

ScholarWorks@GSU

Sites of Contested Histories: Mobilizing the Past in the British and Dominion Press during the First World War

Authors	Franklin, Ryan
Citation	Franklin, Ryan. "Sites of Contested Histories: Mobilizing the Past in the British and Dominion Press during the First World War." 2024. Dissertation, Georgia State University. https://doi.org/10.57709/36946519
DOI	https://doi.org/10.57709/36946519
Download date	2026-06-06 20:20:19
Link to Item	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14694/8228

Sites of Contested Histories:

Mobilizing the Past in the British and Dominion Press during the First World War

by

Ryan Killian Franklin

Under the Direction of Gregory Moore, Ph. D.

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in the College of Arts and Sciences

Georgia State University

2024

ABSTRACT

The First World War was, and is, a seminal event in history. From August 1914 to November 1918, and beyond, history played an important role in discursive battles in Britain, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. This dissertation examines historical discourses between advocates of mainstream and alternative histories in Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand around five key issues—the origins of the war, conscription, rumors of peace, women's suffrage, and the peace itself—in the First World War. In addition to demonstrating history's staying power during an unprecedented war, this dissertation will argue that in some of the historical discourse, specifically conscription, women's suffrage, and the peace treaty, a slight separation between Britain and the Dominions became noticeable. This separation did not signal a break between the metropole and peripheries, but it did suggest that the experiences of the First World War put the Dominions on a different historical path than Britain.

INDEX WORDS: Historical discourse, Mainstream, Alternative, Prussian, Lincolnia, Dominions

Copyright by
Ryan Killian Franklin
2024

Sites of Contested History:

Mobilizing the Past in the British and Dominion Press during the First World War

by

Ryan Killian Franklin

Committee Chair: Gregory Moore

Committee: Ian Christopher Fletcher

Joe Perry

Masako Racel

Electronic Version Approved:

Office of Graduate Services

College of Arts and Sciences

Georgia State University

May 2024

DEDICATION

To Peri, Cecilia, and Jolly Nell. For me, nothing, especially a dissertation, is possible without you three.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It took a village. Not to minimize the original meaning of the saying, but I would not have been able to complete this dissertation without the help, patience, and care of so many people. I cannot adequately express my gratitude to all those who have helped me see this project to completion. Nevertheless, I must try.

The guidance I received from my original mentor, Dr. Ian Christopher Fletcher, throughout so much of this process was invaluable. I will always value the conversations I had with Dr. Fletcher—either in his office, at Chocolaté, or over the phone—for they were pivotal in shaping the structure of this dissertation. Due to Dr. Fletcher’s retirement, Dr. Gregory Moore became my second mentor. As Dr. Fletcher was the person who helped get the dissertation up and running, Dr. Moore was the person most responsible for helping me complete the project. His thorough notes on inchoate drafts helped bring much needed clarity to my work. Additionally, his patience in waiting for revised drafts decreased my stress throughout this process. There is enough to be stressed about when doing a dissertation. It was nice not having to add an inflexible mentor to that mix.

While completing my course for my degree, I took a class with Dr. Joe Perry on the First World War. This class allowed me to delve deeper into the topic that forms the basis of this dissertation. The final member of my committee was Dr. Masako Racel, who was not originally part of this group. Due to the tragic death of Dr. Denis Gainty, Dr. Racel stepped to fill the spot I needed committee for a specialist on the Pacific world. I remain grateful to Dr. Racel for becoming a member of my committee in the wake of this tragedy. I would be remiss if I did not say a brief word on Dr. Denis Gainty. I will never forget the first time I met this singular person. It was a class on pedagogy that was required for all in-coming graduate students. His first words

to the class went something like: “my colleagues razz me for teaching a class on pedagogy. I say: they are the ones missing out.” The thing about this statement: he clearly meant it. The world lost a truly special person when Dr. Gainty passed away on March 26, 2017.

The second group of people who helped me see my dissertation to completion are my colleagues at Piedmont University. It was the Dean of Arts and Sciences Steve Nimmo who encouraged me to pursue a Ph. D. in the first place. Without this encouragement, I do not know if I ever would have gone into a Doctoral program. My colleagues—especially Dr. Al Pleysier and Professor Jeff Bowers—who gave me advice and listened to me whenever I had an issue played an important role in helping me stay reasonably sane throughout this process. Finally, without the help of Piedmont’s library staff—especially Davy Gibbs and Bob Glass—in acquiring books, primary documents, and microfilm, this dissertation would have never been completed.

Finally, there is my family. Of course, my parents—Donald and Marie—are the first to receive mention because without them I would not even be here. The ways in which they supported me in my Ph.D. endeavors are too numerous to list; however, underpinning all their support was an unequivocal belief in me. Their belief sustained me through challenging moments. On the topic of challenges, I know I gave my wife—Peri—plenty of them during my Ph.D. program, particularly while writing the dissertation. The patience, flexibility, and love she showed me as I struggled through this process confirmed something I already knew; I am lucky to have her as a spouse. We are both lucky to have two beautiful girls—Cecilia and Jolly Nell—who were both born during this process. As I mentioned above, without these two girls, and their mother, I do not accomplish this work.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	v
LIST OF FIGURES	ix
1. INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Background and Context	3
1.2 Scholarship	16
1.3 Sources and Methods	29
1.4 Argument and Significance	32
1.5 Outline of Dissertation	37
2. THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR	41
2.1 Moments from British History	42
2.2 Moments from Germany History	60
2.3 Conclusion	78
3. CONSCRIPTION	80
3.1 Conscription in Britain	83
3.2 Conscription in Australia: Round One	100
3.3 Conscription in Australia: Round Two	112
3.4 Conclusion	118
4. RUMORS OF PEACE AND PEACE NOTES	122
4.1 Germany’s Peace Note	125
4.2 Woodrow Wilson’s Peace Proposal & “Peace Without Victory” Speech	146
4.3 Conclusion	160
5. WOMEN’S ROLE IN SOCIETY AND WOMEN’S SUFFRAGE	163
5.1 Beginning of the Suffrage & Anti-Suffrage Movements	165
5.2 The Great Women of the Past	170
5.3 The Great Women of the Present	176
5.4 Conclusion	204
6. THE PEACE CONFERENCE AND THE PEACE ITSELF	206
6.1 Self-Determination versus the Holy Alliance	208
6.2 League of Nations versus the Concert of Europe	221
6.3 Versailles: A New World Order or History Repeating Itself?	233
6.4 Conclusion	242
7. CONCLUSION	243

APPENDICES 255
BIBLIOGRAPHY 256

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1: "The Scrap of Paper"	47
Figure 2.2: "Remember Belgium, Enlist Today"	48
Figure 3.1: "You Can't Fool All the People, All the Time"	109
Figure 4.1: "The Lesser of Two Evils"	136
Figure 4.2: "Automatic Conscript, 'Em, Unlimited" & "Historic Foundations"	142
Figure 4.3: "Taking Their Orders."	158
Figure 5.1: "The Great Patriot"	179
Figure 5.2: "At Last"	201

1. INTRODUCTION

Three days after Great Britain declared war on Germany, the leader of Britain's Unionist Party, Andrew Bonar Law, announced to his compatriots and to the world: "This is perhaps the greatest struggle that this country has ever engaged in. It is Napoleonism once again."¹ Law's juxtaposition of the First World War's unprecedented nature with an invocation of Britain's last major European enemy is interesting because it illuminates how as early as August 1914 commentators sought to historicize the situation they currently found themselves in. Some three thousand miles from where Law explained the origins of the First World War through a reference to Napoleon, the *Daily Telegraph* in Quebec City, Quebec also mentioned the former Emperor of France on August 7 when it explained how in the last great war "Europe was drenched in blood to justify the insatiable ambition of one man – Napoleon – and his lust for universal conquest." It went on to predict that "The hundreds of thousands of human lives, which were ruthlessly sacrificed in the Napoleonic Wars, will probably be increased now to millions."² Thirteen days after this dire forecast, halfway across the world from Britain the *Southland Times* of Invercargill, New Zealand declared on August 20: "France under Napoleon was the menace to European peace then; Germany is just as great a military despot today."³ Like fellow subjects in Britain then, Canadians and New Zealanders would explain the outbreak of hostilities in August 1914 by comparing the Kaiserreich's ambitions to earlier Napoleonic empire-building. Moreover, these Napoleonic references provided a context in which commentators in Britain, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand could opine that Britain and its

¹ "Napoleonism Without a Napoleon," *The Times*, 7 August 1914.

² "Is this Armageddon?," *Daily Telegraph*, 7 August 1914.

³ "The British in Europe," *Southland Times*, 20 August 1914.

Empire had just entered a struggle of historic proportions. So much for the war being over by Christmas.

The overlapping views of Law, the *Daily Telegraph*, and the *Southland Times* about the cause of the First World War reflected an emerging consensus in Britain and the Dominions that Germany of Kaiser Wilhelm II “was intent on emulating Napoleonic France in attempting to establish its hegemony over Europe.”⁴ The fact that Britons, Australians, Canadians, and New Zealanders entered into a common discourse in 1914, which employed historical experience to make sense of the British Empire’s current conflict with Germany, opens up the questions I will explore in my dissertation: how did the British and Dominion press mobilize the past to “frame” and debate the war and its ramifications for the immediate postwar period, specifically the outbreak and stakes of the war, the crises over conscription, the extensions of the suffrage, the terms of peace, and the changing position of the dominions from the Imperial War Cabinet to the League of Nations? What kinds of histories—biblical, classical, European, “American,” “Anglo-Saxon,” British, imperial/naval, colonial, world, etc.—were deployed by journalists, editors, and other contributors? How did the content and style of historical discourse in journalism—historical analogies, arguments, claims, examples, narratives, perspectives, rhetoric, themes, and tropes—vary along the axis of left/right party politics in Britain, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand? How did this discourse vary along the axis of distinct metropolitan/dominion identities and interests? To what extent did historically inflected press controversies about the war disclose deeper differences or cleavages about the empire? And, what did shifting balances of consensus and dissensus about the war and the postwar world in the press reveal about

⁴ David French, *The Strategy of the Lloyd George Coalition: 1916-1918* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 294.

journalists' investments in the "imagined community" of a changing but enduring empire shared by the British and the white settler populations of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand?

1.1 Background and Context

By 1914, the British Empire's impact on the self-governing settler colonies of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand was clear for all to see in a variety of ways. Not so clear, or at least widely recognized, was the impact of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand on the British metropole. A goal of this dissertation will be to demonstrate the ways in which the interactions between the metropole and Dominions were not a one-way street but rather a busy interchange. Such a demonstration will reveal that developments and debates in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand had just as much of an impact on Britain as developments and debates in Britain had on these locations. And as we will see, this interplay among the metropole and the Dominions would carry over into the First World War.

On the eve of the First World War the British Empire was the largest it had ever been in territory and population. In 1914, Great Britain nominally controlled over 12 million square miles of territory. While all this territory fell under British rule, it was not all administered the same.⁵ Most people lived under some form of direct rule as a "colony" or indirect rule as a "protectorate." Consequently, the domestic and foreign policies of such colonies and protectorates were directly administered by the British government through its representatives on the ground. While many people living in the British Empire experienced this type of direct rule by the time Britain went to war in August 1914, there were a handful of settler colonies that had more leeway, especially when it came to self-governance. These polities were Dominions. By 1914, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand – along with South Africa – had become Dominions,

⁵ Ronald Hyam, "The British Empire in the Edwardian Era," in *Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. 4: *The Twentieth Century*, ed. Judith Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 48.

which meant they governed themselves, while Britain controlled foreign policy and security arrangements. Thus, while these territories either had or were in the process of getting self-government, they nevertheless “remained bound by British foreign policy and largely relied on the British army and navy for defense” by the time the First World War started.⁶ The binding of these territories to British foreign policy largely remained intact throughout the First World War; however, these territories’ reliance on the British army and navy for defense gradually diminished from 1914 to 1918.

The process of the Dominions gaining self-government began in the second half of the nineteenth century with the colonies that would become Canada leading the way. In 1867, Canada became the first settler-colonial polity within the British Empire to achieve Dominion status. This unprecedented event in British imperial history occurred through the union of Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia. Within half a decade of these four provinces’ confederation two other provinces – Manitoba and British Columbia – joined the Dominion of Canada, which now stretched across almost the entire northern half of North America.⁷ Canada’s successful move to become a Dominion inspired other territories with heavy populations of British born or descended individuals to begin taking steps to achieve the same status within the British Empire. Both Australia and New Zealand moved to become a Dominion of the British Empire some four decades after Canada paved the way. The genesis of Australia becoming a Dominion of the British Empire began in the 1880s, when talk about bringing all the Australian colonies – New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia, Queensland, and Western Australia – into a federated union started in earnest. By the turn of the

⁶ Brian Douglas Tennyson, *Canada's Great War, 1914-1918: How Canada Helped Save the British Empire and Became a North American Nation* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 3.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 3.

twentieth century, the Commonwealth of Australia had become a reality, and by 1901 it attained Dominion status within the British Empire. By this point, campaigning had been underway to bring New Zealand into the Australian federation. For some time, it looked as though New Zealand had a better chance of becoming part of a federated Australia than of becoming a separate dominion. In 1907, however, New Zealand achieved dominion status following a proclamation by the British Crown.

The moves towards self-government in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand was accompanied by an important debate in the metropole about the prospects for the Empire as a whole. Some in Britain believed the self-government would mark the beginning of the untethering of these territories from Britain.⁸ To some extent, this view was not ill founded because there were certain groups, such as labor radicals, Francophone Canadians, and Irish Catholics throughout the Dominions, who viewed self-government as an important step along the way to break free of the British Empire. Interestingly enough, those who offered a different, counter-hegemonic reading of history during the First World War largely came from these groups. While some in the metropole viewed the granting of Dominion status to Canada, Australia, and New Zealand with a sense of foreboding, others, like Gladstonian Liberals and the Round Tablers, were more optimistic about these developments for they believed the achievement of Dominion status for Canada, Australia, and New Zealand gave the metropole an opportunity to bind these elevated peripheries ever closer to the center. They counted on the inherent “Britishness” of the white settlers, not to mention the strong economic, political, and strategic ties between Britain and the settler colonies. Consequently, this new imperial discourse

⁸ Luke Trainor, *British Imperialism and Australian Nationalism: Manipulation, Conflict and Compromise in the Late Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 95.

now declared the white settler colonists to be “Britons overseas.” Additionally, the new imperial discourse proclaimed that the “whole British people throughout the world constituted a great democracy.”⁹ By stressing the “Britishness” of the white settlers and by situating them in a global democratic polity this new imperial discourse sought to keep Canadians, Australians, and New Zealanders from straying into colonial nationalism, a potential existential threat to the British Empire.

Colonial nationalism should not be confused with the anticolonial nationalism of, for example, the Indian National Congress or the Irish Republican Brotherhood.¹⁰ Colonial nationalism expressed the belief or hope that a distinct nation was taking shape among the white settler population in each Dominion. Indeed, the term was somewhat of a misnomer because there was not just one homogeneous colonial nationalism in the Dominions before 1914. Instead, colonial *nationalisms* are more appropriate because the colonial nationalism for Canadians could, and did, contain different elements within it from the colonial nationalism of Australians, or New Zealanders for that matter. Furthermore, colonial nationalism for certain groups within Canada, Australia, or New Zealand could be different in content and style from colonial nationalism as envisaged by other groups in the same dominion. For example, Irish Australians’ colonial nationalism could include the goal of a sovereign republic, while Australians of English or Scottish ancestry might favor an end to the Anglo-Japanese naval alliance in the Pacific and even an Australian-flagged naval force without reducing the Dominion’s ties to the mother country.

⁹ Andrew S. Thompson, “The Language of Imperialism and the Meaning of Empire: Imperial Discourse in British Politics, 1895-1914,” *Journal of British Studies* 36 (1997): 172-173; Bruce Nelson, *Irish Nationalists and the Making of the Irish Race* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 122.

¹⁰ John Eddy and Deryck Schreuder, eds., *The Rise of Colonial Nationalism: Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa First Assert the Nationalities, 1880-1914* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1988).

While multiple iterations of colonial nationalisms could be found in the dominions, “Britannic nationalism” seemed to offer a way to transcend the sterile opposition of British imperialism and colonial nationalism. Advocates of Britannic nationalism, such as John Seeley, Sir Charles Dilke, Richard Jebb, John S. Ewart, and Clifford Sifton, performed a balancing act. On the one hand, Britannic nationalism consistently stressed that the dominions should not be treated subserviently by the British imperial government.¹¹ On the other hand, Britannic nationalists made it clear they did not want to break free from the metropole or, more generally, from Anglo-Saxondom, an imagined community to which many circles throughout Britain and the British Empire felt they belonged.¹² This Britannic nationalism would underpin the idea of a “Greater Britain” which sought to “formalize the existing ties” between Great Britain and the Dominions by locking the latter “into a permanent constitutional relationship with Great Britain.”¹³ The creation of an Imperial Parliament, instead of ad hoc imperial conferences of leaders from Britain and the Dominions, appeared to some to be the best way to institutionalize the bond between the metropole and these peripheries. The attractiveness of an Imperial Parliament for advocates in the Dominions stemmed from the equality of all members involved. However, as Duncan Bell has argued, the dominant attitude in the Dominions towards the idea of Greater Britain “was one of indifference.”¹⁴ Many in the Dominions were still exploring the latitude of action allowed by self-government to build up their own state capacities.

The conflicting attitudes in the Dominions towards closer union with Great Britain proved to be one of the biggest challenges advocates of Greater Britain had to address. On the

¹¹ Hyam, “The British Empire in the Edwardian Era,” 57-58.

¹² John Darwin, *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World System, 1830-1970* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 147-48.

¹³ Duncan Bell, *The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860-1900* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 14.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 16.

frontlines of this fight was the Round Table movement, which was made up largely of elite men from Britain and around the empire. While the founders of the Round Table Movement all came from the metropolitan elite, it was not a group or movement that contented itself with fighting the fight for Greater Britain solely in Britain. By the time the First World War began, the Round Table Movement had firmly established itself in the Dominions of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.¹⁵ Through its groups in the Dominions and through its journal, *The Round Table*, the movement sought to wake and stir those indifferent to Greater Britain by appealing to their Anglo- Saxon – British – identity with its “highly charged sense of history.”¹⁶ This vision of historical ties connecting Anglo-Saxons in the dominions with those in the metropole was important for two reasons. Firstly, by highlighting historical ties, the Round Table Movement argued that the only way for contemporaries to maintain and strengthen the British Empire they had inherited from their ancestors was by coming together in unprecedented ways. One of those ways was through the creation of a Greater Britain. Secondly, the “highly charged sense of history” that underpinned appeals to Anglo-Saxon identity led Round Tablers to appreciate the powerful ways in which historical discourse could be used for contemporary purposes.

The vehicle through which the Round Tablers brought their project of a Greater Britain to the Dominions was their quarterly journal, *The Round Table*. Their intended audience was what we would call influencers. In other words, *The Round Table* contained articles geared towards “those in a position to influence public opinion.”¹⁷ The most obvious way to stimulate opinion in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand was through the mass media juggernaut of the day, the

¹⁵ Andrea Bosco, *The Round Table Movement and the Fall of the 'Second' British Empire (1909 – 1919)* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017), 15.

¹⁶ Thompson, “The Language of Imperialism and the Meaning of Empire,” 174.

¹⁷ John Kendle, *The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), 65, quoted in Bosco, *The Round Table Movement and the Fall of the 'Second' British Empire (1909 – 1919)*, 9.

newspapers. During the decades leading up to the First World War, newspapers became ubiquitous in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. While not every Canadian, Australian, or New Zealander newspaper promoted British culture and heritage, many of them did have such an agenda. As a result, newspapers helped to bind people from the white settler colonies “into a broader collective imagination based on the idea of a transglobal British settler identity.”¹⁸ This process, however, was not just a “top-down”—metropole to peripheries—process, for Canadians, Australians, and New Zealanders also used newspapers “to communicate information and opinion to audiences in Britain.”¹⁹ In this way then, Canadians, Australians, and New Zealanders made their own contributions to shaping British identity in the decades before the First World War.

The transformation of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand into Dominions brought new domestic and international challenges to each territory and to the metropole as well. One such challenge came from those ethnic, political, and religious communities that called for self-government not only in domestic policy but in foreign policy as well. While the voices of advocates for fully sovereign self-government had been heard in settler colonies before the achievement of Dominion status, they became more insistent in the years leading up to the First World War. Deflecting this challenge became a task of the governments of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.²⁰

Of course, one way to do this was by doubling-down on the Britishness of the self-governing settler colonies. This strategy was two-fold. First, governments sought to convince

¹⁸ Alan Lester, “British Settler Discourse and the Circuits of Empire,” *History Workshop Journal* 54, no. 1 (2002): 31.

¹⁹ Simon Potter, “Webs, Networks, and Systems: Globalization and the Mass Media in the Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century British Empire,” *Journal of British Studies* 46, no. 3 (2007): 621.

²⁰ Voices such as Harry Holland and C. Webb in New Zealand, Henri Bourassa in Canada, and John Hayes, J.F. Archibald, and David Buchannan in Australia.

the white populations of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, who might find the nationalistic, go-it-alone message attractive, that their true identity resided in their connections to the metropole and not to their class, religious affiliation, or some nation-state that had yet to be constructed. Second, governments could try to successfully solve the problems of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand within the framework of dominion status. One challenge was exercising authority over and dispossessing the indigenous inhabitants who still resided on lands coveted by the settler population. The other challenge was populating these territories with settlers who could effectively develop these new lands along lines that increased the wealth and power of the Dominions and the empire as a whole. Both challenges went together and if handled correctly would not only further the influence of the British Empire, but also, in theory at least, reduce the attractiveness of the full sovereignty message. If white settlers in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand could exercise authority over native peoples in these new territories, then this would demonstrate the destiny of the “Anglo-Saxon” race to rule over other peoples. Consequently, this “tightening of white strength and influence” over native peoples in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand would strengthen the Dominion’s “Britannic” identity and showcase its contribution to an essential mission of the empire.²¹ There was a paradox, however. Many of the groups who protested the strengthening of ties with Britain did so because they were opposed to this mission of the British Empire for class, religious, or ethnic reasons.

As Canada, Australia, and New Zealand worked out the possibilities of Dominion self-government, they also had to deal with international challenges. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the rival empires of Japan, Germany, Russia, and the United States expanded

²¹ Michael J.K. Walsh and Andrekos Varnava, eds., *The Great War and the British Empire: Culture and Society* (London: Routledge, 2017), 34.

their efforts in East Asia, North America, and the Pacific. This caused a great deal of consternation in both the dominions and the metropole. From London's perspective, German and Russian actions in these parts of the world were the most concerning. From Ottawa's or Auckland's or Canberra's perspective, however, the moves of Japan and, to a lesser extent, the United States were just as disconcerting. Compounding the challenge was the fear among the Dominions that the British government did not seem to be all that worried about Japanese or American moves in the Pacific world, broadly construed to include eastern as well as western Canada. Such sentiments only increased in the wake of the 1902 naval alliance between Japan and Britain, which was renewed in 1911 and only lapsed as part of the agreements reached among the great powers at the Washington Conference of 1921-22. From the British perspective, the Anglo-Japanese alliance made sense in geostrategic terms as a way to blunt first Russian and then German ambitions in Asia Pacific. However, the Dominions, especially Australia and New Zealand, perceived the alliance as an abomination, for it appeared to give Japan *carte blanche* in the Pacific.²²

Britain's perceived lack of urgency about the supposed perils coming from Japan and the United States caused some Canadians, Australians, and New Zealanders to question the imperial commitment to protecting the Dominions. Such a perception was important seeing that the British army and navy were the first lines of defense for the Canadians, Australians, and New Zealanders. One of the ways Canadians, Australians, and New Zealanders sought to emphasize the importance of these territories to the metropole, and hence the latter's need to take these territories' concerns over Japan and the United States seriously, was by participating in colonial wars in far-flung locations. The best example of this Dominion loyalism came during the South

²² David C. Atkinson, *The Burden of White Supremacy: Containing Asian Migration in the British Empire and the United States* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017), 6.

African War of 1899-1902. The contribution of the Dominions to the war against the Afrikaner republics of Transvaal and the Orange Free State was impressive: 16,378 Australians, 7,368 Canadians, and 6,495 New Zealanders participated in this imperial conflict.²³ Why would thousands of men from the dominions risk their lives by voluntarily participating in a war in South Africa? According to Mark David Sheftall, these volunteers “generally revered the bonds of heritage and culture they believed linked the dominions to the Motherland.”²⁴ In other words, a shared sense of Britishness had prevailed over the feared disintegrating effects of self-government and colonial nationalism.

Ironically, controversies over British preparedness, treatment of Afrikaner civilians, and the continued subordination of Africans during and after the South African War did little to enhance the image of the British Empire in the eyes of the world. This held true for publics in both the metropole and the Dominions. During the South African War, vocal groups—“Gladstonian” Liberals in Britain, Francophones and socialists in Canada, as well as Catholics and socialists in Australia and New Zealand—increasingly spoke out against British policies and actions. The stance of opponents to the South African War in the Dominions could be varied, but an underlying theme connected them all. It largely stemmed from a Victorian conception of the British Empire which “eschewed the use of force in the maintenance of empire and argued that the bonds of empire must be based upon mutual good will, voluntarism, and the recognition of the principle of nationality.” The lesson drawn from the American War of Independence of 1775-83 and the Canadian rebellions in the 1830s was that British settler populations should be

²³ Christopher Pugsley, *The Anzac Experience: New Zealand, Australia and Empire in the First World War* (Auckland: Oratia Books, 2016), 39; Terence Denman, “‘Ethnic Soldiers Pure and Simple’?: The Irish in the Late Victorian British Army,” *War in History* 3, no. 3 (1996): 267.

²⁴ Mark David Sheftall, *Altered Memories of the Great War: Divergent Narratives of Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 43.

accommodated rather than coerced. Of course, the Afrikaner population and the separate Afrikaner republics made South Africa something of a special case, although immigration to Australia and Canada was making these Dominions more ethnically diverse with each passing year. The more expansive constitutional view of empire contrasted greatly with another view of empire held by more conservative-leaning groups. It held that atop the racial hierarchy stood the Anglo-Saxons and other groups would “either be assimilated or swept aside by the historical progress of an expanding Anglo-Saxon nation state.”²⁵ This narrower view of empire appeared to be the driving force behind the war with the Afrikaners.

These two views of how to govern an empire would repeatedly be summoned to either defend or protest the British war effort.²⁶ This is important because it revealed a lack of consensus in the metropole. As one might imagine, the same could be said of the Dominions. Liberals and Conservatives in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand expounded mainstream interpretations of the British Empire’s actions in South Africa. At the same time, subaltern groups among the settler populations in the Dominions—Irish, French-Canadians, Catholics, and Socialists—offered dissenting critiques of the empire’s attempt to defeat and dissolve the independent Afrikaner republics. Even though the settlement of the war and the subsequent unification of South Africa was based on a white supremacist compromise between Britons and Afrikaners to rule as a settler minority over the indigenous African majority, the debates over the war set a precedent for discursive battles that might be fought over imperial wars in the future.

²⁵ John S. Ellis, “‘The Methods of Barbarism’ and the ‘Rights of Small Nations’: War Propaganda and British Pluralism,” *Albion* 30, no. 1 (1998): 49.

²⁶ *One Flag, One Queen, One Tongue: New Zealand, the British Empire and the South African War*, ed. John Crawford and Ian McGibbon (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2003); Craig Wilcox, *Australia’s Boer War: The War in South Africa 1899-1902* (South Melbourne, Victoria: Oxford University Press, 2002).

In August 1914, that future arrived. From the beginning of the First World War the competing visions of the British past that will be examined in my dissertation were already on display. Initially, however, the lines separating the mainstream and dissenting views were not as sharply demarcated as they would become as the war dragged on from 1915 to 1918. The groups in Britain and the dominions who had waged their own “small wars” of ideas during the South African War reloaded their verbal weaponry almost as soon as Britain, on behalf of the whole empire, declared war on Germany. However, their first salvos were cautious range-finding exercises. It was only with the transition to total war that their rhetorical shelling became more sustained and intense. This was not surprising, given the fact that substantial majorities in the metropole and dominions appear to have given their support to the war initially, albeit less enthusiastically than is often claimed.

The first measure of the Dominions’ response to British entry into the conflict were the volunteers who came forward to fight, possibly in faraway battlefields not just in German colonial possessions in the Pacific. While the Dominions had demonstrated during the South African War that they could be counted on when the empire was under threat, the number of volunteers was astonishing.²⁷ During the First World War the number of troops from Australia, New Zealand, and Canada who would fight for the British Empire were: 412,953 Australians; 628,461 Canadians; and, 100,444 New Zealanders.²⁸ While these relatively huge contributions were heartening for the British military, they served to renew the metropolitan debate about the place of the Dominions in the empire. Some interpreted the volunteers as a sign of the eventual exit of these overseas Britons from an Anglocentric empire. Others, of course, interpreted them

²⁷ Darwin, *The Empire Project*, 333.

²⁸ Tennyson, *Canada’s Great War, 1914-1918*, 190; Steven Loveridge, *Calls to Arms: New Zealand Society and Commitment to the Great War* (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2014), 12; E.M. Andrews, *The Anzac Illusion: Anglo-Australian Relations during World War One* (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 5.

as evidence of a strong and united empire that would only become more integrated in the course of a global struggle to defeat Germany and its allies, which grew to include the Ottoman empire at the end of October 1914.

By 1915, deadly battles at Ypres and Gallipoli would test the commitment of the Dominions to the war effort because these episodes produced huge Dominion casualties. At this point in the war, criticism in the metropole increasingly targeted the Asquith government's conservative approach to warfighting. The sense that radical measures had to be taken if Britain was to win became widespread. The introduction of conscription under the Military Service Act in January 1916 marked the beginning of a political as well as strategic shift. The British encouraged the dominion governments to follow their lead. New Zealand followed suit without much opposition. The same, however, cannot be said of Canada and Australia. Canada eventually instituted conscription in 1917, but not without stirring opposition from French Canadians and from workers. Anti-conscription opinion in Australia proved insurmountable. In two separate referendums on conscription, the majority of Australians voted no. Conscription called into question the liberties of the freeborn Englishman (and his Irish and French others), in the mother country and in the new Britains overseas.

David Lloyd George replaced Asquith as prime minister at the end of 1916, an event that proved to be momentous for the whole British imperial war effort. Moving with the utmost speed to place not just Britain but the empire on a total war footing, Lloyd George asked the Dominions to increase their contributions to the war effort. While this created fresh controversies in the dominions, it also presented an opportunity for Dominion leaders to demand a greater say in how their resources and men should be used in the conflict. Lloyd George's Imperial War Conferences and Imperial War Cabinet became arenas in which the dominions

could exercise their growing power.²⁹ Both war aims and peace terms were in play. By the time the Dominions sent representatives to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 they had already seen their position within the British Empire change quite significantly.

The expanding role of the Dominions brought both blessings and headaches for British statesmen. The First World War magnified for better or worse the significance of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and even Ireland in the imperial endeavor. Historians of the British Empire do not dispute these two observations. However, there is a debate among scholars as to whether the First World War weakened or strengthened the bonds that linked Canada, Australia, and New Zealand with Britain and the Empire. It is important to reiterate that on the eve of the First World War there already existed competing views in the metropole and Dominions on the way forward for the empire. The majority of people in Britain and the dominions probably favored strong if not necessarily stronger bonds, but advocates of loosening the ties had not been converted or silenced in the years leading up to 1914. Thus, a certain pattern was in place before the conflict began, but the First World War raised the stakes enormously. One of the ways the debate over the fate of the empire and the place of the dominions within it would unfold was through a historicized discourse in which the past was mobilized to reinforce the positions along a wide front of disputes concerning the war and the peace.

1.2 Scholarship

There are three different bodies of scholarship which are relevant to my dissertation. They all deal with discourse in one way or another. The first focuses on the discourse—both supportive and oppositional—around the topic of Greater Britain which developed in both

²⁹ Robert Holland, “The British Empire and the Great War, 1914-1918,” in *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. 4: *The Twentieth Century*, ed. Judith Brown and William Roger Louis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 124; Darwin, *The Empire Project*, 335.

