the implicit meaning throughout Obama's transnational policy rhetoric was that the U.S. remained in the position of leadership.

³⁵⁰ Barack Obama, "Remarks by President Obama at Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative Town Hall, 11/14/14," *White House Office of the Press Secretary*, November 14, 2014, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/14/remarks-president-obama-young-southeast-asian-leaders-initiative-town-ha.>; Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President in YSEALI Town Hall," *White House Office of the Press Secretary*, November 20, 2015, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/20/remarks-president-yseali-town-hall>.

³⁵¹ Barack Obama, "Remarks by President Obama in Town Hall with Young Leaders of the Americas," *White House Office of the Press Secretary*, April 9, 2015, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/09/remarks-president-obama-town-hall-young-leaders-americas>.

³⁵² Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President at Town Hall with Young African Leaders." *White House Office of the Press Secretary*, August 2, 2010. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-town-hall-with-young-african-leaders>.

These characteristics of transnational foreign policy broaden our understanding of how presidents shape transnational and global identity. They also show the malleability of U.S. exceptionalism. Transnational policy rhetoric in these town hall meetings does not break from U.S. exceptionalist rhetoric completely. Instead, transnational policy rhetoric shares exceptionalism with other nations while upholding the U.S. as a transnational leader. Thus, by analyzing presidential use of transnational foreign policy rhetoric we can better understand how central U.S. political discursive markers such as American exceptionalism help presidents position themselves as global representatives.

4.1.1 American Exceptionalism

American exceptionalism is the belief, and the discourse surrounding the belief, that God uniquely blessed the United States and its people, and that the blessing brings with it national responsibilities. This exceptionalism is tied both to U.S. national identity—how the people imagine their national community—as well as to U.S. international identity—how U.S. citizens imagine themselves in relation to the rest of the world. American exceptionalism, a term coined in 1957 by Max Lerner, can be traced conceptually from the Puritans, and it is present throughout U.S. political and presidential discourse to the contemporary age.³⁵³ When presidents use a discourse of American exceptionalism they do so to justify policy decisions. For instance, when Abraham Lincoln said the U.S. is “the last best hope for man on earth,” he used a belief in U.S. moral exceptionalism to appeal to end slavery.³⁵⁴ When Woodrow Wilson wanted to make

³⁵³ James W. Ceaser, “The Origins and Character of American Exceptionalism,” *American Political Thought: A Journal of Ideas, Institutions, and Culture* 1, no. 1 (2012): 6-8; Max Lerner, *America As a Civilization* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957).

³⁵⁴ Abraham Lincoln, “Second Annual Message,” December 1, 1862, in *The American Presidency Project*, eds. by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29503>; Ceaser, “The Origins and Character of American Exceptionalism,” 3.

the world “safe for democracy,” he used American exceptionalism to call for war.³⁵⁵ Ronald Reagan’s “Crusade for Freedom” garnered appeal for U.S. Cold War policies.³⁵⁶ Bill Clinton’s description of the U.S. as the world’s “one indispensable nation” encouraged democracy enlargement.³⁵⁷ George W. Bush used a rhetoric of American exceptionalism when he said the U.S. was attacked on 9/11 for being “the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world.”³⁵⁸ In each of these instances, the belief that the United States is the most moral and blessed nation provided a warrant for particular political actions either within the U.S. or outside the U.S. Likewise, the description of the foreign policy reflects the national identity of the people.

The discourse of American exceptionalism is such a norm for presidential rhetoric that presidents may be criticized for inadequately relying on it. Republicans in the 2012 presidential campaign, for instance, claimed that Obama’s tour through Middle Eastern countries at the beginning of his presidency was an “apology tour.”³⁵⁹ The accusation that Obama had an “apology tour” and that this made him untrustworthy as a president signals how closely American exceptionalism is tied to some versions of national—and international—identity. For adherents of these versions, a president cannot appear to fault the U.S. in any way, because doing so would concede that the U.S. is not the moral authority of the world. The U.S. must always be

³⁵⁵ Wilson, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress Requesting a Declaration of War against Germany” April 2, 1917; Peter Onuf, “American Exceptionalism and National Identity,” *American Political Thought* 1 (2012): 80.

³⁵⁶ Robert L. Ivie and Oscar Giner, “American Exceptionalism in a Democratic Idiom: Transacting the Mythos of Change in the 2008 Presidential Campaign,” *Communication Studies* 60 (2009): 360.

³⁵⁷ William J. Clinton, “Inaugural Address,” January 20, 1997, in *The American Presidency Project*, eds. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=54183>; Ivie and Giner, “American Exceptionalism in a Democratic Idiom,” 360.

³⁵⁸ George W. Bush, “Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks,” September 11, 2001, in *The American Presidency Project*, eds. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58057>; Ivie and Giner, “American Exceptionalism in a Democratic Idiom,” 360.

³⁵⁹ Ceaser, “The Origins and Character of American Exceptionalism,” 3; Romney, “Speech at the Citadel in Charleston, SC,” *Wall Street Journal*, October 7, 2011, <http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/10/07/text-of-mitt-romneys-speech-on-foreign-policy-at-the-citadel>.

set apart from the “other.”³⁶⁰ It is a national narrative— a national fantasy that tells Americans who they are to each other and who they are in relation to the rest of the world. American exceptionalism becomes trickier in presidential speeches outside the U.S. borders, especially in foreign policy speeches—the subject of which is how the U.S. will relate with other nations. The following sections analyze the identity construction of Obama and foreign citizens. The analysis reveals that the president uses American exceptionalism to figure himself as a global leader and representative, while paradoxically challenging this discursive theme when figuring his audiences as transnational and global entities.

4.2 Obama as Global Representative

Each of Obama’s transnational town hall meetings consisted of a speech by Obama followed by a question-and-answer session with the transnational audience. During the question-and-answer session, several citizens implied an understanding of Obama as being more than a representative of the American people, their discourse suggesting Obama potentially represented them as well. In this section, I describe the scenarios in which students seemed to not only identify with the president, but also position him as their leader. These interactions show the potential power of transnational identity formation by a U.S. president. I then discuss four rhetorical strategies Obama used to figure himself into this global role, and how American exceptionalism plays into this global role.

4.2.1 Audience Response to Obama: Four Anecdotes

During the first town hall meeting between Obama and the Young African Leaders, a group that met sporadically with the president over a period of five years, a student asked the president if the United States was “committed to ensuring a partnership that might not

³⁶⁰ See, for instance, Beasley, *You, the People*.

necessarily be beneficial to America, but truly beneficial to the sovereign interest of the countries” that the students represent. Obama answered that “countries look out for their interests” and that his job is “to look out for the people of the United States,” but that “the interests of the United States and the interests of the continent of Africa greatly overlap.”³⁶¹

While highlighting the interconnectedness of nations, Obama stated that he is concerned with the people in other nations to the extent that they relate to the well-being of the U.S. That is, Obama emphasized his position as President of United States of America, and, thus, was primarily concerned with the interests of the United States. Despite Obama’s statement to the contrary, the discourse of the Young African Leaders suggests that they imagined the president as more than a national leader and representative of the U.S. They saw him as at least a potential partner.

During Obama’s third meeting with the students involved in the Young African Leaders Initiative, a young man from Senegal stated, “President Obama is the first President of the United States of Africa. I would like to know [:] can you share the two important issues you will discuss as the first President of the United Nation of Africa?” The student, here, asked a question that positioned the president as the leader of a “united Africa.” The question led to confusion, with Obama clarifying that he is the first African American President of the United States, not a president of Africa. After some back and forth, Obama asked the student if this was an “intellectual exercise... the idea is if somehow Africa unified into a United States of Africa,” what would he say?³⁶² The student concurred with the president that this was his intent. If we are to take the Senegalese student at his word, the student was asking Obama to place himself in the role of the leader of Africa and to imagine how he might act in that role.

³⁶¹ Obama, “Remarks by the President at Town Hall with Young African Leaders,” August 2, 2010.

³⁶² Barack Obama, “Remarks at the Mandela Washington Fellowship for Young African Leaders Presidential Summit Town Hall and a Question-and-Answer Session,” July 28, 2014, in *The American Presidency Project*, eds. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=105498>.

It was not only Young African Leaders who superimposed the president into the position of the leader of their own country. At the Young Southeast Asian Leaders town hall meetings, students first treated the president as a powerful person who had the potential to help them. As meetings progressed, citizens began to discursively position Obama as a potential representative. For instance, one citizen asked in the first meeting, “How exactly can America lead us youth internationally in championing such issues, ...[as] climate change, women empowerment, poverty eradication?”³⁶³ By the second meeting, another audience member asked Obama how he would develop their country if he “were the President of Myanmar.” Like the audience member at the Young African Leaders town hall meeting, this citizen requested Obama engage in the hypothetical that he were their actual political representative.³⁶⁴ Obama responded with actions that he would take if he were, indeed, the president of Myanmar. He suggested first “transitioning to democracy.” In order to transition to a democracy, Obama said there “needs to be an election next year,” that there “should be constitutional amendments that ensure a transition over time to a fully civilian government,” and that “there needs to be laws put in place to protect freedom of the press, freedom of expression, freedom to politically organize.”³⁶⁵ He also said he would work on economic and agricultural development plans as well as create a free, compulsory educational system. Each of these advances, Obama said, would “happen naturally...[with] a democratic system in place.”³⁶⁶ Obama engaged in the audience member’s

³⁶³ Barack Obama, “Remarks at a Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative Town Hall and a Question-and-Answer Session at the University of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia,” April 27, 2014, in *The American Presidency Project*, eds. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=105144>.

³⁶⁴ Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama at Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative Town Hall, 11/14/14.”

³⁶⁵ Obama, “Remarks by President Obama at Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative Town Hall, 11/14/14.”

³⁶⁶ Obama, “Remarks by President Obama at Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative Town Hall, 11/14/14.”

hypothetic and provided steps he would take as their president. Significantly, Obama tied each of his leadership plans with the concept of democracy.

A final example of foreign citizens imagining—or rather, asking Obama to imagine—the president as their own political representative took place at a town hall meeting in Shanghai, among about three hundred Shanghainese students. The event was broadcast on local Shanghai television stations, streamed on an official Chinese news agency’s website for several hours, and live-streamed on the White House website (which is not censored in China). Before the event, Obama’s administration selected some of the students’ questions, submitted in advance online, for Obama to answer during the meeting. Unlike the previous examples, where the questions were raised in the moment, the Obama administration controlled which questions he would answer. The administration chose one question about Obama’s thoughts on internet censorship, creating a situation in which Obama could speak about the freedom of speech—not a topic that would have likely been broadcast if it had been broached in interactions between Presidents Obama and Hu Jintao earlier in Obama’s visit.³⁶⁷

The question, read by U.S. Ambassador to China Jon Huntsman, asked: “In a country with 350 million Internet users and 60 million bloggers, do you know of the firewall?” And second, “Should we be able to use Twitter freely?”³⁶⁸ Obama responded to these questions by stating that while there is “a price you pay for openness,” he believed the “good outweighs the bad so much that it's better to maintain that openness” and that technology that allows for more

³⁶⁷ Helene Cooper, “China Holds Firm on Major Issues in Obama’s Visit,” *New York Times*, November 17, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/18/world/asia/18prexy.html>.

³⁶⁸ Barack Obama, “Remarks at a Town Hall Meeting and a Question-and-Answer Session in Shanghai,” November 16, 2009, in *The American Presidency Project*, eds. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=86909>.

communication, like Twitter, “helps to draw the world together.”³⁶⁹ Obama spoke about values that he argues are good for the world. He did so in a forum in which he was answering questions by foreign citizens he did not represent in any of the ways we usually understand representation. One Chinese Twitter user said of Obama’s response, “I will not forget this morning. I heard, on my shaky Internet connection, a question about our own freedom which only a foreign leader can discuss.”³⁷⁰ The interaction—with Obama speaking in a country other than the one he has part in governing, responding to questions written by citizens of that country, positioning himself as a global representative—is illustrative of one aspect of presidential rhetoric under conditions of globalization.

“Mr. Obama, do you know about our firewall” and “Should we be able to use Twitter freely?” does different political work than “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall.” These sentences distill a complex relationship between globalization and democracy. Citizens of a polity outside that which Obama governs wrote the questions directed toward Obama, and Obama then spoke about global values and democracy—the format of the town hall meeting with Obama effectively cut Hu Jintao out of the interaction. In this meeting, Obama represented global democracy. Reagan, on the other hand, called upon the leader of another nation-state to take political action. In between these moments, something changed. With increased political, economic, and communicative flows and connectivity, the role of the U.S. president shifted from that of an exclusively national institution to one that also implies an imagined global institution.

In each of these situations, transnational citizens asked Obama to interact with them as if he were their representative. Obama, for the most part, obliged. He provided answers that

³⁶⁹ Obama, “Remarks at a Town Hall Meeting and a Question-and-Answer Session in Shanghai,” November 16, 2009.

³⁷⁰ Helene Cooper and David Barboza, “Obama Wades into Internet Censorship in China Address,” *New York Times*, November 16, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/17/world/asia/17shanghai.html?_r=0.

reflected ideal American values — not necessarily representative of the reality of the U.S. In doing so, he enacted global representation, by responding to questions that figured himself as such, and global leadership, by offering “universal” ideas and plans for achieving them.

4.2.2 Obama’s Rhetorical Strategies

The discourse of these three transnational audiences presents a shift in how citizens understand the role of the U.S. president—from a leader who could potentially help transnational citizens to a potential active representative of these citizens. U.S. presidents, in any official capacity, only represent U.S. citizens. However, different rhetorical strategies may influence how foreign citizens understand the role of the president. I argue that Obama positioned himself as a leader and teacher of universal values, taking on this leadership role both through the forum of town hall meeting and through his speech. In this section, I discuss four rhetorical strategies that suggested Obama’s role as a transnational representative during his town hall meetings. First, Obama’s physical presence in the town hall meetings provided the opportunity for face-to-face dialogue, which is a culturally normative way for representatives to meet with their constituents. Second, Obama’s defining of the rhetorical situation as a “town hall forum” provided context for a specific understanding of representation. Third, Obama uses deliberative principles to govern the town hall meetings, presenting himself as a teacher of democratic values. Fourth, Obama identified with his audiences by presenting a transnational identity. Together, these rhetorical strategies invited audiences to interact with Obama as a potential action-oriented political representative, suggesting a dimension of the U.S. president’s global role, which was marked by U.S. exceptionalism.