Britain and the Dominions during the decades preceding the First World War. This scholarship makes it clear that history was a form of discourse about colonial and political identity way before the fighting began in 1914. The second area of relevant scholarship deals with propagandistic discourse in Britain and the dominions during the First World War. Scholars working in this field have repeatedly shown that “controlling the narrative”—largely through propaganda—was a central concern for authorities in Britain and the dominions from 1914 to 1918. The scholarship surrounding the discourse of memory is the final field that is pertinent to my dissertation. Literature concentrating on the discourse of memory reveals that in Britain and the Dominions there was not a consensus on what the war meant; nor, was there a consensus on the best way to commemorate and honor those who had died or were severely wounded during the conflict. All three of these fields of scholarship are connected because they demonstrate that historical discourse was a mainstay in Britain and the Dominions before, during, and after the First World War.

Over a decade ago, Duncan Bell made the observation that “No longer can Britain be studied in isolation from the empire, or the empire separate from Britain.”³⁰ Bell’s statement came almost a decade following the publication of *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, which pushed historians to connect the histories of the British metropole and dominions.³¹ Yet, even before the publication of the highly influential, multi-volumed Oxford series, historians such as Andrew Thompson had already started to erase the boundary between British history and imperial history. Through an exploration of imperialist rhetoric in British political discourse from 1895 to 1914, Thompson clearly demonstrates that for many groups in Britain the empire

³⁰ Bell, *The Idea of Greater Britain*, 23.

³¹ William Roger Louis, Nicholas Canny, J. Marshall, A.N. Porter, Judith M. Brown, Robin Winks, and Alaine M. Low, *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, 5 Volumes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

was anything but separate from their lives.³² Here, Thompson posits an Andersonian-like argument that empire, like nations, are “imagined communities,” because they “are historical and always loom out of an immemorial past, and still more important, glide into a limitless future.”³³ To substantiate his claim, Thompson examines the historical rhetoric used and developed by one of the biggest promoters of imperialism in the prewar period: the Navy League. According to Thompson, this hyper-imperialist advocacy group constantly used language that “was highly charged with a sense of history and drew heavily on the notions of legacy and heritage that had been so central to the discourse of an earlier generation of Victorian imperialists.” Thus, as with Anderson’s “imagined community” within nationalism, Thompson pinpoints much of the “imagined community” of Britain’s imperial culture, at least from the perspective of groups like the Navy League—forerunners to the proponents of mainstream history during the First World War—to a perceived common past and heritage.

The imagined racial heritage which formed the basis of efforts to create an imagined empire-wide community was Anglo-Saxon. This imperial community, real as well as imagined, was to be historically defined and bounded by a specific kind of Westernness and whiteness. In recent years historians such as Amanda Behm and Alan Lester have clearly demonstrated, the focus on the Anglo-Saxon dimension of the British Empire was something that had become a constant in metropolitan and dominion discourses in the decades preceding the First World War thanks in large part to British intellectuals, such as John Seeley, and writers in the Dominions.³⁴

³² For a counter-argument to Thompson’s claim, see Bernard Porter, *The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

³³ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 3rd ed. (London: Verso, 2006), 11; Thompson, “The Language of Imperialism and the Meanings of Empire,” 174.

³⁴ Amanda Behm, “Settler Historicism and Anticolonial Rebuttal in the British World, 1880-1920,” *Journal of World History* 26, no. 4 (2015): 785-813; Theodore Koditscheck, *Liberalism, Imperialism, and the Historical Imagination: Nineteenth-Century Visions of a Greater Britain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); James Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Angloworld* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men’s*

Underpinning this rhetoric of a common racial heritage which linked populations in Britain and the Dominions was the hope that a Greater Britain could be built in the near future. Eventually, this global Anglo-Saxon polity would come to fruition as a result of the full integration of the Anglo-Saxons in the metropole with those in the Dominions and, to an extent, hoped for the assimilation of other groups into their cultural or civilizational notion of identity. Duncan Bell has argued that this rhetoric of a common racial heritage was the “first and most important step on the road to building a Greater Britain,” because it endeavored to change the way “people imagined the empire.”³⁵ According to this interpretation, before the campaign to unite Britain and the white Dominions into a Greater Britain, most people, especially those in Britain, viewed the empire as lacking a unity beyond the fact that British officials administered the territories nominally under British rule. In an effort to unify and motivate support for the empire, therefore, writers and political leaders in the metropole and Dominions centered the idea of Greater Britain around “rhetoric about unity, glory, and destiny— the iconographic order of Greater Britain.”³⁶ Of course, any effort to unify and motivate support for a project based around appeals to a common racial heritage is going to produce opposition, especially in a multi-racial, multi-ethnic empire such as the British one. Recently, historians have increasingly explored the voices and arguments of those within Britain and the Dominions who either did not fall under the Anglo-Saxon label or who were “Anglo-Saxons” yet still opposed the premise that the British Empire was one built solely by and for white Britons.³⁷

Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Robert J.C. Young, *The Idea of English Ethnicity* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2008); Alan Lester, “British Settler Discourse and the Circuits of Empire,” *History Workshop Journal* 54, no. 1 (Autumn, 2002): 24-48.

³⁵ Bell, *The Idea of Greater Britain*, 9.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 19.

³⁷ Scholars who have focused on the critics of empire include Priyamvada Gopal, *Insurgent Empire: Anticolonial Resistance and British Dissent* (London: Verso, 2019); Paul Townend, *The Road to Home Rule: Anti-Imperialism and Irish National Movement* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2016); Mira Matikkala, *Empire and Imperial Ambition: Liberty, Englishness and Anti-Imperialism in Late Victorian Britain* (London: I.B. Tauris,

The fact advocates of a Greater Britain either overlooked or ignored the non-white populations—the indigenous peoples of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—and the non-Anglo-Saxon populations—predominantly Irish and Francophone settlers—who lived in the territories they sought to draw closer to Great Britain might cause some to label them as propagandists. This is especially true if one takes Oliver Thompson’s definition of a propagandist as one who seeks to persuade public opinion through the “selection of facts favourable to a certain argument” – Anglo-Saxons built the empire and therefore it was for them and them alone - while “leaving out or discounting those which were not” – Anglo-Saxons were just *one* of the numerous groups of people who built and sustained the British Empire.³⁸ Additionally, Philip Taylor’s argument that propaganda can be “based on reasoned, almost quasi-academic explanations of the issues involved, with the facts – even if not all the facts – presented in an objective manner and with measure argument” would seem to suggest that the arguments being put forth by advocates of Greater Britain was indeed a form of propaganda.³⁹ Such a suggestion would seem to be correct seeing that the most vocal advocates of Greater Britain, at least initially, were professional historians, such as Seeley and Froude.

In theory, these same views of propagandists and propaganda could be applied to advocates of mainstream historical narratives—who will also be referred to as Mainstreamers—during the First World War for the main reason that they sought to influence public opinion through the selection of certain parts of the past while conveniently overlooking or silencing other parts of the past which may have contradicted their intended message. While such views

2011); Gregory Claeys, *Imperial Sceptics: British Critics of Empire, 1850-1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

³⁸ Oliver Thompson, *Easily Led: A History of Propaganda* (Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing, 1999), 46.

³⁹ Philip M. Taylor, *British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century: Selling Democracy* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 36.

could be applied to the advocates of mainstream historical discourses of the First World War, they will not be largely because of how loaded the term “propaganda” has become. As Robert Cole has stated, propaganda is now largely seen as something “the unscrupulous employ to seduce people into thinking and behaving in a manner in which they would not otherwise think or behave.”⁴⁰ Ironically, much of the reason why propaganda has become viewed in such a manner stems from the atrocity stories propagated in the British Empire and allied countries during the First World War. Many historians working on the British Empire have focused on this type of propaganda during the last several decades.⁴¹

The term propaganda has not outlived its usefulness per se; however, other rhetorical devices need to be examined if we are to gain a nuanced appreciation for the ways individuals and groups attempted to push forward certain agendas. Throughout my research, I have not come across many works that have examined the myriad ways the past was used in Britain and the Dominions during the First World War.⁴² Some works have focused on a single topic which

⁴⁰ Robert Cole, ed., *The Encyclopedia of Propaganda* (Armonk, NY: Sharpe Reference, 1998), xvi.

⁴¹ Alan Kramer, *German Atrocities: A History of Denial* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001); John S. Ellis, “The Methods of Barbarism and the ‘Rights of Small Nations’: War Propaganda and British Pluralism,” *Albion* 30, no. 1 (1998): 49-75; Steven W. Siak, “The Blood that is in Our Veins Comes from German Ancestors,” *Albion* 30, no. 2 (1998): 221-252; Gary Messinger, *British Propaganda and the State in the First World War* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992); A.J. Hoover, *God, Germany, and Great Britain in the Great War: A Study in Clerical Nationalism* (New York: Praeger, 1989); Stuart Wallace, *War and the Image of Germany: British Academics, 1914-1918* (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, 1988); Eberhard Demm, “Propaganda and Caricature in the First World War,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 28, no. 1 (1983): 163-192; Roland Stromberg, *Redemption by War: The Intellectuals and 1914* (Lawrence, KS: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1982); Albert Marrin, *The Last Crusade: The Church of England in the First World War* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1974); Alice Goldfarb Marquis, “Words as Weapons: Propaganda in Britain and Germany during the First World War,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 13, no. 3 (1978): 467-498; Cate Haste, *Keep the Home Fires Burning: Propaganda in the First World War* (London: Allen Lane, 1977); Harold Laswell, *Propaganda Technique in World War One* (Cambridge, MA: The M.I.T. Press, 1971).

⁴² Some works which have examined the usages of the past in the century preceding World War One are Joanne Parker, *England’s Darling: The Victorian Cult of Alfred the Great* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017); Richard Cosgrove, “A Usable Past: History and the Politics of National Identity in Late Victorian England,” *The Parliamentary History Yearbook* 7, no. 1 (2008): 30-42; Michael Ledger-Lomas, “The Character of Pitt the Younger and Party Politics, 1830-1860,” *Historical Journal* 47, no. 3 (2004): 641-661; John Clive, “The Use of the Past in Victorian England,” *Salmagundi* nos. 68-69 (1985-86): 48-65; Olive Anderson, “The Political Uses of History in Mid-Nineteenth Century England,” *Past and Present* 36, no. 1 (1967): 87-105.

British intellectuals built a discourse around through the employment of historical rhetoric. For instance, a number of scholars have examined British writers' historical interpretation of German militarism from 1914 to 1918. Here scholars have examined the British usage of the actions and policies of Frederick the Great and Otto von Bismarck along with the writings of G.W.F. Hegel, Heinrich von Treitschke, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Friedrich von Bernhardi for the purpose of explaining Germany's militarism during the First World War as the continuation of earlier practices and thinking.⁴³ These works are important because they all successfully illuminate the ways in which British intellectuals and propagandists used the German past to frame the perceived aggression of Germany during the First World War; however, these works do not really go into great detail about any counter narratives in Britain that challenged this "Germany as eternal aggressor" interpretation.

While something of a lacuna exists in the literature on the usages of the past and on the competing historical narratives in Britain and the Dominions during the First World War, the same cannot be said about the "memory wars" which materialized in these locations after 1918. This is especially true regarding the scholarship on the memorialization of the war in Britain. The historiography on British memory contains two schools of thought: the first can be defined as the "Historical Break" school, the second as the "Historical Continuity" school. Both schools of thought focus on the tragedy of the First World War and how the centralities of tragedy, in its different forms, became major elements in the continuing legacy of the war. In his insightful article on British memory and the First World War, Stephen Heathorn explains that the point of

⁴³ Gregory Moore, "The Super-Hun and the Super-State: Allied Propaganda and German Philosophy during the First World War," *German Life and Letters* 54, no. 4 (2001): 311-330; Ellis, "'The Methods of Barbarism' and the 'Rights of Small Nations': War Propaganda and British Pluralism"; Peter Buitenhuis, *The Great War of Words: British, American, and Canadian Propaganda and Fiction, 1914-1933* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987); Marrin, *The Last Crusade*; Laswell, *Propaganda Technique in World War I*.

difference between the “Historical Break” and “Historical Continuity” viewpoints pertains to whether Britons viewed the First World War as continuous or discontinuous with British history.⁴⁴

The “Historical Break” interpretation views the First World War as an unprecedented event in British history because it refashioned Britain’s imagination and view of the world.⁴⁵ Thus, scholars of this school of thought argue that the First World War represented a “watershed in contemporary history” for the British people due to it ushering in a “modern and essentially different world from what had been seen before.” The foundation for the “Historical Break” line of thinking was laid almost fifty years ago with the publication of Paul Fussell’s *The Great War and Modern Memory*. In this influential work, Fussell examines the literature and poetry produced by a number of frontline soldiers to illustrate “how they remembered and wrote about” their experiences of modern warfare.⁴⁶ According to Joanna Bourke, Fussell portrays the First World War as “stimulating a literary revolution, in which the adoption of an ironic mode of writing” came to dominate.⁴⁷ This literary revolution is at the heart of Fussell’s argument that the First World War drastically changed the mindset not only for men who experienced the conflict, but also for society as a whole because for Fussell irony became the “one dominating

⁴⁴ Stephen Heathorn, “The Mnemonic Turn in the Cultural Historiography of Britain’s Great War,” *The Historical Journal* 48, no. 4 (2005): 1111.

⁴⁵ Robert Wohl, “Heart of Darkness: Modernism and its Historians,” *Journal of Modern History* 74, no. 3 (2002): 573-621; Leonard Smith, “Paul Fussell’s *The Great War and Modern Memory*: Twenty-Five Years Later,” *History and Theory* 40, no. 2 (2001): 241-260; Annette Becker, “The Avant-Garde, Madness, and the Great War,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 35, no. 1 (2000): 71-84; Richard Cork, *A Bitter Truth: The Avant-Garde and the Great War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994); Charles Harrison, *English Art and Modernism, 1900-1937* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994); Samuel Hynes, *A War Imagined: The First World War and English Culture* (New York: Maxwell International, 1991); Modris Eksteins, *Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989); Paul Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975).

⁴⁶ Heathorn, “The Mnemonic Turn in the Cultural Historiography of Britain’s Great War,” 1105.

⁴⁷ Joanna Bourke, *Dismembering the Male: Men’s Bodies, Britain and the Great War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 18.

form of modern understanding.”⁴⁸ In other words, Fussell essentially argues that without the First World War, the mindset of the twentieth century would have continued to have developed along the lines of the Victorian and Edwardian eras.

To demonstrate the ways in which the First World War had a complete and lasting impact on British society, Fussell sets out to highlight the mindset of the British people going into the conflict. Here Fussell makes two assertions which illustrate how prewar mentalities differed from those of postwar British society. Fussell’s first assertion comes from his belief that the First World War “was perhaps the last to be conceived as taking place within a seamless, purposeful ‘history’ involving a coherent stream of time running from past through present to future.” This unity of time, however, would be shattered over the course of the conflict because of its unprecedented destructiveness. Secondly, Fussell claims that unlike the wartime and postwar worlds, the First World War began in the context of “a static world, where the values appeared stable and where the meaning of abstractions seemed permanent and reliable.” According to Fussell, the certainty of such prewar values, such as “Honour and Glory,” would be obliterated by the First World War due to the dehumanized and mechanical nature of the conflict.⁴⁹ As a result, the British people experienced profound psychological, imaginative, and creative transformations because of the First World War.

In *A War Imagined: The First World War and English Culture*, Samuel Hynes followed in the footsteps of Fussell in examining the ways the First World War altered the mindset of combatants and societies. As with *The Great War and Modern Memory*, Hynes presents the First World War as an event that not only ended “the life and values of Victorian and Edwardian England” but also “changed reality” for those who survived the conflict. Hynes, like other

⁴⁸ Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory*, 38.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 21-22.

scholars from the modernist school, attributes this altered reality to the nature, scope, and horror of industrial warfare. Therefore, the unprecedented nature of the conflict which engulfed Europe and the world from 1914 to 1918 made the postwar years “seem discontinuous from the years before, and that discontinuity became part of English imaginations.”⁵⁰ The war, however, did not just make the past “remote and unavailable” for it also made the “present a formless space emptied of values.” In this way then, according to Hynes, those survivors of the First World War who came to be disillusioned during and after the conflict would reject “the values of the society that had sent them to war, and in doing so separated their own generation from the past and from their cultural inheritance.”⁵¹ For scholars like Hynes, Fussell, and others from the “Historical Break” school it is this disillusionment and the rejection of all that came before the First World War which provided the most lasting legacy of the conflict.

Proponents of the “Historical Break” position have received pointed criticism for their seemingly hardline stance that the First World War changed everything. However, one scholar from the “Historical Continuity” school—Ted Bogacz—has agreed with the likes of Fussell and Hynes that the conflict did cause some soldiers and writers to become disillusioned. Moreover, Bogacz agrees with the contention that the language used and the ideas expressed by the disillusioned represented a break with the past. Bogacz, however, also highlights how other segments of society responded and remembered the First World War through the language of the “high diction” of the Victorian and Edwardian eras. In this way, Bogacz demonstrates how these older modes of expression retained their importance even in the face of unprecedented death and destruction.

⁵⁰ Hynes, *A War Imagined*, xi.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, xii, 433.

In “‘A Tyranny of Words’: Language, Poetry, and Antimodernism in England in the First World War,” Bogacz explores other responses to the war besides disillusionment. To do this, he focuses his attention on two primary sources—*The Times* and *The Poetry Review*—because they both indulged in “high diction and its rejection of the modern industrial world.”⁵² Bogacz makes it clear that the language employed by *The Times* and *The Poetry Review* throughout the First World War represented a continuation of how many within England spoke, thought, and wrote about the challenges brought about by the Industrial Revolution. Thus, even when people on the home front received news from the battle fronts about the unheroic nature of modern industrial warfare they used antebellum-period language to make sense of the catastrophic First World War. According to Bogacz, the “high diction” of *The Times* and *The Poetry Review* “may perhaps best be understood as a defense and barrier against a threatening modern world.”⁵³ In other words, old ways of thinking and expressing oneself continued to be utilized by some groups within British society to reassure themselves against the challenging and destructive tendencies of modernity.

Since the 1990s other scholars of the “Historical Continuity” school have followed in the footsteps of Bogacz by offering their own critiques of the “Historical Break” interpretation.⁵⁴ In particular, over the last two and a half decades revisionist historians have countered the claim that the First World War marked a watershed in British history by examining how those needing

⁵² Ted Bogacz, “‘A Tyranny of Words’: Language, Poetry, and Antimodernism in England in the First World War,” *Journal of Modern History* 58, no. 3 (1986): 658.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 664.

⁵⁴ Jay Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Stefan Goebbel, *The Great War and Medieval Memory: War Remembrance and Medievalism in Britain and Germany, 1914-1940* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Martin Evans and Ken Luan, *War and Memory in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Berg, 2007); Alex King, *Memorials and the Great War in Britain: The Symbolism and Politics of Remembrance* (Oxford: Berg, 1998); Bourke, *Dismembering the Male: Men’s Bodies, Britain and the Great War*; John Gillis, ed., *Commemoration: The Politics of Remembrance* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); Adrian Gregory, *The Silence of Memory: Armistice Day, 1919-1946* (Oxford: Berg, 1994).

to manage their grief during and after the war looked to traditional forms of mourning to do so. Jay Winter's *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History*, was the first major work to examine traditional forms of mourning to illustrate the ways in which the First World War did not completely erase the past for everyone involved in the conflict. While it is important to note that Winter takes a relatively hardline against the "Historical Break" school, he does not deny that the First World War birthed the modern mindset with "its multi-faceted sense of dislocation, paradox, and the ironic" due to the disconnect between what had come before, during, and after the conflict.⁵⁵ In this sense, Winter is following Ted Bogacz's position by recognizing that the First World War made the past appear discontinuous with the present and the future for some within European society. Nevertheless, Winter explains such novel ways of expressing oneself "could not heal" combatants, veterans, and families.⁵⁶ It was in the realm of mourning and healing in which tradition and the past retained its hold on the population at large during and especially after the First World War.

In order to demonstrate how tradition and the past continued to retain their relevance for people who had lost loved ones during the First World War, Winter focuses on the traditional apocalyptic, biblical, spiritualist themes that appeared in the mediums of art, cinema, literature, and architecture towards the end of the conflict and in particularly after it. Winter's study is not just limited to one country, for he takes a comparative approach by looking at some of the similarities that existed in the ways the British, French, and Germans mourned and remembered their dead. Thus, through his comparative study of the ways Britain, France, and Germany memorialized their dead Winter contends "that the backward gaze of so many writers, artists, politicians, soldiers, and everyday families ... reflected the universality of grief and mourning in

⁵⁵ Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning*, 5.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 5.

Europe from 1914” into the post war era.⁵⁷ In this way then, Winter challenges the assertion that the First World War irrevocably shattered the past from the present, because rather than abandoning tradition many within Britain, France, and Germany embraced it at least when it came to mourning and remembering those who had died.

The types of commemorative practices following the First World War has been the subject of study for scholars working in the Dominions as well. Scholars like Jonathan Vance, who examines the commemorative practices of Canadians in the interwar period, have put forth an argument similar to Winter’s that traditional forms of mourning and remembrance were the dominant modes Canadians turned to following the return of peace.⁵⁸ Other scholars though have challenged such views from both the Canadian perspective as well as the Australian and New Zealander perspective. Here scholars have examined the ways in which the language and focus of commemorative practices were new to the people in the Dominions because they articulated and represented an intensified nationalistic spirit for these Dominions.⁵⁹

Scholars working in the fields of prewar discourse between supporters and opponents of Greater Britain; British propaganda during the First World War; and the “memory wars” of the postwar period have made great contributions to each of these fields. However, scholars have yet to tie these three fields of study together in any meaningful way. My dissertation will do just that by demonstrating that the prewar discourse between advocates of mainstream and alternative history extended into the war in a variety of forms. The form I will concentrate on is the one centered on historical discourse, which scholars have largely ignored heretofore because of the

⁵⁷ Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning*, 223.

⁵⁸ Jonathan Vance, *Death So Noble: Memory, Meaning, and the First World War* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1997).

⁵⁹ Sheftall, *Altered Memories of the Great War*; Denise Thomson, “National Sorrow, National Pride: Commemoration of War in Canada, 1918-1945,” *Journal of Canadian Studies* 3, no. 4 (1995-1996): 5-27.

focus on propaganda. By focusing on the neglected “history wars” fought in Britain and the Dominions during the First World War I will illustrate how these discursive battles paved the way for the “memory wars” of the postwar period. In other words, my dissertation will tie all three relevant fields of scholarship together by demonstrating that the discursive battles fought in the prewar period carried over into the First World War which then spilled over into the postwar period when people could not agree on what the conflict meant.

1.3 Sources and Methods

My dissertation draws its primary source material from the prewar, wartime, and postwar daily and weekly press in Britain, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Of course, the wartime publications are going to be the main source material I draw from given the fact that my study is largely concerned with the wartime years; yet, briefly examining the prewar and postwar press will be an important component of my study because it presents opportunities to illustrate the continuities and discontinuities which existed in historical discourses. Given the ocean of print which existed in these locations before, during, and after the war I have been selective in the newspapers I have analyzed. The main concern I had when deciding what dailies and weeklies to use in my dissertation stemmed from where those newspapers fell on the political/discursive spectrum. I have selected newspapers that clearly represent the mainstream, which would mostly come from both Conservative and Liberal outlets, and the opposition, which would mainly come from more politically radical dailies and weeklies as well as dailies and weeklies that were produced by and for Catholics.

The British newspapers I examine which were representative of mainstream historical discourse are: *The Times* (London), *Daily Mail* (London), *Manchester Guardian* (Manchester), *The Scotsman* (Edinburgh). For the proponents of oppositional historical discourse in Britain, I

use: *Labour Leader* (London), *Daily Herald* (London), and *Forward* (Glasgow).⁶⁰ The Canadian newspapers I utilize which put forth mainstream historical discourse are: *Winnipeg Free Press* (Manitoba), *Daily Colonist* (British Columbia), *Montreal Gazette* (Montreal), *Ottawa Citizen* (Ottawa), and *Globe and Mail* (Toronto). The advocates of oppositional historical discourse in Canada are represented by: *Montreal Star* (Montreal), *Industrial Banner* (Toronto), *Western Clarion* (British Columbia), *Ottawa Journal* (Ottawa), and *Alberta Non-Partisan* (Alberta).⁶¹ The proponents of mainstream historical discourse in Australia which are used in this dissertation are: *Sydney Morning Herald* (Sydney), *Age* (Melbourne), *Argus* (Melbourne), and *Hamilton Spectator* (Victoria). The oppositional newspapers from Australia which will be used throughout my work will be: *The Labor Call* (Victoria), *The Australian Worker* (Sydney), *Truth* (Melbourne), and *Advocate* (Melbourne).⁶² Finally, the advocates of mainstream historical discourse from New Zealand are represented by: *New Zealand Herald* (Auckland), *The Dominion* (Wellington), and *Marlborough Express* (Marlborough). New Zealand's proponents of oppositional historical discourse come from: *Maoriland Worker* (Christchurch), *Truth* (Auckland), and *Pelorus Guardian* (Marlborough).⁶³

Of course, researching so many dailies and weeklies provided an abundance of copy for me to navigate. For this navigation, I identified and analyzed the dominant patterns which existed in mainstream and oppositional histories in Britain and the Dominions during the First World War.⁶⁴ One of the benefits of using this approach in examining the historical discourses

⁶⁰ All the British newspapers can be accessed via the internet either through paid subscriptions or for free.

⁶¹ As with the British newspapers, all the Canadian ones listed above can be accessed on-line either through paid subscriptions or for free.

⁶² All the Australian newspapers mentioned are accessible for free at <https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/>.

⁶³ These New Zealander newspapers are all available for free at paperpast.natlib.govt.nz.

⁶⁴ Of course, a quantitative approach could be used in this study for the purpose of drawing conclusions about the number of times references were made to say Abraham Lincoln, Louis Riel, or the South African War. Such an

which were built around these selected topics is that it reveals the inherent intertextual nature of these discursive engagements. Examining the intertextual patterns which existed in mainstream and oppositional histories in Britain and the Dominions will illustrate there was clearly a conscious effort by people on both sides of the discursive spectrum to use the past to fight history wars in the present. Thus, this approach allowed me to perform a comparative analysis of the diverse ways in which supporters and opponents of the status quo in Britain and the Dominions employed the past to buttress their positions.

The case of Belgium's invasion serves as good example of what this comparative analysis looks like. Proponents of mainstream historical narratives in Britain and the Dominions would present Germany's invasion of Belgium as the catalyst for Britain's entry into the war. For those within Britain and the Dominions who questioned why Britain and its empire needed to come to the defense of Belgium, proponents of mainstream history pointed to numerous instances in the past when Britain apparently came to the defense of threatened peoples on the European continent.⁶⁵ In this context, the mainstream historical interpretation depicted Britain's defense of "small" Belgium as a continuation of the heroic deeds of preceding British generations. Thus, advocates of mainstream history sought to persuade the present generation that it was their moral "responsibility to continue and complete the struggles of the past."⁶⁶

Such a claim of the past on the present received immediate push back from proponents of alternative history. Here oppositional historical interpretations highlighted instances of Britain's

approach, however, would not serve my study well seeing that some historical references were not really part of a discourse.

⁶⁵ "Prayers of the People," *The Times*, 7 August 1914, 3; "The War Day by Day: England and Belgium," *The Times*, 12 October 1914, 5; Arthur Hassall, "Just for a Scrap of Paper," *Oxford Pamphlets*, no. 5 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1914), 6-7; H.A.L. Fisher, *The War and Its Causes* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1914), 23.

⁶⁶ Ross Poole, "Memory, History and the Claims of the Past," *Memory Studies* 1, no. 2 (2008): 160.

more recent past when Britain itself violated the sovereignty of smaller nations or allied itself with countries which had a record of doing so.⁶⁷ By elaborating on instances in the past when Britain's actions contradicted mainstream history's assertions, proponents of oppositional history took the past down an involuntary path from the mainstream's perspective. This demonstrates mainstream history's "ability to reconstruct the past just as it wished" in only calling up instances in the past when Britain came to the defense of smaller nations to explain Britain's entry into the First World War was "limited by the crucial social fact that other people" – proponents of oppositional histories – "were trying to do the same thing."⁶⁸ There was a crucial difference though. The proponents of oppositional history sought to explain Britain's defense of Belgium not as another example of the British tradition of helping smaller nations but rather as another example in British history when Britain used smaller nations for its own purposes.

1.4 Argument and Significance

The arguments and significance of my dissertation derive from answering the following questions: how did the British and Dominion press mobilize the past to "frame" and debate the war and its ramifications for the immediate postwar period, specifically the outbreak and stakes of the war, the crises over conscription, the extensions of the suffrage, the terms of peace, and the changing position of the dominions from the Imperial War Cabinet to the League of Nations? What kinds of histories—biblical, classical, European, "American," "Anglo-Saxon," British, imperial/naval, colonial, world, etc.—were deployed by journalists, editors, and other contributors? How did the content and style of historical discourse in journalism—historical analogies, arguments, claims, examples, narratives, perspectives, rhetoric, themes, and tropes—

⁶⁷ "Persia: 'The Small Nationalities'," *Éire Ireland*, 24 November 1914, 1; "England and the 'Small Nationalities'," *Éire Ireland*, 25 November 1914, 1; "The Fate of Egypt," *Scissors and Paste*, 6 January 1915, 1.

⁶⁸ Michael Schudson, "The Present in the Past Versus the Past in the Present," *Communication* 11, no. 1 (1989): 112.

vary along the axis of left/right party politics in Britain, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand? How did this discourse vary along the axis of distinct metropolitan/Dominion identities and interests? To what extent did historically-inflected press controversies about the war disclose deeper differences or cleavages about the empire? And, what did shifting balances of consensus and dissensus about the war and the postwar world in the press reveal about journalists' investments in the "imagined community" of a changing but enduring empire shared by the British and the white settler populations of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand?

My dissertation demonstrates that the past served as a very important weapon in Britain and the Dominions during the First World War for both supporters and opponents of the status quo and war effort. By examining the variety of discursive battles fought between proponents of mainstream and oppositional historical narratives I reveal that these conflicts on the local – national/dominion – and transnational – empire-wide – fronts were just as important as the Somme and Gallipoli because they had the potential to either buttress or weaken the war effort back on the home fronts of Britain, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Additionally, my examination of the different ways in which advocates of mainstream and oppositional histories used history illustrates that the past remained relevant, and even potent, during the First World War.

The general makeup of the historical discourse I explore can be broken down along political, religious, and ethnic lines. More times than not, mainstream historical interpretations in Britain and the Dominions during the First World War came from supporters of Britannic nationalism who fell somewhere along the lines of the Conservative-Liberal political spectrum. In spite of party-political and policy differences, this bloc spoke about and activated instances from history that sought to both uphold and strengthen British imperial culture. In contrast, a

more diverse set of people put forth oppositional histories which endeavored to weaken the perceived dominance of Britishness. Labor and socialist radicals, Catholics, and Irish immigrants played the pivotal role on this side of the discursive spectrum. While they too had some disputes over politics, they nevertheless sought to challenge and weaken mainstream historical claims through their own employment of historical rhetoric.

Examining conflicting interpretations of history illustrates the ways in which advocates of mainstream and oppositional histories utilized the past in order to maintain or upend the status quo. Such illustrations lend credence to an insight Foucault made when discussing the role historical rhetoric and arguments play in power relations. Foucault argued in *“Society Must Be Defended”* that the function of mainstream history is to “perpetually enhance the luster of power for so long as it endured.” In contrast, oppositional history, or what Foucault calls “counterhistory,” endeavors to show that mainstream historical interpretations conceal “the fact that power, the mighty, the kings, and the laws were born of the contingency and injustice of battles.”⁶⁹ In other words, proponents of oppositional history seek to give voice to the instances in the past which are silenced by mainstream narratives.

Historical themes and tropes were ubiquitous in press controversies in Britain and the dominions during the First World War. Trying to highlight and analyze all those instances would be impossible. Therefore, in my dissertation I focus on the historical rhetoric and arguments which appeared in Britain and the dominion press around the topics of the German invasion of Belgium, freedom and conscription, wartime service and enfranchisement, the terms of peace, and the empire in the postwar world. These topics, of course, were not the only ones in

⁶⁹ Michel Foucault, *“Society Must Be Defended”*: *Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976*, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 1997), 71-2.

which history was utilized to discuss them. These topics and the historical discourse in which they were embedded do highlight the “history wars” that were fought alongside the “first modern war in history.” Probably no site during the First World War served as a better battlefield for these “history wars” than the press in Britain, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Hence, newspapers from Britain and the dominions serve as the primary source material for my dissertation.