4.2.2.1 Physical Presence

Obama's physical presence at the town hall meetings is a type of rhetorical circulation that amplifies his position as a potential representative. Rhetorical scholars have theorized about the circulation of texts—both linguistic and visual—and the methods by which to analyze these texts. These studies, when considered in the context of the presidency, help scholars discern colonial logics within circulated texts³⁷¹; they help us understand what happens when presidential speech texts are condensed and circulated as fragments³⁷²; and they clarify the relationship between circulation of texts and democracy³⁷³ and the public sphere.³⁷⁴ These studies make clear that understanding the fragmentation and circulation of texts is vital for rhetorical studies. We do not yet, however, understand the circulation of embodied presidential texts—that is, no studies attend to a president's movement into different rhetorical situations around the world and the unique implications of that circulation.

In the case of Obama's transnational town hall meetings, Obama's physical circulation—his presence in particular transnational situations—invited audiences to imagine Obama as a global representative. It is because Obama's speech is embodied by the president himself (rather than by any other medium) that the president was able to interact with citizens on a transnational scale through the rhetorical forum of town hall meetings. Studying embodied presidential

³⁷¹ Darrel Wanzer, "Delinking Rhetoric, or Revisiting McGee's Fragmentation Thesis through Decoloniality," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 15 (2012): 247-258; Jason Edward Black, "Native Authenticity, Rhetorical Authenticity, and Neocolonial Decay: The Case of Chief Seattle's Controversial Elogy," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 15 (2012): 635-645.

³⁷² Megan Foley, "Sound Bites: Rethinking the Circulation of Speech from Fragment to Fetish," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 15 (2012): 613-622.

³⁷³ Brandon Inabinet, "Democratic Circulation: Jacksonian Lithographs in U.S. Public Discourse," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 15 (2012): 659-666.

³⁷⁴ For more on the intersection between theories of the public and circulation, see Cara A. Finnegan and Jiyeon Kang, "'Sighting' the Public: Iconoclasm and Public Sphere Theory" *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 90 (2004): 377-204 and Nathan S. Atkinson, "Celluloid Circulation: The Dual Temporality of Nonfiction Film and Its Publics," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 15 (2012): 674-684. For more on the circulation of presidential speech and other public address, see Stephen Heidt, "The Presidency as Pastiche: Atomization, Circulation, and Rhetorical Instability," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 15 (2012): 623-634.

circulation includes not only the movement of presidents from place to place and the importance of that movement to the institution of the presidency, but also how presidential speech and the physical presence of the president works in conjunction with the institution of the presidency and all the connotations, traditions, and symbolic and political power that the institution entails. My analysis of the constitutive work of Obama's transnational town hall meetings, then, considers the presence of the president, the interaction between the president and transnational citizens within the context of the particular rhetorical forum, and the constitutive rhetorical effects of this interaction.³⁷⁵

Embodied speech works differently than disembodied speech, or speech embodied by a medium other than the speaker in that it allows for contextual specificity of messages and more trust between the speaker and the listener. Embodied speech also works differently for presidents than for other speakers. First, the *ethos* of the president is revealed through his discourse in which he reflects his understanding of the image of the people. Presidents reflect that understanding of the people by being physically present with them. Second, there is an historical link between presidential travel and the power of the president over the people.³⁷⁶ Presidents travel to be nearer to the people, to better understand them and reflect their values, and to garner

³⁷⁵ Studies on circulation respond to the fact that contemporary audiences often do not encounter speeches in their entirety, which is a problematic that does not apply to my case studies of Obama's town hall meetings. Instead, I use the concept of circulation to show new ways in which the president performs the global imaginary—namely, by engaging with transnational audiences in person. This study is similar to other studies on rhetorical circulation in that it examines ways in which rhetors reach increasingly fragmented audiences. Instead of connecting to transnational audiences through mass mediated bits of discourses, Obama reached these audiences by creating rhetorical forums and directly engaging with them.

³⁷⁶ For more discussion on presidential travel, see Emily Jane Charnock, James A. McCann, and Kathryn Dunn Tenpas, "Presidential Travel from Eisenhower to George W. Bush: An 'Electoral College' Strategy," *Political Science Quarterly* 124 (2009): 323-339; Jeffrey E. Cohen and Richard J. Powell, "Building Public Support from the Grassroots Up: The Impact of Presidential Travel on State-Level Approval," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 35 (2005): 11-27; Brendan J. Doherty, "Elections: The Politics of the Permanent Campaign: Presidential Travel and the Electoral College, 1977-2004," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 37 (2007): 749-773; Richard J. Ellis, *Presidential Travel: The Journey from George Washington to George W. Bush* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2008); Keith V. Erickson, "Presidential spectacles: Political Illusionism and the Rhetoric of Travel," *Communications Monographs* 65 (1998): 141-153.

their support. This theoretical framework for embodied presidential speech helps us understand Obama's performance of representation at his transnational town hall meetings.

Embodied speech allows for a tailoring of a message specific for that particular audience, a point that has been contentious at least as far back as Plato. In *Phaedrus*, for example, Socrates lamented that writing created too much distance between the speaker and the message, and thus, between the speaker and the audience. Socrates said, "No one will ever possess the art of speaking, to the extent that any human being can, unless he acquires the ability to enumerate the sorts of characters to be found in any audience, to divide everything according to its kind."³⁷⁷ In other words, for Socrates, there needs to be an intimate relationship between the speaker and audience such that the speaker can teach the hearer what is good for the hearer's soul. As John Durham Peters notes, Socrates' view is that "indiscriminate dissemination is bad; intimate dialogue or prudent rhetoric that matches message and receiver good."³⁷⁸ Broad dissemination, in this line of thought, is less valuable to the relationship between the speaker and the hearer than embodied discourse because it disallows contextual specificity of the message. And with less contextual specificity, there is a potential distancing in the relationship between the speaker and the hearer.

Peters notes that with the advent of radio, presidents had to compensate for the disconnect between themselves and their audiences. They did so using different strategies with varying degrees of success. For example, Franklin Roosevelt inserted his physical presence in one of his fireside chats by interrupting himself and asking, "Where's that glass of water?" Roosevelt's bodily necessity increased his "presence" through the radio address providing "the

³⁷⁷ Plato, *Phaedrus*, in *Plato on Love*, ed. C.D.C. Reeve (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2006), 145.

³⁷⁸ John Durham Peters, *Speaking into the Air* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).

ultimate *ethos*.³⁷⁹ *Ethos* is derived through physical presence both because of the authenticity the body brings and the ability of speakers to tailor their messages to their specific audiences.

The president is a “one man distillation of the American people,” which gives him a unique relationship to the message and the hearer.³⁸⁰ According to Walter Fisher, the president’s *ethos* is directly connected to the image the president has of the people as expressed in his discourse, and thus, how well he fulfills the expectations of the people.³⁸¹ Likewise, Mary Stuckey notes that “presidents must unite contemporaneous occasions with appropriate traditions and innovations so that enough of us will continue to see ourselves—and sometimes even our better selves—reflected in the national mirror of public discourse.”³⁸² In other words, it is important for the president to be intimately connected to the people and to reflect the best version of these constituents. While this connection does not necessitate physical proximity, as Plato might argue it would, presidents have historically traveled to be near the people they represent. This travel suggests that physical proximity to the people is also symbolic of political proximity to the people.

Since George Washington, presidents have traveled in an effort for presidents to “see and be seen.”³⁸³ While the reasons for presidents to travel are expansive—such as collaborating on transnational peace-treaty deals and creating environmental policies internationally, or, within the U.S., “articulating administration policies, cultivating or dramatizing popular support, putting public pressure on other politicians, boosting the president’s reelection chances, and bolstering the electoral prospects of other candidate’s in the president’s party”³⁸⁴—a core purpose for the

³⁷⁹ Peters, *Speaking into the Air*, 220-221.

³⁸⁰ Clinton Rossiter, *The American Presidency* (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace & World Inc., 1960), 18.

³⁸¹ Fisher, “Rhetorical Fiction and the Presidency.”

³⁸² Stuckey, *Defining Americans*, 2.

³⁸³ Tulis, *The Rhetorical Presidency*, 69; Ellis, *Presidential Travel*.

³⁸⁴ Ellis, *Presidential Travel*, 5.

circulation of the presidential body has been to connect with “the people.” For instance, George Washington first toured New England for a month, hoping to, in part, make himself “more accessible to numbers of well-informed person, who might give him useful information and advice on political subjects.”³⁸⁵ That is, for the sake of his presidential *ethos*, Washington needed to make connections with the people. Since Washington, U.S. presidents have traveled in an effort to “consolidate national power” by increasing the visibility of a national head throughout the colonies. The arrival of Andrew Jackson ushered in a new commitment to travel that focused on “continually mingling with large masses of people.”³⁸⁶ With more technology and greater democratic, rather than republican, inclinations, presidential tours increased—with every president between Jackson and James Buchanan (with the exception of William Henry Harrison) touring the nation during their presidency.³⁸⁷ While presidential travel has increased both nationally and internationally, one purpose of the travel, according to political scientist Richard Ellis, remains the need for presidents to be physically near the people.

While presidents certainly travel to be symbolically near the people, the presence of the president with the people is an antecedent to a constitutive rhetorical experience in which the people imagine the president as a reflection of themselves and as their leader. The relationship between speaker and audience is important in the relationship between the president and the people he represents. According to Fisher, we can understand the president’s *ethos* by considering how the president imagines the people, as related in his speeches. How the president imagines the people is directly connected to how the people understand the president because the president is a figure of the people. When presidents travel, a unique experience occurs between

³⁸⁵ Ellis, *Presidential Travel*, 20. For Washington’s quotations, see Donald Jackson and Dorothy Twohig, eds., *The Diaries of George Washington* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1979).

³⁸⁶ Ellis, *Presidential Travel*, 234.

³⁸⁷ Ellis, *Presidential Travel*, 8.

the president and the audience that cannot occur through disembodied speech. Thus, Obama's physical presence with transnational audience strengthened his *ethos* as a representative, helping him to move from the realm of the national to the transnational and global.

4.2.2.2 Definition of a Situation

According to David Zarefsky, presidential rhetoric "defines political reality." That is, Zarefsky notes, characterizations of social realities are not "given," but rather "chosen from among multiple possibilities."³⁸⁸ Thus, Obama's naming of these meetings with foreign citizens "town halls" has meaning, and it has the potential to shape and define political realities such as the role of the president in relation to the citizens in the town hall meetings. In addition to shaping the political reality, Obama's defining of the situation as a town hall meeting had the potential to "shape the context in which events . . . are viewed by the public."³⁸⁹ The power of definition, in this instance, could extend from the transnational audience present at the events to the wider audiences that broadcast or read about the events, potentially also informing how the U.S. audience understood the role of the president.

Moreover, the naming of these events as town hall meetings plays an important role shaping Obama's rhetoric at the meetings. The U.S. town hall meeting is a rhetorical tradition. Rhetorical traditions, as John Murphy notes, "provide inventional resources which offer actors the opportunity to construct political authority."³⁹⁰ Obama drew upon the rhetorical tradition of the town hall meeting to frame his dialogue with transnational audiences. By naming the events town hall meetings as opposed to "question and answer forums," for instance, Obama invoked U.S. national mythos of direct democracy and thus implied particular rhetorical norms of

³⁸⁸ Zarefsky, "Presidential Rhetoric and the Power of Definition," 611.

³⁸⁹ Zarefsky, "Presidential Rhetoric and the Power of Definition," 611.

³⁹⁰ Murphy, "Inventing Authority," 71.

participation. New England town hall meetings were, as political scientist Frank M. Bryan argues, the only instances of “real democracy” in the history of U.S. politics. These meetings functioned as democratic forums by inviting all eligible citizens to legislate themselves.³⁹¹ They were moments of direct, rather than representative, democracy—arguably as pure in form as ever experienced in the U.S. The cultural memory of town hall meetings, especially as articulated by political theorists such as Alexis de Tocqueville, is that they were central to municipal governance. Tocqueville argued that these meetings were “to liberty what primary schools are to science; they bring it within the people’s reach, they teach men how to use and how to enjoy it,”³⁹² a description that reflects the idea that town hall meetings are democratic events in the truest sense. Within town hall meetings, or at least the public memory of town hall meetings, “the people” have direct access to power. They make effective change; they actively consent to laws that are binding upon themselves and their communities.

Of course, the power of presidential definition is constrained. Just because the president calls a rhetorical situation a “town hall” meeting, does not make it so. There are many differences between New England town hall meetings and Obama’s town meetings abroad, not the least of which is that Obama doesn’t represent the foreign citizens with whom he participated in the meeting; therefore, these citizens could not expect results from their dialogue with the president. These transnational town hall meetings risked offering false hope to transnational citizens, as Obama did not have actual power to make effective change in their national governments.

³⁹¹ Frank M. Bryan, *Real Democracy: The New England Town Meeting and How It Works* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 3-4.

³⁹² Alexis de Tocqueville, trans., translated by Henry Reeve, *Democracy in America* (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing Inc., 2002 [1889]); See also Bryan, *Real Democracy*, 21.

That Obama did not offer political representation, however, does not preclude the possibility of positive effects from the rhetorical interaction, either. There is a potential value in creating a better understanding between a person who holds enormous global power—the U.S. president—and foreign citizens. In other words, Obama’s power to define could have effects in the symbolic realm, not only the political realm.

4.2.2.3 Leader and Teacher of Democratic Practice

Obama’s town hall meetings drew upon certain norms for democratic participation in historical U.S. town hall meetings. This forum invited Obama’s audience members to enact, momentarily, a version of transnational democratic deliberation—by engaging with him on issues of their own agenda. Vanessa Beasley notes that “ritualized instances of presidential speech can be expected to affirm idealized cultural norms.”³⁹³ In this case, the idealized cultural norms are those of the United States, and they were transferred to a transnational scale.³⁹⁴ That is, they were not shared norms among the audience and the speaker. Obama transposed U.S. practices to citizens of other nations. Thus, if idealized cultural norms were affirmed, they were the cultural norms of the U.S. In this way, the “transnational democratic deliberation” that Obama circulates remained within the value-frame of the U.S. This is significant, because it shows that if transnational citizens identify with Obama as a potential representative, Obama’s “global role” is more imperialistic than it is anything else. That Obama positioned himself as a teacher of these “democratic” norms suggests that, like his predecessors, Obama used of the tropes of democracy and U.S. exceptionalism for the benefit of the U.S.

³⁹³ Beasley, *You, the People*, 9.

³⁹⁴ Transnational means “across nations.” With the exception of China, each audience included a multiplicity of nation-states and people groups. Thus, the rhetorical forum consists of interactions between the U.S. president and students from across national borders. The town hall forum invited the students from across different nation-states to adjust their subjectivity and co-constitute a new relationship between themselves and the president as he circulated with him the town hall forum.

The aspect of the town hall forum that differentiates it from other speeches delivered to international audience is that it relied on dialogue with foreign citizens. Dialogue offers an orderly way to express disagreement. At a Young Southeast Asian Leaders town hall meeting, some of the students brought protest signs with them. Obama responded to the signs by asking the audience members to put them away. “We’re here for a town hall,” he said. “See, that’s the thing, when you have a town hall, you don’t have a protest because you can just ask the questions directly.”³⁹⁵ In this moment, Obama exerted control over his audience by silencing it, thereby reinforcing a norm of a deliberative democratic forum common to the U.S., which, as several rhetorical scholars have noted, has always feared the *demos*.³⁹⁶ Despite silencing the *demos* for the sake of order, Obama used the dialogic format to show that the town hall meeting was a democratic event.

Obama’s town hall meetings also modeled national, racial, and gender equality. Obama advised the students to not divide themselves “on religious and ethnic lines and racial lines” and not to “discriminate against women.” He said that if they refrain from these types of discrimination, they are “not guaranteed success but at least ... not guaranteed failure.”³⁹⁷ He explained, perhaps presumptuously, to the Young African Leaders, that he would call on “girl, boy, girl, boy” because one of the things he wanted to “teach... Africa is how strong the women are and how we've got to empower women.”³⁹⁸ By alternating between women and men and by calling on students from all nations and people groups present in the meetings, Obama modeled

³⁹⁵ Obama, “Remarks by President Obama at Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative Town Hall, 11/14/14.”

³⁹⁶ See Robert Ivie, *Democracy and America's War on Terror* (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2005), 12.; Mercieca, *Founding Fictions*, 18.; Jeremy Engels, “Demophilia: A Discursive Counter to Demophobia in the Early Republic,” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 97 (2011): 131-154.

³⁹⁷ Obama, “Remarks by the President in Town Hall with YSEALI Initiative Fellows,” June 2, 2015, *White House Office of the Press Secretary*, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/06/02/remarks-president-town-hall-yseali-initiative-fellows>.

³⁹⁸ Obama, “Remarks at the Mandela Washington Fellowship for Young African Leaders Presidential Summit Town Hall and a Question-and-Answer Session,” July 28, 2014.

the value of equal representation in democratic events. When young leaders participated in these meetings, then, they engaged in a dialogic process of civic participation that Obama proposed as a model for global citizenship. Obama's performance as the leader of these town hall meetings—the one who set the rules, the one who modeled representation, dialogue, and democratic norms, in a deliberation over transnational policy, invited the audience to understand him as an active political representative.

Obama's performance as a representative is not without its complications. Scholars often criticize democratic deliberation, which Obama modeled, as Western-centric, meaning that it is not inclusive of other types of thought or styles of participation, and that its values are framed by the West.³⁹⁹ Obama's positioning of himself as a leader of values, such as equality, is also potentially patronizing. In a town hall meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Obama stated that the “interesting thing about being President of the United States” is that he is “not just President of the United States . . . [because] if there are problems elsewhere, people still expect you to solve them, even though they're not your country. And that's part of the leadership and obligation and responsibility that we have as a powerful nation.”⁴⁰⁰ Obama's speech on his relationship with the rest of the world reflected American exceptionalist discourse of modern U.S. presidential rhetoric—the U.S. president is the leader, the teacher, and the savior of the world.

The U.S. president not only positioned himself as exceptional through the power of the nation-state, but also through its democratic values, which he described as universal. One way that Obama demonstrated global leadership of these (U.S.) values was through the forum of the town hall. Obama used the trope of democracy to lead transnational citizens in a pseudo-

³⁹⁹ For a review of many critiques to deliberative democracy, see Darrin Hicks, “The Promise(s) of Deliberative Democracy,” *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 5 (2002): 223-260.

⁴⁰⁰ Obama, “Remarks by the President in YSEALI Town Hall,” November 20, 2015.

democratic event. In doing so, he increased authority for himself as a global leader, while also listening to, and engaging with, the concerns of transnational citizens. He used American exceptionalism to perform global representation and leadership, demonstrating one way presidents use traditional U.S. public discourse to strengthen their global role.

4.2.2.4 Transnational Identification

Obama's final rhetorical strategy was to identify with his audience through transnationalism. Obama consistently recalled his own transnational background in these town hall meetings. With the Young African Leaders, for instance, Obama spoke about his Kenyan father. With the Young Leaders of the Americas, Obama reminded the audience that he was born on an island and that a million Americans trace their ancestry to Jamaica.⁴⁰¹ With the Young Southeast Asian Leaders, Obama mentioned both his Indonesian sister who is married to a Chinese man and his mother's work abroad, reciting versions of the following:

As you know, I've got a strong personal connection to Southeast Asia. I spent time as a young boy in Indonesia. Indonesia is in the house. My sister, Maya, is half-Indonesian—she was born in Jakarta. My mother spent years working in rural villages in this region, empowering women. And so the rich tradition of the Pacific—the food, the people—which I like the people and I really like the food—this is part of who I am and how I see the world.”⁴⁰²

These stories helped the president relate to his audience while inviting the audience to identify with Obama. Obama shared a transnational identity similar to the identity he imposed onto the audience. By drawing attention to the transnational aspects of his identity, Obama was able to

⁴⁰¹ Obama, “Remarks by President Obama in Town Hall with Young Leaders of the Americas,” April 9, 2015.

⁴⁰² Obama, “Remarks by President Obama in Town Hall with Young Leaders of the Americas,” April 9, 2015.

consubstantiate with his transnational audience, bolstering his role as symbolic global representative.

4.3 Obama Figures Foreign Citizens

In addition to providing a forum in which Obama could discursively and physically present himself as a symbolic representative of transnational citizens, the town hall meetings also provided a rhetorical context for Obama to define extra-national identity markers. Namely, Obama figured his audiences as transnational/global, rather than national citizens. He also altered American exceptionalist rhetoric, arguing that foreign citizens were exemplary. Together, these characteristics offer a differentiation between transnational policy speech and foreign policy speech, traditionally exclusionary American myths providing a rhetorical resource for the characterization of foreign citizens.

4.3.1 Citizens as Transnational/Global

Obama constructed transnational identification for the town hall audiences through the grouping of nations and through his discourse about these groups. Town hall meetings rarely contain single nation states. For instance, Obama met with the Young Leaders of the Americas, Young African Leaders, and Young Southeast Asian Leaders throughout his terms. These town hall meetings were then institutionalized into White House Initiatives, a practice Obama hoped his successors would continue.⁴⁰³

The grouping of these citizens provided a context for the audiences to think of themselves collectively. Obama encouraged this collective thinking throughout his discourse in several ways, including presenting statistics that reflected the citizens' transnational, rather than national,

⁴⁰³ Barack Obama, "Remarks by President Obama at YSEALI Town Hall," September 7, 2016, *The White House Office of the Press Secretary*, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/07/remarks-president-obama-yseali-town-hall>.

makeup; focusing on policies that affect those particular geopolitical regions; and discussing the groups' collective vision. In these ways, Obama invited citizens to understand themselves as having transnational, rather than solely national, identities. For instance, Obama told Young Southeast Asian Leaders that he visited with them "because the ten nations of ASEAN are home to about one in ten of the world's citizens. About two-thirds of Southeast Asia's population is under thirty-five years old.... [This region has] growing economies and emerging democracies, and a vibrant diversity."⁴⁰⁴ In this example, Obama focused on the power of these citizens only in relation to other citizens across national borders.

Obama also bolstered transnational identification by focusing exclusively on the merits of policies that would benefit Obama's determined region of citizens. For instance, Obama told the Young Southeast Asian Leaders that the "landmark Trans-Pacific Partnership" would "grow our economies and support jobs in each of our countries. Together, we're working to stand up for human rights and democracy."⁴⁰⁵ Obama argued that nations are partners with one another—they succeed or fail together. Obama was able to talk about transnational policies because he presented these citizens as holding a singular purpose. To the Young African Leaders, Obama positioned a group of nations as one entity with one vision. He said:

You represent a different vision, a vision of Africa on the move—an Africa that's ending old conflicts, as in Liberia, where President Sirleaf told me, today's children have "not known a gun and not had to run"; an Africa that's modernizing and creating opportunities— agribusiness in Tanzania, prosperity in Botswana, political progress in

⁴⁰⁴ "Remarks by President Obama at Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative Town Hall, 11/14/14."

⁴⁰⁵ Obama, "Remarks by the President in YSEALI Town Hall," November 20, 2015.

Ghana and Guinea; an Africa that's pursuing a broadband revolution that could transform the daily lives of future generations.⁴⁰⁶

Here, Obama presented the stories of several nations alongside each other, implying that these nations have similar qualities to one another—so much so that they qualify as a single entity—“an Africa.” By presenting “an Africa,” Obama shaped his audience’s identity as transnational rather than national, revealing another aspect of how U.S. presidents perform a global role. Transnational citizenship is part of a global, rather than national, imaginary. As such, it has the potential to help audiences imagine extra-national representative and leadership possibilities.

The exceptions to the creation of transnational audiences include one meeting in China with a primarily Chinese audience, one meeting in India with a primarily Indian audience, and one meeting in France with a primarily French audience. Still, the meeting in France took place in a border town, which Obama called out explicitly, saying, “Strasbourg has been known throughout history as a city at the crossroads It’s fitting because we find ourselves at a crossroads as well—all of us—for we’ve arrived at a moment where each nation and every citizen must choose at last how we respond to a world that has grown smaller and more connected than at any time in its existence.”⁴⁰⁷ Here, Obama stressed the importance of understanding the world as interconnected and dependent. Obama constituted his audiences as purposefully transnational, and he identified with these constructed audiences by enacting transnationalism as well.

⁴⁰⁶ Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at Town Hall with Young African Leaders,” August 3, 2010, *White House Office of the Press Secretary*, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-town-hall-with-young-african-leaders>.

⁴⁰⁷ Obama, “Remarks by President Obama at Strasbourg Town Hall,” April 3, 2009, *White House Office of the Press Secretary*, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-strasbourg-town-hall>.

Furthermore, Obama consistently proposed that his audience members would become global rather than national leaders. For instance, when one of the Young African Leaders asked if the president would continue the Young African Leaders Initiative once he had left office, Obama responded that he was working toward institutionalizing the program so that future presidents would continue to sustain the program. Here, he pointed out that this initiative was not only in Africa—that it is also in Asia and Latin America, because “as I said before, ultimately you’re going to be global leaders, not just leaders in your own country.”⁴⁰⁸ The vision of his audience members being global leaders rather than purely national ones also appeared in his speeches when he stated the goals of the town hall meetings. When he met with the Young Southeast Asian Leaders, he told them that his vision is one of a “shared future” that “America cannot impose” and that this future “is one we need to build together, in partnership, with all the nations and people of the region, especially young people.”⁴⁰⁹ Obama’s message displayed the implications of the town hall meeting forum: that the students were equal, democratic citizens who were to work together to make effective change.

The students’ interactions with the president, though, never reflect that they understood themselves in such a way, instead identifying as citizens of particular nation-states, or even regions of nation-states. In the final meeting of Young Southeast Asian Leaders, for instance, questions included, “What is your view on the democracy in Malaysia with the recent jailing of Anawar Ibrahim, the opposition leader, and the crackdown on opposition?” and “What do you see . . . [as] critical issues . . . [in which] the U.S. can contribute economic development in

⁴⁰⁸ Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at the Young African Leaders Initiative Presidential Summit Town Hall,” *White House Office of the Press Secretary*, August 3, 2015, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/08/03/remarks-president-young-african-leaders-initiative-presidential-summit>.

⁴⁰⁹ Obama, “Remarks at a Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative Town Hall and a Question-and-Answer Session at the University of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia,” April 27, 2014.

Burma?”⁴¹⁰ Both of these questions regarded the specific country of the audience member who asked Obama the question. Likewise, Young African Leaders asked if the President “will support Africa’s condition for permanency at the U.N. Security Council.”⁴¹¹ The audience members’ political subjectivity remained within the realm of their nation states or region of nation-states. This is important because it shows that Obama’s transnational citizen-making was not entirely successful. Though citizens came together across nations to meet with Obama, they did not identify as transnational or global citizens—they remained in the realm of the nation-state. Citizens, in these cases, were more willing to believe that the U.S. president has power to make effective change in their lives, and potentially shift the identity of the president, than they were to believe they are connected to other citizens across state borders.

4.3.2 Transnational Citizens as Exceptional

To a group of young Southeast Asian citizens, Obama said that the ASEAN region has “incredible potential...as a place of religious diversity and ethnic diversity,” and this region can “set an example, not just to stand up to violent extremism, but to build interfaith dialogue.”⁴¹² While seemingly innocuous, this statement veered dramatically from traditional foreign policy rhetoric, which rarely describes other nations as places that may set a moral example for the rest of the world. The president exemplified a region of nations as being uniquely able to lead against violence and to promote diversity—a common refrain in domestic political speech when referring to the U.S.