The important role the press played as a site for the competing historical narratives in Britain and the First World War should come as both no surprise and surprise. In the decades and years preceding the First World War, the press in Britain and the Dominions came to wield a great deal of power because it was the most important means in which Britons, Australians, Canadians, and New Zealanders acquired information, news, and informed opinions. Moreover, when the First World War broke out the press remained the principal medium of communication between political leaders and the public at large in Britain and the dominions. Finally, by the time the “guns of August” started firing enough oppositional newspapers had been established to compete with the more mainstream newspapers. The combination of these factors placed the owners, editors, and journalists of dailies in an exceptionally strong position to shape attitudes at every level of society during the First World War. I argue historical discourse – from both the mainstream and oppositional sides of the spectrum – represented one of the clearest ways the owners, editors, and journalists of newspapers sought to achieve their ends.

The press was the primary site for contested historical narratives during the First World War even though censorship existed in Britain and the dominions from the beginning to the end of the conflict. While censorship in the British Empire was not as draconian as in other belligerent countries during the First World War, it nevertheless was something that creators and

conduits of advocacy, criticism, and controversy had to be cognizant of. What is striking is that the authorities tolerated the contest between mainstream and oppositional histories. This is intriguing because proponents of oppositional histories used languages and examples from the past which *could* be read as being counter to the war effort. One of my contentions is that proponents of oppositional histories outsmarted censors by couching their criticisms of the war effort through historical rhetoric and analogies. This approach goes beyond the familiar focus on censorship. Usually, discussions on censorship highlight the ways censorship was implemented or the ways in which the press self-censored itself. My approach demonstrates the ways in which proponents of oppositional histories “beat” censors through their varied usages of the past.

The invasion of Belgium and the debates over conscription and citizenship all happened in “real time”—the present—for the people of Britain and the Empire. In contrast, the other two areas of focus for my dissertation – the terms of peace and the postwar world – were things that had yet to come to fruition. Nevertheless, advocates of mainstream and oppositional historical narratives still used the past to shape the peace and imagine how the postwar world could be built on the blasted foundations of the prewar world. In their own ways then, mainstream and oppositional historical narratives would look back in an effort to steer Britain, its empire, and the world in a new forward direction.

By focusing on the historical rhetoric and arguments which appeared in Britain and the Dominion press around the invasion of Belgium, conscription, citizenship, the terms of peace, and the postwar world my dissertation argues the following. The historical discursive battles fought in Britain and the dominions during the First World War was an extension of the discursive engagements between mainstream and oppositional groups in the prewar period. In other words, just as history was a characteristically British form of discourse about cultural and

political identity during the nineteenth century, it remained so during and after the First World War. Thus, a corollary to this argument, is that the putatively unprecedented nature of the First World War did not make history irrelevant, at least from the perspective of the proponents of mainstream and oppositional histories in Britain and the dominions. Furthermore, the central role played by the British and Dominion press in the history wars of the First World War illustrate that this site remained *the* apparatus by which mainstream and oppositional groups delivered their ideologies for an empire-wide audience. Finally, I argue that the contrasting ways the First World War was remembered and portrayed in postwar “memory wars” was a continuation of the wartime “history wars.”

1.5 Outline of Dissertation

Chapter Two deals with the outbreak of the war and the stakes of the war in selected British, Australian, Canadian, and New Zealander newspapers. The central question which is explored in Chapter Two is: how did mainstream and oppositional newspaper respond to the catalytic event – Germany’s invasion of Belgium - which brought Britain and its Empire into the war? Specifically, this chapter will explore the ways in which proponents of oppositional history countered the mainstream argument that Britain’s defense of Belgium was part of a long-standing tradition of helping smaller nations and peoples when attacked by more powerful forces, while Germany’s invasion of Belgium was part of a long-standing tradition of aggressive war and accompanying culture and philosophy of militarism.

Chapter Three focuses on the conscription crises in Britain and Australia and compare historical framing of the issue by the press in both polities. What makes this comparison so interesting is the fact that conscription was legislated by parliament in Britain but prevented by referendum in Australia. One of the ways pro- and anti-conscription advocates framed the issue

historically was by appealing to the example of Abraham Lincoln during the American Civil War. Throughout Chapter Three, and subsequent ones, the term *Lincolnia* is used when discussing Lincoln's example. The dominance of *Lincolnia* in this debate puts the following question at the center of Chapter Three: why did Britons and Australians use an American story to support their cases and what does this indicate about the boundaries of Anglo-Saxondom, particularly as the U.S. entered the conflict in 1917?

Chapter Four's examines the rumors of peace and the peace notes from German and the United States of American in December 1916. Woodrow Wilson's "Peace without Victory" speech in January 1917 is also utilized in this chapter, for this controversial speech was perceived in Britain and the Dominions as being a slight to the British Empire because Wilson appeared to suggest that both sides in the war were not fighting for altogether different things. The German and American peace notes of December 1916 were the first noticeable signs of peace discussions during the First World War. At this point in the war, Britain was nowhere close to defeating Prussianism. To explain why peace was inconceivable to the British Empire in December 1916, or the beginning of January 1917 for that matter, the mainstream in Britain and New Zealand turned to instances in the past, especially through *Lincolnia*, when a people were asked to make peace before their goals in a war was accomplished. The goal of the British Empire of defeating Prussianism was far from complete during the winter of 1916 and 1917. By taking such a position, however, the mainstream provided Alternatives with further opportunities to highlight instances of British Prussianism in the past. Through references to these moments in British history, Alternatives emphasized that all Prussianism—German as well as British—had to be destroyed before peace could become a reality.

The debates surrounding the extension of suffrage to women in Britain and Canada and the ways the press framed this issue historically is the focus in Chapter Five. Between January 1916 to April 1917, the women of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, Ontario, and British Columbia won the provincial franchise. Later in 1917, the federal government extended the vote to women in the military and to women whose male relatives were in the military. Finally, in 1918, white Anglophone and Francophone women received the federal vote. Likewise, across the Atlantic British women received the parliamentary vote in 1918. As Canadian and British women struggled to make their own history, advocates of mainstream and alternative histories debated whether the suffragists should be grouped with the great women of the past. Chapter Five examines how this process unfolded.

In Chapter Six, I depart from the two-state comparative approach I use in Chapters Three, Four, and Five and revert to the four-state comparison I began with in Chapter Two. In this chapter, I focus on selected newspapers in Britain, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand and their historical framing of the peace conference and the issues that fully emerged after the conclusion of the First World War. In Britain and the Dominions, the Congress of Vienna was the historical ground on which the discussions of peace terms unfolded. Both Mainstreamers and Alternatives agreed that the peace ending the First World War would not be like the peace which ended the Napoleonic Wars. Taking the Congress of Vienna as a framing device, both sides highlighted how “small states” and their ambitions received very little attention by the main parties at Vienna a century earlier. They agreed that this time small states had to be part of any lasting peace settlement. By focusing on this usage of the Congress of Vienna, Chapter Six answers the question: what did the focus on small states a century earlier suggest about the proper role of the Dominions in the formulation of the British Empire’s peace terms? An additional question that

will be answered in Chapter Six is: did the historical framing of peace negotiations and the deliberations over the covenant of the League of Nations a signal a shift in the balance of power between Britain and the Dominions and if so, what kind of shift?

2. THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR

On 4 August 1914, Reichskanzler Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg told the British Ambassador to Berlin, Sir Edward Goschen: “We are at war today ... just for a word – ‘neutrality’ – a word which in war time has so often been disregarded – just for a scrap of paper.”¹ Bethmann-Hollweg was responding to the British government’s decision to declare war in defense of Belgian neutrality, guaranteed by the 1839 Treaty of London, which Germany had violated when its troops invaded Belgium on 2 August 1914. Prior to Germany’s invasion of Belgium, the public and press in Britain and the dominions had expressed ambivalent views about Britain and the Empire entering a European land conflict. Such ambivalence centered on the belief that the conflict which had been brewing ever since Archduke Franz Ferdinand’s assassination in July had nothing to do with Britain or its Empire.

For many in Britain and the Dominions, Germany’s violation of Belgian neutrality transformed earlier uncertainty into resolve; yet, for others—particularly labor radicals, Francophone Canadians, Irish Catholics, and opponents of Britannic nationalism—serious doubts remained as to whether Germany’s actions required a military response from Britain and its Dominions. To quiet such doubts, proponents of mainstream historical discourse in Britain and the Dominions summoned up examples from the British and German past to explain why Britain had to go to war. Unfortunately for proponents of mainstream historical discourse, their selective usage of the past backfired because doubters of the war effort – advocates of oppositional historical discourse – utilized their own narratives from British and Germany history to counter the mainstream narrative.

¹ Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, “Interview with Sir Edward Goschen,” quoted in A. Higgins, “The Law of Nations and the War,” *Oxford Pamphlets*, no. 24 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1914), 13.

The central question explored in this chapter is: how did mainstream and oppositional newspapers respond to the catalytic event – Germany’s invasion of Belgium – which brought Britain and its Empire into the war? Specifically, this chapter explores the ways in which proponents of oppositional history countered the mainstream argument that Britain’s defense of Belgium was part of a long-standing tradition of helping smaller nations/people when attacked by more powerful forces, while Germany’s invasion of Belgium was part of a long-standing tradition of aggressive war and accompanying culture and philosophy of militarism.

2.1 Moments from British History

According to historian Steven Siak, Britain entered the First World War with the belief that it, and its empire, stood for the “trustworthiness of solemn pledges given between nation and nation and for the security of smaller communities.”² Unsurprisingly, one pledge that proponents of mainstream historical discourse spent a fair amount of time highlighting was the one referred to by Bethmann-Hollweg as “a scrap of paper”: the 1839 Treaty of London. In this agreement Britain, along with the other great European powers at the time, recognized and guaranteed the independence and neutrality of Belgium. Moreover, the Treaty of London gave Belgium assurances that the signatories would militarily defend Belgium against any country which threatened Belgian neutrality and independence.³

The first major reference to the 1839 Treaty of London came from Britain’s Foreign Minister at the time, Sir Edward Grey. In a speech delivered in Parliament one day after Germany invaded Belgium, Grey explained to his audience Britain was obliged by the Treaty of London to come to Belgium’s defense. Grey pointed out that Germany’s invasion of Belgium in

² Steven W. Siak, “The Blood that is In Our Veins Comes from German Ancestors: British Historians and the Coming of the First World War,” *Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies* 30, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 249-250.

³ “Long-Standing Relations between Britain and Belgium,” *Scotsman*, December 17, 1914, 7.

1914 was not the first time the commitments in the Treaty of London were challenged. Grey explained that the Treaty of 1839 “is a treaty with a history – a history accumulated since” by highlighting how the question of Belgian neutrality had also arisen during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1. According to Grey, during that earlier conflict British Prime Minister at the time, William Gladstone, had made it clear Britain would come to the defense of the Belgians if France *or* Prussia invaded Belgian territory. As a result of Gladstone’s position, Belgian sovereignty remained intact during the Franco-Prussian War. From Grey’s perspective, “the honour and interests are at least as strong today as they were in 1870, and we cannot take a ... less serious view of our obligations ... than was taken by Mr. Gladstone’s Government in 1870.”⁴

The references to the Treaty of London and the actions taken by Gladstone’s Government in 1870-1 endeavored to establish Britain’s contractual and moral duty to protect Belgium from German aggression. It was this notion of duty that proponents of mainstream historical discourse appealed to get their fellow citizens to support the war effort. At the beginning of the First World War, many within Britain and the Dominions “tended to be emotionally attached to symbols of national identity” since “simple values of duty and loyalty had been pervasive influences on British society” in the century leading up to 1914.⁵ Thus, duty “was not an abstract notion” in Britain or the Dominions at the start of the First World War. Duty was “a practical imperative” that could inspire people into action.⁶ The emphasis placed on Britain’s duty to honor its treaty obligations to protect Belgian sovereignty sought to do just that.⁷

⁴ “Foreign Minister’s Statement,” *The Times*, 4 August 1914, 6.

⁵ Graham Goodlad, “British Government and Society, 1793-1918,” *History Review*, no. 55 (September 2006): 13.

⁶ Modris Eksteins, *Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age* (Boston: Mariner Books, 2000), 179.

⁷ For many in Britain and the Dominions such appeals to duty undoubtedly inspired men to join the fight; however, in a sign of things to come, some within Britain and the dominions criticized the powers that be for lecturing “the

The immediate audience Grey endeavored to move to action through appeals to duty were the members of Parliament who were present during his August 3rd speech. Apparently, coming into this speech Grey had some convincing to do. According to Australian High Court Judge H.G. Higgins, who happened to be in London in the days before and after Britain declared war on Germany, many Liberal members of the House of Commons opposed Britain's entry into the war as late as just a few days before Germany's invasion of Belgium. As Higgins told the *New Zealand Herald*: "Then came Sir Edward Grey's speech when Great Britain learnt of the cynical and deliberate violation of Belgium's neutrality." This altered the views of those who had initially opposed Britain's entry into the war indicating "the deep impression of horror of Germany's violation of the 1839 treaty." Consequently, according to the *New Zealand Herald*, Grey's speech "united the House of Commons and the Empire in its action."⁸ Undoubtedly, many rallied behind the Union Jack as a result of Grey's speech; however, as we will see shortly, not everyone was so moved by the Foreign Minister's words.

The magnitude and consequences of Grey's speech guaranteed the Dominion press would pick it up and publish it, either in its entirety or in abridged version. In Australia, the Melbourne daily morning newspaper *The Argus*—one of the designated proponents of mainstream historical discourse—pursued the latter option. Selectively, *The Argus* included the following from Grey's speech: "If in a crisis like this we ran away from those obligations of honour and interest as regards the Belgian Treaty, I doubt ... it would be very much value in the face of the respect that we should have lost."⁹ From *The Argus*' conservative, mainstream perspective, the "we" in Grey's speech doubtlessly included its readers and other Australians who found themselves

people of this country on 'their duty' at this hour." "Our Duty," *Daily Herald*, August 4, 1914; H.E. Boote, "A Personal Word," *Australian Worker*, August 13, 1914; "The Jargon of Jingoism," *NZ Truth*, 26 September 1914.

⁸ "Notes and Comments," *New Zealand Herald*, 13 May 1915, 6.

⁹ "Britain's Decision," *Argus*, August 5, 1914, 9.

thousands of miles from the crisis. As mentioned in the opening chapter, the decades preceding the First World War saw a concerted effort to strengthen the idea of a Greater Britain amongst people living in the Dominions, especially among white people. This effort reiterated time and time again how the Dominions “were an extension of the British nation” connected to the metropole “by commonality of race, institutions, sensibility and citizenship.”¹⁰ Largely because of this effort “a sense of shared British identity was deeply ingrained among the ethnic British majorities in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand” by the time Grey gave his speech on August 3, 1914.¹¹ The *Argus*’ inclusion of Grey’s explanation of Britain’s historic obligation to Belgium sought to tap into this deeply ingrained British identity. By doing so, The *Argus* made it clear that Australians, because they were part of a Greater Britain, would become just as disgraced as the metropole if they did not do their part in this crisis.

The trans-oceanic migration of 1839’s invocation did not appear solely from Grey’s speech.¹² As the *Marlborough Express* in New Zealand reported on April 29, 1915, there had been a recent arrival “of several posters published in England with a view of stimulating recruiting.” One of the posters highlighted by the *Marlborough Express* was “The Scrap of Paper” – figure 2.1 – which directly referenced the 1839 treaty. According to the *Marlborough Express*, posters such as “The Scrap of Paper” were “striking evidence of the vigorous recruiting campaign being conducted by the Parliamentary committee in England.”¹³ A couple of months after the *Marlborough Express* had highlighted the recruiting campaign then underway in Britain, the influential Canadian magazine, *Maclean’s*, reprinted in its “Review of Reviews”

¹⁰ Bell, *The Idea of Greater Britain*, 11, 24.

¹¹ Darwin, *The Empire Project*, 11.

¹² References to the 1839 Treaty for the purposes of explaining Britain’s entry into the war also were made in: “For a Scrap of Paper,” *Globe*, 20 August 1914, 4.; “History Repeats Itself,” *Calgary Daily Herald*, 2 October 1914, 6; “Why Britain is at War,” *Labour Leader*, 5 November 1914, 3.

¹³ “Poster as Recruiting Agents,” *Marlborough Express*, 29 April 1915, 6.

section an article from the British *Windsor Magazine* discussing the impact of this recruiting campaign. “It is a reasonable assumption that a goodly percentage of those who have joined the military forces ... have been directly influenced, if not certainly led, by the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee’s publications.”¹⁴ Be that as it may, the question remains: what impact did the “Scrap of Poster” have on the average male in Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand? Did they really care about Belgian sovereignty?

According to Peter James Cahalan, the British public “had only the vaguest knowledge” of Belgium when the First World War started. If Britons barely knew anything about a nation that was practically its neighbor, then one can only imagine how little Canadians, Australians, and New Zealanders knew of this tiny country situated in the northwest corner of Europe. The limited knowledge Britons, and those in the Dominions, had of Belgians was that they were brutal colonizers and highly effective farmers. The unflattering colonial picture of Belgium stemmed largely from the work of the Congo Reform Association, founded in 1904. The work of the Association, especially that of E.D. Morel and Roger Casement, during its decade of existence “exposed a horrifying picture of mass brutality and exploitation of the native people by Belgian officials.”¹⁵ The second source of knowledge was from a publication by English sociologist Seebohm Rowntree entitled *Land and Labour: Lessons from Belgium*, which provided the basis for a strong campaign for land reform in Britain in 1910. In addition to

¹⁴ “Recruiting by Poster,” *Windsor Magazine* in *Maclean’s Magazine*, August 1915, 47. According to *Maclean’s*, the articles which appeared in its “Review of Reviews section,” endeavored to keep readers “posted on all that is new, all that is important and worthwhile to thinking men of the world today.”

¹⁵ Peter James Cahalan, “The Treatment of Belgian Refugees in England during the Great War” (PhD Thesis, McMaster University at Hamilton, 1977), 12.

creating an image of the Belgians as highly efficient farmers, Rowntree's work allowed "the press to easily stereotype Belgium as an agrarian nation."¹⁶




Figure 2.1: "The Scrap of Paper"

Unsurprisingly, the publics in Britain and the Dominions were subjected to this second prewar depiction of Belgium rather than the first depiction. This is especially true when it came to depictions of Belgium on recruiting posters. In "Remember Belgium ... Enlist To-day," a British soldier provides protection to a helpless Belgian mother and her two children – one a baby – fleeing their bucolic home in the wake of Germany's invasion. The "Remember Belgium" poster thus worked in at least two ways. First, the audience would recall what was

¹⁶ Leanne Green, "Advertising War: Picturing Belgium in First World War Publicity," *Media, War & Conflict* 7, no. 3 (December 2014): 312-3.

happening to the Belgian peoples at this very moment. Second, the viewer was reminded that Belgium was a land like their own.

Undoubtedly, the “Remember Belgium” poster proved more effective at moving regular Brits, Canadians, Australians, and New Zealanders to enlist than the more academic “Scrap of Paper” poster depicting the 1839 Treaty of London. Nevertheless, the fact that the latter poster was part of the arsenal employed by the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee suggests there was a belief that historical discourse had a role to play in the First World War.



Figure 2.2: "Remember Belgium, Enlist Today."

When the *Marlborough Express* and *Maclean's* published their articles referring to the poster campaign including the “Scrap of Paper,” Britain and the dominions continued to rely on volunteer soldiers for the war effort; however, by 1915 the number of volunteers had dropped compared to the previous year. In Chapter 3, I elaborate on how the diminution of volunteers

brought about widespread demands for conscription by 1915, but here it is important to note that British and New Zealand authorities, which included proponents of mainstream historical discourse, believed making renewed appeals to the 1839 treaty would stimulate recruiting in New Zealand. Why was volunteerism into the army dropping by 1915? In other words, why the need for a renewed recruiting effort one year into the war? Developments, or lack thereof, in the war deflated whatever initial enthusiasm people had for the war when it began in 1914. By 1915, the stalemated Western Front had already claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of men. Additionally, people on the home front were increasingly feeling the burdens of the war. While these developments probably were the central ones driving anxiety about decreasing support for the war, I argue there was another contributing factor to this state of affairs: the counter-history campaign being waged by advocates of alternative history.

Throughout the First World War, the advocates of alternative historical discourse came from the labor and socialist press. In the present chapter, the representatives articulated a line which was consistent with anti-imperialist sentiment that existed before 1914. According to Nicholas Owen, the Alternatives who articulated such sentiment “inherited many of the tenets of Radical thought on Empire from the nineteenth century forebears.”¹⁷ Men such as Richard Cobden, Goldwyn Smith, John Bright, and other “little Englanders” had criticized British imperialism during the second half of the nineteenth century largely through an economic lens, especially whether the Empire was a financial burden.

To a new generation of anti-imperialists at the turn of the twentieth century, “the insularity” of the Little England mindset “reflected a moral indifference to exploitation.” In “one

¹⁷ Owen, 207.

of the most impressive accounts of imperialism” from the prewar years, Ramsay MacDonald argued that such indifference contributed to the British Empire’s “constant extension of territory” and “constant subjection of peoples.”¹⁸ Consequently, asserted MacDonald, “pax and jus Britannica involve the ruin of every robust national characteristic.”¹⁹

Instead of standing by and letting imperialists exploit the Irish, the Egyptians, and the Persians, H.N. Brailsford, another central advocate of alternative historical discourse, called on all Englishmen “to enlist in the cause of freedom by lending their support to national struggles for emancipation.” In the prewar period Brailsford focused on the “struggles for emancipation” then taking place in Egypt, Ireland, and Persia; that is, “struggles for emancipation” currently underway in the British Empire. On Persia, Brailsford produced a 1912 pamphlet, which highlighted Britain’s alliance with an Empire that had recently crushed Finnish and Persian sovereignty. In the latter case, Britain was fully complicit in the “ruin of Persia” for in the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 Britain conceded the northern half of Persia, including the capital of Tehran, to Russia.²⁰ As a result of this concession, Britain obtained Southern Persia as a sphere of influence. What made the Anglo-Russian Convention so distasteful, from Brailsford’s perspective, was that the Persians as recently as 1900 had begun to overthrow “centuries of corruption” by forcing the Shah to accept a Constitution and a Parliament.²¹

Brailsford’s interest in Russia attracted the attention of Keir Hardie, founder of the Independent Labour Paper, first leader of the Labour Party, MP. and editor of the *Labour Leader*. In addition to being “the most celebrated socialist figure” in Britain before the war,

¹⁸ Claeys, *Imperial Sceptics*, 199; J. Ramsey MacDonald, *Imperialism: Its Meaning and Tendency* (1900), 4-5, 10, 6-7, 9, 13-15.

¹⁹ MacDonald, *Imperialism*, 6-7.

²⁰ H.N. Brailsford, *Persia, Finland, and our Russian Alliance* (Independent Labour Party Pamphlet, 1915).

²¹ *Ibid.*

Hardie also was an outspoken critic of imperialism prior to 1914.²² Thanks to Keir Hardie's encouragement Brailsford published articles critical of Russia in the *Labour Leader* during the years leading to the First World War.²³ These articles, however, were not just critical of Russia for like the "Persia, Finland, and our Russian Alliance" pamphlet, Brailsford offered critiques of Britain and its Empire as well. Readers of Brailsford pamphlet and *Labour Leader* articles would have clearly recognized that while Britain and Russia's domestic governments differed in nature, their behaviors towards smaller peoples did not; imperialism was imperialism, regardless of what language the imperialists spoke.

Sounding like Brailsford and Hardie was Robert Hogg, a Scottish compatriot of the latter. Before moving to New Zealand in 1900, Hogg developed strong relationships with Hardie and other important socialists in Britain.²⁴ The impact these connections had on Hogg manifested during Hogg's editorship of the *New Zealand Truth*. Hogg's lead role in the left-of-center *Truth* started only one year before the First World War, but from 1913 to 1922 Hogg wrote and published articles which maintained an anti-imperialist line. Another staunchly anti-imperialist voice that could be heard in New Zealand was that of Harry Holland. Like Hogg, Holland was born in Australia but located to New Zealand after numerous troubles related to his alternative politics. Holland also became editor of a left-to-center newspaper in 1913: the *Maoriland Worker*. The *Maoriland Worker* provided Holland numerous opportunities to demonstrate his "distaste for imperialism and oppression of minorities."²⁵

²² Kenneth Morgan, *Keir Hardie* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 25.

²³ Fred M. Leventhal, *The Last Dissenter: H.N. Brailsford and His World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 131.

²⁴ Les Cleveland, "Hogg, Robert," *Dictionary of New Zealand Biography* (1996). Te Ara – the Encyclopedia of New Zealand, <https://teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/3h30/hogg-robert> (accessed 28 August 2023).

²⁵ O' Farrell, *Harry Holland: Militant Socialist*, 92.

Back in Holland's native Australia, Liverpool born H.E. Boote also spoke the language of anti-imperialism. There is no evidence linking Boote to Hardie during the Liverpoolian's twenty-four years in Britain, but Boote's writings and editorship would have found approval with the Scotsman. Like Hogg and Holland, Boote became editor of a left-of-center newspaper right before the First World War----Boote took over the *Australian Worker's* editorship in 1914. As with its British and Antipodean comrades, the *Australian Worker's* prewar anti-imperialist line carried on into the First World War. The anti-imperialism of Brailsford, Hardie, Hogg, Holland, Boote, and others represented a key component in alternative historical discourse throughout the First World War. This was especially true during the first two years of the conflict.

The alternative historical discourse campaign materialized over the days and months after Britain declared war on Germany. As might be expected, the proponents of alternative historical discourse directed their first efforts at the 1839 Treaty to try to convince people in Britain and the dominions that "Nobody cares two pence about treaties" and that "The cry of Belgian neutrality merely brands us as hypocrites."²⁶ The first challenge to the mainstream historical discourse narrative about Britain's duty to Belgium because of the 1839 treaty came as early as August 6, 1914, in Hardie's *Labour Leader*. After making a brief reference to Grey's invocation of 1839 in his August 3rd speech in the House of Commons, Hardie reminded his reader that very recently:

Great Britain and Russia signed a solemn agreement which they published to the world to uphold and maintain the integrity of Persia, and before the ink was dry on the document Russian troops were pouring over the border into the north of Persia. Their march was marked by their unspeakable and unnamable outrages against men, women, and children. Every Persian who showed love for his country and its independence was shot or hanged ... the cries and tears of ravaged women and orphaned children went up to high heaven in despair, and England, with its alleged love of the independence of small nations stood by

²⁶ George Bernard Shaw, "Common Sense about the War," *The New Statesmen*, 1914; Leyton Richards, "The Churches and the War," *Maoriland Worker*, 5 May 1915, 7.

silent, and thereby connived at the destruction of Persian liberty. It is the hypocrisy of the thing that burns in one's heart. Are not the rights and liberties of Persia as dear to her people as Belgium, and if we are prepared to go to war to preserve the rights and liberties of the smaller nations, why have we gone hand and glove with Russia in destroying the liberties of Persia?²⁷

Hardie's reference to Russia's apparent violation of Persian sovereignty and of Britain's refusal to take any action against Russia highlighted the inconsistency of British rhetoric and British action. Hardie, along with other proponents of alternative history, saw very little that differentiated Russia's action in Persia with German actions in Belgium. And yet, Britain declared war on Germany for its violation of the 1839 Treaty all the while Russia remained a British ally into the First World War.

When Hardie made his references to alleged Russian atrocities in Persia Germany had only just entered Belgium. Consequently, the German military had yet to commit its own alleged atrocities against the Belgian people. However, when the *Labour Leader* returned to the topic of Russian actions in Persia in its 24 September 1914 publication there were ubiquitous German atrocity stories in the British and Dominion press. Cries of German barbarism accompanied the atrocity stories of the First World War, but as the *Labour Leader* pointed out when Russia committed atrocities and "outraged the independence of Persia ... instead of protesting against the 'barbarism' of her ally, Britain actually encouraged Persia to submit!"²⁸

Maybe a bit embarrassingly for Alternatives the double standard they emphasized aligned with German critiques of Britain, before and during the war: German commentators railed against British "cant" and "perfidious Albion." While Alternatives did not go so far to use these specific terms to describe Britain's double standard towards small nations, they nevertheless spoke a similar language to the Germans. Consequently, many advocates of alternative historical

²⁷ J. Keir Hardie, "The Government's Crime," *Labour Leader*, 6 August 1914, 6.

²⁸ "Reply to Asquith and Lloyd George," *Labour Leader*, 24 September 1914, 4.

discourse were labelled pro-German because of such similar language throughout the First World War.

Proving he could speak the language of anti-imperialism and alternative historical discourse to workers and intellectuals alike, Brailsford wrote in *The New Statesmen*, a weekly magazine founded by the Fabians in 1913, about how Britain and Russia had made Persia “The Oriental Belgium” a few years before Germany’s invasion. Before Belgium, Brailsford explained, Persia had its “scrap of paper” – the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 – torn up when Britain and Russia divided Persia between themselves. Thus, according to Brailsford, Britain and its Empire “can hardly ... ostracise Germany as an outcast while we embrace Russia as an ally.”²⁹ According to the *Herald* in England, Germany should not be treated as a pariah since “there is no Government in Europe which has not at some time torn up its 'scrap of paper.' The Finns, the Egyptians, and the Persians have all of them experienced a like wrong.”³⁰

Unlike the Egyptian and Persian cases, Britain did not have any direct involvement in the Finnish episode. During the Finnish War of 1808-09 the British government decided not to intervene as the Finns resisted Russia’s invasion. Technically, Britain did assist the Finns. As Russia invaded Finnish territory in 1808 the Royal Navy fought the Imperial Russian Navy in a series of naval battles in the Baltic. Unfortunately for the Finns, the Anglo-Russian War—1807-1812—was not enough to keep Finland from becoming a satellite of Tsarist Russia. In the establishment of the Grand Duchy of Finland and the attempted Russification of Finland at the turn of the twentieth century the *Labour Leader* saw British culpability. From the perspective of Hardie’s newspaper, Britain’s culpability was even more curious in 1914 given Britain supposedly entered the First World War to protect the integrity of Belgium. In asking “where

²⁹ “The Moral Outcast”, *New Statesmen*, 21 November 1914, 169.

³⁰ “The Sin Against Belgium,” *Herald*, 17 Oct 1914.

were our efforts for Finland?”, the *Leader* challenged the mainstream narrative that Britain was doing it had always done: protect weaker peoples from being overrun by stronger ones.³¹

For many in Britain and the Dominions there appeared to be some amnesia surrounding Britain’s actions in Egypt. To heal this collective forgetting advocates of counter-history encouraged people to “consider Egypt.” As the *Labour Leader* in England explained: “We entered Egypt under a strict pledge to evacuate it as soon as rebellion was suppressed, and order restored. Rebellion was suppressed. Order was restored. But in Egypt we remain.”³² From the perspective of advocates of counter-history, Britain’s continued presence in Egypt some twenty years after it “tore up a treaty respecting Egypt” demonstrated that “Britain, like every other nation, breaks her treaties when convenient to herself.”³³

Alternatives were opposed to Britain entering the war for a variety of reasons. First, they believed the war would result in profits for the capitalists and misery for the masses. According to advocates of alternative historical discourse, the capitalists did not mind one bit if thousands, maybe millions, of the proletariat were maimed or killed, especially considering they would be the foot soldiers for the proletarian army in a future class war. Better for these people to die in a war which sought to maintain the status quo rather than one which sought to overturn it. Alternatives may have been split on what an overturning of the status quo should look like; however, they could agree the masses should not fight in a war that would only benefit the elite. Alternatives also believed the main goal of the war was to increase the territorial holdings of the victorious powers. This is really the area where advocates of alternative historical discourse placed their focus. By reiterating Britain’s checkered past when it came to protecting smaller

³¹ “Britian’s War Policy,” *Labour Leader*, 4 February 1915, 6.

³² “German Militarism and British Imperialism,” *Labour Leader*, 17 September 1914, 4.

³³ A.W. Haycock, “Ammunition: Our Own Junkers,” *Labour Leader*, 26 August 1915, 12; “German Atrocities and Others,” *Labour Leader*, 01 October 1914, 3.

people, Alternatives were really questioning whether Britain's entry into the First World War was as altruistic as advocates of mainstream historical discourse claimed.

The *Labour Leader* summed up the counter-historical side well when it argued that the mainstream's continued selective use of history would "bring ridicule upon, rather than honour to, Britain."³⁴ At the beginning of the war, then, mainstream advocates argued Britain and its Empire would suffer shame and humiliation if it did not follow its traditional practice of abiding by treaties – this one being the 1839 treaty. Conversely, advocates of counter-history argued Britain and its Empire would suffer ridicule if episodes from the British past that contradicted the mainstream line continued to be silenced or overlooked. In addition to the Persian and Egyptian cases, the counter-historical advocate H.N. Brailsford posited they were not discussed by the mainstream because representatives from this group viewed Egyptians and Persians as "only Orientals, who stand outside our Western code of honour and morals."³⁵ The *Montreal Gazette*, a mainstream representative from Canada, seemed to substantiate Brailsford's argument when it declared: "As for Egypt, the inhabitants are pretty well satisfied with their present condition."³⁶

If orientalism was one reason advocates of mainstream history failed to discuss Persia and Egypt in the context of Britain's putative history of respecting treaties and small nations, what about instances in which people stood inside "the Western code of honour and morals"? Here, the advocates of counter-history turned to three cases: Denmark, South Africa, and Ireland. The Danish case occurred in 1807, when the Royal Navy's attack on neutral Denmark resulted in Copenhagen being severely damaged. By attacking Denmark, Britain "forgot its obligations" to

³⁴ "Mr. Asquith's History," *Labour Leader*, 24 September 1914, 4.

³⁵ "Russia Invades Neutral Territory," *Labour Leader*, 26 November 1914, 4.

³⁶ *Montreal Gazette*, 25 August 1914, 8. A similar argument about Persia was articulated in the Canadian magazine *Maclean's* later in the war. "Persia Today," *Maclean's*, August 1916, 44-45.

recognize and respect Danish neutrality due to the fact Denmark had not attacked Britain.³⁷ When referring to this incident, the *Labour Leader* declared: “Nothing has ever been done by any other nation more utterly in defiance of the conventionalities of so-called international law. We considered it advisable and necessary and expedient, and we had the power to do it; therefore, we did it.” Thus, from the *Labour Leader*’s perspective, “What sickening hypocrisy it must seem to other nations to hear us, of all people, prate the sanctity of international law.”³⁸ While the *Labour Leader*’s take on Britain’s attack on Denmark in 1807 may have a whiff of hyperbole given this newspaper was a main advocate of alternative historical discourse, historians have come to share its assessment. According to John D. Grainger, Britain’s actions against the Danish Fleet and Copenhagen in 1807 “was and remains an atrocity.” Furthermore, according to Grainger, “had such a concept been current at the time, it would have been classed as a war crime.”³⁹ Undoubtedly, the Danish example complicated the mainstream’s narrative of Britain always being the protector of small nations. More than likely then, the *Herald* in London had the mainstream in mind when it asked: “ever heard of our attack on neutral Denmark in 1807?”⁴⁰

Advocates of the mainstream historical discourse might have been able to get away with their silencing of the British raid on Denmark, seeing that it happened in the broader context of the Napoleonic Wars. Silencing the other two instances—Ireland and South Africa—evoked by proponents of alternative historical discourse would have been more difficult given the proximity of the former and the recent history of the latter. In one of Canada’s representatives of

³⁷ “The Way of the World,” *Daily Herald*, 24 October 1914, 2.

³⁸ A.W. Haycock, “Ammunition: Our Own Junkers,” *Labour Leader*, 26 August 1915, 12.

³⁹ John D. Grainger, *The British Navy in Baltic* (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2014), 171.

⁴⁰ Gerald Gould, “One Never Knows Lloyd George,” *Herald*, 2 Oct 1915, 10. Gould was one of the founders of the United Suffragists. Interestingly, he would also be an official in C.F.G. Masterman’s Wellington House War Propaganda Bureau. He was also one member of the “Lansbury Lambs,” a group of young idealistic men who worked at the *Daily Herald*.

alternative historical discourse—the *Western Clarion*—the influential socialist Charles M. O’Brien highlighted the issue advocates of mainstream historical discourse faced when they attempted to gloss over the Boer War. “The Boer War is within the memory of all adults. The brazen shame-faced falsehoods ... as to the cause of the war ... have been exposed so many times ... that it is almost impossible for anyone not to know.”⁴¹ *Pioneer* – another Canadian representative of alternative historical discourse – made it clear for anyone who did not know about British actions in South Africa that “Britain has never been the defender of small states ... Fifteen years ago, England was butchering the peaceful peasants of the two Boer Republics in South Africa to enrich a handful of British capitalists.”⁴² In a speech given to Parliament, Ramsay MacDonald, whose resignation as Labour Party leader in 1914 did not stop him from becoming the first Labour Prime Minister after the war, explained the way those British capitalists inspired young men to go and fight in South Africa through appeals to “honour.” As the *Labour Leader* reported on the speech given by MacDonald when he made such a pronouncement: “It was ‘honour’ that veiled the adventure of the Transvaal, and now the same fetish was being appealed to.” According to the *Labour Leader’s* report, “MacDonald remembers the Boer War and the frenzy into which the Gramophones drove the poor dupes who listened to them. He knows that ... these experiences may have to be lived through again, and he is saddened at the forgetfulness.”⁴³ Clearly, advocates of alternative historical discourse desired to stop such forgetting from happening by keeping the history of the South African War fresh in the minds of the British, Canadians, New Zealanders, and Australians.

⁴¹ C.M. O’Brien, “The Present – and Echoes of the Past,” *Western Clarion*, 1 September 1915, 3.

⁴² “Britain’s Part in the War,” *Pioneer*, 12 December 1914, 7.

⁴³ “Labour’s Protest in Parliament,” *Labour Leader*, 6 August 1914, 9.

In all fairness to some advocates of mainstream historical discourse, they too played a part in trying to keep people from not forgetting the South African War. Of course, their motivations were some slightly different from those of the advocates of alternative historical discourse. Canadian Premier Robert Borden offered an example of how advocates of mainstream historical discourse utilized the South African War when he explained in a speech: “This is not the South African experience over again. In that thousands of Canadians were opposed, thousands more were reluctant, and many thousands were filled with regret.” According to Borden, the First World War was different from the South African conflict because unlike the earlier conflict Britain entered this new war “to promote national freedom and world-democracy.”⁴⁴ During the South African War, Canada was not the only location in the British Empire to have pockets of opposition. As a speech delivered by the moderate Irish nationalist John Redmond in October of 1914 demonstrated, Ireland too was the home of massive resistance. Redmond explained that “Ireland, at the beginning of the century, was on the side of a little Protestant nation” – the Boers – “fighting for her independence.” While bringing up such history might have been problematic from a mainstream perspective, Redmond then went on to explain that “Ireland should be on the side of a little Catholic nation” – Belgium – “which was fighting for hers” in 1914.⁴⁵ Redmond’s evocation of the Irish example during the South African War was risky to say the least, given the fact that many within Ireland openly supported and even fought alongside the Boers.

The Pandora’s box that was Irish history showed itself when advocates of alternative historical discourse utilized their own references to Irish history to challenge the mainstream narrative of Britain being a defender of small nations. The *Daily Herald* illustrated such a

⁴⁴ “Canada’s Part in the World Crisis,” *Globe*, 19 August 1914, 4.

⁴⁵ “Ireland and the War,” *Advocate*, 28 November 1914, 25.

utilization when it wrote its cleverly entitled article, “Rip Van Winkle Wakes Up.” In that article, the *Daily Herald* portrayed Britain’s defense of as “a strange commentary on the new professions of enthusiasm from freedom and civilisation, and small nationalities,” especially considering that Britain had “for centuries waged war to prevent the growth of a distinct Irish nation.”⁴⁶ Britain’s “official tradition” of trying to convert Ireland “into an Anglicized province” caused the *Daily Herald* to ask the question: “is this simply not Prussianism under another name?”⁴⁷ The Irish socialist, William P. Ryan, who wrote for the *Daily Herald*, clearly thought so by declaring: “Ireland is the Belgium where the Germans have remained.”⁴⁸ The conflation of Britain with Germany would be something advocates of alternative historical discourse would come back to repeatedly during the opening salvo of the history wars in Britain and the Dominions.

2.2 Moments from Germany History

The further conflation of Britain with Germany by advocates of alternative historical discourse came in the wake of advocates of mainstream historical discourse attempting to explain the outbreak of the First World War through references to German history. Advocates of mainstream historical discourse pursued two approaches in their endeavors to explain how Germany history led to Germany’s invasion of Belgium in 1914. The first approach found the explanation for the outbreak of hostilities in 1914 “in the history of the Prussian Empire, which lived and grew by war” in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.⁴⁹ In other words, this approach separated the good Germany—the Germany of Kant, Goethe, Bach, etc.—from the bad Germany—that of Frederick the Great and Bismarck. These former leaders, according to the

⁴⁶ “Rip Van Winkle Wakes Up,” *Daily Herald*, 12 June 1915, 9.

⁴⁷ “Irish Affairs,” *Daily Herald*, 31 July 1915, 2.

⁴⁸ W. Ryan, “Ireland’s New Year – When?,” *Daily Herald*, 2 January 1915, 13.

⁴⁹ *Scotsman*, 15 October 1914, 8.

mainstream interpretation, “were responsible for the deplorable attitude of German public opinion in the matter of international good faith” at the start of the First World War.⁵⁰ The second approach taken by advocates of mainstream historical discourse connected the policies of Frederick the Great and Bismarck to the writings of Heinrich von Treitschke, and Friedrich von Bernhardi. The references made to Germany’s past by both approaches sought to “magnify the depravities” of Germany to blame it for starting the First World War.⁵¹ In this way, advocates of mainstream historical discourse in Britain and the Dominion attempted “to mobilize the animosity” of their publics against Germany.⁵²

The first approach pursued by advocates of mainstream historical discourse focused on developments which occurred in Prussia during the two centuries preceding the First World War. The public in Britain and the Dominions were reminded that the geographical makeup of Germany in 1914 had previously been composed of thirty-nine independent German States from 1815 to 1866. The eighteenth-century witnessed one of those states—Prussia—become one of the most powerful Germanic states under the leadership of Frederick the Great. A century later, Prussia united the other German States into one German nation thanks in large part to Otto von Bismarck’s continuation of policies pursued by Frederick the Great. Advocates of mainstream historical discourse in Britain and the Dominions reminded their readers the unification of the other twenty-five states under Prussian leadership resulted in the German nation adopting Prussian policies and traditions. From the perspective of mainstream historical discourse, it was this “Prussianization” of Germany which explained German actions towards Belgium.

⁵⁰ H.A.L. Fisher, “The War and its Causes,” (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1914), 12.

⁵¹ David Lowenthal, *The Past is a Foreign Country* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 345.

⁵² Cate Haste, *Keep the Home Fires Burning* (London: Allen Lane, 1977), 79.

Advocates of mainstream historical discourse pinpointed the roots of “Prussianism” to the policies pursued by Frederick the Great, who ruled Prussia from 1740 to 1786. A main contributor to this narrative were the *Oxford Pamphlets*, written by six Professors of Modern History from Oxford University. According to Arthur Marwick, the *Oxford Pamphlets* “did not ... maintain the highest standards of objective scholarship.”⁵³ Much of this lack of objectivity had to do with the fact the *Oxford Pamphlets* were commissioned by the Central Committee for Patriotic Organizations. While the Central Committee for Patriotic Organizations endeavored to justify “both historically and morally England’s position” in the First World War, it nevertheless did so by commissioning historians to write largely a one-sided, mainstream view of history.⁵⁴ In the twentieth pamphlet of this mainstream effort, Ernest Barker argued Frederick laid the roots of “Prussianism” when he committed his “first and most shameless crime” during his first year on the throne when he ordered Prussian troops to attack the rich Austrian province of Silesia.⁵⁵ Prussia’s invasion of Silesia was in clear violation of the Pragmatic Solution of 1713, which ensured that the Archduchess Maria Theresa of Austria would inherit the Austrian throne and Hapsburg lands. The province of Silesia was included as part of the territory Maria Theresa would take over when she succeeded her father, Charles VI. The *Scotsman* explained that just as Prussia had guaranteed the independence and neutrality of Belgium in the Treaty of London in 1839, so too had Prussia committed itself “by treaty to respect, maintain, and defend the rights” granted to Maria Theresa by the Pragmatic Sanction.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, Frederick, like Wilhelm II in 1914, treated the Pragmatic Sanction as nothing more than “a scrap of paper” when he

⁵³ Arthur Marwick, *The Deluge: British Society and the First World War* (New York: W.W. Norton Company, 1965), 44-45.

⁵⁴ “Report of the Central Committee for National Patriotic Organizations,” quoted in Marwick, *The Deluge*, 44-45.

⁵⁵ Ernest Barker, “Nietzsche and Treitschke: The Worship of Power in Modern Germany,” *Oxford Pamphlets* no. 20 (Oxford: 1914), 5.

⁵⁶ “How History Repeats Itself,” *Scotsman*, 23 September 1914, 10.

attacked and usurped Silesia from Maria Theresa in 1740. Thus, as the *Scotsman* explained, the policy Britain and its Empire were fighting in the First World War dated “from the time of Frederick the Great, who left a stamp on his country which has never been effaced.”⁵⁷

Advocates of mainstream historical discourse thus blamed Germany for starting the First World War by connecting Germany’s violation of Belgian neutrality in 1914 to Frederick’s seizure of Silesia from Maria Theresa in 1740. According to Ludwik Ehrlich—who was Polish and whose homeland had been a victim of Frederician aggression—Germany’s contemporary leadership was “full of the memories of Frederick the Great,” which caused them to embrace Frederick’s ideals of conquest and war for its own sake.⁵⁸ From *The Times*’ perspective, Germany had “lived up to the worst principles of the Frederician tradition” because it disregarded all “obligations of right and wrong at the bidding of immediate self-interest” when it attacked Belgium in August 1914.⁵⁹ Likewise, H.A.L. Fisher explained Germany “was acting in complete harmony with her historical traditions of ruthless and barbarous dealing” when it violated Belgian neutrality in 1914, because “ever since the days of Frederick the Great the breaking of treaties in the interests of the State has been held by Germans to be a righteous and proper act.”⁶⁰

Advocates of mainstream historical discourse in Britain and the Dominions claimed that Germany’s Frederician traditions had been continued by Otto von Bismarck during his tenure as Prussia’s Minister President, which lasted from 1862 to 1890. While the mainstream historical discourse explained the policy Britain was fighting in 1914 dated from Frederick the Great, it also pointed out that Bismarck pushed the policies of Frederick further during his time in power

⁵⁷ “A Fight for Existence,” *Scotsman*, 23 September 1914, 10.

⁵⁸ Ludwik Ehrlich, “Poland, Prussia, and Culture,” *Oxford Pamphlets* no. 87 (Oxford: 1914), 21.

⁵⁹ “The German Invasion,” *The Times*, 3 August, 7.

⁶⁰ H.A.L. Fisher, *Militarism: German and British* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1914), 11.

for the purpose of uniting the other twenty-five German States into one nation under Prussian leadership.⁶¹ Bismarck demonstrated his appreciation of the Frederician tradition during his “era of blood and iron,” which lasted from 1860 to 1870, because during this decade Prussia assaulted the neighboring countries of Denmark, Austria, and France.⁶²

Bismarck commenced his “era of blood and iron” in 1864, when Prussia forcefully acquired Schleswig-Holstein from the Kingdom of Denmark. The impetus for the Prussian-Danish conflict came on 15 November 1863, when the Danes introduced a shared constitution for Denmark and Schleswig, which was not part of Denmark proper at the time given it was a personal possession of the Danish Crown at the time. On 16 January 1864, Bismarck formally responded to Denmark’s constitutional developments by issuing the Danes an ultimatum that Prussia would invade their territory if they did not cancel the constitution of 15 November 1863.⁶³ Just like the Belgians would do in 1914, the Danes refused to comply with the Prussian ultimatum in 1864. Consequently, Bismarck sent troops into Denmark and swiftly incorporated the former Danish duchies of Schleswig and Holstein into Prussia. This action on the part of Prussia violated the 1852 Treaty of London, which fixed and guaranteed the territorial integrity of the Danish Kingdom. According to *The Times*, Prussia’s seizure of Schleswig-Holstein under Bismarck’s leadership resembled Frederick’s acquisition of Silesia from Austria in 1740 because in both instances Prussia disregarded guarantees it had made in international agreements which ostensibly protected its victims’ territories.⁶⁴ Thus, just as Germany had violated Belgian

⁶¹ “An Aberdeen Professor on Germany,” *Scotsman*, 16 January 1915, 12; “The Prussian Spirit,” *Scotsman*, 20 February 1915, 12.

⁶² Fisher, *Militarism: German and British*, 9.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 6-7.

⁶⁴ “Appeal of the Theologians,” *The Times*, 21 October 1914.

neutrality in 1914, its progenitor – Prussia – had done the same to Austria in 1740 and Denmark in 1864.

The second conflict Prussia fought under Bismarck's leadership came in 1866 against its southern neighbor, Austria. According to the conservative Oxford history professor C.R.L. Fletcher, Bismarck launched the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 principally because he “thought a little more blood-letting was needed.”⁶⁵ *The Times* pointed out Bismarck once again followed Frederick's policy of “striking when he thought the moment was right” in 1866 because Austria “was a very slow, stupid, and tired power” at this time.⁶⁶ Bismarck's calculations proved correct, for Austria capitulated after seven weeks of fighting. Once again, Prussia made territorial gains with its victory over Austria. Bismarck made Austria a subordinate of Prussia after it triumphed over it, but he decided before the war that Prussia should not acquire any of Austria's territory. Instead, Prussia gained the territory of the north and central German States—Hanover, Hesse-Kassel, Nassau, and Frankfurt—which allied with Austria in the conflict of 1866.

Once again, advocates of mainstream historical discourse connected this moment from Germany's past with Germany's actions towards Belgium in 1914. Prior to Prussia's invasion of Austria, according to *The Times*, Bismarck “had required of Hanover and Bavaria, as Germany had required of Belgium in 1914, that they should declare themselves either a friend or a foe.”⁶⁷ Bismarck presented Prussia's subjugation of Hanover and Bavaria as nothing more than “mediation,” since they had decided to side with Austria in 1866; but, C.R.L. Fletcher accused Bismarck of “inventing this charming diplomatic word to avoid calling a spade a spade or a theft

⁶⁵ C.R.L. Fletcher, “The Germans, Their Empire, and How They Made It,” *Oxford Pamphlets* no. 6 (Oxford: 1914), 25.

⁶⁶ “Witness to Character,” *The Times*, 9 October 1914.

⁶⁷ “Through German Eyes: New Doctrines of Neutrality,” *The Times*, 21 October 1914, 7.

a theft.”⁶⁸ The lesson from this episode was clear: Germany could be expected to annex Belgium—just as Prussia had annexed Hanover and Bavaria—if she emerged victorious from the contemporary conflict on the basis that Belgium declared herself a “foe” of Germany when she decided to defend its neutrality.

Bismarck’s “blood and iron era” ended in 1870-71 with Prussia’s victory over France in the Franco-Prussian War. Advocates of mainstream historical discourse recalled to their readers that hostilities between France and Prussia officially commenced when France declared war on Prussia; however, as *The Times* explained, this “declaration was the result of a provocation deliberately intended by Bismarck to produce war.”⁶⁹ Bismarck’s deliberate provocation appeared in the Ems Telegraph, which angered the French so much it caused them to declare war on Prussia. As the *Sydney Morning Herald* explained, Bismarck’s purposeful antagonism of France “arranged to make it appear at the time that Napoleon III had forced Prussia to fight,” but this was not the case because Bismarck saw war with France as being the last act in his unification project.⁷⁰ Bismarck’s last Prussian act and the establishment of the resulting German Empire led H. A. L. Fisher to assert that “as Frederick the Great made Prussia great by the sword ... so was Germany united through Bismarck’s contrived diplomacy.”⁷¹

Prussia’s leading role as unifier of Germany meant that all the other German States became “simply vassals” of Prussia. Bismarck’s “Prussianization” of Germany “imposed an evil tradition upon” the infant nation because Germany inherited Prussia’s military policies of

⁶⁸ Fletcher, “The Germans, Their Empire, and How They Have Made It,” 27.

⁶⁹ “Witness to Character,” *The Times*, 9 October 1914, 7.

⁷⁰ “Prussia’s Wars,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, 25 March 1915, 8. At least one advocate of mainstream historical discourse, Sir Henry Braddon of Australia, utilized the Franco-Prussian War as further proof of Britain’s tradition of helping “smaller nations” out. As Braddon said at the meeting of the British Empire League: “England rather sympathized with France in the Franco-Prussian War, for it is a national habit to sympathise with the weaker side.” The *Sydney Morning Herald* emphasized “Applause” after Braddon’s assertion. “Two Ideals: German and British – Mr. Braddon’s Address,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, 20 August 1914, 8.

⁷¹ Fisher, *The War and Its Causes*, 11-12.

preemptive warfare, deceitful diplomacy, and the Prussian view of the State. According to advocates of mainstream historical discourse, the supposed Prussianism of the new German nation made it where Germany would inevitably instigate another war. That instigation, of course, came in August of 1914 with Germany's invasion of Belgium. While Bismarck was no longer alive when the First World War started, he nevertheless received a great deal of the blame for German actions in 1914 because of the leading role he played in Prussianizing Germany.⁷² Hence, as the *Argus* in Australia put it: "Bismarck's statesmanship cannot be absolved of responsibility for the events of 1914."⁷³ Or, as the *Sydney Morning Herald* proclaimed: Kaiser Wilhelm II's Germany is "Bismarckian ... It has adopted his (Bismarck's) brutality as it has his greatness."⁷⁴

While advocates of mainstream historical discourse utilized Bismarck's memory to provide a genealogy of German actions in 1914, the *Labour Leader*, that staunch advocate of alternative historical discourse in England, evoked Bismarck to explain how Bismarckian diplomacy had admirers of its own in Britain just a couple of years before the war. In "German Militarism and British Imperialism," the *Labour Leader* reprinted a speech delivered by Lord Roberts, military hero from the Afghanistan campaigns of the 1880s and the South African War, in 1912 in which he declared in front of a Mancunian crowd: "Germany strikes when Germany's hour has struck ... That was the policy relentlessly pursued by Bismarck ... And gentlemen, it is an excellent policy." Of course, mainstream advocates of historical discourse would not have reprinted such a statement by a national hero in 1914, especially the part where Roberts declared

⁷² "The Diplomacy of Bismarck," *Ottawa Citizen*, 21 August 1914, 12; "The Dominant Will of Bismarck," *Age*, 24 August 1914, 8.

⁷³ "Bismarck's Legacy," *Argus*, 14 November 1914, 7. The catalyst for this *Argus* article was a "special war number of the 'Round Table'."

⁷⁴ "Current Literature," *Sydney Morning Herald*, 14 November 1914, 8.

that Bismarck's policy "is, or should be, the policy of every nation prepared to play a great part in history."⁷⁵ For the *Labour Leader*, however, this speech proved that "in Germany and in Britain alike there have been militarists and War Lords" celebrating and promoting Bismarckian policies not only in the decades following "blood and iron" but also in the years immediately leading up to the First World War.⁷⁶

The *Labour Leader's* tactic of turning the mainstream's usage of Bismarck on its head proved to be an approach that advocates of alternative historical discourse would pursue in other instances when the mainstream turned to German philosophy to offer another explanation for Germany's aggression in 1914. Advocates of mainstream historical discourse turned to German philosophy to illuminate the origins of contemporary Germany's view of the State, which was seen as fostering a spirit of militarism. In particular, this aspect of the mainstream historical discourse campaign focused on the writings and teaching of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Heinrich von Treitschke, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Friedrich von Bernhardi.⁷⁷ By turning their attention to these German philosophers, advocates of mainstream historical discourse sought to portray Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality in 1914 not only as a continuation of Frederick the Great and Otto von Bismarck's policies but also as representing "a trend in German philosophy that would usher in international anarchy by replacing the rule of law with an absolute rule of the state."⁷⁸

⁷⁵ Interestingly, while advocates of mainstream historical discourse would not reprint Lord Roberts' advocacy of Bismarck's diplomacy, they did utilize the actual image of Lord Roberts in a Recruiting Poster which appeared in the wake of Roberts' death in November 1914. See Appendix:: Parliamentary Recruiting Committee, "He Did his Duty. Will You Do Yours?," London, Poster No. 20.

⁷⁶ "German Militarism and British Imperialism," *Labour Leader*, 17 September 1914, 4.

⁷⁷ Gregory Moore, "The Super-Hun and the Super-State: Allied Propaganda and German Philosophy during the First World War," *German Life and Letters* 54, no. 4 (October 2001): 310-330.

⁷⁸ Nicoletta F. Gullace, "Sexual Violence and Family Honor: British Propaganda and International Law during the First World War," *American Historical Review* 102, no.3 (June 1997): 719.

Advocates of mainstream historical discourse found the ideological origins of the German view of the State in the writings of Hegel. Hegel's conception of the State, claimed German-educated William Harbutt Dawson, posited that "natural rights did not exist, and that no rights at all can be possessed other than those created by the States."⁷⁹ In other words, from the perspective of Dawson and other advocates of mainstream historical discourse Hegel's conception of the State centered on a rejection of the Enlightenment idea that "individual liberty consisted in having rights against the state."⁸⁰ Moreover, according to J. H. Muirhead, who was a professor at the University of Birmingham at the start of the First World War, the importance ascribed to the State by Hegel was based on his belief that a State was the "judge of its own cause" because "no entity, earthly or divine, existed above it."⁸¹ According to advocates of mainstream historical discourse, it was Hegel's elevation of the State above all other interests and obligations which provided a theoretical vindication for the policies pursued by Frederick the Great, Otto von Bismarck, and Kaiser Wilhelm II.⁸²

The deceased historian Heinrich von Treitschke—(1834 – 1896)—was another person advocates of mainstream historical discourse turned to for the purposes of highlighting the ways in which the German view of the State promoted militarism. In a few articles, the Australian *Sydney Morning Herald* described Treitschke described as a "sinister" intellectual who "exercised a vast influence" on how the German ruling class viewed the State.⁸³ English author Joseph McCabe explained that Treitschke's vast influence as an intellectual stemmed from the

⁷⁹ William Harbutt Dawson, *What is Wrong with Germany* (London: Longman, Green and Co., 1915), 28-29.

⁸⁰ Wallace, *War and the Image of Germany*, 49.

⁸¹ J.H. Muirhead, *German Philosophy in Relation to War* (London: John Murray, 1915), 33.

⁸² "Militarism," *Scotsman*, 15 August 1914, 6.

⁸³ "Current Literature – Germany: War Inevitable," *Sydney Morning Herald*, 22 August 1914, 6; "Origins of the War," *Sydney Morning Herald*, 28 November 1914, 7. In both instances, the *Sydney Morning Herald's* references to Treitschke came from review articles on publications which originated in Britain. Scottish author J.A. Cramb's *Germany and England* and Sir Valentine Chirol's "The Origins of the Present War" were the two publications, respectively.

fact that many of the Kaiserreich's diplomats and statesmen "came to listen and imbibe the lessons with which Treitschke drew from history" about the State during his twenty-two-year career as a history professor at Berlin's Friedrich Wilhelm University.⁸⁴ Consequently, advocates of mainstream historical discourse, like the *Scotsman* and William Harbutt Dawson, blamed Treitschke for creating the "attitude of mind which caused Germany to draw the sword against the liberties of Europe" in August 1914, because it was his "theory of the State which was held by the German ruling classes" at the start of the First World War.⁸⁵

Domestically, Treitschke's view of the State differed little from Hegel's. As J. H. Muirhead explained in his *Germany Philosophy in Relation to War*, Treitschke's "power State" was "a purely autocratic organism" because it derived and preserved its power domestically by demanding obedience from its citizens.⁸⁶ According to the *Scotsman*, the German view of the State, as put forth by Hegel and Treitschke, bred "intolerance, despotism, and slavish obedience to authority" both domestically and internationally. It was the latter of course where advocates of mainstream historical discourse found the "harshness and crudeness of the gospel of force which had spread desolation through Belgium" at the beginning of the First World War.⁸⁷

The *Manchester Guardian* explained that in the international sphere Treitschke "came to think of ruthless, aggressive war as the noblest of national functions," because he believed this was the only way a State preserved and, if possible enlarged, its power amongst other States.⁸⁸ The *Scotsman* pointed out that a necessary corollary to this notion was that external obligations, such as treaties, were not binding if they limited a State's freedom of action.⁸⁹ In other words,

⁸⁴ Joseph McCabe, *Treitschke and the Great War* (London: T.F. Unwin), 9.

⁸⁵ "Treitschke's Teaching," *Scotsman*, 21 October 1914, 6; Dawson, *What is Wrong with Germany?*, 28.

⁸⁶ J.H. Muirhead, *German Philosophy in Relation to the War* (London: John Murray, 1915), 85.

⁸⁷ *Scotsman*, 24 December 1914, 2.

⁸⁸ "Prussianism," *Manchester Guardian*, 24 November 1914, 6.

⁸⁹ "Treitschke's Teaching," *Scotsman*, 21 October 1914, 6.

treaties were “a voluntary self-limitation of the state and were adhered to only as long as the state found it expedient.”⁹⁰ According to the *Scotsman*, therefore, Germany’s violation of Belgian neutrality “would have found in Treitschke an enthusiastic defender, for small State like Belgium ... stood in the way of German expansion.”⁹¹

From the perspective of advocates of mainstream historical discourse Treitschke’s writings were not the only ones that inspired the German State to abandon treaty promises for the purpose of realizing greatness. In the pages of mainstream historical discourse in Britain and the Dominions Treitschke’s views were seamlessly connected to those of Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s writings, claimed the *Scotsman*, made up “the Bible for the German military caste” due to his ideas being founded on the belief “that the world was not for the best but for the strongest.”⁹² Many references made to Nietzsche’s philosophy focused on his notion of the “Superman,” the German “Übermensch.” Nietzsche’s Superman, who would also be evoked by Anglophone writers during the Second World War to explain the intellectual roots of the Nazi’s pureblooded Aryan hero, was a combination of his own ideas of “self-culture” and the “dominance of will power” with Charles Darwin’s biological theories of the “Struggle for Life” and “Survival of the Fittest.” This Nietzschean-Darwinian combination, according to Edinburgh University’s Emeritus Professor John Kirkpatrick, produced a Superman who was “above the laws of morality” because he lived by a code centered on the belief that “the violent shall, by means of the mailed fist, acquire glorious reputation for greatness” at the “expense of the weak.” Consequently, the Superman was “in a constant state of war – first, with his weaker self, then with his weaker neighbours.” For those within Britain and the Dominions who had been exposed

⁹⁰ Moore, “The Super-Hun and the Super-State,” 325.

⁹¹ *Scotsman*, 24 December 1914, 2.

⁹² “Militarism,” *Scotsman*, 21 October 1914, 6.

to the ideas about the Prussianization of modern Germany the message should have been clear: Prussia's unification of the disparate Germanic states into a "Über-Germany" through a series of wars against its weaker neighbors was Nietzsche's Superman albeit on a grander scale. It was this "Superstate," according to Arthur Balfour, who became Britain's Secretary for Foreign Affairs in 1915, which had "brought civilization into the peril" that was the First World War.⁹³

The ideas that had been selectively chosen from the writings of Hegel, Treitschke, and Nietzsche culminated in the works of Friedrich von Bernhardi, who was the only one of this quadrumvirate to be alive at the start of the First World War. When the First World War began, Bernhardi's 1911 work, *Germany and the Next War*, was one of the most recent publications by a German military figure. Naturally, advocates of mainstream historical discourse exploited *Germany and the Next War* to show how the deceased of the quadrumvirate, as well as Bismarck, impacted Bernhardi. According to advocates of mainstream historical discourse, Bernhardi's view of the State aligned with those of Hegel and Treitschke in that he, like his predecessors, viewed it as supreme. Moreover, in Bernhardi's *Germany and the Next War* there was a Nietzschean-Darwinian dimension due to Bernhardi's belief that "war was a biological necessity" for a great State because if it was not constantly expanding then it would atrophy.⁹⁴ For Bernhardi, history demonstrated that "wars which were produced of deliberate intent with statesmanship like insight had the happiest results."⁹⁵ From Bernhardi's perspective, recent Prussian, and consequently German, history substantiated such a view. Did not Germany, the strongest nation in continental Europe on the eve of the First World War in many ways, come into being through wars purposefully orchestrated by Bismarck? Resoundingly, it did.