⁴¹⁰ Obama, “Remarks by the President at the Young African Leaders Initiative Presidential Summit Town Hall,” August 3, 2015.

⁴¹¹ Obama, “Remarks by the President at the Young African Leaders Initiative Presidential Summit Town Hall,” August 3, 2015.

⁴¹² Obama, “Remarks by the President in YSEALI Town Hall,” November 20, 2015.

It is rare for presidents to ever exemplify other nations as models. Kevin Coe and Rico Neumann find that from 1934 to 2008, presidents only held up foreign entities as exemplars three times (out of 2,480 total mentions) in State of the Union (SOTU) speeches.⁴¹³ Sheila Croucher notes that Obama made sixty-eight references to foreign entities in SOTUs from 2010 to 2014 and only three of those references can be considered “cosmopolitan,” or acknowledging common humanity and moral reasoning.⁴¹⁴ In Obama’s final two SOTU addresses, I found approximately thirty references to foreign entities (including the world or the “global”), only one of which named another nation as cosmopolitan or exemplary. The exception to the rule was when Obama said that the U.S. is the only “advanced country on Earth that doesn't guarantee paid sick leave or paid maternity leave to our workers.”⁴¹⁵ Here, Obama strayed from an expected discourse of exceptionalism to show that the U.S. lags behind other countries in employee rights.

In Obama’s SOTU addresses, the references he made to foreign entities were almost exclusively about terrorism or economic competition. For example, regarding China, Obama said: “twenty-first century businesses, including small businesses, need to sell more American products overseas. Today, our businesses export more than ever, and exporters tend to pay their workers higher wages. But as we speak, China wants to write the rules for the world's fastest growing region. That would put our workers and our businesses at a disadvantage. Why would we let that happen? We should write those rules.”⁴¹⁶ For Obama, as a representative and leader of the U.S., the U.S. should have the power and authority to “write the rules” for trade in Asia,

⁴¹³ Coe and Neumann, “International Identity in Theory and Practice: The Case of the Modern American Presidency,” 154.

⁴¹⁴ Sheila Croucher, “From World Citizenship to Purified Patriotism: Obama's Nation-shaping in a Global Era,” *Identities* 22 (2015), 12.

⁴¹⁵ Barack Obama, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,” January 20, 2015, in *The American Presidency Project*, edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=108031>.

⁴¹⁶ Obama, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,” January 20, 2015.

rather than the most populated country in Asia writing the rules for themselves. This is exceptionalist speech that contrasts with how Obama broached the topic of economy and trade at his town hall meeting in Shanghai. There, Obama used China's economic success as a marker of strength, saying the United States admires China's "growing economy . . . [and] extraordinary commitment to science and research."⁴¹⁷ It is not common in presidential speech on foreign policy to admire another country's growing economy. According to exceptionalist precepts, another country's competitive economy would threaten the U.S.'s God-given right to be supreme.

In Strasbourg, France, Obama admitted "failure" for the U.S. to "appreciate Europe's leading role in the world." In fact, Obama says, "America has shown arrogance and been dismissive, even derisive."⁴¹⁸ Here, the president not only acknowledges a U.S. failure—but also admitted to shared leadership and responsibility. While it is not surprising that a president would speak well of a country when he stands before them on their own turf and less well of a foreign country when he addresses the state of the union, it is nonetheless important to note that there is now a forum in which a president might not only mention foreign entities, but also treat them as worthy of emulation. So far, this is unique to the Obama presidency and it signals a potential shift in presidential policy speech. Moreover, it reveals how presidents might shape the extra-national identity of citizens outside of the United States. Just as U.S. exceptionalism shapes and reflects national identity, the exemplification of foreign nations invites these nations to imagine their role within the rest of the world—or at least their role according the U.S. president.

⁴¹⁷ Barack Obama, "Remarks by President Barack Obama at Town Hall Meeting with Future Chinese Leaders," November 16, 2009, *White House Office of the Press Secretary*, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/realitycheck/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-town-hall-meeting-with-future-chinese-leaders>.

⁴¹⁸ Obama, "Remarks by President Obama at Strasbourg Town Hall," April 3, 2009.

In addition to exemplifying foreign nations and admitting past mistakes, Obama also described the U.S. as a model to avoid. This, of course, is in direct opposition to the rhetoric of American exceptionalism. A Malaysian citizen asked what advice Obama would give to potential young leaders in the Southeast Asian region “to avoid the pitfalls of challenges facing the U.S.” Obama responded that “it is very important to avoid any political system where money overwhelms ideas” and then explained that the political process in the U.S. “has become so expensive and it lasts so long . . . and when politicians have to raise so much money all the time, then they start listening a little bit more to the people who have money, as opposed to ordinary people.”⁴¹⁹ In this quotation, Obama revealed corruption in the U.S. political system and undercut the U.S. as a democratic nation. He also told the Southeast Asian audience that “politics in the United States increasingly is defined by personal attacks and saying very sensational things in the media.”⁴²⁰ In this response, Obama did not use American exceptionalist rhetoric. He did, however, continue to position himself as a moral leader and teacher. By figuring transnational citizens as exceptional, and at the same time denying American exceptionalism, Obama strayed from traditional foreign policy speech, exemplifying a difference between foreign policy and transnational policy speech. Moreover, this speech reveals how a president can connect to foreign citizens, an important aspect of a global presidential role.

4.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I examined a third audience relevant to the global role of the president—transnational citizens. Obama’s town hall meetings provided a case study in which presidential speech was directed toward, and in dialogue with, these transnational citizens. By analyzing these speeches through the lenses of transnational policy speech and the myth of American

⁴¹⁹ Obama, “Remarks by the President in YSEALI Town Hall,” November 20, 2015.

⁴²⁰ Obama, “Remarks by the President in YSEALI Town Hall,” November 20, 2015.

exceptionalism, I found two important aspects of the president's rhetoric toward foreign citizens. First, that the president used American exceptionalist rhetoric and practices to position himself as a global leader, teacher, and representative. And second, that he paradoxically dropped this exceptionalism as he called forth a transnational and global identity among these citizens. These two aspects of Obama's rhetoric display the complicated dynamic of representation and citizenship under conditions of globalization.

Furthermore, this chapter provided a deeper understanding of rhetorical circulation—of both rhetorical practices and of the orator himself. There is reason to understand these town hall meetings as modeling global citizenship through a transnational circulation of rhetorical practice. Thomas Farrell argues that a rhetorical forum provides a “provisionally constrained context and an avenue of mediation among discourses that might otherwise be self-confirming, incommensurable, or perhaps not even heard at all.”⁴²¹ It is possible that these citizens' concerns would not have been heard by a political leader had they not been a part of Obama's town hall meetings. However, the citizens still experienced little power in these rhetorical forums. While the foreign citizens might be heard, to an extent, in these town hall meetings, there was also significant uneven power structure at play. The president held political power, whereas these audience members, in this rhetorical forum, did not. So while the citizens and the president may enact a type of discursive global citizenship in these forums, the citizens were not making their own laws that would be binding for them—which was the power of true New England town hall meetings.

Thus, while embodied presidential circulation did the constitutive work of inviting a new global imaginary of the relationship between the U.S. president and the foreign citizen, it was, in

⁴²¹ Thomas B. Farrell, *Norms of Rhetorical Culture* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993), 282.

the end, not entirely successful. Jason Edward Black argued that “circulation involves interpretive communities whose cultural workings provide their own ways to evaluate and live their public lives based on the circulated texts that mesh with their civic mythos.”⁴²² In this case, the circulation was the president himself and the forum of the town hall meetings, not discursive texts—and, ultimately, the citizens could not share civic mythos because they belonged to different nations. Thus, they retained their own national interests and identity. Moreover, these audience members did not actually possess the power of self-governance as implied by the town hall meeting forum—the forum that invited them to understand themselves and each other as global citizens was unable to provide the political power necessary for them to make political decisions. They could only ask the president for his help. So, it follows that the invitation to understand Obama as a global leader was accepted and the invitation to understand themselves as active global citizens was rejected.

This chapter is rhetorically significant because it extends a study of rhetorical circulation to include rhetorical forums and presidential presence. Politically, it reveals how President Obama used a democratic practice to position himself as a global representative and to create identity formations among foreign citizens. In the next chapter, I explain the rhetorical and political implications of this dissertation as well as provide some discussion of how Donald Trump’s rhetoric fits within this schema of the global imaginary.

⁴²² Black, “Native Authenticity, Rhetorical Circulation, and Neocolonial Decay,” 637-638.

5 CONCLUSIONS

On March 20, 2016, President Obama became the first sitting president to visit the Republic of Cuba since Calvin Coolidge traveled there by battleship in 1928.⁴²³ Obama's presence in Cuba displayed a new era of relations between the U.S. and Cuba. This event and the discourse that surrounded the event echoed that of George H.W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev's meetings in Malta, itself significant for ending the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the U.S. Just as Gorbachev's spokesman declared the Cold War "buried at the bottom of the Mediterranean Sea,"⁴²⁴ Obama stated that he had come to Cuba to bury the last remnant of the Cold War in the Americas.⁴²⁵ Also like Bush and Gorbachev's meeting in Malta, Obama's trip to Cuba included a joint press conference with the estranged nation's head of state. This collaborative event displayed a degree of solidarity between the two nations as they appeared together before international press. Moreover, it provided an opportunity for Obama to perform a global role—engaging in a cooperative act of leadership with the leader of one of the U.S.'s long-standing adversaries and employing democratic ideology throughout the joint press conference.

Democratic ideology, and U.S. actions justified by democratic ideology, is a significant element of the tense relationship between the U.S. and Cuba. It is also foundational to the

⁴²³ "Obama in Cuba on Historic Visit," *Reuters*, March 20, 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cuba-idUSKCN0WM04H>

⁴²⁴ "How 1989 Brought an End to the Cold War," *BBC*, December 27, 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8429237.stm>.

⁴²⁵ "Obama Visits Cuba," *New York Times*, March 22, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/international/obama-in-cuba/even-cubas-die-hard-communists-liked-what-obama-had-to-say>.

rhetorical frame U.S. presidents use to construct a global imaginary.⁴²⁶ For instance, in the joint press conference with Castro, Obama made a case for the universal nature of democracy, saying:

America believes in democracy. We believe that freedom of speech and freedom of assembly and freedom of religion are not just American values but are universal values. They may not express themselves exactly in the same way in every country. They may not be enshrined in the founding documents or constitutions of every country in the same way or protected legally in exactly the same ways, but the impulse, the human impulse towards freedom, the freedom that José Martí talked about, we think is a universal longing.⁴²⁷

Obama, as a representative of the U.S., claimed the values of democracy and human rights. Extending this argument, Obama maintained that human rights and democracy, as defined by the U.S., are not only American values, but also the impulses of humanity — meaning they are universal. He then referenced Cuban nationalist hero José Martí, figuring him as a synecdoche for the world. Not only do Americans believe in these democratic ideas, the argument goes, so do all great people from other nations, as represented in Martí.⁴²⁸ In this speech, Obama made a case that the U.S. was in the position to be a model for other nations because of its commitment to democracy and human rights. Furthermore, Obama appealed to his audience and established his global role by providing evidence that these values were transnational, crossing the

⁴²⁶ Presidents have been making a case for the universalization of democracy since the founding of the U.S. This anecdote, as well as the case studies throughout the dissertation, consider how they do so in the post-Cold War context.

⁴²⁷ “Remarks by President Obama and President Raul Castro of Cuba in a Joint Press Conference,” March 21, 2016, *The White House Office of the Press Secretary*, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/21/remarks-president-obama-and-president-raul-castro-cuba-joint-press>.

⁴²⁸ “Remarks by President Obama and President Raul Castro of Cuba in a Joint Press Conference,” March 21, 2016.

ideological and geographical borders of nations that had somewhat remained within the polarized blocs of the Cold War frame.

Further, Obama used the press conference to promote U.S. global ideology by pressuring Castro into engaging with the press and thus responding to questions about human rights violations. Obama, after answering a question that U.S. Andrea Mitchell posed to both leaders about human rights, said to Castro, “Okay, now I’m done, but Señor Presidente, I think Andrea had a question for you just about your vision. It’s up to you . . . if you want to address that question [about human rights].”⁴²⁹ At this moment, Obama presented himself as a leader willing to engage in a democratic practice and positioned Castro as a potentially uncooperative Other who might not want to address the topic of human rights. Castro took the reporter’s question, defending Cuba’s human right’s record. The press conference presented an opportunity for democratic performance by both leaders, though it is clear that Obama navigated the reporters’ questions with more ease than did Castro. Thus, the press conference offers another example of how presidents use institutions to promote their image abroad.

Obama’s trip to Cuba provides a representative anecdote of several through lines in this dissertation. First, it shows how elements of the Cold War discursive frame persist in contemporary presidential rhetoric and are used on behalf of the global imaginary. Second, it shows how presidents use “democracy” to legitimate themselves as global leaders. Third, it shows how presidents use institutional elements to promote the global imaginary.

This chapter continues with an overview of each case study. I then discuss the themes of the dissertation, which include (1) the institutional facets of a global presidency, including bilateral conversations with other world leaders; joint press conferences; and transnational town

⁴²⁹ “Read a Transcript of Obama’s Press Conference in Havana,” *Time*, March 21, 2016, <http://time.com/4266772/barack-obama-raul-castro-press-conference-transcript/>

hall meetings. Each of these elements provide transnational audiences, with whom presidents collaborate, and for whom presidents craft messages specifically for extra-national citizens and contexts. (2) The discursive construction of universals, through which presidents ground their authority. (3) The ways in which presidents shape identity among nations and citizens in a global context. (4) Globalization as a subjective phenomenon created through the rhetorical construction of a global imaginary. Then, I discuss the political and rhetorical implications of this study. Rhetorically, this dissertation helps us better understand the relationship between speakers and transnational audiences; expands our understanding of the rhetorical presidency in a global context; and provides case studies that connect rhetoric to the imaginary. Politically, this dissertation provides insight into post-Cold War presidential speech; transnational relationships among nations; and how globalization, and the presidential construction thereof, has shaped political realities. Finally, I present Donald Trump's presidency as an example of backlash against U.S. presidential involvement in globalization. Applying the lens of the global imaginary, I briefly discuss Trump's discourse to show the potential of this rhetorical framework to analyze presidential discourse even when this discourse presents an aberration from the norm.