⁹³ "The Superstate': Mr. Balfour on German Arrogance," *The Times*, 14 December 1914, 12.

⁹⁴ Fisher, *Militarism: German and British*, 11; "Library Notes on the War," *Dominion*, 9 December 1914, 10.

⁹⁵ "The Doctrine of German Professors," *Dominion*, 29 September 1914, 4.

In a similar fashion to the *Labour Leader* when it flipped the mainstream's usage of Bismarck to highlight those within Britain who openly defended Bismarckian policies, advocates of alternative historical discourse showed how Britain had its own Bernhardis and Treitschkes.⁹⁶ In a review of the *Oxford Pamphlets*, John Scurr—Australian immigrant who became a prominent Labour man in Britain—highlighted the ways in which advocates of mainstream historical discourse disingenuously portrayed Treitschke's writings as somehow being influential. Scurr responded to this misleading portrayal when he pointed out: "one can imagine the panegyric which Oxford would have written if Treitschke's name had been Jones or Brown, and he had written England instead of Germany."⁹⁷ While advocates of alternative historical discourse could not find actual Jones, Browns, etc., who had expressed views of a Treitschke or Bernhardi, they did find Lord Roberts and J. A. Cramb to be good stand-ins. Through such connections, alternative historical discourse sought to prove that the British world "have for years had as bad or worse than Bernhardi," who had not been vilified like the latter, "but honored" throughout Britain and the Dominions.⁹⁸

Coming back to the same Lord Roberts who in his 1912 Manchester speech had praised Bismarck, the *Maoriland Worker* reprinted an excerpt from Roberts' "Message to the Nation," which celebrated the British Empire's militarism and praised Bernhardi's promotion of it. In his message, Roberts declared: "War founded this Empire – war and conquest! Who amongst us, knowing the past of this nation ... can accuse Germany or regard utterances of General Bernhardi with any feeling except those of respect?"⁹⁹ Those within Britain and the Dominions

⁹⁶ As will be seen, Nietzsche was a special case in this regard. Advocates of alternative historical discourse did not locate any British Nietzsches, but they refuted claims that Nietzsche had been the inspiration for German militarism.

⁹⁷ John Scurr, "The Special Pleading of Oxford," *Daily Herald*, 15 September 1914, 6.

⁹⁸ "Real Bona-Fide British Bernhardis," *Maoriland Worker*, 7 April 1915, 5.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 5.

who were readers of mainstream historical discourse could be forgiven for not recognizing the militaristic foundation of the British Empire. They had been fed a steady diet of the British Empire's righteousness. In the context of the First World War, there was nothing righteous about militarism. Nevertheless, just two short years before the First World War a national hero, whose image would appear on recruiting posters in 1914 and 1915, was celebrating a man who the mainstream press portrayed as being responsible for inspiring Germany to invade neutral Belgium in 1914.

Readers of mainstream historical discourse in Britain and the Dominions may not have been all that surprised to hear a hero like Lord Roberts celebrating the militaristic foundations of the British Empire; however, they may have been taken aback to hear that British professors had been doing a similar thing in the years leading up to the First World War. One former British professor was singled out in this regard: J. A. Cramb. Cramb, referred to as "the British Bernhardi" or "the British Treitschke" by advocates of alternative historical discourse, died in 1913, and his lectures from London University were published posthumously in *Germany and England*.¹⁰⁰ Advocates of alternative historical discourse utilized this work to highlight how Germany did not have a monopoly on university professors who praised, and by extension promoted, militarism in the years leading up to the First World War. In a sermon delivered at the beginning of the First World War, the Reverend G. T. Sadler, of Wimbledon, quoted directly from *Germany and England* to illustrate how Bernhardian-Treitschkian ideas had been taught to young British minds just one year before Germany's invasion of Belgium. Stadler's voice spoke Cramb's assertion that:

Pacifists do not reckon on the heroic-idea, deeper than reason, by which men *want* war ... Germany will never sincerely cease arming ... Treitschke's answer to all our talk about limitation of armaments is that Germany shall increase to the

¹⁰⁰ *Labour Leader*, 17 June 1915, 2; "A Practical Peace Programme," *Labour Leader*, 26 August 1915, 10.

utmost of her power ... And I confess it is a magnificent and a manly answer ... And what Englishman, remembering the methods by which the British Empire has been established in India, in America, in Africa, in Egypt, dare arraign these impulses or ambitions?¹⁰¹

Like Roberts then, Cramb's views converged with those of Bernhardt and Treitschke.

Additionally, Cramb explained that the roots of the Empire upon which the sun never set were firmly attached to the kind of militarism on display in August 1914. Conveniently for advocates of alternative historical discourse, Cramb had died before the First World War and Roberts died just a couple of months into the conflict—November 1914—so neither one of them could offer counters to the claims that they were the British equivalents of Treitschke or Bernhardt.

Nevertheless, from the perspective of advocates of alternative historical discourse, their words indicted them as such. Additionally, their words demonstrated to people within Britain and the Dominions that militarism was not just a German thing.

While advocates of alternative historical discourse found their British Treitschke and Bernhardt in Roberts and Cramb, they had a harder time finding their British Nietzsche.¹⁰² Clearly, the father of the *Übermensch* was inimitable. The absence of a British Nietzsche did not mean, however, that Alternatives would just let their opponents on the opposite side of the discursive spectrum get away with their selective takes on Nietzsche and the supposed impact he had on the German people. To counter the mainstream's contention that Nietzsche has poisoned the minds of the German people and thus was "the father of the present war," advocates of alternative historical discourse argued that most Germans had never read Nietzsche in the first

¹⁰¹ *Labour Leader*, 17 June 1915, 2.

¹⁰² There was one instance in which an advocate of alternative historical discourse – Henry Scott-Bennett – utilized the militaristic pronouncements from well-known British military writers – Colonel Maude, Major Stewart Murray, and Sir Percy Scott – to demonstrate they too had articulated the supposed "Nietzschean sentiment" that had inspired German aggression in Belgium. See: "The Nietzsche Horror," *Maoriland Worker*, 23 June 1915, 3.

place.¹⁰³ The *Daily Herald* explained that regardless of what one thought about Nietzsche the man, “anyone who knows much of German literature, philosophy, and thought” knew that Nietzsche was “something quite incidental in the intellectual story of the Fatherland, and the bugbear so many Britons make of him is piquant.”¹⁰⁴ The *Maoriland Worker* expressed a similar sentiment when it declared: “Only a tithe of the inhabitants of Germany have ever read philosophy, and only a tithe of those Nietzsche ... Nietzsche then did not cause the war.”¹⁰⁵ Quantifying just how many Germans read Nietzsche in the years leading up to the First World War is beyond the parameters of this project, so it is hard to corroborate the validity of the *Daily Herald* and the *Maoriland Worker*’s statements. Nevertheless, as Steven Aschheim has argued, by the beginning of the twentieth century, Nietzsche had “entered into the mainstream of German life.”¹⁰⁶ Be that as it may, Alternatives sought to strengthen the claim of Nietzsche’s unpopularity with the Germans by highlighting what Nietzsche said of the German people themselves.

Advocates of alternative historical discourse explained to their readers that while Nietzsche was born in Germany, “he was not a German and did not love the Germans.”¹⁰⁷ Thus, as Langdon Everard declared: Nietzsche was a “Germanophobe.”¹⁰⁸ The *Truth* in New Zealand highlighted a few examples of Nietzsche’s anti-German statements, such as: “A man must have something which he can implicitly obey – this is a German sentiment, a German deduction: it is

¹⁰³ J. Ramsay MacDonald, “The Gospel of Hate,” *Labour Leader* 7 January 1915, 5; Langdon Everard, “The Unspeakable Nietzsche,” *Herald*, 23 January 1915, 14; “Nietzsche: the Man and his Message,” *Maoriland Worker*, 23 June 1915, 2.

¹⁰⁴ “The Dean and the Devil,” *Daily Herald*, 24 October 1914, 7.

¹⁰⁵ “News and Views,” *Maoriland Worker*, 23 June 1915, 1.

¹⁰⁶ Steven E. Aschheim, *The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany, 1890-1990* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 18.

¹⁰⁷ “Nietzsche’s Naughtiness,” *New Zealand Truth*, 30 January 1915, 3.

¹⁰⁸ Langdon Everard, “The Unspeakable Nietzsche,” *Daily Herald*, 23 January 1915, 14.

the basis of all German teaching.”¹⁰⁹ Nietzsche then would have agreed with those advocates of mainstream historical discourse who claimed that education in Germany had bred a nation of people who worshipped the State at the expense of everything else. Undoubtedly, Nietzsche, as well as advocates of alternative historical discourse, would have disagreed that his writings had anything to do with such an education. Even J.M. Kennedy, who was otherwise an advocate of mainstream historical discourse, recognized Nietzsche’s innocence. Undoubtedly, part of Kennedy’s defense of Nietzsche stemmed from him being a prominent Nietzschean before 1914. In his book, *Nietzsche*, which was published in Britain in 1914, Kennedy explained that Nietzsche “With bitter severity criticised the Germany of his own time; and even in stronger terms the Germany which was developing out of it.” By contrast, according to Kennedy, “Every other philosopher, historian, student, and scientist took precisely the opposite view, and condemned Nietzsche accordingly.” For Kennedy, it was Treitschke who was “the real intellectual leader of modern Germany.”¹¹⁰ Therefore, in Kennedy’s mind, Treitschke bore responsibility for creating the mindset that led Germany into the First World War.

In 1915, the Melbourne *Socialist* made it clear that it had not read Kennedy’s book when it declared: “it will be interesting to hear the truth as to the writings of Nietzsche, especially after the misrepresentation that had been indulged in by the press.”¹¹¹ While Kennedy maintained his mainstream credentials by laying all the blame at Treitschke’s feet, he nevertheless made an effort to clear Nietzsche’s name by giving an honest take on Nietzsche’s writings. A review of Kennedy’s book in the mainstream *New Zealand Herald* illustrates that Kennedy’s endeavors were not in vain. After summarizing Kennedy’s “unprejudiced” take on Nietzsche’s writings,

¹⁰⁹ “Nietzsche’s Naughtiness,” *New Zealand Truth*, 30 January 1915, 3.

¹¹⁰ J.M. Kennedy, *Nietzsche* (London: T. Werner Laurie, 1914) 7-8.

¹¹¹ “Party Chronicles,” *The Socialist*, 9 April 1915, 3.

the *Herald* admitted that “We have been blaming Nietzsche unduly.”¹¹² The *Ottawa Citizen* – another advocate of mainstream historical discourse – made a similar admission when it declared: “It seems a far-fetched conclusion to label the present struggle ‘the Nietzschean War,’ as many writers are doing today.” The *Citizen*’s acknowledgement came after it explained that Nietzsche’s Übermensch “was his ideal of the victor, not over morality, but over the morality which defends man’s baseness, his mean and cowardly self-love.”¹¹³ So, unlike what other Mainstreamers said about Nietzsche’s Übermensch – that its militaristic foundation provided the basis for modern Germany and the First World War – the *Citizen* offered a differed assessment: yes, the Übermensch was in a constant state of war, but only with himself. Moreover, Nietzsche did not intend for the Übermensch to be translated beyond the individual level.

2.3 Conclusion

One week into the start of the new year of 1915, J. Ramsay MacDonald wrote in the *Labour Leader*: “History can be left to take care of herself. Nobody needs try to recruit her with rhetoric and prejudice.”¹¹⁴ MacDonald’s statement acknowledged that alongside the actual fighting in places such as Frontiers, Ypres, and Neuve Chapelle there were history wars being waged throughout Britain and its Dominions at the start of the First World War. Undoubtedly, MacDonald directed his comments at those on the side of the historical discursive spectrum who framed Britain’s entry into the First World War as a continuation of previous episodes in British history of Britain standing up for small nations and peoples threatened by larger, aggressive powers. Moreover, MacDonald’s targeted audience had selected moments and people from

¹¹² “Notes on Books,” *New Zealand Herald*, 6 February 1915, 3.

¹¹³ “Nietzsche and German Culture,” *Ottawa Citizen*, 23 November 1914, 12.

¹¹⁴ J. Ramsay MacDonald, “The Gospel of Hate,” *Labour Leader*, 7 January 1915, 5.

German history to explain the origins of Germany's aggressive actions against Belgium in August 1914.

As this chapter has demonstrated, it was not just advocates of mainstream historical discourse who recruited history for framing purposes at the beginning of the First World War. In fact, MacDonald himself was not immune from doing so. Nor were other advocates of alternative historical discourse who countered the mainstream narrative by selectively employing episodes from British history which illustrated that Britain and its Empire had not always stood up for weaker nations and peoples. Additionally, MacDonald's side of the historical discursive spectrum picked moments from British history which demonstrated that Britain had its own past of being the aggressor. Finally, advocates of alternative historical discourse offered two types of challenges to the mainstream's portrayal of Germany as being a nation who over the decades had been brainwashed by militaristic intellectuals. First, advocates of alternative history highlighted how Britain had its own celebrated militaristic individuals who did their own brainwashing of people in Britain and its Dominions; and, secondly, by downplaying the supposed popularity of those militaristic intellectuals in Germany.

Just as 1914 and 1915 marked the beginning years of the First World War so too did they mark the start of history wars fought by advocates of mainstream and advocates of alternative historical discourses in Britain and its Dominions. Those history wars would continue up to and even after the actual fighting stopped in November 1918. Thus, as subsequent chapters will show, MacDonald's words of 1915 fell on deaf ears.

3. CONSCRIPTION

The issue of Belgium and the historical discourses built around that “small country” persisted throughout the First World War in Britain and the Dominions. By 1915, however, advocates of mainstream and alternative historical discourses began to shift their attention to a topic that would increasingly engulf all of Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand: conscription. From August 1914 to the opening months of 1915 discussions over conscription remained limited, given that in both locations an overwhelming number of volunteers had joined the armed forces. The significant tapering of volunteers following the first months of 1915, along with the commencement of trench warfare on the Western Front and the disastrous Gallipoli campaign, brought intense and sustained discussions over the best way to secure men for the military. In Great Britain, this debate, which took place roughly from the spring of 1915 to the spring of 1916, contributed to Prime Minister Asquith’s downfall, as well as the full adoption of conscription. Australia’s main debate surrounding conscription took place from October 1916 to December 1917. While Prime Minister William Hughes did survive “the most bitter and divisive debate in Australian history,” he nevertheless experienced humiliations when Australians voted down his two referendums on conscription.¹

The arguments posited by both supporters and opponents of conscription in Great Britain and Australia during the months surveyed here were many, but the focus of this chapter centers on those arguments for and against conscription which utilized the example of Abraham Lincoln. To say Lincoln was a popular figure in Britain and the Dominions during the First World War would be an understatement. Following Lincoln’s assassination, his popularity in the British

¹ Joan Beaumont, “The Politics of a Divided Society” in *Australia’s War 1914-1918*, ed. Joan Beaumont (St. Leonards: Allen and Unwin, 1995), 46.

world grew steadily. This was most visible in the fact that all sides of the political spectrum embraced him. As Adam I.B. Smith has claimed, Lincoln became “the epitome of the democratic hero by many working-class and middle-class radicals in Britain.” To offset the “potentially unsettling, perhaps even subversive connotations” of the radical Lincoln, British conservatives recast Lincoln within the ideology of “racial Anglo-Saxonism.” Advocates of racial Anglo-Saxonism defined Anglo-Saxons “in a language of order, force, and power.”² Due to their orderly, forceful, and powerful nature Anglo-Saxons became the “the possessors and progenitors of unique, ‘free’ political values and institutions.” The extraordinary feature of Anglo-Saxons was their race’s desire “to spread empires of liberty” wherever they went.³

The image of Lincoln that developed in the decades before the First World War keyed in on the essential elements of Anglo-Saxonism. Lincoln demonstrated his power by forcefully expanding the empire of liberty to the enslaved peoples of the South. To achieve this goal, Lincoln made the controversial decisions to suspend habeas corpus, implement conscription, and fight what amounted to a total war on the South. Before these aspects of Lincoln’s Civil War performance were fought over during the First World War, the British public in general applauded “Lincoln’s pragmatic willingness to violate the Constitution” since it served “the higher purpose of maintaining freedom.”⁴ The ends justified the means when it came to protecting or expanding liberty and democracy.

² Eugenio F. Biagini, David W. Blight, et al., “Interchange: The Global Lincoln,” *The Journal of American History* 96, no. 2 (September 2009): 464-465.

³ Paul Kramer, “Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule between the British and United States Empires, 1880-1910,” *The Journal of American History* 88, no. 4. (March 2002): 1322-1323.

⁴ Eugenio F. Biagini, David W. Blight, et al., “Interchange: The Global Lincoln,” *The Journal of American History* 96, no. 2 (September 2009): 494.

Like Lincoln, Anglo-Saxons throughout the British Empire sometimes had to look past their scruples when spreading their “empire of liberty.” As we saw in the previous chapter, anti-imperialists in Britain and the Dominions highlighted numerous instances which questioned whether the people living in the British Empire were free. Pro-imperialists viewed this as a non-question. Freedom might be more limited in certain locations, sure; but eventually it would be experienced by all in the British Empire, for this was an empire ruled over by the democratic, freedom loving Anglo-Saxons. Expanding democracy, sometimes controversially and costly, was in their blood just as it was in Abraham Lincoln’s.

The successful incorporation of Lincoln into Anglo-Saxonism had been achieved in the years preceding the First World War. As Smith argues, “unquestionably, one reason for Lincoln’s salience in those years was Britishers’ perception that in some sense he was one of them.”⁵ It is fair to say then, Abraham Lincoln was popular and held in high esteem in Britain and the British Empire by 1914. Lincoln’s popularity certainly did not decrease in Britain during the First World War. As to whether this was the case in Australia, is less clear. Nevertheless, in both Britain and Australia, discursive battles were waged over Lincoln, especially his decision to implement conscription.

Focusing on the Lincolnia historical discourse surrounding the issue of conscription in Britain and Australia illustrates two points.⁶ First, history, especially American history, remained relevant in Britain and Australia even as both locations debated the most un-British thing: compulsory military service. Secondly, the historical discourse surrounding conscription

⁵ Eugenio F. Biagini, David W. Blight, et al., “Interchange: The Global Lincoln,” *The Journal of American History* 96, no. 2 (September 2009): 474.

⁶ The term Lincolnia will be used throughout this chapter to refer to references to Abraham Lincoln that endeavor to guide, persuade, or criticize actors in the present.

in Britain differed from the historical discourse surrounding Belgium in a very important way: advocates of mainstream history – the *Round Table*, *Daily Mail*, *The Times* – utilized the past, specifically in relation to Abraham Lincoln, to critique the government rather than support it, as they had in the case of Belgium.⁷ Furthermore, British opponents of conscription did not contest conscriptionists' Lincolnia with alternative Lincolnia of their own. Advocates of alternative historical discourse did utilize history to argue against conscription, but they did so without referring to Lincoln. This is especially interesting given the way advocates of alternative historical discourse in Australia used Lincolnia in their successful campaigns against conscription.

3.1 Conscription in Britain

The opening calls for conscription in Britain began to be heard by the spring of 1915. At this early point in the conflict, the British people increasingly became aware that this conflict was shaping up to be a prolonged one. In addition to this sobering realization, a growing number of Britons started to feel that the burdens of war were not being equally shared at home.⁸ Consequently, the British people began to pressure the Asquith government to do two things. First, British citizens—Conservatives and increasingly Liberals—started to call for the government to take full control over Britain's resources to maximize the nation's productivity and manpower. Relatedly, Britons also called on the Asquith government to take steps to ensure

⁷ The affinity shown by advocates of mainstream history towards Lincoln represented a complete departure from how the British Press viewed Lincoln during the American Civil War. For a discussion on how the British depicted Lincoln during the Civil War, see Michael de Nie, "The London Press and the American Civil War," in *Anglo-American Media Interactions, 1850-2000*, eds. Joel H. Wiener and Mark Hampton (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

⁸ John Horne and Alan Kramer, *German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 317; Nicholas Reeves, *The Power of Film Propaganda: Myth or Reality?* (London: Wellington House, 1999), 18-19; Stuart Wallace, *War and the Image of Germany: British Academics 1914-1918* (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, 1988), 170-1; Deian Hopkin, "Domestic Censorship in the First World War," *Journal of Contemporary History* 5, no. 4 (1970): 155.

all Britons made equal sacrifices to the war effort. Synonymous with manpower issues and equality of sacrifice in British discourse was the controversial topic of conscription.

The conscription debate in Britain and Australia did not emerge with the First World War. Pro-conscriptionists and anti-conscriptionists had been debating the issue of mandatory service since the start of the century.⁹ There were some important differences separating the prewar and wartime debates on conscription. The antebellum discourse around conscription was primarily the domain largely of special interest groups and a minority of politicians and commentators. These “compulsory service zealots” argued for conscription on the basis that it was necessary for national defense. Additionally, they argued it would increase the discipline among the young and improve the national physique, which seemed to be declining as evidenced in the South African War.¹⁰ During the First World War, a growing majority of Britons would advocate for conscription largely on the grounds that it was the fairest way to ensure equality of sacrifice amongst the classes. If the antebellum advocacy of conscription lacked the equality of sacrifice argument that would dominate discourse during the First World, so too did it lack the Lincolnia element that was on display throughout the conflict. One can only surmise why the antebellum discourse lacked evocations of Lincoln. More than likely, Lincolnia did not appear in prewar Britain because it would have lacked potency, given that Lincoln only enacted conscription amid the American Civil War.

The influential *Round Table* made the first appeal to conscription through Lincoln in its March 1915 issue. The genesis of the Round Table movement was Sir Alfred Milner’s

⁹ For a discussion of prewar debates surrounding conscription in Britain, see R.J.Q. Adams and Philip Poirier, *The Conscription Controversy in Great Britain, 1900-1918* (Ohio State University Press, 1987), chapters 1-3.

¹⁰ R.J.Q. Adams and Philip Poirier, *The Conscription Controversy in Great Britain, 1900-1918* (Ohio State University Press, 1987), x, 19.

“Kindergarten” group. Milner established his “Kindergarten,” which was made up of young Oxford men, “to help reconstruct South African society after the war of 1899-1902.”¹¹ Back in London, Milner’s “Kindergarten” evolved into the Round Table movement and in 1910 it started printing *The Round Table Journal: A Quarterly Review of the Politics of the British Empire*. The central goal of the Round Table movement and its journal was the strengthening of the empire by drawing the Dominions ever closer to the metropole. Andrea Bosco has gone so far as to argue that Milner “created the Round Table in order to gain the Dominions’ support for Great Britain in the event of a new European war.”¹² One such way in which the Roundtable sought to achieve this goal was by emphasizing the “shared Anglo-Saxon heritage and continuing racial mission” of Britons, Canadians, Australians, and New Zealanders.¹³ The “shared Anglo-Saxon heritage and continuing racial mission” of Britain and the Dominions could extend to the United States as well. As we have seen, Lincoln had firmly established itself in Anglo-Saxon discourse by the time the Round Table movement came into existence. Lincoln’s willingness to adopt militaristic policies—specifically the adoption of conscription—to further the racial mission of Anglo-Saxons played well with the Roundtable and broader mainstream. Thus, when the *Round Table* made its first appeal to conscription in March 1915 it naturally reached for the example of Lincoln and the United States during the American Civil War.

The *Round Table*’s article, “Abraham Lincoln and the Civil War,” summarized the issues Lincoln had to wrestle with as he contemplated conscription in 1863. The issues were: fighting an enemy who had its own conscripted army; a shrinking number of volunteers into the armed forces; and a governing philosophy that vehemently opposed conscription. Unlike Germany in

¹¹ Simon L. Potter, “Richard Jebb, John S. Ewart and the Round Table, 1898-1926,” *The English Historical Review* 122, no. 495 (February 2007): 105.

¹² Bosco, *The Round Table Movement*, 12.

¹³ Potter, “Richard Jebb, John S. Ewart and the Round Table,” 106.

the First World War, the Confederate States of America did not enter the Civil War with a conscript army. Rather, the Confederacy adopted compulsory military service in April 1862. While the Confederacy enlisted all men between the ages of seventeen and fifty, the Union increasingly saw a diminution in volunteering. Thus, by 1863, Lincoln started to argue that the North temporarily had to restrict its own liberties so “the cause of liberty might triumph.” The *Round Table* concluded its article on a note that would be picked up time and again by supporters of conscription. “Lincoln’s great conflict is near enough both in time and character to our own to throw some light upon the task in which we have to succeed.” To succeed, Asquith and Britain like Lincoln and the North could not “be guided by the ordinary canons of peace,” such as voluntarism. Rather, in a war for democracy’s survival governments must do all they can to win the war. Thus, “If Lincoln ... the child of the Declaration of Independence ... resorted to temporary measures so greatly prejudicial to personal liberty as conscription” then Britain should and could too.¹⁴

As one can surmise from the concluding part of the *Round Table*’s article on Lincoln, a main problem that stood in the way of pro-conscriptionists was the fact that Asquith’s Liberal government, along with its constituents, believed that “reliance on voluntary recruiting was an essential feature” of a free and democratic society and that Britain would be “Prussianizing” its soul if it introduced any form of conscription.¹⁵ In other words, Asquith’s Liberal government and its supporters based their opposition to conscription on the principle that it was undemocratic. Like much of the wartime discourse examined in this dissertation, the rhetoric connecting conscription to Prussianism preceded the First World War; it was part of a larger

¹⁴ “Abraham Lincoln and the Civil War,” *Round Table*, no. 18 (March 1915): 321-2.

¹⁵ Graham Goodlad, “British Government and Society, 1793-1918,” *History Review*, no. 55 (September 2006): 10.

anti-German campaign on the part of Britain following the South African War. A key figure in this campaign was Lord Northcliffe. Northcliffe's *Daily Mail* which in 1906 serialized William Le Queux's novel *The Invasion of 1910*, which depicted a German invasion of England in the not-too-distant future. Le Queux's work was part of a larger campaign by Northcliffe and other Mainstreamers, especially Lord Roberts and Lord Milner, to push British society and the government to take the threat of a militaristic Germany seriously. Northcliffe's subsequent role in the spy mania of 1910 indicated he did not believe his message was being received.¹⁶ A central part of that preparation included Britain becoming militaristic itself by adopting compulsory military service. Thus, even before the First World War, Northcliffe and other Mainstreamers advocated adopting German-like policies to prepare for a potential war against Germany.

As seen in the last chapter, when that war eventually came in August 1914, the Northcliffe press played a significant part in blaming Germany's invasion of Belgium on Prussian militarism. Furthermore, Prussian militarism's aggressive behavior abroad was rooted in slavish obedience to the state at home. This narrative would continue throughout the First World War; the story had to be kept straight at all costs. Nevertheless, as the totality of the First World War became ever more apparent by 1915, it became clear that the central characteristics of Prussianism were needed to fight a total war. Even with such a realization the question remained: how to fight a war against a militaristic power without becoming militaristic yourself? To solve this dilemma, Northcliffe and other Mainstreamers utilized Lincolnia.

¹⁶ J. Lee Thompson, *Politicians, the Press, and Propaganda: Lord Northcliffe and the Great War, 1914-1919* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2013), 13.

In the spring of 1915, the Northcliffe press dedicated five articles which illustrated how a relatively “free society” in the past resorted to conscription in a time of crisis. Northcliffe made clear he read the *Round Table*’s March 1915 article because on 26 March 1915 under the heading: “Fear of Facing Compulsory Service: A Lesson in Firmness from Abraham Lincoln,” *Daily Mail* reprinted excerpts from the article.¹⁷ From then until January 1916 Northcliffe’s newspapers—*Times*, *Daily Mail*, and *Weekly Dispatch*—followed the *Round Table*’s example of utilizing Lincolnia for the purpose of getting conscription implemented. Like the *Round Table* before it one month earlier, the Northcliffe press explained to its readers that Lincoln, like Asquith, abhorred compulsory military service, yet he was forced to come to it in the spring of 1863 when the supply of volunteers for the North Army started to decline.¹⁸ Given the fact that Britain in 1915, like the North in 1863, saw its number of volunteers shrinking the *Daily Mail* called on Asquith to “have the courage to bear the burden himself and enforce national service, as Abraham Lincoln did in the Civil War the moment the supply of volunteers declined.”¹⁹ In its article, “A Great Example,” *The Times* explained the urgency of the situation forced Lincoln to realize “the need not only of drastic action, but of immediate action.” Thus, Lincoln “did not stop at half measures” nor did he waste precious time “over arguments or experiments in volunteering.” Lincoln’s courage, boldness, and decisive action culminated in Congress passing a Conscription Act on 3 March 1863, which “soon supplied the recruits, and the superior wealth and staying power of the North.”²⁰

¹⁷ “Fear of Facing Compulsory Service: A Lesson in Firmness from Abraham Lincoln,” *Daily Mail*, 26 March 1915, 4.

¹⁸ “The Voices from the Trenches: When Are You Going to Make War?,” *Daily Mail*, 23 April 1915, 4.

¹⁹ “The State and the Stay-At-Home,” *Daily Mail*, 10 April 1915, 4.

²⁰ “A Great Example,” *The Times*, 16 April 1915, 4.

By the time the Northcliffe press began its conscription campaign via the appropriation of Lincoln the biggest action taken by Asquith and the government had been to address the decreasing number of enlistments occurred with the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee. Asquith's government established the PRC at the end of August 1914 for "the express purpose of boosting military recruitment."²¹ To call the PRC a "half measure" would be a disservice to both it and Asquith, given that by the spring of 1915 it had produced two million recruiting posters along with twenty million leaflets and pamphlets.²² Additionally, the PRC organized approximately 12,000 recruiting meetings over the course of its year and a half existence, which equates to about twenty-five meetings a day.²³ Work such as this, according to W.J. Reader, was far more than a half measure. Reader declared that in total the PRC's recruiting activities were conducted "on a scale never previously approached and rarely, if ever, equaled or exceeded since."²⁴ It is hard to argue that the productivity of the PRC was not impressive; yet did such productivity produce results, or was it all just an exercise in futility, as the Northcliffe press appeared to insinuate?

It should be noted that from the start of the First World War until January 1916, when Britain instituted conscription, more men voluntarily enlisted than would be conscripted during the remainder of the conflict.²⁵ During voluntarism's last calendar year—1915—monthly enlistments dropped below 100,000 per month just five times. Nevertheless, by 1915, which is when the PRC did much of its work, there was a gradual decline in numbers. According to

²¹ Brendan Maartens, "The Great War, Military Recruitment, and the Public Relations Work of the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee, 1914-1915," *Public Relations Inquiry* 5, no. 2 (2016): 170.

²² R.J.Q. Adams and Philip Poirier, *The Conscription Controversy in Great Britain, 1900-1918* (Ohio State University Press, 1987), 61.

²³ W.J. Reader, *'At Duty's Call': A Study in Obsolete Patriotism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), 115.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 113.

²⁵ David Silbey, *The British Working Class and Enthusiasm for War, 1914-1916* (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 27.

Brendan Maartens though, this “decline may have been steeper and more sudden had recruiters not aggressively promoted enrolment.”²⁶ Furthermore, even with the reduction in numbers in its entirety “enlistment remained, on average, the highest in British history.”²⁷ Surely, the PRC, and the Asquith government behind it, played a pivotal role in helping bring about this historic event.

It is hard to determine if Northcliffe himself viewed the PRC’s historic work as impressive. Most likely, Northcliffe’s “half measures” critique of Asquith’s government in April 1915 was in reference to the PRC. It would be another nine months before Northcliffe’s full measure of conscription came to pass. During the nine-month interval, the Northcliffe press continued to evoke Lincoln for one of two purposes: inspiring Asquith to find Lincoln’s courage or replacing Asquith with someone who already possessed Lincoln’s courage. While Northcliffe would have to wait until the beginning of 1916 to see conscription enacted, he could take some heart in the fact that in May 1915, in the wake of the “Shells Scandal,” he found his “dynamic alternative to Asquith” in David Lloyd George, then Chancellor of the Exchequer.²⁸ The “scandal,” which was broken by Lieutenant-Colonel and war correspondent Charles Repington in Northcliffe’s *Times*, blamed the Asquith government for the British military’s failed offensive at the Battle of Neuve Chapelle in April. Repington’s source for his reporting was none other than Sir John French, Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force at the time, who claimed that Asquith and his government bore the responsibility for the failed offensive because it had not provided the army with enough explosive shells to make a breakthrough. Lloyd George, who had come to share Northcliffe’s view that a more centralized approach was needed for the war effort, utilized the scandal in Parliament to force Asquith into action. Immediately,

²⁶ Brendan Maartens, “The Great War, Military Recruitment,” 180.

²⁷ Silbey, *The British Working Class and Enthusiasm for War*, 27.

²⁸ Thompson, *Politicians, the Press and Propaganda*, 68.

Asquith dissolved his Liberal government—the last one ever—and subsequently formed a multiparty coalition ministry on 19 May 1915. Additionally, Asquith created a Minister of Munitions, with Lloyd George as the first incumbent of this position. As Asquith would come to see shortly, this would not be the last high ranking governmental position Lloyd George would occupy during the First World War.

To the *Manchester Guardian* Asquith's 19 May 1915 decision to form a coalition government amounted "to something of a revolution, because it is alien to our traditions."²⁹ While the *Guardian* disapproved of Asquith's new coalition government because it supposedly lacked precedents, the Northcliffe press approved of it for that very reason. For the Northcliffe press, liberal traditions threatened the entire war effort. In Northcliffe's eyes, the coalition government, which "included a powerful minority dedicated to the passage into law of military conscription," was a step in the right direction because of the belief that conscription was right behind it.³⁰ *The Times* crystallized this position five days into the coalition government when it hoped that conscription "would be the watchword and first work of the new Government; for on that, its own future – and more importantly, the future of the British race and Empire – most urgently depend." In the same article, *The Times* reiterated the importance of bold and courageous action through Lincolnia. "The time is long past for debating political shibboleths. If this new Government is to succeed, it must throw shibboleths to the winds at once, just as Pitt and Lincoln threw them in emergencies far less terrible than ours."³¹

Northcliffe's initial hope that Asquith's new government would quickly move to enact conscription did not last long. By the end of August 1915, "the political shibboleth" of

²⁹ "A National Government," *Manchester Guardian*, 19 May 1915, 6.

³⁰ Adams and Poirier, *The Conscription Controversy in Great Britain*, 73.

³¹ "Our Urgent Need," *The Times*, 24 May 1915, 9.

voluntarism remained, even as monthly enlistments continued to drop. Enlistment numbers in July and August of 95,413 and 95,980 respectively represented a decrease from May and June – 135,263 and 114,679, respectively.³² Moreover, July and August’s returns were just the second and third times that monthly enlistments had fallen below 100,000 since the conflict started.³³ As enlistment numbers fell in July 1915, the Asquith government did do something to make it look like it was moving towards addressing the growing manpower situation when it signed the National Registration Bill into law. This piece of legislation required a compulsory registration for all people between the ages of 15 and 65, and while Liberal supporters of Asquith would see in this the foundations of conscription the Northcliffe press was unimpressed. Thus, by the end of summer 1915 Northcliffe had already become convinced that “the coalition government would have to be pressured into implementing compulsory military service.”³⁴ Once again, as part of this campaign, the Northcliffe press turned to the example of Abraham Lincoln.

On 23 August 1915, *The Times* published a “Letter to the Editor,” from Lord Middleton, who declared: “In Great Britain alone the obligation to serve the country ... is still partial or non-existent.” With enlistment numbers dropping below 100,000 for the second consecutive month, the author asked: “For what are we waiting?” After acknowledging that the Asquith government “have done much since June” with the passage and implementation of the National Registration Bill, Middleton claimed the government now endeavored “to avoid anything which may divide the nation.” While recognizing the fraught consequence of conscription, the author

³² W.J. Reader, ‘*At Duty’s Call*,’ 102.

³³ The only other time was in February 1915, which saw 87,896 men enlist. Recall, shortly after this the Northcliffe press began its conscription campaign, which included Lincoln.

³⁴ J. Lee Thompson, *Politicians, the Press and Propaganda*, 72.

asserted that “if Lincoln had similarly shrunk from responsibility, the United States would not now be united.” Thus, concluded the author, “The need for action is urgent.”³⁵

In June 1915 all males and females aged fifteen to sixty-five were required to register with governmental officials. The same month also saw Lloyd George break with the Liberal Party by defending conscription through Lincolnia. During a speech in Manchester on 3 June 1915, Lloyd George “stoutly defended the democratic character of compulsory military service” against those segments within Britain who felt that their country would “be Prussianising her soul if she adopted conscription” when he stated: “if to be a conscriptionist is to be a Prussian then Abraham Lincoln, who was the greatest and most unselfish statesman, was a Prussian.”³⁶ Lloyd George’s public support for conscription reflected a recent evolution in his thinking. Unlike other Liberals, Lloyd George had come to see conscription as a necessity to win the war. Also, unlike other Liberals, or any other politicians for that matter, Lloyd George had developed a close-knit relationship with Lord Northcliffe to the point that George Riddell, a close confidant to Lloyd George, speculated that the two men were “in daily contact” with each other.³⁷ As a result of this relationship, Lloyd George “received a steady flow of advice and encouragement” from the press baron himself.³⁸ We will never know if some of this advice included suggestions by Northcliffe for Lloyd George to evoke Lincoln to undermine arguments against conscription. What we do know is that, by the summer of 1915, both Northcliffe and Lloyd George essentially shared the same goals: “a more vigorous war effort, full mobilization of the nation’s resources at

³⁵ Middleton, “How Long Halt Ye Between Two Opinions,” *The Times*, 23 August 1915, 7.

³⁶ “Matters of Moment: The Candid Friend,” *Daily Express*, 4 June 1915, 5.

³⁷ Riddell’s war diary, 185 in J.M. McEwen, “Northcliffe and Lloyd George at War, 1914-1918,” *The Historical Journal* 24, no. 3 (Sept. 1981): 656.

³⁸ McEwen, “Northcliffe and Lloyd George at War, 1914-1918,” 654.

a faster pace, dynamic leadership.” Clearly, both men believed that one of the ways to make these goals a reality was by connecting them to Abraham Lincoln.

While some members of the public and Lloyd George had followed Northcliffe’s example of turning to Lincolnia to push the government towards conscription, it had yet to do so as summer turned to fall in 1915. However, as the war entered its second full year several developments further weakened arguments for continuing voluntarism. First, and most concerning, 71,617 men enlisted in the armed forces during the month of September. This represented the lowest monthly total since the war began. September 1915 also marked the beginning of the Battle of Loos on the Western Front. Loos was the first time in which soldiers from “Kitchener’s Army,” made up of volunteers from August 1914 on, saw conflict. In this short battle—it lasted until 8 October 1915—those volunteers suffered immensely: 16,000 dead, nearly 25,000 wounded.³⁹ According to David French, these sobering numbers convinced even the most diehard voluntarists, including Asquith, “that fighting on the Western Front in 1916 would be more expensive than the voluntary system could sustain.”⁴⁰

September’s low enlistment numbers, coupled with a very costly defeat in Artois, signaled the end of voluntarism. Asquith made it known to his Cabinet in October 1915 that he was prepared to bring forth conscription on the condition that he be given “time to prepare the political way for a measure of compulsory service that would serve both his and the nation’s needs.” As Asquith made this admission and request, the final analysis of the National Registration was made, revealing that there were approximately 2.7 million men eligible men for military service still residing in Britain. The figures from the National Registration gave Asquith

³⁹ John Keegan, *The First World War* (New York: Vintage Books, 2000), 202.

⁴⁰ David French, *British Strategy and War Aims* (Winchester, Mass.: Allen and Unwin Inc., 1986), 130.

the time he requested because he used them to make one “final voluntary push” with the Derby Scheme.⁴¹ On 5 October, Asquith tasked Lord Derby, Director-General of Recruiting, with asking the men between the ages of 18 and 41 who appeared on the register if they would either enlist now or “attest” their willingness to serve if called upon by the armed forces to do so. Under the Derby Scheme the Asquith government set as a goal 500,000 men who either enlisted or attested that they would do so. One would imagine that the Northcliffe press had a field day with Asquith’s most recent equivocation on conscription, but even Northcliffe publicly supported the government’s move because he believed it would truly be the final nail in voluntarism’s coffin.⁴² Asquith, too, believed the Derby Scheme would fail, but he felt it would provide those who opposed conscription enough time to accept its inevitable introduction.⁴³ Lord Derby confirmed the beliefs of Northcliffe and Asquith when he released his final findings on 23 December 1915: only 340,000 men either enlisted or attested to their willingness to do so.

With the writing on the wall for voluntarism, Asquith informed his colleagues on 29 December 1915 that he would introduce a conscription bill to Parliament as soon as Christmas recess ended. A day later *The Times* reminded its readers about the campaign the Northcliffe press started back in the spring of 1915, which “drew attention ... to the action of President Lincoln in raising by conscription the troops needed for the successful defence of the American Union.” Throughout this campaign, explained *The Times*, the Northcliffe press argued this “great democratic leader of a democratic nation” could and should be a guide for another leader of a democratic nation: Herbert Asquith. The campaign to get Lincoln-like movement on the manpower issue undoubtedly lasted longer than the Northcliffe press would have liked, yet it

⁴¹ Thompson, *Politicians, the Press and Propaganda: Lord Northcliffe and the Great War*, 80.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 81.

⁴³ Roy Douglas, “Voluntary Enlistment in the First World War and the Work of the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee,” *The Journal of Modern History* 42, no. 4 (December 1970): 579.

was clear that Asquith would act in a more Lincolnian manner in the coming new year. Thus, when *The Times* article referred to a “solemn warning” Lincoln had made to the United States Congress in 1862, it did so with Parliament as its intended audience. Lincoln was quoted as saying: “The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present ... As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country.” Whether conscription was referred to as a “dogma of the quiet past” in the nineteenth century or a “shibboleth that should be thrown to the wind” in the twentieth century, the message was clear: in extraordinary times the weight of traditions threatened the future. If Britain, like the United States during the Civil War, wanted its cherished traditions to live on for future generations, then they had to be temporarily suspended to win the war. So, just as Asquith had finally thrown off the old dogma of voluntarism, members of Parliament should too. *The Times* concluded: “When our Government and our Parliament are searched by the tests which Abraham Lincoln describes, with what countenance will they emerge from the ordeal? Will history hand down their memories with honour or with dishonour?”⁴⁴ On the cusp of a new calendar year, the Northcliffe press once again summoned the power of history—backward with Lincoln’s example and forward with British politicians’ own legacies—to make the case for why conscription needed temporarily to become the law of the land. The only difference with this most recent evocation of Lincoln was that Asquith was no longer the target.

It is unlikely that members of Parliament, even if they did not subscribe to the Northcliffe press, were unaware of the consequences of Lincoln’s actions during the Civil War.

Nevertheless, two days before Parliament voted on the compulsion bill, the *Daily Mail* provided

⁴⁴ “The American Precedent. Lincoln on National Service. An Example for all time,” *The Times*, 30 December 1915, 6.

a reminder: “From the moment Abraham Lincoln introduced the obligatory principle during the American Civil War, the tide of battle turned in favour of the North.” Addressing anyone who argued that this was just a British interpretation, the *Daily Mail* explained: “nearly every American authority agrees that compulsion marked ‘the true turning-point in the war’.” The *Daily Mail* did not highlight the fact that this “true turning-point” in the Civil War occurred some three years before the fighting stopped. By 1916, people had come to the sobering reality that, even if the British military did have the required men, the war would still have no end in sight. Nevertheless, the *Daily Mail* expressed its confidence that, if politicians followed in Lincoln’s footsteps and voted in favor of conscription on 5 January 1915, then “the war will begin to turn in our favour.”⁴⁵ While Adams and Poirier are one hundred percent justified in referring to conscription’s overwhelming passage in the House of Commons by a vote of 328 to 36 “an event of enormous moment,” one wonders if this could be considered “the true turning-point” in the war from a British perspective.⁴⁶ To be sure, it did represent a more committed effort on the part of the British government. Additionally, it inspired the dominions of New Zealand and Canada to issue their own compulsory military measures later in the war. What 5 January 1915 did not do, however, was bring an end to the conscription debate. Neither did it, consequently, end Lincolnia.

The second act in Britain’s conscription debate played out from February to May 1916. It resulted from the exemptions granted to married men by the legislation of 5 January 1915. Within a month after the Military Service Act was passed, conscriptionists started to call for conscription’s extension to all men on the grounds that the first act had already demonstrated an

⁴⁵ “The Year of Mystery: What is Behind the Veil of 1916,” *Daily Mail*, 3 January 1916, 4.

⁴⁶ Adams and Poirier, *The Conscription Controversy in Great Britain*, 141.

inability to deal with the British military's growing manpower shortage.⁴⁷ Asquith, who felt it too soon to extend mandatory service, responded to these calls by appointing a committee to examine whether further conscription measures needed to be introduced. With Asquith reverting to his pre-December 1915 behavior the Northcliffe Press renewed its critique of Asquith through *Lincolnia*. In March 1916, as Asquith's committee continued to debate the need for conscription's expansion, the *Daily Mail* expressed its disapproval of Asquith's actions by stating: "Instead of declaring, as Abraham Lincoln did, that all able-bodied citizens were the national forces and liable to be called out for duty, Asquith has turned to his committees once again to decide for him."⁴⁸ Such a decision would not be forthcoming for three months.

As the British public waited for Asquith's committee, Asquith's Government began to be called the "Put-it-Off Ministry," because it still hesitated to introduce "general compulsion involving equal sacrifice for all and fair exemption for those who cannot serve."⁴⁹ During the committee's months of deliberation, Asquith and his coalition government lost a great deal of the public's confidence, because many felt conscription should be extended as soon as possible.⁵⁰ On 3 May 1916, almost one year to the day when the Northcliffe Press began its *Lincolnia* conscription campaign, Asquith finally introduced a second Military Service Bill, which proposed extending conscription to all men, single and married, between the ages of 18 and 41. In the debate that followed in the House of Commons an interesting exchange took place, which seemed to illustrate the role Northcliffe's *Lincolnia* campaign had on David Lloyd George.

⁴⁷ Thompson, *Politicians, the Press and Propaganda*, 95.

⁴⁸ "Drifting on the Rocks: The Cause of the Cabinet's Peril," *Daily Mail*, 20 March 1916, 4.

⁴⁹ "The Execution of the Kaiser: Before or After We Adopt Conscription," *Daily Mail*, 20 April 1916, 4.

⁵⁰ Ian Beckett, "The British Army, 1914-1918: The Illusion of Change," in *Britain and the First World War*, ed. John Turner (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 123.

After speaking out against conscription, Llewellyn Williams, Liberal MP from Wales, “chaffed the House over the prospect of hearing ‘The Master’s Voice’” in David Lloyd George’s subsequent speech—in which he would, of course, act as Lord Northcliffe’s mouthpiece. To those who had been paying attention to the Lincolnia conscription campaign, Northcliffe’s voice was indeed audible in David Lloyd George’s speech, especially when Lloyd George connected Britain’s expansion of conscription to Lincoln’s implementation of the system. After giving his thanks to God that “Great Britain was not so paralytic that it could not demand the service of every Briton,” Lloyd George reminded his House colleagues that “Lincoln kept the principle of Government of the people by the people for the people—by conscription.”⁵¹ Lloyd George’s evocation of Lincoln on the eve of conscription’s full implementation bookended a campaign the Northcliffe press had waged for more than a year. The campaign to fully shake Britain out of its conscription paralysis officially succeeded on 25 May 1916.

Is it possible to argue that Lincolnia convinced Asquith to abandon voluntarism in December 1915? No. Is it possible to argue that Lincolnia persuaded an overwhelming majority of the House of Commons to vote in favor of limited conscription on 5 January 1916? No. Finally, is it possible to attribute conscription’s expansion to married men in May 1916 to Lincolnia? No. What can be demonstrated is this: when the Northcliffe Press began its conscription campaign it used Lincolnia as one of its strategies. Lincolnia’s continued presence throughout the conscription campaign is evidence that the Northcliffe Press viewed this as an effective tool. Furthermore, the fact that the future prime minister, David Lloyd George, started

⁵¹ “Bad News for the Hun,” *Daily Mail*, 5 May 1915, 5.

utilizing *Lincolnia* during a period of closeness with Northcliffe suggests the Welshman believed in its efficacy.

3.2 Conscription in Australia: Round One

The fact that influential members of British society felt *Lincolnia* could help the conscriptionist cause brings up the question of whether a *Lincolnia* conscription campaign would work in other parts of the Empire? The New Zealand and Canadian conscription campaigns are beyond the scope of this study, but the Australian case is not. Australia's conscription campaign is noteworthy for a couple of reasons. Unlike Britain, New Zealand, and Canada, which all passed conscription through parliamentary procedures, Australia did not. The impetus for this came from Prime Minister Hughes, who sought to implement conscription through two different referendums, both of which failed. In each referendum campaign—September to October 1916 and December 1917—Hughes and his allies used numerous discursive strategies to convince Australians of why conscription needed to be implemented. As was the case with pro-conscriptionists in Britain, Hughes and other pro-conscriptionists in Australia would utilize *Lincolnia* to bolster support for conscription. And yet, unlike in Britain, *Lincolnia*'s utilization did not result in a conscription victory in Australia. Thus, a central question the remaining part of this chapter will explore is: why did *Lincolnian* references in Britain succeed while in Australia they failed?

Important for the Australian side of the conscription debate was Prime Minister Hughes' three-month visit to Britain—from March until the end of June 1916—which coincided with the second act in Britain's own conscription debate.⁵² Hughes' undoubted exposure to arguments in favor of conscription while in Britain shaped how he framed the issue upon his return to

⁵² Hughes left Australia in late January 1916 and returned on 31 July 1916.

Australia. Just as important was the company Hughes kept while in Britain, for during his time there “he cultivated and was cultivated by ... his fellow Welshman Lloyd George.”

Additionally, Hughes’ “de facto public relations officer and confidant” would be Keith Murdoch, who, according to Joan Beaumont, “was in league with Lord Northcliffe.”⁵³ Finally, the third member of the Lincolnia trio—the *Round Table*—could count Hughes as an “associate,” according to Andrea Bosco.⁵⁴ Given that these three powerful entities—Lloyd George, Northcliffe, and the *Round Table*—all used Lincolnia in their recently successful conscription campaign and given they all had close contacts with Hughes it seems more than a little coincidental that the prime minister subsequently used Lincolnia in Australia’s conscription debate.

On 18 and 19 September 1916, Hughes crystallized his position in a Lincolnia-laced “manifesto” and speech in Sydney Town Hall. Presenting conscription as a “test of nationhood,” Hughes explained that voluntary enlistments had fallen in three consecutive months. If this trend continued, Hughes warned, Australia would not be able to maintain its five divisions, which would have been a huge embarrassment for Australia. To stave off such an embarrassment, “We must get the men,” declared Hughes. For those who saw “getting the men” via conscription as “a menace to democracy, labor, and unionism,” Hughes responded with his first use of Lincolnia. In both the manifesto of 18 September and the speech at the trade hall on 19 September, Hughes used “the glowing words of ... Abraham Lincoln” to explain: “Men can be had only voluntarily or involuntarily. We have ceased to obtain them voluntarily, and to obtain them involuntarily is the draft—conscription ... The principle of the draft ... is not new. It has been practiced in all

⁵³ Joan Beaumont, *Broken Nation: Australians in the Great War* (Sydney: Unwin and Allen, 2013), 169.

⁵⁴ Andrea Bosco, *The Round Table Movement and the Fall of the Second British Empire 1909-1919* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017), 16.

ages of the world. Wherein is the peculiar hardship now? Shall we shrink from the necessary means to maintain our free Government?"⁵⁵ As seen here, Hughes, like his British pro-conscriptionist counterparts, would use Lincolnia to push back against arguments portraying conscription as undemocratic, Prussian, and despotic.

Hughes continued to follow the Lincolnia line of pro-conscriptionists in Britain in both his manifesto and speech when he called Lincoln's implementation of conscription "the turning point in the great Civil War." By this logic, Britain had already created its turning point in the First World War with its full implementation of conscription in May 1916. Australia now had the chance to affect its own turning point in the conflict. Hughes concluded his second appeal to Lincoln by further connecting Australia's situation in 1916 with that of the North in 1862. "Like them, we fight in the cause of liberty. Voluntarism has failed us as it failed them. And we, like them ... must tread the path they trod, along which they strode resistlessly [sic] to victory."⁵⁶ As will be seen, anti-conscriptionists would challenge Hughes's claim that the "North strode resistlessly to victory" by highlighting the draft riots that took place in the North following Lincoln's decision in the wake of voluntarism's failure. For now, the significance of Hughes' written and spoken words of 18 and 19 September 1916 resided in these being the first instances since Hughes' return from Britain when he utilized Lincolnia to argue in favor of conscription.

As the Northcliffe press quickly followed the *Round Table's* example in Britain during the spring of 1915, pro-conscriptionists quickly followed Hughes example in Australia during the fall of 1916. John Garland, who served on the executive of the Universal Service League in 1915 and 1916, at "a crowded and enthusiastic meeting ... in Mosman Town Hall," "denied that

⁵⁵ "Mr. Hughes's Manifesto: We Must Get the Men," *The Argus*, 18 September 1916, 6; "Stirring Appeal by the Prime Minister," *Sydney Morning Herald*, 19 September 1916, 9.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

conscription meant militarism. America had conscription, and Lincoln won his cause with it.” No one could say Lincoln was the leader of an undemocratic nation.⁵⁷ After repeating the assertion that conscription “brought about the final victory” in America’s Civil War, Mr. David Storey used a quotation from Lincoln that had yet to be used in either the British or Australian conscription campaigns. According to Storey, Lincoln said the following: “voluntarism ... had ground up the choicest seed-corn of the nation, consumed the young, the generous, the patriotic, the intelligent, and the brave, wasted the best moral, social, and political elements of the Republic, and left the cowards, shirkers, egotists, and money-makers to stay at home and procreate their kind.”⁵⁸ Suffice it to say, Storey agreed with Lincoln’s take on those who stayed behind while patriots gave their all. So too, did Senator Millen for on 27 October 1916 he referred to these exact same words from Lincoln during “a rousing speech” in Sydney.⁵⁹

This harsher, class-centered rhetoric made its full display during an outdoor speech given by William Holman, Premier of New South Wales twelve days before the referendum. The exchange as reported by *The Argus* needs to be quoted in its entirety to get a sense of just how intense Australia’s conscription campaign was. Holman, who would also be expelled by Labor in 1916 for his support of conscription, declared:

Mr. Hughes and I and others of us have not chosen this path we are treading because we like it. It is a grave matter, Mr. Hughes could have kept quiet ... It is a question of our responsibility (Jeers and hoots). What kind of men have we got here in Marrickville? Are these miserable specimens, to whose minds nothing that is worthy can make appeal, the hope of Australia? God help our young democracy. (Uproar). Those hoots and that rowdyism are the only arguments you possess, you curs. It’s a shame to think that the fine men who volunteered will have to associate with you (Hoots). You disgrace your breed. Let us hope (he was hard to continue) that when compulsion does come in that you will be given the work you are best suited for – that you will be kept to do cleaning-up work in the back lines of the camp. You are the cowards who hunt in packs at

⁵⁷ “Enthusiasm at Mosman: A Labour Man’s Advocacy,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, 7 October 1916, 18.

⁵⁸ “A ‘Yes’ Vote,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, 16 October 1916, 9.

⁵⁹ “Senator Millen: A Rousing Speech,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, 27 October 1916, 8.

public meetings, and encourage and support each other ... At the bottom of it all is pure blue funk that is making you do this. You are cowards, do you hear?
 President Lincoln –
 A Voice – Mind, he was killed.
 The Premier – killed, assassinated, and the assassin was a member of the I.W.W. class.⁶⁰

One can only speculate which bit of Lincolnia Holman was about to use but given the context of Holman speaking in front of a hostile crowd and given the fact this episode was sandwiched between Storey and Millen’s quotation of Lincoln’s harsh rhetoric, it is reasonable to assume that Holman was about to go the route of Storey and Millen. Of course, we will never know given that a heckler interrupted Holman. This interruption and Holman’s response are interesting for several reasons. First, they both got the history wrong. The implication that John Wilkes Booth assassinated Lincoln because of his institution of conscription is incorrect. Booth murdered Lincoln because he sympathized with the South and abhorred the abolition of slavery. Additionally, Holman’s claim that Booth “was a member of the I.W.W. class” is inaccurate. Booth came from a well to do family and at the time of his crime he was one of the leading theatre actors in the United States. Finally, this exchange reveals the coarseness of Australia’s conscription debate. The implication that Hughes, Holman, or other high-profile supporters of conscription could be assassinated clearly represents an intensity that was lacking back in Britain during its conscription campaign. This intensity, however, did not just come from the anti-conscriptionist side—more on that in a moment—for Holman’s conflation of Booth and the I.W.W. was part of a broader strategy of fully discrediting not just the Industrial Workers of the World but all anti-conscriptionists.

⁶⁰ “Mr. Holman Hooted: Reference to Lincoln’s Fate,” *The Argus*, 16 October 1916, 7.

Australian Alternatives had created the grounds for this discrediting campaign as soon as Hughes issued his manifesto and speech of 18 and 19 September. Throughout both conscription campaigns, anti-conscriptionists “grasped at pretty much any argument that they thought might sway voters.”⁶¹ Such arguments included but were not limited to: “geographical and military-strategic considerations, differing assessments of the risks facing Australia, differing assessments of how Australians could help best Britain, partisan interests, nationalist reasoning, and religious sectarianism.”⁶² One form of argument historians have yet to examine are those put forth by anti-conscriptionists based on alternative Lincolnia. Such arguments were unique in that they were part of a discursive struggle within the broader conscription debate. Unlike in Britain, where Lincolnia in support of conscription largely went unchallenged, in Australia this was not the case.

One of the first and most powerful persons to court the pro-side’s discrediting campaign was the editor of the all-important *Australian Worker* (*AW*), H.E. Boote. Boote, whom Robin Archer calls “the single most important anti-conscription ideas merchant” in Australia at the time, would use the power of the press throughout both conscription referendum campaigns and in both he also used Lincolnia.⁶³ In a “Challenge to Mr. Hughes,” H.E. Boote’s *Australian Worker* began by asserting: “A more unconvincing speech than that of Mr. Hughes was never delivered by a responsible statesman in a great crisis.” Unlike some pro-conscriptionists who

⁶¹ Frank Bongiorno, “Anti-Conscription in Australia: Individuals, Organisations and Arguments,” in *The Conscription Conflict and the Great War*, ed. Robin Archer, Joy Damousi, Murray Goot, and Sean Scalmer (Melbourne: Monash University Press, 2016), 69.

⁶² Robin Archer, “Labour and Liberty: The Origins of the Conscription Referendum”, in *The Conscription Conflict and the Great War*, ed. Robin Archer, Joy Damousi, Murray Goot, and Sean Scalmer (Melbourne: Monash University Press, 2016), 40.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 38.

saw Hughes as the “Lincoln of Australia,”⁶⁴ the *AW* found him desperate as “evidenced by the gross misuse he made of ... America’s great president, Abraham Lincoln.”⁶⁵ After explaining that Lincoln “would have spat on the scheme of militarism which Mr. Hughes has borrowed from the Kaiser,” the *AW* explained Lincoln was “anti-conscriptionist,” in the manner of Australians for “He favored the Citizen Army—for Home Defence Only.” Alternatives claimed they would support conscription to protect Australia, but they, like Lincoln found “The idea of forcing men abroad, to fight in foreign lands ... utterly repugnant.” The *AW* concluded by accusing Hughes “of the basest desecration” for his “dragging of Lincoln from honored grave to serve a cause he detested.”⁶⁶

The discursive component in Boote’s *Lincolnia* of 21 September is noteworthy because heretofore whenever *Lincolnia* had been utilized for the purposes of supporting conscription there had been little to no push back. Boote and other anti-conscriptionists would follow this model for both the first and second referendum campaigns. A point Boote would expound on in a later article during the first referendum debate had to do with Lincoln’s “Citizen Army—for Home Defence Only.” In an article entitled “Freedom or Fetters,” Boote’s *AW* reiterated its earlier observation that Hughes “makes much capital out” of Lincoln’s institution of conscription. According to *AW* though, the prime minister “misrepresents the case,” because when Lincoln introduced conscription in the Civil War he “did just what we did in Australia” in 1909 when it introduced military training for home service. Thus, the *AW* declared Lincoln, unlike Hughes, “was not a war lord”—a reference to Kaiser Wilhelm II, who possessed the title of “Supreme War Lord”—but “a democrat who never raised an army for foreign service.”

⁶⁴ Hughes as the “Lincoln of Australia” appeared in a speech by Senator Lynch on 19 October 1916. See: “Conscription Referendum,” *Hamilton Spectator*, 19 October 1916, 3.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, 3.

⁶⁶ “A Challenge to Mr. Hughes,” *Australian Worker*, 21 September 1916, 3.

“Nobody,” asserted *AW*, knew this fact of the case “better than Mr. Hughes.”⁶⁷ The likes of *AW* saw in Hughes’ willful misuse of Lincolnia a larger plot to strip Australians of their freedom.

Hughes’ supposed misappropriation of Lincolnia received further treatment by *AW* when it produced what appears to be the first visual usage of Lincolnia in either Britain or Australia during the respective conscription campaigns. In “You Can’t Fool All the People All the Time” (figure 3.1) the diminutive William Morris Hughes is towered over by Abraham Lincoln. While the huge discrepancy in height is pretty accurate—Lincoln was a tall man and Hughes was short—it nevertheless is meant to distinguish the loftiness of Lincoln and the baseness of Hughes. In other words, it makes clear through this height difference who the real leader is. Lincoln’s stern gaze downward at the “Little Digger” illustrates the deceased president’s disgust at having to address this manipulator of his legacy. Lincoln addresses Hughes’ appeal to his authority by saying: “Well, yes, William there are certain points of resemblance. For instance, I freed the slaves, whereas you would enslave the free.”⁶⁸ Unlike Lincoln, who introduced conscription for the purpose of freeing more than four million enslaved people in the South, Hughes desired conscription’s introduction for the purpose of enslaving his fellow Australians. By forcing Australians to fight overseas, according to this line of argument, Hughes became the enslaver of Australians.

The ridicule Hughes suffered in the *AW*’s cartoon was not limited to Lincoln’s talking down. In the background of the illustration there are four illustrations of men connected to conscription. The men in the first two posters—Oliver Cromwell and Napoleon Bonaparte—had successful records with conscription. In the case of Cromwell, he initiated conscription with his

⁶⁷ “Freedom or Fetters?” *Australian Worker*, 5 October 1916, 13.

⁶⁸ “You Can’t Fool all the People, All the Time,” *Australian Worker*, 5 October 1916, 17.

New Model Army during the English Civil War. While Napoleon did not establish the *levée en masse*, he nevertheless oversaw its continuation to great effect during the Napoleonic Wars. In the third poster stands Kaiser Wilhelm II: another man who also oversaw the continuation of conscription. The last example of conscription came from the system—Prussianism—that Britain and the Dominions were fighting during the First World War. This is what makes the fourth poster so damning, for in it stands Hughes with a crown on his head. The image of the would-be War Lord and King of Australia is perpendicular to both the actual Hughes—the one being talked down to by Lincoln—and the poster of the Kaiser. By connecting the would-be Hughes to both the actual Hughes and Kaiser Wilhelm, the *AW* tapped into the existing alternative narrative explaining Britain and its own Empire had Prussians of their own.

On the same day, that Boote's *AW* began its alternative Lincolnia campaign Mr. Frank Brennan, in a House of Representatives speech, depicted conscription as “an act of coercion and oppression” that should not be tolerated in Australia. Like pro-conscriptionists, Brennan highlighted the fact that the United States implemented conscription during the Civil War. Unlike pro-conscriptionists, however, Brennan did not see this as a turning point in the War. Instead, he argued, without any proof given, that conscription failed in the United States. A week after Brennan made this Edmund Hogan, a recently elected member of the Victoria Legislative Assembly, published an article in *Labor Call*, the most important labor paper after *AW*, in which he provided numbers to substantiate his own claim that conscription in the United States “failed ignominiously.”⁶⁹ As was the case in Britain, the Australian press and politicians utilized

⁶⁹ “American Civil War,” *Labor Call*, 28 September 1916, 9.