5.1 Chapter Summary

The first case study examined George H.W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev's discourse at the end of the Cold War. These world leaders represented the Western and Eastern Blocs, respectively. When they met in Malta, Bush and Gorbachev expected their time together to be merely a preparatory meeting for a larger summit that would bring the war to a close. The talks were so successful that by the end of their time in Malta, Bush and Gorbachev held an unprecedented joint press conference, symbolically ending the Cold War. In this analysis, I show that Bush and Gorbachev negotiated the "East-West" metaphorical frame pervasive in Cold War

discourse during their private meetings. In doing so, they formed global imaginaries that aligned sufficiently for the two leaders to perform a degree of unity that joint press conferences demand. This chapter, then, revealed an aspect of the global role of the president—that presidents interact with other world leaders on the global stage to negotiate new political realities.

The second case study examined Bill Clinton and George W. Bush’s speeches before the United Nations General Assembly. Clinton and Bush used the UNGA to universalize the trope of “democracy,” thus increasing their authority and legitimacy as global leaders. They did so first by enacting democratic leadership through the speech setting of the UNGA, the most deliberative and representative body of the UN, thus gaining collective political approval. Second, they conflated “democracy” with “global market” and “human rights.” In doing so, they served U.S. interests in a global context. This chapter used the rhetorical theory of “universal audience” to explain how presidents may relate to the UN to universalize U.S. values, protect U.S. interests, and strengthen their role as a global leader.

The third case study analyzed Barack Obama’s transnational town hall meetings. In doing so, I shifted the focus toward a third audience central to the role of the contemporary president—transnational citizens. These town hall meetings revealed that foreign citizens imagined, to some degree, that Obama was their leader and representative. In analyzing Obama’s performance, embodied circulation, and speech in these town hall meetings, I discussed several of Obama’s rhetorical strategies that might account for these students’ global imaginary. Furthermore, I described Obama’s speech as transnational foreign policy speech, differentiating it from traditional foreign policy speech and outlining its characteristics. Finally, I delineated how presidents can use this speech to construct transnational and global identity for both themselves and their audiences.

5.2 The Rhetorical Presidency and the Global Imaginary

This dissertation builds off previous scholarship that critiques and extends the rhetorical presidency as a paradigm for studying the institution of the presidency, and especially the relationship between the presidency and the people, through the use of rhetoric. The rhetorical presidency model, as developed originally by James Ceaser, Glen Thurow, Jeffrey Tulis, and Joseph Bessette, notes a shift in the institution of the presidency in the latter half of the twentieth century in which presidents began to appeal directly to the public through rhetoric. The causes of this shift, they argue, was a combination of a modern doctrine of presidential leadership, a rise of mass media, and the modern presidential campaign.⁴³⁰ Studies in the fields of political science and communication built upon this theory of the rhetorical presidency, focusing primarily on how the rhetorical presidency changed the institution of the presidency or the speech, respectively.⁴³¹ What all of these studies have in common is that they focus on the presidency as a national institution. I used the rhetorical presidency paradigm as a starting point for understanding a global presidency, grounding it in an understanding of the presidency as an institution that has the potential to shift over time, and providing context for how the president has related to “the people” over time. The dissertation departed from the model in that “the people” I considered were transnational, not national. The dissertation also considered additional institutional elements of the presidency as it focused on the role of the president outside the bounds of the nation-state.

This dissertation also fits within the realm of scholarship on presidential rhetoric. Martin Medhurst distinguishes the rhetorical presidency model from the study of presidential rhetoric,

⁴³⁰ Ceaser, Thurow, Tulis, and Bessette, “The Rise of the Rhetorical Presidency,” 161; Tulis, *The Rhetorical Presidency*.

⁴³¹ See Stuckey and Antczak, “The Rhetorical Presidency.”

arguing that while scholars of the rhetorical presidency are “concerned with the nature, scope, and function of the presidency as a constitutional office,” those who study presidential rhetoric are concerned with the “principles and practice of rhetoric” within the construct of the presidency.⁴³² This dissertation concerns both sub-disciplines. I analyzed presidential public address, gaining insight into transnational rhetoric broadly, and how presidents construct a global imaginary more specifically. I analyzed the relationship between the president’s character, his audience, his appeals, and the context of his speech. The context of the speech, of course, includes the institution of the presidency—bound by tradition and generic expectation. The dissertation revealed both how the institution of the presidency functions rhetorically under conditions of globalization and how presidents use rhetoric to negotiate new global political realities with other world leaders, intervene in supranational institutions, and imagine new identities between nations and citizens.

In order to study the multi-faceted global presidency, I attended specifically to how presidents have engaged with different transnational audiences since the Cold War. I made this methodological choice because the end of the Cold War presents a moment in which global alliances realigned. There was also a shift in the role of the president and in presidential rhetoric. In negotiating new political realities, presidents constructed new reasons for international policy and forged new relationships with international audiences. For example, George H.W. Bush’s presidency presented an opportunity, and perhaps a need, for the president to (re)construct a global imaginary. This imaginary functioned as a rhetorical framework for future presidents to engage in the world and among transnational audiences. Of course, Bush did not invent the global imaginary out of thin air and then pass it down to his successors. Instead, the global

⁴³² For the distinction between presidential rhetoric and the rhetorical presidency, see Medhurst, *Beyond the Rhetorical Presidency*, xi-xxv.

imaginary contains elements of the U.S. rhetorical tradition from different moments in its history. For instance, U.S. public address has always relied on American exceptionalism to justify international intervention. Since at least the creation of the Declaration of Independence, politicians have espoused American values as “universal.” Politicians have always created an Other to war against. And since the Cold War, U.S. public address has relied on the “East-West” frame to explain foreign policy decisions. My case studies show that presidents draw upon this American rhetorical tradition to create a global imaginary, and it is through this tradition that they ground their authority as global leaders.

This global imaginary works differently in different contexts and for different ends, but it coheres with common themes. George H.W. Bush’s presidency was characterized by the end of the Cold War. He used the global imaginary to present a new world order in which the U.S. was the leader. Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, as the first presidents to begin their terms after the Cold War, used the global imaginary to universalize democracy through speeches before an increasingly important supranational institution, the UN, thus emboldening Bush’s claim to global leadership. These presidents, through their role as leaders of the U.S. as well as supranational institutions, provided a global imaginary that was grounded in the idea that the U.S. was exceptional because of its commitment to values, which they argued were universal. Barack Obama, then, used this as a warrant to enact global representation and leadership. In other words, George H.W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush’s construction of a global imaginary provided background knowledge for Obama’s performance of a global presidency. The global imaginary functioned as a rhetorical tool to both construct and justify a global role for the contemporary president, which extends the interests of the U.S. throughout the world, undoubtedly exacerbating global power inequalities.

While I focused on different types of audiences to understand how presidents develop a global imaginary, the global presidency model has dimensions that would benefit from different methodologies. For instance, further studies could consider the global “image” of the president—how presidents construct an aesthetic to appeal to transnational audiences and how these transnational audiences construct images of presidents; how different presidential personas appeal to transnational audiences; how the circulation of mediated messages change the relationship between the president and transnational audiences; and how presidents engage with transnational citizens within the U.S. Each of these studies would deepen our understanding of the global role of the contemporary president and presidential rhetoric.

5.3 Implications

This dissertation has rhetorical and political implications. Rhetorically, it deepens our understanding of the relationship between speakers and transnational audiences, expands our understanding of the political rhetoric in the context of the global, and connects rhetoric to the concept of the imaginary. Presidents, as powerful political actors, use different types of transnational audiences to figure their own role in the world and to figure the relationship between their audience and the rest of the world.⁴³³ Moreover, presidents draw on aspects of the global imaginary and, in turn, alter this imaginary.

For instance, in Chapter Two, when George H.W. Bush engaged with Mikhail Gorbachev in Malta, Bush figured himself as a global leader. In these discussions, he also collaborated with Gorbachev’s vision of how nations should relate to one another as members of a global society that had similar values, rather than exceptional Western values. The two leaders drew upon the transcendent notions of justice and freedom to forge particular global imaginaries. Chapter Three

⁴³³ This has consequences as U.S. interests are not the same as the interests of other nations or the globe.

showed how presidents used the trope of “democracy” to make themselves, and thus the U.S., one with the UNGA, their universal audience. To do so, they expanded a national ideograph (“democracy”) into the realm of the universal, constructing a global imaginary that relied on a U.S. concept. That is, “democracy” referred to a specifically U.S.-brand of democracy, which Clinton used to alter the global imaginary. Finally, Chapter Four revealed how Obama presented himself not only as a global leader and representative of the foreign citizens in his immediate audience, but he also constructed transnational identities between citizens in his town hall meetings. He drew upon an aspect of the global imaginary that had been established by presidents and other political elites before him— universal democracy—to present himself as a representative as well as a leader within a transnational democratic forum, thus expanding the role of the president in the global imaginary. These cases show how presidents use the global imaginary as an inventional resource to create new realities and relationships between speakers, audiences, and the rest of the world.

This dissertation is politically significant in that, as presidents create these new global realities, they also establish and reinforce often problematic global hierarchies. Furthermore, through understanding the relationship between the rhetorical and the imaginary in the context of political leaders and transnational audiences, we can better understand global problems. Global problems, in addition to the power inequalities include, for example, immigration, global warming, and war. Understanding “the global” as a rhetorical construction provides a starting point for analyzing political speech about these problems. Political actors and discourses are part of a global network with multiple global imaginaries. By untangling this web, we can more clearly understand the background knowledge that provides warrants for these discourses. Another example of a global problem, for some, is globalization itself, and the role of the U.S.

president in it. In the next section, I turn to anti-globalization rhetoric and the presidency of Donald Trump. Using the rhetorical lens of the global imaginary and the historical understanding of how post-Cold War presidents have used the global imaginary to shape their role in the world, I provide initial insight into Trump's presidency as an anomaly of the global presidency.

5.4 Backlash Against Globalization

On September 26, 2016, presidential candidates Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump engaged in a televised debate. During this debate, Clinton said the following:

I want to reassure our allies in Japan and South Korea and elsewhere that we have mutual defense treaties and we will honor them. It is essential that America's word be good. And so I know that this campaign has caused some questioning and worries on the part of many leaders across the globe. But I want to say ... our word is good. It's also important that we look at the entire global situation. ... People around the world follow our presidential campaigns so closely, trying to get hints about what we will do. Can they rely on us? Are we going to lead the world with strength and in accordance with our values? ... I intend to be a leader of our country that people can count on, both here at home and around the world, to make decisions that will further peace and prosperity, but also stand up to bullies, whether they're abroad or at home. We cannot let those who would try to destabilize the world to interfere with American interests and security."⁴³⁴

Hillary Clinton's statement in the first presidential debate with Donald Trump is representative of contemporary U.S. presidential speech— until Trump. Clinton's run for president was

⁴³⁴ Aaron Blake, "The First Trump-Clinton Presidential Debate Transcript, Annotated," *Washington Post*, September 26, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/09/26/the-first-trump-clinton-presidential-debate-transcript-annotated/?utm_term=.61ec93e2e804.

unsuccessful, yet her speech reflected a similar understanding of the role of the U.S. president as the previous four post-Cold War presidents. The discourse of these presidents— George H.W. Bush, William J. Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama— reflected the idea that the presidency resides simultaneously in the sphere of the national and the global. Their rhetoric was characterized by the notions that presidents must answer, to some extent, to other world leaders, acknowledge and respond to non-U.S. citizens, and “look at the entire global situation” all the while protecting “American interests and security.” Presidents perform this global role largely discursively, which candidate Clinton self-reflexively demonstrated with her commitment to “America’s word” toward other nations and being “a leader... people can count on, both here at home and around the world.”⁴³⁵ That is, the contemporary president (or in this case, candidate) figures himself or herself rhetorically and politically as a global president. Donald Trump is an exception that potentially proves this rule.

Trump’s speech throughout his campaign, and the beginning of his presidency, provides an example of an aberration from post-Cold War presidential discourse, and his election a populist backlash against globalization.⁴³⁶ By way of comparison, in their first debate, Clinton spoke directly to world leaders, recommitting the U.S. to transnational treaties and deals. Trump, on the other hand, criticized relationships between the U.S. and other nations that were, in his judgment, not beneficial to the U.S. He said, “We defend Japan, we defend Germany, we defend South Korea, we defend Saudi Arabia, we defend countries. They do not pay us. But they should be paying us, because we are providing tremendous service and we're losing a fortune.”⁴³⁷ That

⁴³⁵ Blake, “The First Trump-Clinton Presidential Debate Transcript, Annotated.”

⁴³⁶ For Obama’s explanation of the relationship between globalization, Brexit, and Trump, see Justin Sink, Eleni Chrepa, and Margaret Talev, “Obama Says Brexit and Trump Powered by Globalization Fears,” *Bloomberg*, November 15, 2016, <https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-11-15/obama-says-brexit-and-trump-both-powered-by-globalization-fears>.