Lincolnia in tandem during the conscription campaigns; however, unlike in Britain, the Australian press, and subsequently politicians, utilized Lincolnia to argue against conscription.



Figure 3.1: "You Can't Fool All the People, All the Time."

In addition to arguing that conscription failed in the United States because of the low number of conscripts, Hogan further challenged the “turning point thesis” regarding conscription by referring to decisive battles won by the North before the implementation of conscription. According to Hogan, “The turning point of the Civil War was not the compulsory draft, as

asserted by Mr. Hughes.” Rather, the Northern victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, which Hogan pointed out both occurred “before a single conscript was drafted,” were the moments when the tide began to turn for the North.⁷⁰ So, from Hogan's perspective, victories on the battlefield signaled “turning points” in war, or at least the American Civil War. The problem with this scenario for Australia, and the whole British Empire, was that in 1916 there had been no victories on the battlefield. The Gallipoli failure and the slaughter on the Western Front, which was becoming ever more apparent as the Battle of the Somme neared its months-long stalemate, made the lack of military victories all too apparent.

To highlight the “terrible destruction wrought” by Lincoln’s conscription Hogan focused on the New York City Draft Riots of 13-16 July 1863, one of the worst episodes of public disorder in United States history. While Hogan highlighted the physical destruction caused by the riots, he failed to mention who the main instigators of it were Irish Americans. Given the context of Hogan’s article, his Irish American omission is interesting, especially considering subsequent users of this *Lincolnia* made sure to include them. Only a couple of months before Hogan’s retort, the Easter Rebellion in Ireland intensified sectarianism in Australia. This intensification, worsened by the fact that most Protestants were middle-class pro-conscriptionists while most Catholics were working-class anti-conscriptionists, may have created an environment where Hogan believed inclusion of the Irish Americans in his *Lincolnia* would only exacerbate already fraught conditions in Australia. At the same time, however, Hogan could have left the Irish American component out of his *Lincolnia* due to the fact it was subtle enough to send a warning to pro-conscriptionists in Australia. Such a warning could be seen later in Hogan’s article, when he referred to a request Lincoln ignored for the purpose of creating a commission to

⁷⁰ “American Civil War,” *Labor Call*, 28 September 1916, 9.

investigate the genesis of the riot. According to Hogan, Lincoln explained his lack of action by stating:

If I had said ‘Yes,’ and appointed the judge, I should simply have touched a match to a barrel of a gunpowder. You have heard of sitting on a volcano! We are sitting on two – one is blazing away already and the other will blaze away the moment we scrape a little loose dirt from the top of the crater. Better let the dirt alone – at least, for the present. One rebellion at a time is as much as we can handle.⁷¹

As we have seen, the situation in Australia during the first referendum campaign was intense. Destruction of property and acts of violence had occurred several times between pro- and anti-conscription forces during this period.⁷² The usage of Lincolnia here suggested that if Hughes and pro-conscriptionists got their way violence, possibly on the scale of rebellion, was a real possibility in Australia.

Whether or not the possibility of violence on the scale of New York in 1863 was on the minds of Australians as they went to the polls on 28 October 1916 we will never know. What we do know is that, unlike in Britain, Lincolnia utilized for supporting conscription did not go unchallenged in Australia. Furthermore, unlike in Britain where the politicians voted in favor of conscription in January and May 1916, the Australian people voted against it with the first referendum—1,160,033 against to 1,087,557 for—at the end of October 1916. In the aftermath of this upset, for most people had thought the “for” party would win, Hughes and other pro-

⁷¹ “A Smashing Answer: E.J. Hogan, MLA, Pulverizes One of H.M Hughes's Pet Arguments,” *Australian Worker*, 28 September 1916, 5.

⁷² In September 1916, a series of fires in Sydney’s business district were linked with the IWW. In May 1916, a meeting of the No Conscription Fellowship saw soldiers assaulted a female anti-conscriptionist, Mary Grant. Later, during the second referendum campaign, even Hughes was subjected to violence in the form of both rotten eggs being thrown at him as well as a bomb, causing the Prime Minister to carry a pistol “part of the time” during the campaign. See L.F. Fitzhardinge, *The Little Digger 1914-1952: A Political Biography of William Morris Hughes*, vol. 2 (Sydney: Angus and Robertson Publishers, 1979), 289.

conscriptionist blamed their defeat on the Irish, women, and radicals – anyone from the working class that was an anti-conscriptionist.⁷³

3.3 Conscription in Australia: Round Two

During the second referendum campaign the rhetoric of pro-conscriptionists differed little from that of the first; they maintained that Lincoln’s conscription won the war and that Lincoln’s conscription bill looked a lot like Hughes’ proposal. Anti-conscriptionists did not deviate too much from their approach of the first referendum campaign either, reiterating their arguments that Hughes and pro-conscriptionists were misleading the Australian people through Lincolnia. However, as will be seen, antis did place more of an emphasis on the riots of 1863 during the second referendum campaign than they had in the first.

The beginning of Lincolnia discourse during the second referendum campaign appeared in the form of a speech given by pro-conscriptionist Sir Joseph Carruthers on 8 November 1917. After expressing his displeasure that Hughes pursued the referendum route, which gave voice “to the disloyal elements of the community,” instead of forcing conscription on Australians, Carruthers proclaimed: “I wish we had an Abraham Lincoln, who would bring the draft and levy system into force.”⁷⁴ Carruthers’ desire for an Australian Lincoln to appear stemmed from his belief in the conscription-as-turning-point thesis. As it had during the first referendum campaign, Boote’s *AW* fired the opening alternative Lincolnia in response to Carruthers. This time’s refutation the *AW* referred to a speech given on the House floor by General Isaac Sherwood, a Civil War veteran who subsequently was a United States Congressman from Ohio. In this speech, Sherwood endeavored to demonstrate the failure of Lincoln’s conscription by

⁷³ Frank Bongiorno, “Anti-Conscription in Australia,” 71.

⁷⁴ “Sir William Irvine: Vigorous Speech – Ministry Should Stake Its Life,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, 9 November 1917, 7.

pointing to “an official report ... of the draft riots throughout the country during the Civil War.” Americans opposed the draft “not because they believed the draft was un-American, unconstitutional, and unnecessary.” Impracticality “killed the Lincoln Draft Act” as it forced the army to transfer soldiers from the all-important fighting front to put down an internal revolt against. In conclusion, *AW* advised Carruthers and all other pro-conscriptionists that before they spoke “of the Lincoln Draft again,” they “would well to get further educated concerning the workings and the subsequent result of that Act.”⁷⁵

Following the *AW*'s suggestion, it seems at least one pro-conscriptionist further acquainted himself with the riots that occurred in the wake of Lincoln's institution of conscription. On 4 December 1917, James Boyd, M.H.R., spoke in favor of Hughes' second go with conscription by using some Lincolnia of his own. Following his explanation of the circumstances that forced Lincoln's hand regarding conscription, Boyd highlighted what happened consequently in New York. “The rabble had then held up New York in two days, but Lincoln sent some troops and shot a few hundred of them.” Unlike anti-conscriptionists, who saw the divergence of troops from the fighting front to the domestic one as a sign of conscription's failure Boyd did not. “The result,” according to Boyd, “of shooting those vermin was that America today was a free democracy.”⁷⁶ Recall, there was a strong Irish element in the New York riots of 1863. Chances are Boyd's “vermin” in New York City in 1863 were Irish. This would fit with a broader development that increasingly linked all Irish in Australia with anti-conscription during the second referendum campaign. Much of this had to do with the public duel between Prime Minister Hughes and Cardinal Daniel Mannix since the latter openly

⁷⁵ “The Lincoln Draft Act,” *Australian Worker*, 22 November 1917, 11.

⁷⁶ “Reinforcements Referendum,” *Argus*, 4 December 1917, 7.

opposed conscription as well as Hughes heavy-handed ways in trying to force it upon Australians.⁷⁷ In a letter to Lloyd George, Hughes demonstrated his increasing inability to distinguish between Mannix and the broader Irish-Australian community when he wrote: “Mannix ... and the Irish are mainly responsible for the trouble” engulfing Australia during the second referendum campaign.⁷⁸ Such sentiment was ubiquitous in conscriptionist circles during the second referendum campaign.

To say the largely Irish-led riots of 1863 dominated Lincolnia discourse during Australia’s second referendum campaign would be overstating things; however, there was a noticeable increase in its utilization in December 1917, especially on the anti-side of the debate. On the same day Boyd made his “vermin” comment, anti-conscriptionist Arthur Rae also utilized Lincolnia from 1863. Of course, Rae’s Lincolnia struck a different tone from that of Boyd’s. In his statement, Rae demonstrated the failure of Lincoln’s conscription by referring to the Union soldiers who were called from the front “to shoot down some 2,000 men” in New York City. According to Rae, the “militaristic fire-eaters,” like Boyd, on the pro-conscriptionist side viewed this response positively, but the majority of Australians would strongly oppose “the introduction of any system of conscription which had to be forced on the people by 2000 citizens being shot down.” Even after the deaths of these 2,000 in New York, objection to Lincoln’s conscription did not come to an end for there was “open hostility evidenced throughout the whole Union.”⁷⁹ The likelihood of antis protesting the introduction of conscription throughout Australia was high because of their strong opposition to it. This likelihood coupled with the rhetoric of some, again

⁷⁷ Joan Beaumont, “The Politics of a Divided Society,” in *Australia's War 1914-1918*, ed. Joan Beaumont (St. Leonards: Allen and Unwin, 1995), 153.

⁷⁸ Hughes to D. Lloyd George, 17 August 1917, Lloyd George Papers, F/28/2/2, Beaverbrook Library reprinted in L.F. Fitzhardinge, *The Little Digger*, 276-7.

⁷⁹ “The 'No' Side,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, 4 December 1917, 8.

like Boyd, on the pro-conscriptionist which appeared to be begging the Australian government to do with antis what the American government did in 1863 suggested that there was a high chance of widespread violence if “Yes” won the second referendum.

In its campaign to weaken further the conscriptionist argument by reference to events of 1863, the *AW* turned to a speech Governor Seymour gave to the New York state legislature less than a year after the riots of 1863. *AW*, in two separate articles from September and December 1917, further demonstrated the ineffectiveness of Lincoln’s draft and warned Australia’s “local Prussianists” about what would happen if they got their way. Seymour explained how Lincoln’s conscription act “wrought a change in the public feeling” and “disturbed the public mind” as evidenced by the riots. While proving “injurious to the civil, industrial, and military interests of the country,” Lincoln’s conscription “gave no useful results.”⁸⁰ Again, rather than seeing conscription as the turning point in the Civil War, anti-conscriptionists utilized this Lincolnia to highlight its failure. Furthermore, *AW*’s inclusion of Seymour’s legislature speech provided a further warning to conscriptionists about the deleterious domestic impact conscription’s introduction could have in Australia.

The issue of home defence was connected to the Lincolnia from 1863, for if Australia went the way of the North during the Civil War civil disturbances would break out in the aftermath of conscription’s implementation. As we saw during the first referendum showdown, the issue of home defence played an important role in the anti-conscriptionist campaign. During the second referendum campaign, home defence reappeared in response to conscriptionists maintaining that Hughes’ conscription plan resembled that of Lincoln’s. In two different

⁸⁰ “A Warning to Australia,” *Australian Worker*, 20 September 1917, 4; “Why Don’t They Quote This?,” *Australian Worker*, 3 December 1917, 8.

speeches, W.A. Holman, the premier of New South Wales, presented Hughes' conscription plan as "the very prototype introduced in the North of America by Abraham Lincoln."⁸¹ In response to Holman's 22 November 1917 remark, Rae accused Holman of Lincolnia misuse by saying "he should know that Lincoln's principle was exactly that already embodied in the Australia Defence Act—conscription for home defence." Unlike Hughes' Australia, Lincoln's America "was actually being invaded by rebel troops" before it instituted conscription.⁸²

After Rae's comments, the *AW* picked up on Lincolnia self defence arguments in two articles during the last full month of the referendum campaign. In recognition of its ongoing Lincolnia discursive battle with conscriptionists, the *AW* highlighted that once again Lincoln's conscription was "being trotted out as precedents for compulsion in Australia."⁸³ As it had during the first referendum campaign, the *AW* centered its retort on claims that Hughes' proposal was like Lincoln's by using two words: home defence. Through bold typeface, the *AW* emphasized the following points in an article from 29 November 1917: "**Lincoln's conscription was for home defence. Hughes' proposal is conscription for service abroad.**"⁸⁴ Six days later, the *AW* again emphasized this point through all caps when it argued that "the point" conscriptionists missed when they connected Hughes' proposal to Lincoln's was, unlike the former, that the latter "was CONSCRIPTION FOR HOME DEFENCE."⁸⁵ To conscriptionists who glossed over this aspect of Lincolnia, the *AW* accused them of being either "grossly ignorant of historic fact" or deceitful "because they are set upon misleading persons too careless, too lazy,

⁸¹ "Referendum: Eloquent Speech by Premier, What if We Fail?," *Sydney Morning Herald*, 22 November 1917, 8; "The 'Draft': Lincoln's Example to Australia," *Age*, 13 December 1917, 7.

⁸² "The Anti View," *Sydney Morning Post*, 23 November 1917, 8.

⁸³ "The Lincoln Argument for Conscription," *Australian Worker*, 29 November 1917, 11.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁸⁵ "Campaign Notes," *Australian Worker*, 3 December 1917, 1.

or too distrustful to find out for themselves exactly what Lincoln did.”⁸⁶ While a resort to the type of labeling and name calling used by the conscriptionist side—recall the examples of Holman and Boyd above—probably did not change the minds of those “careless, lazy, and distrustful” Australians who unquestionably accepted conscriptionists’ Lincolnia, the *AW*’s return to Lincolnia home defence twice during the last month of the second referendum campaign suggests it believed there were still some in Australia who could possibly be turned towards the anti-conscriptionist side.

Four days after the *AW*’s second article dealing with the issue of home defence, the Attorney General for New South Wales, David Hall, gave a speech at a “well-attended meeting” in Rozelle, an inner suburb of Sydney. Hall began his speech by explaining that unlike the first referendum campaign when he spoke before audiences about conscription “they did most of the talking.” This time around, however, Hall believed a “change had come over” those same audiences because they were now “willing to listen.” Apparently, at least one person in the Rozelle crowd disabused Hall of his belief. After Hall explained that even the greatest democrat who ever lived—Lincoln—had to resort to conscription, “A Voice” in the audience shouted: “For home defence.” Clearly, the home defence argument resonated with some. To the voice in the crowd, and to those who had been imbibing the *AW*’s recent articles, Hall responded with a question: “Do you think we are not fighting for home defence in France and Belgium?” Hall believed the line of thinking of “if we don’t stop aggression ‘over there’ then it will soon be here” would be enough to get people to vote “Yes” on 20 December 1917. If they did so,

⁸⁶ “The Lincoln Argument for Conscription,” *Australian Worker*, 29 November 1917, 11.

according to Hall, Australia would “wipe out the big black stain that was placed upon her history when the referendum vote was taken last year.”⁸⁷

Hall, Hughes, and other conscriptionists would be sorely disappointed with what 20 December 1917 revealed about Australia. In the second referendum on conscription, 1,015,595 Australians voted in favor of conscription while 1,181,796 voted against it. In comparison with the previous year’s referendum, the “No” side’s victory on 20 December 1917 was more impressive, for it increased its share of the vote (53.8% as compared to 51.6% in 1916).

3.4 Conclusion

Many reasons have been given to explain the remarkable victories of the “No” side in Australia. One of the reasons that has yet to be explored is the role the anti-Lincolnia campaign played. The Lincolnia discursive struggle was just one component of a broader debate Australians had over conscription during the referendum campaigns of 1916 and 1917. As was the case with the British campaign, conscription stirred up a great deal of controversy in Australia. Unlike the British case, however, some of that controversy stemmed from the uses and misuses of Lincolnia. While Lincolnia in favor of conscription was clearly present in Britain during the conscription campaigns of January 1916 and May 1916, it received very little push back from opponents of conscription. In contrast, anti-conscriptionists in Australia consistently utilized anti-Lincolnia to challenge conscriptionists’ own Lincolnia-based claims. It is a central contention of this chapter that such Lincolnia contributed to conscription’s defeat in Australia. Utilizing their own Lincolnia to challenge the “turning point in the war” thesis and claims that Hughes’ conscription was the same as Lincoln’s as well as to offer warning of possible

⁸⁷ “War Position Worse,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, 7 December 1917, 8.

repercussions domestically if conscription was implemented, anti-conscriptionists successfully mounted and sustained a discursive struggle against conscriptionists in Australia.

Several explanations can be given for why Britain did not have the kind of discursive struggle Australia had over the issue of conscription. First, British society was less egalitarian and less democratic than Australia. In Australia, the concept of “mateship” created an intense sense of national identity and cohesion. During the First World War, “mateship” contributed to Australians feeling they did not need conscription because of the belief that everyone has doing their fair share in one way or another. In other words, malingering was not something Australians thought about doing, or accused other people of doing, because it went against Australian culture. Britain’s more structured class system did not preclude a strong sense of national identity and cohesion to develop there; however, in a time of total war, a society with a more rigidly defined class system is susceptible to heightened tension amongst the classes. This is especially the case when the middle and upper classes are criticizing the lower class for not carrying their own weight—on the domestic front nor on the fighting front. Britain’s more rigid class system also made Britain much less democratic than Australia, as evidenced by the smaller electorate—proportionally speaking—and the fact conscription was decided in Parliament and not by referendums in Britain.

If Britain’s lack of mateship and its lesser democracy contributed to Britain not having the kind of discursive struggle Australia had over the issue of conscription so too did Britain’s proximity to the battlefields. In Australia, fears about invasion were assuaged following the capture of Germany’s Pacific colonies in 1914. This is one of the main reasons why the argument that Lincolnian conscription was a defensive measure had extra valence in Australia. Britain did not have such a luxury. Zeppelin raids, the sound of artillery from the Western Front,

unrestricted submarine warfare, the constant presence of soldiers—those injured and those on leave—and many more aspects of the First World War constantly reminded Britons how close the war was to them. The immediacy of the First World War for Britons undoubtedly contributed to British discourse on conscription not being as contentious as in Australia.

A final explanation of why Britain did not experience the same kind of discursive struggle as Australia over conscription has to do with the different position of labor in Britain compared to Australia. In Britain, any possible protest by the labor movement was forestalled by the government giving labor a great deal of say about war work on the domestic front. In Australia, Hughes' obstinance to offering any type of compromise over war production work intensified labor's hostility to him and his government's plans for Australia's manpower. Hughes' behavior, coupled with Australia's remoteness from the theater of war, meant that Hughes, a Labour politician until 1916, had a harder time of it with the Australian Labour Party than did David Lloyd George, the Liberal, with the British Labour Party. Finally, in Australia, H.E. Boote and the *Australian Worker* offered a counterweight to pro-conscriptionist politicians. In Britain, it was largely the work of Lord Northcliffe that swayed politicians into action while in Australia it was Boote's *AW* that countered the pro-conscriptionist politicians.

From this analysis of the *Lincolnia* campaign in Britain and Australia over the issue of conscription it becomes clear that history still mattered in both locations during this most unprecedented of wars. The fact that politicians and press figures in Britain and Australia returned to Lincoln again and again signals that they thought this a worthy weapon in their struggle either to implement conscription or reject it. Additionally, what emerges here is that just because an argument won out in Britain did not mean that it would win out in a Dominion, like Australia. To say *Lincolnia*'s lack of success in Australia compared to Britain illustrates a

growing gulf between metropole and dominion is a slight stretch; however, the fact that conscription did not get implemented in Australia during a life and death struggle for the British Empire does indicate that something was going on with this relationship during the First World War.

4. RUMORS OF PEACE AND PEACE NOTES

British historian D.C. Watt argued that when one examines how British statesmen, advisors, and newspapermen contemplated and debated a settlement to end the First World War “it becomes almost impossible to avoid recognizing the role played by arguments based on lessons from the past.”¹ Watt’s accurate observation of the influential role history played in shaping discussions about peace is largely rooted in the advisory role British historians played amongst the British delegation at Versailles. While the focus on the historians who went to Versailles is an important one, and a few historians have seconded this, it largely obscures the important role history played in public discussions about peace during the conflict itself.²

During the first two years of the war, the war aims of the British Empire remained pretty much unchanged: the restoration of Belgium and the destruction of German–Prussian—militarism.³ In 1916, Britain and its Allies were still a long way from realizing these aims. Of course, this does not mean that hopes for peace were not on the minds, lips, and pens of at least some within Britain and the Dominions from 1914 until David Lloyd George replaced Asquith as prime minister on 7 December 1916.⁴ From that point until March 1918, nine different “peace openings” materialized, but the first two from Germany and the United States in December 1916, with Wilson’s subsequent “peace without victory” speech in January 1917, generated the greatest

¹ D.C. Watt, “Every War Must End: War-Time Planning for Post-war Security, in Britain and America in the Wars of 1914-1918 and 1939-1945. The Roles of Historical Examples and of Professional Historians,” *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 28 (1978): 166.

² Catherine Ann Cline, “British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles,” *Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies* 20, no. 1 (Spring 1988): 43-58; Erik Goldstein, “Historians Outside the Academy: G.W. Prothero and the Experience of the Foreign Office Historical Section, 1917-1920,” *Historical Research* 63, no. 151 (June 1990): 195 – 211; Tomás Irish, “Scholarly Identities in War and Peace: The Paris Peace Conference and the Mobilization of Intellect,” *Journal of Global History* 11, no. 3 (2016): 365–386.

³ V.H. Rothwell, *British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy, 1914-1918* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 3; M.L. Sanders and Philip Taylor, *British Propaganda during the First World War, 1914-1918* (London: Macmillan Press, 1982), 137-8.

⁴ Some examples of this are: G. Lowes Dickinson, “The War and the Way Out,” *Atlantic Monthly Magazine*, 1914; Clive Bell, *Peace at Once* (Manchester: The National Labour Press, 1915).

commentary from advocates of both mainstream and alternative historical discourse.

Additionally, at this time New Zealand's prime minister, William Massey, as well as its deputy prime minister, Joseph Ward, happened to be in Britain for a stay of several months.

Like their colleague across the Tasman Sea, Billy Hughes, who—recall—was present during Britain's conscription debates, Massey and Ward would encounter firsthand the ways in which advocates of mainstream and alternative historical discourses utilized the past to discuss the issue of peace. With the prime minister in Britain, the press back in New Zealand gave more coverage to developments in the metropole. One of those developments was the peace proposals made by Germany and the United States in December 1916 and Wilson's "peace without victory" speech of January 1917. While the *New Zealand Truth* may have claimed that "in isolated New Zealand, it is regarded as being akin to a crime to ... give utterance to a thought of peace," advocates of mainstream and alternative historical discourse did discuss why the German and American peace proposals were insufficient at this point in the war.⁵ Most of this discussion centered on the fact that Prussianism had not yet been defeated in war; therefore, peace was not possible. Where the mainstream and alternative press differed was on whether Prussianism was just a German problem—as Mainstreamers asserted—or a British one too—as asserted by Alternatives. Considering these factors, this chapter takes the German and American notes of December 1916 along with Wilson's "peace without victory" speech of January 1917 as its organizing theme and compares historical framing by the press in Britain and New Zealand.

Before discussing the ways in which advocates of mainstream and alternative historical discourses in Britain and New Zealand responded to the arrival of the German and American

⁵ "Peace Intrigues: Why Was Asquith Set Aside?," *New Zealand Truth*, 16 December 1916, 1.

notes as well as Wilson's "peace without victory" speech, it is important to give the context in which those notes and the president's speech materialized. December 1916 was a very busy time in both Britain and New Zealand. In Britain, Asquith's coalition government folded at the start of December. There were many reasons why this occurred but the most crucial was the belief that Asquith was just not cut out to lead the country during wartime. In the months preceding Asquith's departure, mainstream society, especially the Northcliffe press, increasingly called for Asquith to be replaced by the Secretary of State for War, David Lloyd George. Lloyd George's earlier success as Minister of Munitions and his strident advocacy of conscription throughout 1915 and 1916 caused commentators in Britain and the Dominions to see him as the leader Britain needed in what had become a total war.⁶

New Zealand's prime minister, William Massey, happened to be an eyewitness to Asquith's final downfall, for he had been in Britain since October 1916. Massey, who since August 1915 had presided over his own coalition government, would be the last of the Dominion prime ministers to visit Great Britain during the First World War. His stay would last until April 1917. Massey's arrival in Britain coincided not only with Lloyd George's ascension but also with New Zealand's adoption of conscription. New Zealand's own conscription campaign occurred in the wake of the Gallipoli failure, which resulted in 2,721 New Zealand deaths and 4,752 casualties. Following the Dardanelles disaster, volunteering in New Zealand dropped significantly.⁷ This, coupled with the British government's request for a full division, ultimately

⁶ Advocates of mainstream historical discourse would play an important role in Lloyd George becoming Britain's prime minister through their depiction of Lloyd George as a modern-day William Pitt the Younger and Abraham Lincoln. See: "Divided Forces," *The Times*, 29 April 1915, 9; "Men and the Hour," *Observer*, 4 July 1915, 10; "Ministers and Real responsibility," *Observer* 19 September 1915, 8; "Mr. Pitt Rang His Bell," *Daily Mail*, 14 February 1916, 4; "The 23 Scandal: How Much Longer," *Daily Mail*, 29 April 1916; "Change of Ministers," *The Times*, 7 December 1916; "The Man," *Observer*, 10 December 1916, 8.

⁷ Richard G.H. Kay, "In Pursuit of Victory: British-New Zealand Relations during the First World War" (PhD diss., University of Otago, Dunedin, NZ, October 2001), 112.

resulted in New Zealand adopting conscription in August 1916. Its implementation began in November 1916, one month into Massey's ten-month absence from New Zealand. New Zealand's upping of its commitment to the war effort came at a time when New Zealanders were growing increasingly dissatisfied with the way Britain, especially the military, was fighting this war.

David Lloyd George, who would ask more of the Dominions than Asquith had, recognized that New Zealand wanted more of a say in the decision-making process as to how the war was to be fought. In his inaugural address to the House of Commons on 19 December 1916, Lloyd George recognized the concerns of New Zealand, and the other Dominions, by announcing the formation of an imperial war conference. The inclusion of New Zealand and the other Dominions in the Imperial War Conference and then subsequently the Imperial War Cabinet elevated the position of these territories to a level approaching that of Britain itself.⁸ New Zealand's elevation to almost an equal status with Britain coupled with the presence of Massey and Ward in Britain had a tremendous impact on New Zealand's commentary on developments and debates unfolding back in Britain.

4.1 Germany's Peace Note

The biggest development, at least initially, took place on 12 December 1916, when Germany published a supposed peace note that aroused a tremendous amount of commentary in Britain and the Dominions. For British Mainstreamers this document was anything but a peace note because it contained "no more than a conglomeration of commonplaces and non-committal phrases."⁹ Germany's failure to state its own peace terms in the note confirmed mainstream

⁸ Ibid., 148.

⁹ W.B. Fest, "British War Aims and German Peace Feelers during the First World War: December 1916-November 1918," *The Historical Journal* 15, no. 2 (June 1972): 289; Esther Caukin Brunauer, "The Peace Proposals of December, 1916-1917," *The Journal of Modern History* 4, no. 4 (December 1932): 565.

Britain's suspicion and distrust of this German action. According to Mainstreamers, Germany's true purpose with its note was threefold. First, Germany hoped to make Britain look bad in neutral countries. Such a hope rested on the possibility that Britain would respond so harshly to the note that neutral opinion would perceive Britain as being the nation prolonging the war. Secondly, Mainstreamers argued Germany sought to divide members of the Entente through separate peace deals. Here the feeling was that Germany endeavored to cause rupture in the Allied camp by offering a deal sweet enough for a country like France—say the evacuation of its territory and the possible restoration of Alsace-Lorraine—that it pulled out of the war. Finally, the mainstream in Britain and New Zealand depicted the German note as an attempt to divide Britain, and hence the Dominions, on the home front by giving peace groups a tool to amplify their messages.

These perceptions of the German note emphasized to mainstream Britain the need to demonstrate to neutrals, allies, and the home front why a negotiated peace with Germany was impossible at this point in the war.¹⁰ One of the ways advocates of mainstream history portrayed Germany's note as insincere was by employing the "popular interpretation of German history, which argued essentially that Germany had a disreputable past," therefore it could not be trusted now.¹¹ As Chapter 2 demonstrated, advocates of mainstream history established this negative interpretation of German history almost as soon as the first German marched into Belgium. At the start of the conflict, and really throughout the entirety of it, references to Frederick the Great and Otto von Bismarck illustrated how Germany's supposed inheritance of Prussian values and policies caused her to violate Belgian neutrality in August 1914. Likewise, advocates of

¹⁰ M.L. Sanders and Philip Taylor, *British Propaganda during the First World War, 1914-1918* (London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1982), 140.

¹¹ Sterling Kernek, "Distractions of Peace during War: The Lloyd George Government's Reactions to Woodrow Wilson, December 1916-November 1918," *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* 65, no. 2 (1975): 8.

mainstream history evoked their selective memories of Frederick and Bismarck to connect Germany's current "peace" maneuver with policies pursued by these two men during their time in power. In this way, advocates of mainstream history attempted to convince Britons that Germany's disreputable past in foreign relations made a negotiated peace with contemporary Germany impossible.

Mainstreamers started to dismiss Germany's note, on the basis of historical references, as soon as it officially arrived in Britain. On 13 December 1916, the German proposal was made known to the British public and in his usual swift manner Lord Northcliffe responded to it in a variety of ways. One was through an evocation of the past, which he did when he described Kaiser Wilhelm II's offer as the "same old hoax" used by Bismarck during the Franco-Prussian War. In an article entitled, "Hun Impudence: The 'Peace Trick' Again," Northcliffe's *Daily Mail* came back to the Franco-Prussian War to explain that during Bismarck's last conflict the Iron Chancellor "spread 'peace talk' whenever he thought he would gain advantage by it." According to Northcliffe's newspaper, Bismarck's strategy "divided and distracted" his opponents to the point that those "unhappy dupes" lessened their war effort hoping that in doing so they would "obtain 'munificent' terms." While Bismarck kept his enemies distracted with peace talk, the German military pressed on with its "operations with all possible energy." Unlike those "unhappy dupes" on the losing side of the Franco-Prussian War, Britain, the Dominions, and their allies would not "be caught by this white-whiskered device." Therefore, Britain could not contemplate peace negotiations with Germany until Prussianism was "completely an

decisively beaten.” Until such a time, any peace with the Kaiser’s Germany would be no “more than a truce, which she would violate the first moment it served her purpose.”¹²

The *Daily Mail*’s historical paralleling of Bismarck’s feigned peace effort with the contemporary one of Kaiser Wilhelm II illustrated for its readers how Germany’s current move, like the one of the late nineteenth century, endeavored to sow discord between Britain and its Allies while Germany furthered its military objectives. By the time Germany sent its note to Britain in December 1916, German success on the Western Front was largely limited to stopping attempted Allied advances. The just recently concluded Battle of the Somme demonstrated the type of “gains”—remaining in French territory—Germany had made on the Western Front. The Eastern Front, however, was another story. The arrival of Germany’s note coincided with Germany and its allies wrapping up their defeat of the Romanian army. As a result of Romania’s defeat, Germany acquired what would amount to a million tons of oil from Romania’s Ploesti oilfields. Additionally, Germany took possession of two million tons of grain with Romania’s collapse.¹³ Suffice it to say then, the Central Powers’ defeat of Romania buttressed Germany’s position at the end of 1916. From the additional resources Germany would more than likely use on the Western Front to the food they could feed their population, which was starving due to the successful British blockade, the situation looked favorable to Germany. Thus, from the perspective of Northcliffe’s *Daily Mail*, Britain and its allies must not make the situation even more favorable to Germany by being distracted by bogus peace notes. In short Britain and its allies, unlike the French in 1871, would not be duped into losing this war.

¹² “Hun Impudence: The ‘Peace Trick’ Again,” *Daily Mail*, 13 December 1916, 4.

¹³ John Keegan, *The First World War* (New York: Vintage Books, 2000), 308.