⁴³⁷ Blake, “The first Trump-Clinton Presidential Debate Transcript, Annotated.”

is, Trump argued that spending resources on other nations and their security was not in the interest of the U.S. While the four presidents before him often connected the interests of the U.S. with the global economy—social, economic, or political—Trump linked the good of the state with its separation from international entanglements. For instance, part of Trump’s solution to the problem of globalization, as stated in campaign speeches, was to withdraw from trade deals such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). In doing so, he said, America would be “put first again.”⁴³⁸

Trump’s anti-globalization stance in this speech aligned with populist discourse in other parts of the world. For instance, in a campaign speech on trade, Trump argued that political and financial elites have used globalization to their advantage at the expense of U.S. workers. Trump said that “Pennsylvania towns, once thriving and humming, are now in a state of total disrepair. This wave of globalization has wiped out totally, totally, our middle class. It does not have to be this way. We can turn it around and we can turn it around fast.”⁴³⁹ The argument—that globalization takes away jobs at home—is a common refrain of politicians and blue collar workers in other parts of the world. As David Rennie, a British journalist for *The Economist*, noted, citizens throughout Western Europe say they have “lost the French dream” or “lost the British dream” like U.S. citizens say they have “lost the American dream.”⁴⁴⁰ This “dream” is tied to upward mobility and job stability. Citizens, in Western Europe and the U.S. alike, recall a “golden era” of finding stable work and building a life without an advanced degree. While surely there was never a utopian time during which everyone held jobs, there was a time when there

⁴³⁸ “Read Donald Trump’s Speech on Trade,” *Time*, June 28, 2016, <http://time.com/4386335/donald-trump-trade-speech-transcript/>.

⁴³⁹ “Read Donald Trump’s Speech on Trade.”

⁴⁴⁰ Jamelle Bouie, John Dickerson, and David Plotz, “The ‘Brexit Pursued by a Bear’ Edition,” *Slate*, June 16, 2016, http://www.slate.com/articles/podcasts/gabfest/2016/06/the_orlando_shooting_the_u_k_s_brexit_vote_and_whether_anti_trump_democrats.html.

was less market competition from regions in the world such as India and China in the U.S. and Western Europe. The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 marked a shift in economic processes, increasing global capitalism and, thus, increasing global competition for jobs.⁴⁴¹ George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George Bush, and Barack Obama each, to some extent, framed this global situation as an opportunity for U.S. citizens and the U.S. as a nation to gain more influence and prosperity. Trump's rhetoric, on the other hand, tapped into the populist resistance to participation in "the global." That is, Trump rejected the global imaginary constructed by the presidents before him. Instead, he relied on a national imaginary exhibited in his slogan "Make America Great Again."

The concept of the global imaginary, and knowledge of the four previous presidents' use of the global imaginary, helps contextualize and make sense of Trump's rhetoric. Trump, instead of positioning himself as a global leader and representative, who wants to strengthen relations between transnational audiences, rejected that rhetorical frame altogether, appealing to a different audience base. Trump acknowledges globalization and positions himself against it, tapping into populist, nationalist discourse. Analyzing Trump's rhetoric through the lens of the global imaginary reveals a potential shift in presidential rhetoric and the role of the contemporary president, as Trump's anti-globalization discourse is one reason that he has supporters at home and abroad. Though certainly not the only reason for his presidential victory, and perhaps not even the main reason, Trump's stance against globalization provides one explanation for his popularity.

This dissertation provides insight into the contemporary role of the president. This role, I show, includes a global dimension. Post-Cold War presidents, until Trump, constructed a global

⁴⁴¹ Bouie, Dickerson, and Plotz, "The 'Brexit Pursued by a Bear' Edition"; See also Gilpin, *The Challenge of Global Capitalism*.

imaginary, which is revealed in their discourses with transnational audiences. They used this global imaginary to figure themselves as global leaders and representatives. Each drew upon the trope of “democracy” to engage with their audiences, though they did so in different ways. By the time Obama was in office, the president no longer needed to make a case for the universalization of democracy—that work had already been done for him. Instead, he performed his role as democratic leader. The global imaginary works to justify presidential acts. As populist discourses arise around the world, as more physical walls are constructed, and as the immigration crisis increases, it is also apparent that the global imaginary is limited.⁴⁴²

⁴⁴² For instance, Obama after he intervened in the “Brexit” debate. See “Backlash after Barack Obama EU referendum Intervention,” *BBC*, April 23, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-36117907>; “Obama’s Brexit comments Spark Controversy in UK,” *Al Jazeera*, April 22, 2016, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/obama-eu-britain-brexit-160422042549023.html>; For a discussion on an increase of walls around the world, see “Raising Barriers: A New Age of Walls,” *Washington Post*, October 12, 2016, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/border-barriers/global-illegal-immigration-prevention/?tid=graphics-story>; For international polling in which foreign citizen explain that they support Trump because of his isolationist tendencies, see “What the World is Saying in our Global Straw Poll on the US presidency,” *PRI*, September 1, 2016, <https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-11-01/what-world-saying-our-global-straw-poll-us-presidency>.

REFERENCES

- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. New York: Verso, 2006.
- Appadurai, Arjun. *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1996.
- Aristotle. *Rhetoric*. Edited by Rhys Roberts. <http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/rhetoric.1.i.html>.
- Ash, Timothy Garton. "The Fall of the Berlin Wall: What it Meant to be There." *Guardian*, November 6, 2014. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/06/-sp-fall-berlin-wall-what-it-meant-to-be-there>.
- Atkinson, Nathan S. "Celluloid Circulation: The Dual Temporality of Nonfiction Film and Its Publics." *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 15, no. 4 (2012): 675-684.
- "Backlash after Barack Obama EU referendum Intervention." *BBC*, April 23, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-36117907>.
- Bakara, Hadji. "Poetry in the Shadow of Human Rights." *American Literary History* 28 (2016): 512-541.
- Barreto, José-Manuel, ed. *Human Rights from a Third World Perspective: Critique, History and International Law*. Newcastle Upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014.
- Bartelson, Jens. "Three Concepts of Globalization." *International Sociology* 15, no. 2 (2000): 180-196.
- Beasley, Vanessa B. *You, the People: American National Identity in Presidential Rhetoric*. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2011.
- Beck, Ulrich. *What is Globalization?* London: Polity Press, 2000.
- Berggren, D. Jason, and Nicol C. Rae. "Jimmy Carter and George W. Bush: Faith, Foreign Policy, and an Evangelical Presidential Style." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 4 (2006): 606-632.
- Bhatia, Aditi. "Critical Discourse Analysis of Political Press Conferences." *Discourse & Society* 17, no. 2 (2006): 173-203.
- Black, Jason Edward. "Native Authenticity, Rhetorical Circulation, and Neocolonial Decay: The Case of Chief Seattle's Controversial Speech." *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 15, no. 4 (2012): 635-645.

- Blake, Aaron. "The first Trump-Clinton Presidential Debate Transcript, Annotated." *Washington Post*, September 26, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/09/26/the-first-trump-clinton-presidential-debate-transcript-annotated/?utm_term=.61ec93e2e804.
- Blanchard, Margaret A. *Exporting the First Amendment: The Press-Government Crusade of 1945-1952*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 1986.
- Blanton, Thomas. "U.S. Policy and the Revolutions of 1989, in *Masterpieces of History: The Peaceful End of The Cold War in Europe, 1989*." In *Masterpieces of History: The Peaceful End of The Cold War in Europe, 1989*, edited by Svetlana Savranskaya, Thomas Blanton, and Vladislav Zubok, 49-98. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2011.
- Bostdorff, Denise. *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine*. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2008.
- Bostdorff, Denise M. *The Presidency and the Rhetoric of Foreign Crisis*. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1994.
- Bouie, Jamelle, John Dickerson, and David Plotz, "The 'Brexit Pursued by a Bear' Edition." *Slate*, June 16, 2016. http://www.slate.com/articles/podcasts/gabfest/2016/06/the_orlando_shooting_the_u_k_s_brexit_vote_and_whether_anti_trump_democrats.html.
- Brinkley, Douglas. "Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine," *Foreign Policy* 106 (1997): 111-127.
- Brodie, Janine. "Introduction: Globalization and Citizenship Beyond the National State." *Citizenship Studies* 8, no. 4 (2004): 323-332.
- Bryan, Frank M. *Real Democracy: The New England Town Meeting and How it Works*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2010.
- Burke, Kenneth. *A Grammar of Motives*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969.
- Burke, Kenneth. *A Rhetoric of Motives*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969.
- Burke, Kenneth. "Four Master Tropes," *The Kenyon Review* 3 (1941): 421-438.
- Bush, George. "Address Before the 45th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, New York," October 1, 1990. In *The American Presidency Project*, edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=18883>.

- Bush, George. "Remarks at the Welcoming Ceremony in Brussels," December 3, 1989. In *The American Presidency Project*, edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17902>.
- Bush, George. "Remarks of the President and Soviet Chairman Gorbachev and a Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters in Malta," December 3, 1989. In *The American Presidency Project*, edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17900>.
- Bush, George. "Remarks to the Chamber of Commerce in Cincinnati, Ohio," January 12, 1990. In *The American Presidency Project*, edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=18027>.
- Bush, George W. "Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks," September 11, 2001. In *The American Presidency Project*, edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58057>.
- Bush, George W. "Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City," September 12, 2002. In *The American Presidency Project*, edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64069>.
- Bush, George W. "Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City," September 23, 2003. In *The American Presidency Project*, edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58801>.
- Bush, George W. "Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City," September 25, 2007. In *The American Presidency Project*, edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=75848>.
- Bush, George W. "Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City," November 10, 2001. In *The American Presidency Project*, edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58802>.
- "Bush Speaks at American Legion Convention." *Washington Post*, August 31, 2006. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/31/AR2006083100832.html>.
- Campbell, Karlyn Kohrs, and Kathleen Hall Jamieson. *Deeds Done in Words: Presidential Rhetoric and the Genres of Governance*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990.
- Campbell, Karlyn Kohrs, and Kathleen Hall Jamieson. *Presidents Creating the Presidency: Deeds Done in Words*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008.
- Carney, Zoë Hess, and Allison M. Prash (forthcoming). "'A Journey for Peace': Spatial Metaphors in Nixon's 1972 'Opening to China.'" *Presidential Studies Quarterly* (2017).

- Carothers, Thomas. *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 1999.
- Carrithers, Michael, Louise J. Bracken, and Steven Emery. "Can a Species Be a Person? A Trope and Its Entanglements in the Anthropocene Era." *Current Anthropology* 52, no. 5 (2011): 661-685.
- Ceaser, James W. "The Origins and Character of American Exceptionalism." *American Political Thought: A Journal of Ideas, Institutions, and Culture* 1, no. 1 (2012): 3-28.
- Ceaser, James W., Glen E. Thurow, Jeffrey Tulis, and Joseph M. Bessette. "The Rise of the Rhetorical Presidency." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 11, no. 2 (1981): 158-171.
- Charnock, Emily Jane, James A. McCann, and Kathryn Dunn Tenpas. "Presidential Travel from Eisenhower to George W. Bush: An 'Electoral College' Strategy." *Political Science Quarterly* 124 (2009): 323-339.
- Chilton, Paul. *Analysing Political Discourse: Theory and Practice*. London: Routledge, 2004.
- Chilton, Paul. "The Meaning of Security." In *Post-realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations*, edited by Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman, 193-216. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1996.
- Chilton, Paul, and Mikahil Ilyin. "Metaphor in Political Discourse: The Case of the 'Common European House.'" *Discourse and Society* 4, no. 1 (1993).
- Clinton, Hillary Rodham. "Remarks on Internet Freedom." *U.S. Department of State*. January 21, 2010. www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm.
- Clinton, William J. "Inaugural Address," January 20, 1997. In *The American Presidency Project*, edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=54183>.
- Clinton, William J. "Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City," September 27, 1993. In *The American Presidency Project*, edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=47119>.
- Coe, Kevin, and Rico Neumann. "International Identity in Theory and Practice: The Case of the Modern American Presidency." *Communication Monographs* 78, no. 2 (2011): 139-161.
- Cohen, Jeffrey E., and Richard J. Powell. "Building Public Support from the Grassroots Up: The Impact of Presidential Travel on State-Level Approval." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 1 (2005): 11-27.
- Cohen, Michael Joseph. *Truman and Israel*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.

- “Companies Commit Human Rights Abused in America, Too.” *Atlantic*, May 28, 2014. <https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/05/human-rights-abuses-happen-in-america-too/371702/>.
- Connery, Christopher L. “Pacific Rim Discourse: The US Global Imaginary in the Late Cold War Years.” *Boundary 2*, no. 1 (1994): 30-56.
- Cooper, Helene. “China Holds Firm on Major Issues in Obama’s Visit.” *New York Times*, November 17, 2009. <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/18/world/asia/18prexy.html>.
- Cooper, Helene, and David Barboza. “Obama Wades into Internet Censorship in China Address.” *New York Times*, November 16, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/17/world/asia/17shanghai.html?_r=0.
- Crosswhite, James. “Universalities.” *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 43, no. 4 (2010): 430-448.
- Crosswhite, James. “Universality in Rhetoric: Perelman’s Universal Audience.” *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 22, no. 3 (1989): 157-173.
- Croucher, Sheila. “From World Citizenship to Purified Patriotism: Obama's Nation-shaping in a Global Era.” *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power* 22, no. 1 (2015): 1-18.
- Curran, James, and Myung-Jin Park. “Beyond Globalization Theory.” In *De-Westernizing Media Studies*, edited by James Curran and Myung-Jin Park, 3-18. London: Routledge, 2000.
- de Tocqueville, Alexis. *Democracy in America*, translated by Henry Reeve, edited by Bruce Frohnen. Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing Inc., 2002 [1889].
- Denton, Robert E. “Forum on the Future of the Presidency: Rhetorical Challenges to the Presidency.” *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 3, no. 3 (2000): 445-451
- DiIulio Jr, John J. “The Hyper-Rhetorical Presidency.” *Critical Review* 19, no. 2-3 (2007): 315-324.
- Dijkink, Gertjan. *National Identity and Geopolitical Visions: Maps of Pride and Pain*. London: Routledge, 1996.
- Dingo, Rebecca. *Networking Arguments: Rhetoric, Transnational Feminism, and Public Policy Writing*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012.
- Doherty, Brendan J. “Elections: The Politics of the Permanent Campaign: Presidential Travel and the Electoral College, 1977-2004.” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 4 (2007): 749-773.
- Dorn, Walter A. “The League Covenant and the UN Charter: A Side-by Side (Full-Text) Comparison.” <http://www.rmcc-cmrc.ca/en/defence-studies/walter-dorn>.

- Dorsey, Leroy G., ed. *The Presidency and Rhetorical Leadership*. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002.
- Doyle, Michael. "Peace, Liberty, and Democracy: Realists and Liberals Contest a Legacy." In *American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts*, edited by Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry, and Takashi Inoguchi, 21-40. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Edwards, Jason A. *Navigating the Post-Cold War World: President Clinton's Foreign Policy Rhetoric*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008.
- Edwards, Jason A., and David Weiss, *The Rhetoric of American Exceptionalism: Critical Essays*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2011.
- Ellis, Richard J. *Presidential Travel: The Journey from George Washington to George W. Bush*. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2008.
- Engels, Jeremy. "Demophilia: A Discursive Counter to Demophobia in the Early Republic." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 97, no. 2 (2011): 131-154.
- Engels, Jeremy. *Enemyship: Democracy and Counter-Revolution in the Early Republic*. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2010.
- English, Robert. *Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War* (Columbia, NY: Columbia University Press, 2000).
- Erickson, Keith V. "Presidential Spectacles: Political Illusionism and the Rhetoric of Travel." *Communications Monographs* 65, no. 2 (1998): 141-153.
- Farnsworth, Stephen J., S. Robert Lichter, and Roland Schatz. *The Global President: International Media and the US Government*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013.
- Farrell, Thomas B. *Norms of Rhetorical Culture*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993.
- Farrell, Thomas B. "Reason and Rhetorical Practice: The Inventional Agenda of Chaim Perelman." In *Practical Reasoning in Human Affairs*, edited by James L. Golden and Joseph J. Pilotta, 259-286. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1986.
- Finnegan, Cara A., and Jiyeon Kang. "'Sighting' the Public: Iconoclasm and Public Sphere Theory." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 90, no. 4 (2004): 377-402.
- Fisher, Walter R. "Rhetorical Fiction and the Presidency." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 66, no. 2 (1980): 119-126.

- Flanagan, Jason C. "Woodrow Wilson's 'Rhetorical Restructuring': The Transformation of the American Self and the Construction of the German Enemy," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 7 (2004): 115-148.
- Foley, Megan. "Sound Bites: Rethinking the Circulation of Speech from Fragment to Fetish." *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 15, no. 4 (2012): 613-622.
- Forrester, Sibelan, Magdalena J. Zaborowska, and Elena Gapova. *Over the Wall/After the Fall: Post-Communist Cultures through an East-West Gaze*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004.
- Fousek, John. *To Lead the free World: American Nationalism and the Cultural Roots of the Cold War*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000.
- Frank, David, and Michelle Bolduc. "From Vita Contemplativa to Vita Activa: Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca's Rhetorical Turn." *Advances in the History of Rhetoric* 7, no. 1 (2004): 65-86.
- Fraser, Nancy. "Transnationalizing the Public Sphere: On the Legitimacy and Efficacy of Public Opinion in a Post-Westphalian World." *European Institute for Progressive Culture Policies* (2007), http://eipcp.net/transversal/0605/fraser/en/#_ftn1.
- Friedman, Jonathan. "Order and Disorder in Global Systems: A Sketch." *Social Research* 60 (1993): 205-234.
- Gastil, John. *Political Communication and Deliberation*. Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications, 2008.
- Gellner, Ernest. *Nationalism*. New York: New York University Press, 1997.
- Gibbs, Joseph. *Gorbachev's Glasnost: The Soviet Media in the First Phase of Perestroika*. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1999.
- Giddens, Anthony. *The Consequences of Modernity*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990.
- Giddens, Anthony. *Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshaping our Lives*. New York: Routledge, 2000.
- Gilpin, Robert, and Jean Millis Gilpin. *The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 21st Century*. Vol. 5. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.
- Gorbachev, Mikhail. "From the Address to the 43rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly." In *The Road We Travelled, the Challenges We Face*. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Ves Mir for the Gorbachev Foundation, 2006.
www.gorby.ru/userfiles/file/gorbaghev_book_speeches_en.pdf.

- Gorbachev, Mikhail. "Underpinning a Secure World." In *Perestroika: The Global Challenge*, edited by Ken Coates and Michael Barratt Brown, 27-38. Nottingham, UK: Spokesman, 1988.
- Greene, Ronald Walter. "The Aesthetic Turn and the Rhetorical Perspective on Argumentation." *Argumentation and Advocacy* 35, no. 1 (1998): 19-29.
- Guilhot, Nicolas. *The Democracy Makers: Human Rights and International Order*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005.
- Habermas, Jürgen. *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998.
- Habermas, Jürgen. *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, translated by Thomas Burger. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991.
- Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri. *Empire*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001.
- Harlow, William Forrest. "Bush's Rhetoric of Silence during German Reunification." In *The Rhetorical Presidency of George H.W. Bush*, edited by Martin J. Medhurst. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2006.
- Hart, Roderick. *The Sound of Leadership: Presidential Communication in the Modern Age*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.
- Hart, Roderick, and Joshua Scacco. "Rhetorical Negotiation and the Presidential Press Conference." In *Communication and Language Analysis in the Public Sphere*, edited by Roderick Hart (IGI-Global, 2014).
- Hartnett, Stephen John, and Jennifer Rose Mercieca. "'A Discovered Dissembler Can Achieve Nothing Great'; Or, Four Theses on the Death of Presidential Rhetoric in an Age of Empire." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 4 (2007): 599-621.
- Hedentoft, Ulf, and Mette Hjort, eds., *The Postnational Self: Belonging and Identity*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002.
- Heidt, Stephen. "Presidential Rhetoric, Metaphor, and the Emergence of the Democracy Promotion Industry." *Southern Communication Journal* 78 (2013): 233-255.
- Heidt, Stephen. "The Presidency as Pastiche: Atomization, Circulation, and Rhetorical Instability." *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 15, no. 4 (2012): 623-633.
- Held, David. "Cosmopolitan Democracy and the Global Order: A New Agenda." In *Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal*, edited by James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, 235-252. Cambridge, MA: MIT University Press, 1997.

- Held, David. *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance*. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 1995.
- Herbst, Susan. "The Rhetorical Presidency and the Contemporary Media Environment." *Critical Review* 19, no. 2-3 (2007): 335-343.
- Hicks, Darrin. "The Promise(s) of Deliberative Democracy." *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 5 (2002): 223-260.
- Hoffman, Eva. *Exit into History: A Journey through the New Eastern Europe*. London: Minerva, 1994.
- Hogan, Michael J. *Woodrow Wilson's Western Tour: Rhetoric, Public Opinion, and the League of Nations*. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2006.
- Hollihan, Thomas A. "The Public Controversy over the Panama Canal Treaties: An Analysis of American Foreign Policy Rhetoric." *Western Journal of Speech Communication* 50, no. 4 (1986): 368-387.
- "How 1989 Brought an End to the Cold War." *BBC*, December 27, 2009.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8429237.stm>.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *Who Are We?: The Challenges to America's National Identity*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004.
- Ikenberry, G. John. "Woodrow Wilson, the Bush Administration, and the Future of Liberal Internationalism." In *The Crisis of American Foreign Policy*, edited by G. John Ikenberry, Thomas J. Knock, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Tony Smith, 1-24. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009.
- Inabinet, Brandon. "Democratic Circulation: Jacksonian Lithographs in US Public Discourse." *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 15, no. 4 (2012): 659-666.
- Ivie, Robert L. "Cold War Motives and Rhetorical Metaphor." In *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology*, edited by Martin J. Medhurst, Robert L. Ivie, Philip Wander, and Robert L. Scott, 71-80. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1990.
- Ivie, Robert L. *Democracy and America's War on Terror*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2005.
- Ivie, Robert L. "Fire, Flood, and Red Fever: Motivating Metaphors of Global Emergency in the Truman Doctrine Speech." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 29 (1999): 570-591.
- Ivie, Robert L. "Images of Savagery in American Justifications for War." *Communication Monographs* 47 (1980), 279-294.

- Ivie, Robert L. "Presidential Motives for War." *The Quarterly Journal of Speech* 60 (1974): 337-345.
- Ivie, Robert L. "Rhetorical Deliberation and Democratic Politics in the Here and Now." *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 5, no. 2 (2002): 277-285.
- Ivie, Robert L. "Savagery in Democracy's Empire." *Third World Quarterly* 26 (2005): 55-65.
- Ivie, Robert L., and Oscar Giner. "American Exceptionalism in a Democratic Idiom: Transacting the Mythos of Change in the 2008 Presidential Campaign." *Communication Studies* 60, no. 4 (2009): 359-375.
- Jackson, Donald, and Dorothy Twohig, eds. *The Diaries of George Washington*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1979.
- James, Edwin L. "New League Starting with Good Prospects." *New York Times*, October 15, 1944.
- Jamieson, Kathleen Hall. *Eloquence in an Electronic Age: The Transformation of Political Speechmaking*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.
- Jasinski, James. "A Constitutive Framework for Rhetorical Historiography: Toward an Understanding of the Discursive (Re)constitution of 'Constitution' in *The Federalist Papers*." In *Doing Rhetorical History: Concepts and Cases*, edited by Kathleen J. Turner. Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 1998.
- Karst, Kenneth L. *Belonging to America: Equal Citizenship and the Constitution*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989.
- Keane, John. *The Life and Death of Democracy*. New York and London: W.W. Norton, 2009.
- Keeling, Diane Marie. "Of Turning and Tropes." *Review of Communication* 16, no. 4 (2016): 317-333.
- Kennedy, John F., "Inaugural Address," January 20, 1961. In *The American Presidency Project*, edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8032>.
- Kernell, Samuel. *Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership*. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2006.
- Kimball, Jeffrey. "The Nixon Doctrine: A Saga of Misunderstanding." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 1 (2006): 59-74.
- Kramer, Mark. "Beyond the Brezhnev Doctrine: A New Era in Soviet-East European Relations?" *International Security* 14, no. 3 (1989): 25-67.

- Kumar, Martha. *Managing the President's Message: The White House Communications Operation*. Baltimore, MD: JHU Press, 2010.
- Lake, Anthony. "From Containment to Enlargement: Address to John Hopkins University, Washington D.C." *U.S. Department of State Dispatch* 4, no. 39 (1993).
- Lakoff, George. "Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy: Why Strategic Framing Matters." *Frameworks Institute* (1999).
- Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson. *Metaphors We Live By*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980.
- Lamay, Craig. L. *Exporting Press Freedom*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2009.
- Laracey, Melvin. *Presidents and the People: The Partisan Story of Going Public*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002.
- Lerner, Daniel. *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*. New York: Free Press, 1958.
- Lerner, Max. *America as a Civilization*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957.
- Lincoln, Abraham. "Second Annual Message," December 1, 1862. In *The American Presidency Project*, edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29503>.
- Litwak, Robert. *Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment after the Cold War*. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000.
- Lucaites, John Louis and Celeste Michelle Condit. "Universalizing 'Equality': The Public Legacy of Martin Luther King, Jr. In *Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Sermonic Power of Public Discourse*, edited by Carolyn Calloway-Thomas and John Louis Lucaites, 85-103. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1993.
- Lyon, Alynna. *U.S. Politics and the United Nations: A Tale of Dysfunctional Dynamics*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2016.
- Malanczuk, Peter. *Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law*, 7th edition. London: Routledge, 1997.
- Matlock, Jack F. *Autopsy on an Empire: The American Ambassador's Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union*. New York: Random House Incorporated, 1995.
- Mattelart, Armand. "An Archeology of the Global Era." In *International Communication: A Reader*, edited by Daya Thussu, 313-328. London: Routledge, 2010.

- Maxwell, Alexander. *East-West Discourse: Symbolic Geography and its Consequences*. Oxford: Peter Lang, 2011.
- Maynard, Christopher. *Out of the Shadow: George H.W. Bush and the End of the Cold War*. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2008.
- McEvoy-Levy, Siobhán. *American Exceptionalism and US Foreign Policy: Public Diplomacy at the End of the Cold War*. New York: Palgrave Press, 2001.
- McMahon, Robert J. "‘By Helping Others, We Help Ourselves’ The Cold War Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy." In *Critical Reflections on the Cold War: Linking Rhetoric and History*, ed. Martin Medhurst, 233-246. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2000.
- Medhurst, Martin. *Beyond the Rhetorical Presidency*. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1996.
- Medhurst, Martin, and H.W. Brands, eds. *Critical Reflections on the Cold War: Linking Rhetoric and History*. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2000.
- Mercieca, Jennifer R. *Founding Fictions*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2010.
- Meyer, Sam. "The John F. Kennedy Inauguration Speech: Function and Importance of Its ‘Address System,'" *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 12, no. 4 (1982): 239-250.
- Mignolo, Walter. "The Allocation and Relocation of Identities: Colonialism, Nationalism, Transnationalism," *Mester* 27 (1998): xxvii-16.
- Mignolo, Walter. "The Many Faces of Cosmo-polis: Border Thinking and Critical Cosmopolitanism." *Public Culture* 12, no. 3 (2000): 721-748.
- Moore, John Allphin, Jr., and Jerry Pubantz, *To Create a New World? American Presidents and the United Nations*. New York: Peter Lang, 1999.
- Morskink, Johannes. *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999.
- Murphy, John M. "Inventing Authority: Bill Clinton, Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Orchestration of Rhetorical Traditions." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 83, no. 1 (1997): 71-89.
- Najmabadi, Afsaneh, and Gayatri Spivak. "Interview with Gayatri Spivak." *Social Text* 28 (1991): 122-134.

- Nelson, Dana D. *Bad for Democracy: How the Presidency Undermines the Power of the People*. Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota Press, 2008.
- Obama, Barack. "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 20, 2015. In *The American Presidency Project*, edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=108031>.
- Obama, Barack. "Remarks at a Town Hall Meeting and a Question-and-Answer Session in Shanghai," November 16, 2009. In *The American Presidency Project*, edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=86909>.
- Obama, Barack. "Remarks at a Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative Town Hall and a Question-and-Answer Session at the University of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia," April 27, 2014. In *The American Presidency Project*, edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=105144>.
- Obama, Barack. "Remarks at the Mandela Washington Fellowship for Young African Leaders Presidential Summit Town Hall and a Question-and-Answer Session," July 28, 2014. In *The American Presidency Project*, edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=105498>.
- Obama, Barack. "Remarks by President Obama at Strasbourg Town Hall," April 3, 2009. *White House Office of the Press Secretary*. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-strasbourg-town-hall>.
- Obama, "Remarks by President Barack Obama at Town Hall Meeting with Future Chinese Leaders," November 16, 2009. *White House Office of the Press Secretary*, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/realitycheck/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-town-hall-meeting-with-future-chinese-leaders>.
- Obama, Barack. "Remarks by the President at Town Hall with Young African Leaders," August 3, 2010. *White House Office of the Press Secretary*. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-town-hall-with-young-african-leaders>.
- Obama, Barack. "Remarks by President Obama at Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative Town Hall, 11/14/14," November 14, 2014. *White House Office of the Press Secretary*. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/14/remarks-president-obama-young-southeast-asian-leaders-initiative-town-ha>.
- Obama, "Remarks by President Obama at YSEALI Town Hall," September 7, 2016. *The White House Office of the Press Secretary*. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/07/remarks-president-obama-yseali-town-hall>.
- Obama, Barack. "Remarks by President Obama in Town Hall with Young Leaders of the Americas," April 9, 2015. *White House Office of the Press Secretary*.

<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/09/remarks-president-obama-town-hall-young-leaders-americas>.

Obama, Barack. "Remarks by the President at the Young African Leaders Initiative Presidential Summit Town Hall," August 3, 2015. *White House Office of the Press Secretary*. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/08/03/remarks-president-young-african-leaders-initiative-presidential-summit>.

Obama, Barack. "Remarks by the President in Town Hall with YSEALI Initiative Fellows," June 2, 2015. *White House Office of the Press Secretary*. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/06/02/remarks-president-town-hall-yseali-initiative-fellows>.

Obama, Barack. "Remarks by the President in YSEALI Town Hall," November 20, 2015. *White House Office of the Press Secretary*. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/20/remarks-president-yseali-town-hall>.

"Obama's Brexit comments Spark Controversy in UK." *Al Jazeera*, April 22, 2016. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/obama-eu-britain-brexit-160422042549023.html>.

"Obama in Cuba on Historic Visit." *Reuters*, March 20, 2016. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cuba-idUSKCN0WM04H>.

"Obama Visits Cuba." *New York Times*, March 22, 2016. <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/international/obama-in-cuba/even-cubas-die-hard-communists-liked-what-obama-had-to-say>.

Olson, Kathryn M. "Democratic Enlargement's Value Hierarchy and Rhetorical Forms: An Analysis of Clinton's Use of a Post-Cold War Symbolic Frame to Justify Military Interventions," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 34, no. 2 (2004): 307-340.

Onuf, Peter. "American Exceptionalism and National Identity." *American Political Thought* 1, no. 1 (2012): 77-100.

Osborn, Michael. "Rhetorical Distance in 'Letter from Birmingham Jail.'" *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 7, no. 1 (2004): 23-35.

Parry-Giles, Shawn J. "Constituting Benevolent War and Imperial Peace: U.S. Nationalism and Idyllic Notions of Peace and War." In *Public Address and Moral Judgment*, edited by Shawn Parry-Giles and Trevor Parry-Giles, 161-20. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2009.

Pach, Chester. "The Reagan Doctrine: Principle, Pragmatism, and Policy." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 1 (2006): 75-88.

- Perelman, Chaïm. *The New Rhetoric and the Humanities*, translated by William Kluback. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979.
- Perelman, Chaïm. "The New Rhetoric and the Rhetoricians," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 84 (1984): 188-196.
- Perelman, Chaïm. *The Realm of Rhetoric*, translated by William Kluback. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982.
- Perelman, Chaïm and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca. *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation*, translated by John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969.
- Peters, John Durham. *Speaking into the Air*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012.
- Phillips, Kendall R. and G. Mitchell Reyes, "Surveying Global Memoryscapes: The Shifting Terrain of Public Memory Studies." In *Global Memoryscapes: Contesting Remembrance in a Transnational Age*, edited by Kendall R. Phillips and G. Mitchell Reyes, 1-26. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2011.
- Pietz, William. "The 'Post-Colonialism' of Cold War Discourse." *Social Text* 19/20 (1988): 55-75.
- Plato, *Phaedrus*. In *Plato on Love*, edited by C.D.C. Reeve. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2006.
- Prasch, Allison M. "Toward a Rhetorical Theory of Deixis." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 102, no. 2 (2016): 166-193.
- Rabe, Stephen G. "The Johnson Doctrine." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 1 (2006): 48-58.
- Railsback, Celeste Condit. "Beyond Rhetorical Relativism: A Structural-Material Model of Truth and objective reality." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 69, no. 4 (1983): 351-363.
- "Raising Barriers: A New Age of Walls." *Washington Post*, October 12, 2016.
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/border-barriers/global-illegal-immigration-prevention/?tid=graphics-story>.
- "Read a Transcript of Obama's Press Conference in Havana." *Time*, March 21, 2016.
<http://time.com/4266772/barack-obama-raul-castro-press-conference-transcript/>.
- "Read Donald Trump's Speech on Trade." *Time*, June 28, 2016.
<http://time.com/4386335/donald-trump-trade-speech-transcript/>.

- Reagan, Ronald. "Address to Members of the British Parliament," June 8, 1982. In *The American Presidency Project*, edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=42614>.
- "Remarks by President Obama and President Raul Castro of Cuba in a Joint Press Conference," March 21, 2016. *The White House Office of the Press Secretary*. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/21/remarks-president-obama-and-president-raul-castro-cuba-joint-press>.
- Romney, Mitt. "Speech at the Citadel in Charleston, SC." *Wall Street Journal*, October 7, 2011. <http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/10/07/text-of-mitt-romneys-speech-on-foreign-policy-at-the-citadel>.
- Rossiter, Clinton. *The American Presidency*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World Inc., 1960.
- Said, Edward. *Orientalism*. London: Penguin Books, 2003.
- Savranskaya, Svetlana. "The Logic of 1989: The Soviet Peaceful Withdrawal from Eastern Europe." In *Masterpieces of History: The Peaceful End of the Cold War in Europe, 1989*, edited by Svetlana Savranskaya, Thomas Blanton, and Vladislav Zubok, 1-48. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2011.
- Savranskaya, Svetlana, and Thomas Blanton, eds. *The Last Superpower Summits*. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2016.
- Scacco, Joshua M., and Kevin Coe. "The Ubiquitous Presidency: Toward a New Paradigm for Studying Presidential Communication." *International Journal of Communication* 10 (2016): 2014-2037.
- Schramm, Wilbur. *Mass Media and National Development: The Role of Information in the Developing Countries*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1964.
- Scott, Robert L. "Cold War and Rhetoric: Conceptually and Critically." In *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology*, edited by Martin J. Medhurst, Robert L. Ivie, Philip Wander, and Robert L. Scott, 1-16. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1990.
- "Second Expanded Bilateral Session," December 3, 1989. *Memorandum of Conversation, ID# 041944*. Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.
- Shaw, Martin. "The State of Globalization: Towards a Theory of State Transformation." *Review of International Political Economy* 4, no. 3 (1997): 497-513.
- Shaw, Martin. "The Theoretical Challenge of Global Society." In *Media in Global Context Reader*, edited by Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammedi, Dwayne Winseck, Jim McKenna, and Oliver Boyd-Barrett, 27-36. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997.

- Shome, Raka. "Mapping the Limits of Multiculturalism in the Context of Globalization." *International Journal of Communication* 6 (2012): 144-165.
- Shome, Raka, and Radha S. Hegde. "Culture, Communication, and the Challenge of Communication," *Critical Studies in Media Communication* 19, no. 2 (2002): 172-189.
- Silber, Ilana Friedrich. "Space, Fields, Boundaries: The Rise of Spatial Metaphors in Contemporary Sociological Theory." *Social Research* 62 (1995): 323-355.
- Sink, Justin, Eleni Chrepa, and Margaret Talev, "Obama Says Brexit and Trump Powered by Globalization Fears." *Bloomberg*, November 15, 2016.
<https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-11-15/obama-says-brexit-and-trump-both-powered-by-globalization-fears>.
- Smith, Michael J. "Going International: Presidential Activity in the Post-modern Presidency." *Journal of American Studies* 31, no. 2 (1997): 219-233.
- "Soviet Transcript of the Malta Summit, December 2-3, 1989." *National Security Archive*.
<http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB298/Document%2010.pdf>.
- Spalding, Elizabeth. *The First Cold Warrior: Harry Truman, Containment, and the Remaking of Liberal Internationalism*. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2006.
- Starosta, William J. "The United Nations: Agency for Semantic Consubstantiality." *Southern Journal of Communication* 36, no. 3 (1971): 243-254.
- Steger, Manfred B. *Globalization: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Steger, Manfred B. *The Rise of the Global Imaginary: Political Ideologies from the French Revolution to the Global War on Terror*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Steger, Manfred B. "The Rise of the Global Imaginary and the Persistence of Ideology." *Global-E* 3 (2009). <http://www.21global.ucsb.edu/global-e/july-2009/rise-global-imaginary-and-persistence-of%20ideology>.
- Stuckey, Mary E. "Competing Foreign Policy Visions: Rhetorical Hybrids after the Cold War." *Western Journal of Communication* 59, no. 3 (1995): 214-227.
- Stuckey, Mary E. *Defining Americans: The Presidency and National Identity*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2004.
- Stuckey, Mary E. "One Nation (Pretty Darn) Divisible: National Identity in the 2004 Conventions." *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 8, no. 4 (2006): 639-656.
- Stuckey, Mary E. "Rethinking the Rhetorical Presidency and Presidential Rhetoric 1." *Review of*

- Communication* 10, no. 1 (2010): 38-52.
- Stuckey, Mary E. *The President as Interpreter-in-Chief*. Chatham, NJ : Chatham House Publishers, 1991.
- Stuckey, Mary E., and Frederick J. Antczak. "The Rhetorical Presidency: Deepening Vision, Widening exchange." *Annals of the International Communication Association* 21, no. 1 (1998): 405-442.
- Stuckey, Mary E., and Joshua R. Ritter, "George Bush, <Human Rights>, and American Democracy," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 4 (2007): 646-666.
- Stuckey, Mary E, and Karen S. Hoffman. "Constituting 'The People': National Identity Under William H. Taft and Richard M. Nixon." *Congress & the Presidency: A Journal of Capital Studies* Autumn 2006, no. 33 (2010).
- Taylor, Charles. "Modern Social Imaginaries." *Public Culture* 14, no. 1 (2002): 91-124.
- "The Covenant of the League of Nations." *Yale Law School*.
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp.
- Truman, Harry S. "Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine," March 12, 1947. In *The American Presidency Project*, edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12846>.
- Tsing, Anna Lowenhaupt. *Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011.
- Tsygankov, Andrei P. "From International Institutionalism to Revolutionary Expansionism: The Foreign Policy Discourse of Contemporary Russia." *Mershon International Studies Review* 41, no. 2 (1997): 247-268.
- Tuathail, Gearóid Ó. and John Agnew. "Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy." *Political Geography* 11, no. 2 (1992): 190-204.
- Tucker, Robert W. "The Triumph of Wilsonianism?" *World Policy Journal* 10, no. 4 (1993): 83-99.
- Tulis, Jeffrey. *The Rhetorical Presidency*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987.
- United Nations. "Charter of the United Nations." <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index.html>.
- United Nations. "Functions and Powers of the General Assembly." <http://www.un.org/en/ga/about/background.shtml>.

- United Nations. "History of the United Nations." <http://www.un.org/en/sections/history/history-united-nations/index.html>.
- United Nations. "League of Nations." <http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/history/index.shtml>.
- United Nations. "Universal Declaration of Human Rights." <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/>
- "United States: Events of 2015." *Human Rights Watch*. <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/united-states>.
- U.S. Department of State. "Presidential Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly." <http://www.state.gov/p/io/potusunga/> for a collation of these speeches.
- Vladimirov, Leonid. *The Russians*. New York: Praeger, 1968.
- Wander, Philip. "The Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 70, no. 4 (1984): 339-61.
- Wander, Philip. "The Third Persona: An Ideological Turn in Rhetorical Theory." *Communication Studies* 35 (1984): 197-216.
- Wanzer, Darrel Allan. "Delinking Rhetoric, or Revisiting McGee's Fragmentation Thesis through Decoloniality." *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 15, no. 4 (2012): 647-657.
- Wanzer-Serrano, Darrel. *The New York Young Lords and the Struggle for Liberation*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2015.
- Weiss, Thomas G., David P. Forsythe, Roger A. Coate, and Kelly-Kate Pease. *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*. Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 2016.
- Westad, Odd Arne. *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- "What the World is Saying in our Global Straw Poll on the US Presidency." *PRI*, September 1, 2016. <https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-11-01/what-world-saying-our-global-straw-poll-us-presidency>.
- Wilkins, Karin Gwinn, and Bella Mody. "Reshaping Development Communication: Developing Communication and Communicating Development." *Communication Theory* 11, no. 4 (2001): 385-396.
- Wilson, Woodrow. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress on the Conditions of Peace," January 8, 1918. In *The American Presidency Project*, edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=65405>.

Wilson, Woodrow. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress Requesting a Declaration of War Against Germany," April 2, 1917. In *The American Presidency Project*, edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=65366>.

Wilson, Woodrow. "An Address in the City Auditorium in Pueblo, Colorado," September 25, 1919. In *Woodrow Wilson's Western Tour: Rhetoric, Public Opinion, and the League of Nations*, ed. J. Michael Hogan. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2006.

Wilson, Woodrow. "Inaugural Address," March 5, 1917. In *The American Presidency Project*, edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25832>.

Withey, Stephen B. and William A. Scott, *Public Reactions to the United Nations 1945-1954*. New York: Manhattan Publishing Co., 1958.

Wolff, Larry. *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994.

Zarefsky, David. "Presidential Rhetoric and the Power of Definition." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 34, no. 3 (2004): 607-619.