Lord Northcliffe's evocation of Bismarck appeared to strike a chord in Britain. Shortly after the publication of the *Daily Mail's* article several other advocates of mainstream historical discourse employed their own references to German history to rebuff Germany's peace offer. Probably the best evidence for this emerged on 19 December 1916, when David Lloyd George dismissed the German government's note during his first speech as British prime minister. It should be borne in mind that, even before becoming prime minister, David Lloyd George had made news on the issue of peace. In September 1916, Lloyd George, who was then Secretary of War, explained in an interview with an American journalist that his government would consider any peace moves on the part of a neutral country—obviously, the United States in this case—as a “pro-German move.” To make Britain's position unequivocally clear, Lloyd George stressed Great Britain would only make peace with Germany once his country dealt a “knockout blow” to Prussian militarism.

On the eve of Germany's peace note arriving in London, the *Marlborough Express* in New Zealand returned to Lloyd George's “knockout blow” comment from three months earlier to explain that “since the war began there is not a British statesman since the days of Pitt who has been more singly successful in imbuing the British public mind with confidence in his stalwart patriotism.”¹⁴ The *Marlborough Express's* invocation of William Pitt, who as two-time serving prime minister during the Napoleonic Wars was a constant thorn in Napoleon's side, anticipated what was to come from advocates of mainstream historical discourse. In the days following the arrival of Germany's peace note, Mainstreamers expressed their hopes that Lloyd George would continue to behave like Pitt and flatly reject Germany's offer.

¹⁴ “Lloyd George and the War,” *Marlborough Express*, 11 December 1916, 4.

In the House of Commons, Lloyd George returned to the well-worn narrative about the Prussianization of Germany by explaining that ever since Germany fell into the hands of the Prussian military caste “she has been a bad neighbour ... shifting boundaries at her will, taking one fair field after another from weaker neighbours.” With portions of Belgium, France, and now Romania under German control it appeared as though Kaiser Wilhelm II’s Germany was primed to add more territory as Frederick and Bismarck had done back in their days. Lloyd George’s reiteration of this familiar narrative within British discourse during the First World War highlighted for both his immediate Commons audience and broader empire audience that there was “no peace where she—Germany—dwelt.”¹⁵ Thus, negotiating at this point in the war was not possible because it would result in a capitulation to Prussianism. For Mainstreamers, like Lloyd George, the only possibility of peace rested with the destruction of the system—Prussianism—that encouraged and perpetuated these usurpations.

Other Mainstreamers soon followed the lead of Northcliffe and Lloyd George by making their own references to German history to explain why Germany could not be trusted in any negotiations. On New Year’s Day 1917, both the *Scotsman* and *Daily Express* depicted the German note from a month earlier as consistent with German policy from the beginning of the war. According to the *Scotsman*, Kaiser Wilhelm II “has been following the familiar precepts of his idol, Frederick the Great, and has persistently sought to sow discord among his enemies.”¹⁶ The *Daily Express* echoed this sentiment when it asserted that Britain was face to face with “the heritage of Frederick.” Consequently, Britain and her allies “cannot recognise the professions of faith and sincerity of the present upholders of Prussian dynastic militarism.” Once again the

¹⁵ “Mr. Lloyd George’s Speech,” *The Times*, 20 December 1916, 10.

¹⁶ *Scotsman*, 1 Jan. 1917, 4.

message from the mainstream was clear: “The heritage of Frederick the Great and Bismarck must be removed from Europe.”¹⁷ Until such removal, any talk of peace with Germany was not only futile but also potentially catastrophic for Britain’s war effort.

The *Dominion* in New Zealand followed the New Year’s lead of the *Scotsman* and *Daily Express* in utilizing Bismarckian discourse to highlight the dangers of any peace with Germany at this point in the war. After reminding readers of Germany’s invasion of Belgium in August 1914, the *Dominion* asked how any agreement could be made “with a Government which accepts and acts upon Bismarck’s dictum that ‘no people should sacrifice its existence on the altar of fidelity to treaty, but should only go so far as suited its own interests’?” From the perspective of the *Dominion*, and the broader mainstream perspective which it was part of, Germany’s treatment of the 1839 Treaty of London as “a mere scrap of paper” evidenced how Bismarck’s thinking had triumphed in August 1914. As the Schlieffen Plan demonstrated, the treaty respecting Belgian sovereignty and neutrality had become a hinderance to Germany’s progress in August 1914. According to Bismarckian thinking, therefore, Germany was justified in no longer respecting such a treaty. The problem for Britain, the Dominions, and the Allies in 1916 centered on the fact that at this point in the war this type of thinking had not been overthrown in Germany. Thus, until such a time came Britain could not enter good faith negotiations with Germany for the simple reason that “No treaty can bind a nation which regards fidelity to treaty as stupidity.”¹⁸

Advocates of mainstream historical discourse in Britain utilized not only German history to delegitimize Germany’s note of December 1916, for they also delegitimized it by referring to

¹⁷ “A Hohenzollern Heritage,” *Daily Express*, 1 January 1917, 4.

¹⁸ “Guarantees for the Future,” *The Dominion*, 13 January 1917, 8.

the “peace offers” Napoleon made to Britain in 1799 and 1802. As we saw in Chapter 2, at the beginning of the First World War, Mainstreamers evoked Napoleon to highlight the ambitions of Kaiser Wilhelm II. In December 1916, they returned to Britain’s last major enemy to illustrate how Germany’s peace note was “a leaf snatched by clumsy hands from Napoleon’s book.”¹⁹ The first page of that book appeared on Christmas Day 1799, for this was the occasion in which Napoleon made his first proposal of peace to Britain, which was led by William Pitt at the time. According to the *Daily Express*, Pitt “refused to be deluded by Napoleon’s specious protestations of peace and place faith in any of his assurances or recognise his guarantees.”²⁰ Thus, Britain rejected the first of Napoleon’s peace advances. The story was different on 25 March 1802 when Britain, now governed by Henry Addington, described as “a driveling, weak statesman of no great ability and less prescience,” succumbed to “the trap that was dug for her” by accepting Napoleon’s second peace offer. Napoleon’s second peace move culminated in the Treaty of Amiens, which “lasted only enough for Napoleon to prepare for another campaign.” Mainstreamers utilized this fact of Amiens to make an analogy with Britain’s contemporary situation by explaining that “the peace which Germany has in mind is just such a peace as that of Amiens.”²¹ In an article entitled, “The Kaiser Steals Napoleon’s Peace Bluff,” the *Daily Express* elaborated on how the lessons of the Treaty of Amiens provided guidance for how Britain should respond to Germany’s note when it stated:

The negotiated peace with Napoleon proved a failure. A negotiated peace with Germany today would only suspend strife for a year or two. Let us profit from the experience of our forefathers. Let us emulate their doughty resistance to Napoleon. Those same causes which made a peace with Napoleon only a temporary peace are before us today. Germany will never relinquish those insidious and aggressive designs which kept Europe in a state of ferment for over

¹⁹ “Peace or Blackmail,” *Daily Mail*, 16 December 1916, 4.

²⁰ “The Kaiser Steals Napoleon’s Peace Bluff,” *Daily Express*, 14 December 1916, 4.

²¹ “Hun Impudence: The ‘Peace Trick’ Again,” *Daily Mail*, 13 December 1916, 4.

half a century, and which have cost Europe limb, life, and money something beyond all comparison with anything in the past until she has learnt those lessons which we taught Napoleon.²²

While recognizing the unprecedented death and destruction caused by the First World War, advocates of mainstream historical discourse turned to Britain's last major war to explain that all of it would be for naught if Britain fell into Germany's peace trap. Thus, in the face of Germany's note, Britain's contemporary leadership needed to find inspiration and "extract much wisdom" from their "doughty forefathers," like Pitt but not Addington, and make it clear that no discussions of peace could be had until Prussianism had been fully eradicated.

To really drive the message home that David Lloyd George needed to respond in a Pitt-like manner, Mainstreamers utilized William Pitt's own statements regarding Napoleon's peace overture. Once again, Northcliffe's *Daily Mail* set the example of how this should be done. Accordingly, the *Daily Mail* printed Pitt's own reasoning for why peace was not possible with Napoleon by printing the following words: "I see no possibility at this moment of concluding such a peace as would justify that liberal intercourse which is the essence of real amity." A day later the *Daily Express* utilized another reason voiced by Pitt to explain why amity and peace could not exist with Napoleon. In calling for "perseverance in the war," Pitt explained that "Peace with a nation by whom war was made against all order, religion and morality" would only be a temporary peace which would allow Napoleon to restrengthen his forces. "As a lover of peace," Pitt declared that he would "not sacrifice it by grasping at the shadow when the reality is not substantially within reach." Thus, Pitt refused peace with Napoleon in 1799 because at the time in the conflict peace "is deceptive ... it is perilous, because it cannot exist." Through Pitt's words, the *Daily Mail* and the *Daily Express* gave voice to the widely held mainstream belief

²² "The Kaiser Steals Napoleon's Peace Bluff," *Daily Express*, 4.

that any peace with Germany at this point in the war would be just as perilous as it was during Britain's titanic struggle with Napoleonic France.

Lloyd George appeared to give the mainstream press another indication that he had heard what they—and Pitt—had said during a speech in the House of Commons. As demonstrated above, one of the ways Lloyd George dismissed Germany's note was by appealing to the same German—Prussian history so readily referred to by the press. In addition to utilizing German history in his speech, Lloyd George also spoke in the voice of Pitt when noting that “There has been some talk about proposals of peace ... but there are none.” If Britain entered negotiations with Germany “without any knowledge of the proposal she makes” it would be putting its “head into a noose with the rope end in the hand of Germany.” In his Pitt-like manner, Lloyd George made it clear to Germany, as well as to peace advocates in Britain, that his government “would not negotiate without hearing Germany's terms” given the widespread belief that “Germany was dangerous and not to be trusted.”²³ Through Lloyd George's depiction of peace talks with Germany being just as deceptive, just as perilous, and just as impossible as they had been a century earlier with Napoleonic France the new prime minister made it clear he still wanted to deliver a “knockout blow” to Prussianism.

The resemblance of Lloyd George's response to Pitt's probably was best reflected in an illustration in the *Bystander*, which showed the British prime minister dismissing any kind of peace with the “Mantle of Pitt” in his lap (figure 5.1). In a train compartment, Lloyd George sits between Bellona—the Roman goddess of war—on his right and Pax—the Roman goddess of peace—on his left. The prime minister's finding Bellona, who has snakes coming out of her

²³ Sterling Kernek, “The British Government's Reactions to President Wilson's 'Peace' Note of December 1916,” *The Historical Journal* 13, No. 4 (Dec. 1970): 734.

helmet and shell shock on her face, “less repulsive” than Pax stems from what is located directly above the latter’s head in the storage compartment: Belgium, Serbia, most of Romania, part of France, and Poland; that is, territory which Germany occupied at the time of its peace note. In other words, the significant amount of territory Germany held at the end of 1916 put it in a better negotiating place than Britain. Additionally, if Germany was allowed to keep any of this territory then Prussian militarism would have been vindicated. Such a vindication, from the British perspective, would only produce more war because it would embolden Prussian militarists to take more aggressive actions in the future.

Ironically, another reason why Bellona was seen as the lesser of two evils came from the belief that Britain had not yet fully militarized itself. By the end of 1916, the British finally started believing “that they were just reaching their stride militarily” thanks in large part to the new prime minister’s commitment to fighting a total war against Germany.²⁴ The “High Explosives” and two physical shells above Bellona’s head signaled that Lloyd George would ramp up military production at home to unprecedented levels. Directly above Lloyd George’s head, the “Good Wishes of the Empire” indicated the new prime minister would ask for more sacrifices and commitments from the Dominions than Asquith had during the first two years of the First World War. Lloyd George’s embracing the “Mantle of Pitt” provided the British and the Dominions the time to see if a fuller effort on their parts could turn the war in their favor.

²⁴ Kernek, “The British Government's Reactions to President Wilson's 'Peace' Note of December 1916,” 725.

a little confounding considering the latter two men were quintessential sovereigns. Clearly, Lincoln was not a sovereign in this sense. Rather, Lincoln was seen as a “sovereign ruler” because of his single-minded determination to see his goals—the restoration of the Union and the abolition of slavery—come to fruition before the Civil War could come to an end. To achieve these goals, Lincoln further demonstrated his sovereign-like style by controversially suspending habeas corpus and implementing conscription. Of course, Lloyd George was also not a sovereign in the sense of Frederick or Napoleon. From the perspective of the *NZ Times*, however, the British prime minister’s refusal to entertain Germany’s peace note was Lincoln-like because it was firm and unequivocal. Thus, according to the *NZ Times*, Lloyd George’s speech “will live in history as the proclamation of a man of genius and a masterful leader of men, determined, powerful, clear-sighted, and inspiring.”²⁵

While Mainstreamers, and probably most Britons, shared the same sentiment as their prime minister, it must be recalled that the situation facing Britain, the Dominions, and their allies was in no way superior to that of the Germans at the end of 1916. The situation had the potential to get even more complicated shortly after Lloyd George articulated the mainstream line, for just days after German sent its supposed peace, American president, Woodrow Wilson, sent his own to both belligerent sides. Such a possible complication need not have surprised British officials, though, for they had known for some time Wilson’s desire to mediate a peace between the Entente and Central Powers. What did surprise the mainstream in Britain was that Wilson in his official note declared “that the objectives of both sides were virtually the same’.”²⁶ While American statesmen would clarify that Wilson did not believe Britain and its Allies fought

²⁵ “Progress of the War,” *NZ Times*, 21 December 1916, 4.

²⁶ W. B. Fest, “British War Aims and German Peace Feelers during the First World War (December 1916–November 1918),” *The Historical Journal* 15, no. 2 (June 1972): 290.

for the same thing as Germany did, there was by the end of 1916 a diminution of “American sympathies for Britain”, due to its Irish policy, specifically how it had responded to the Easter Rebellion.²⁷ The executions in May 1916 of the Rebellion’s leaders caused many in Ireland, Britain, the Dominions, and the United States to question Britain’s commitment to “small nations” and to end militarism.

As highlighted in Chapter Two, Alternatives had turned the mainstream narrative of Britain’s tradition of helping small nations on its head by highlighting the wrongs Britain had committed in Ireland over the centuries. Now, in the context of the First World War, Britain further complicated the “small nations” narrative by brutally suppressing Irish demands for self-determination. This display of Britain’s “Prussianism” more than likely caused some, including Wilson, to question whether Britain’s cause was all that different from Germany’s.²⁸

Immediately after the executions, Harry Holland, whose *Maoriland Worker* had been questioning Britain’s commitment to small nations since the beginning of the war, began publishing his months-long series on the “Historic Foundations of the Irish Rebellion.” Throughout this year-long series—the last publication was on 2 May 1917—in the *Worker*, Holland championed the Irish cause and cursed British imperialism. In the first article on the Easter Rebellion’s genealogy, Holland established the tone that he would maintain throughout the whole series. “Through long centuries the bloody sweat of Ireland’s national crucifixion has rained from her collective brow. The foundation of her agonies laid deep in the years that stretch backward to the darkness.”²⁹

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 291.

²⁸ Austen Harrison, “Towards a New Europe,” *English Review* (November 1918), 456.

²⁹ H.E. Holland, “Historic Foundations of the Irish Rebellion,” *Maoriland Worker*, 24 May 1916, 4.

In the process of tracing the Easter Rebellion's historical foundations across the centuries, the *Worker* referred to the last major attempt by the Irish to break from the British yoke in 1798. Coincidentally, this earlier attempt to obtain freedom also occurred during a time of war: the French Revolutionary Wars, which saw England ally "with the Prussian and Austrian monarchies for the crushing of the newly-risen French republic."³⁰ Even more of a coincidence, this earlier rebellion in Ireland took place when William Pitt—"that contriver of the Irish Parliament's destruction"—was the prime minister of Great Britain.³¹ After Pitt the Younger "shattered the Rebellion with fire, sword, gallows and prison," he presided over the 1800 Acts of Union, which abolished the Irish legislature and brought Ireland into the United Kingdom.³² Thus, while the mainstream turned to William Pitt for the purpose of dismissing Germany's peace proposal, Alternatives utilized Pitt's treatment of Ireland after the failed rebellion of 1798 to highlight how the roots of the "Irish Question" stemmed from Britain's refusal to grant Ireland its long sought after independence. According to J.R. Green, who was quoted by Holland, Britain's suppression of the 1798 rebellion and the subsequent Acts of Union "burned into the Irish heart the belief that the British Government was their implacable enemy, that the law was their oppressor, and Englishmen the haters of their race."³³

In the minds of Britons, Australians, Canadians, and New Zealanders, Prussianism equaled militarism. From the mainstream's perspective it was Prussianism that produced the First World War. The question remained: now that one found oneself in a war with militarism, should not one become militaristic oneself? In other words, to defeat Prussianism, one had to become Prussian oneself. The problem: militarism, from Alternatives' perspective, was not

³⁰ Holland, "Historic Foundations of the Irish rebellion," *Maoriland Worker*, 23 August 1916, 2.

³¹ "Irish Insurgents and Irish Ideals," *NZ Truth*, 26 August 1916, 10.

³² Holland, "Historic Foundation of the Irish Rebellion," *Maoriland Worker*, 30 August 1916, 2.

³³ Holland, "Historic Foundations of the Irish rebellion," *Maoriland Worker*, 23 August 1916, 2.

something easily discarded once embraced. Militarism might serve a people well in war; however, there was no guarantee such behavior would cease once peace returned. For many, conscription marked their first direct experience with Prussianism. For others—conscriptors and Mainstreamers in general—Prussianism was, according to Alternatives, their essence.

It was one thing for a smallish group of individuals to be Prussians. As Chapter 2 demonstrated, Alternatives believed British Prussians had done their own damage during the prewar years due to their suppression of self-governing demands amongst their colonial populations, especially the Irish. It was another thing for a nation to be Prussian. As the *New Zealand Truth* argued: “unfortunately history proves that once Militarism ... grips a nation, reduces it to a mere machine, that nation forfeits freedom.”³⁴ Germany demonstrated this in August 1914. From the perspective of Alternatives, it appeared as though militarism could take over a body politic quite quickly, for Britain’s harsh response to the Easter Rebellion occurred just a couple of months after the British Parliament passed the first conscription bill in January 1916. The fact that the last of the Easter Rebellion executions occurred during the same month Parliament amended the original Military Service Act now to include married men seemed to indicate that Britain’s full embrace of Prussianism was now bearing its ugly fruit. According to the *NZ Truth*, Prussianism produced “the infliction of Draconic punishments upon men belonging to a people who have fought for us in this dreadful war with bravery, loyalty, and heroism that are the envy and wonder of the Empire’s enemies.”³⁵ From the *Maoriland Worker’s* perspective, Britain’s actions in Ireland were “an undying monument to the sort of

³⁴ “Conscription,” *NZ Truth*, 3 June 1916, 4.

³⁵ “The Making of Martyrs: Rebellions and Executions in Ireland,” *NZ Truth*, 3 June 1916, 1.

atrocities that some crazy people thought were confined to Belgium under the German occupation.”³⁶

From the perspective of New Zealand Alternatives, the Prussian spirit that had taken over the metropole now threatened a full takeover of New Zealand. Shortly after the final executions in Ireland, pro-conscriptionists in New Zealand introduced to Parliament a bill “for the final Prussianising of New Zealand” —the Military Service Act, which would conscript all men between the ages of 20 to 45 years old.³⁷ From the days following the introduction of the Military Service Act to its passage on 1 August 1916, Harry Holland’s *Worker* placed several cartoons depicting conscription as Prussianism side-by-side with the articles on the “Historical Foundations of the Irish Rebellion.” It is no coincidence these cartoons and articles appeared next to each other for they revealed that Britain’s past and present Prussian behavior was about to be imposed on New Zealanders.

Probably the best example of the *Worker* connecting Britain’s enactment of conscription with Britain’s previous Prussian behavior in Ireland appeared in figure 5.3. In the cartoon, “Prussian Conscription” greedily gobbles up unsuspecting dupes and taunts: “Automatic Conscript, ‘em, Unlimited.” Next to this scene of devourment, Holland’s “Historic Foundations of the Irish Rebellion” discussed the period of “Cromwell in Ireland,” which was one of the most brutal moments in Irish history. Coincidentally, some Mainstreamers referred to Cromwell’s army for the purpose of highlighting that Britain—or at least England—had some precedent with conscription during the conscription debate.³⁸ Cromwell used his New Model Army to invade

³⁶ “Sir Edward Carson,” *Maoriland Worker*, 5 July 1916, 4.

³⁷ “The Bill to Prussianize New Zealand,” *Maoriland Worker*, 31 May 1916, 2.

³⁸ “End It,” *Observer*, 9 January 1916, 10; “Conscription Bill Carried,” *Daily Express*, 7 January 1916, 1; “A Real Heritage: National Traditions Recalled,” *The Times*, 5 January 1916, 7.

Ireland in 1649 to “reassert control over an ongoing Catholic rebellion-turned royalist threat.”

Due to Cromwell’s actions, Ireland suffered “famine, plague, the violence of continued guerrilla war, ethnic cleansing, and deportation; hundreds of thousands died from the war and its aftermath.”³⁹



Figure 4.2: “Automatic Conscript ...” & “Historic Foundations of the Irish Rebellion”

According to Sarah Covington, the depiction of “Cromwell as an embodiment of English violence and perfidy is a relatively recent phenomenon in Irish historical memory.” Cromwell as

³⁹ Sarah Covington, “The Odious Demon from Across the Sea, Oliver Cromwell, Memory and the Dislocations of Ireland,” *Memory before Modernity*, ed. Erika Kuijpers, Judith Pollmann, Johannes Müller, and Jasper van der Steen (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 149.

a villain emerged “as the result of nineteenth-century nationalist movements which constructed traditions or shaped memories around him in order to justify their respective causes.”⁴⁰ During the First World War, Alternatives utilized the Cromwell-as-villain narrative to provide further proof that Britons acting like Prussians was nothing new.

The Cromwell-as-villain narrative made an appearance in the 28 June 1916 edition of the *Worker's* “Historical Foundations of the Irish Rebellion.” As typical for Holland’s series, the *Worker's* editor referred to several historians who specialized on Irish and English history: in the 28 June 1916 article, to three works by Samuel Gardiner, Alexander M. Sullivan, and John Richard Green which constantly appeared throughout the whole series. Gardiner and Green were both English and Sullivan was Irish. In pursuing the Cromwell-as-villain narrative Gardiner was the fiercest of the two Englishmen. Gardiner explained Cromwell’s behavior at Drogheda a caused “a scene, the like of which had seldom been witnessed in the English war. Amidst shrieks and groans and shouts of triumph, pike and sword plied their fiendish work down the sloping streets.”⁴¹ While Cromwell believed such brutality would “procure for him an easy entrance” into other enemy cities, Cromwell’s “butchery steel[ed] the hearts of brave men to defy the worst rather than yield to the perpetrator of the massacre of Drogheda.”⁴² Sullivan, the Irish nationalist, unsurprisingly went further than Gardiner by explaining that the Irish hatred of Cromwell rested with “the butcheries of unarmed and defenceless noncombatants—the ruthless slaughter of women and children—as Drogheda and Wexford witnessed.” Irish hatred of

⁴⁰ Covington, 149-150.

⁴¹ Samuel Rawson Gardiner, *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate, 1649-1660*, vol. 1 (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1894), 133.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 139-140.

Cromwell appeared when he “crushed the people with a ruthlessness that has never been excelled in the whole barbarous annals of war.”⁴³

Sullivan’s language sounded a lot like the language Mainstreamers and Alternatives in Britain and the Dominions used to propagate Germany’s “Rape of Belgium.” Substitute Drogheda and Wexford with Louvain and Liege and the stories about Cromwell in Ireland and the Germans in Belgium sound quite similar. By the time Sullivan’s take on Cromwell appeared in the *Worker*, the Bryce Report had been published for more than a year. Recall, the Bryce Report played an important role in trying to present German atrocities from an objective perspective. And yet, even it concluded with the following statement about German actions in Belgium: “Murder, lust, and pillage prevailed over many parts of Belgium on a scale unparalleled in any war between civilised nations during the last three centuries.”⁴⁴ Incidentally, Cromwell’s invasion of Ireland fell within the three centuries by referred to by the Bryce Report. More than likely, the Irish-born Bryce, who also served as Chief Secretary for Ireland in Campbell-Bannerman’s cabinet from 1905-1906, would have familiarity with the Cromwell-as-villain narrative. While it is unclear whether Bryce believed that narrative or not, it is telling that in his opinion, and that of the mainstream, German actions in Belgium eclipsed Cromwell’s actions in Ireland.

From Alternatives’ perspective, both Cromwell’s invasion of Ireland in 1649 and Germany’s invasion of Belgium in 1914 represented the epitome of Prussianism. So too did Britain’s harsh treatment of Irish rebels and civilians during and after the Easter Rebellion. Again, the fact this happened right after Britain expanded conscription to all men—single and

⁴³ “Historic Foundations of the Irish Rebellion,” *Maoriland Worker*, 28 June 1916, 1.

⁴⁴ James Bryce, *Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages* (London: Macmillan & Company, 1915), 61.

married—indicated another consequence of British Prussianism. With New Zealand following suit with conscription on 1 August 1916, it appeared as though the whole British Empire was on the verge on embracing Prussianistic policies. Consequently, as rumors of peace circulated during the final month of 1916, the *Maoriland Worker* asserted: “Unless the war slays Prussianism, not only in Germany, but everywhere, including the British Empire, there is no hope for peace.”⁴⁵ It would only be a premature peace if just German Prussianism was defeated, for the British Empire would have maintained its pre-war Prussianistic behavior towards Ireland and others. Such maintenance came about largely through the expansion of Prussianism into society through the conscription of men for military service. By the time rumors of peace proposals became to circulate at the end of 1916, the mainstream line in Britain and the Dominions, which emphasized the British Empire’s moral superiority over Germany in the war, had begun to get increasingly blurry.

As Britain’s actions in Ireland before and during the First World War revealed, Britain’s own track record on issues such as democracy, freedom of nations, and self-determination was mixed at best. Mainstreamers returned to Lincolnia to disabuse any persons in Britain, the Dominions, or neutral countries—especially President Wilson in the United States—who increasingly believed Britain and Germany were moral equivalents because of their shared Prussianism. While numerous British actions throughout the Empire demonstrated the incompatibility between imperialism and democracy, Lincoln’s actions during the Civil War demonstrated that maintaining and expanding freedom sometimes required a temporary abandonment of lofty principles. Through this strain of Lincolnia, British Mainstreamers

⁴⁵ “The Primary Condition of Peace,” *Maoriland Worker*, 13 December 1916, 14.

attempted to parry any peace moves and justify Britain's desire for an ultimate victory over German Prussianism.

4.2 Woodrow Wilson's Peace Proposal & "Peace Without Victory" Speech

On 20 December 1916, a peace proposal did appear from the American president. As mentioned earlier, British officials had received word of the president's intentions days before his note arrived. As usual, the Northcliffe press stayed ahead of the curve in both alluding to Wilson's move as well as in using *Lincolnia* to dismiss such a move. As early as 14 December 1916, *The Times* compared the situation Britain faced in 1916 with the situation facing the North in 1864, which was when the Confederacy floated its own peace proposal. *The Times* explained how three years into the conflict Lincoln and many Northerners "felt that all their highest ideals were at stake." Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation of the previous year made the abolition of slavery the highest of ideals in 1864. The incompatible views of freedom versus slavery convinced Lincoln and Northerners that the "fight must go on to the end," and because of this determination went on to achieve "the greatest decision in the history of the New World." For "Old World" Britain, the steadfastness and commitment to victory of Lincoln and the North "is indeed to us a precious example and an inspiring parallel." *The Times* concluded by asserting that "Peace to us now would be what peace would have been to America in 1864."⁴⁶ Just as a peace with the Confederacy in 1864 would have brought about a major defeat to the forces of freedom so too would a peace with Germany in 1916 given the fact that it would result in the enslavement of millions—including those in Britain and the Dominions—to Prussian militarism.

The utilization of *Lincolnia* to emphasize the ideals of Britain and why it must not make peace until the realization of those ideals found its way into the speeches and writings of other

⁴⁶ "The Reception of the 'Peace Proposals'," *The Times*, 14 December 1916, 9.

advocates of mainstream historical discourse in the days following *The Times*' editorial. Once again, David Lloyd George's speech is illustrative. Six days after *The Times* drew its parallels between Britain and the North, the new prime minister referred to words directly spoken by Lincoln to the South in 1864. "We accepted this war for an object, a worthy object, and the war will end when that object is attained. Under God, I hope it will never end until that time."⁴⁷

Responding to Lloyd George's *Lincolnia*, the *Auckland Star* exclaimed: "We are glad to find him quoting Lincoln, whose task was so like that of the Allies." Following the prime minister's example, the Auckland newspaper offered up its own *Lincolnia* when it referred to how Lincoln responded to "strong arguments for peace" after a "long list of Southern victories." In the face of those strong arguments for peace, Lincoln asserted: "any man, or set of men, who from a sense of weariness or despair abandoned the struggle without achieving the high purpose for which we entered into it" would be committing a crime of infamy.⁴⁸

One day after the British government received Wilson's note, the *Auckland Star* reported that the "English newspaper comment that we publish today shows how deeply the tone of President Wilson's peace Note is resented at Home (sic)." Clearly, home was the metropole. Nevertheless, home could have just as easily been the Northcliffe press. One day after the *Daily Mail* utilized *Lincolnia* in its article, "The Answer Has Been Given," the *Auckland Star* reported on "an English paper"—undoubtedly the *Daily Mail*—which did "well to ask Americans how they would have received intervention or mediation when things were going badly with the North in the Civil War." After drawing parallels between Lincoln's cause in the Civil War and

⁴⁷ "A National War Programme," *The Times*, 20 December 1916, 9. Lloyd George's first speech as prime minister was not the first time he used Lincoln's words to discuss when the war would end. On 8 May 1915, Lloyd George, who was Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time, quoted Lincoln at an annual dinner for the Newspaper Press Fund to answer the question: "How long will the war last?" See "Lloyd George to the Press," *New York Times*, 9 May 1915.

⁴⁸ "The Insult," *Auckland Star*, 21 December 1916, 4.

that of the British Empire in the First World War, the *Auckland Star* asked: “who should be better aware” of these similarities “than the President of the United States?” Yet, “by a strange irony of history a successor of Lincoln” refused to see such similarities as evidenced by his claim that Britain and Germany essentially fought for the same thing.⁴⁹

Leaving aside the fact that when the Civil War began the sole objective was the reunification of the nation, and not the “high purpose” of slavery’s abolition, Mainstreamers reminded Wilson, the United States, and their fellow Britons at home and in the dominions that from the start of the war Britain’s worthy objects were the destruction of Prussian militarism and the defense of smaller nations. The *Daily Mail* offered a reminder to its readers of the similarities between Britain in the First World War and the North during the Civil War. “As the North fought in the American Civil War to preserve the cause of freedom ... so the Allies today are fighting to save the freedom of Europe and of the world.”⁵⁰ In the New Year of 1917, the *Scotsman* echoed this sentiment by explaining that Britain was “as resolute to abolish militarism and establish peace as were the Northern States under Abraham Lincoln to abolish slavery and reestablish the Union.”⁵¹

Advocates of mainstream history believed that one of the ways Britain should respond to Wilson’s note was by placing themselves in the position of Lincoln when he “was approached with offers of mediation during the Civil War, quoting him freely and at length.” This was something the *Daily Mail* did when it referred to a moment in 1862 when Lincoln “stamped upon mediation” through communications with Charles Francis Adams, who was the United States’ Envoy to the United Kingdom at the time. Lincoln “stamped upon mediation” when he informed

⁴⁹ “The Insult,” *Auckland Star*, 23 December 1916, 4.

⁵⁰ “The Answer Has Been Given,” *Daily Mail*, 22 December 1916, 4.

⁵¹ “Security,” *Scotsman*, 7 January 1917, 6.

Adams that should representatives of the British Government present appeals that “seem to imply a purpose to dictate or to mediate, or to advise” Lincoln on issues of peace “*you will answer that you are forbidden to debate, to hear, or in any way receive, entertain, or transmit any communication of the kind.*” While expecting Britain to produce “a more polite response” to the United States, the *Daily Mail* stood confident that Britain would not be “one whit less emphatic or determinedly meant” as Lincoln in 1862.⁵² By responding to Wilson’s note through Lincoln’s own words, Mainstreamers sought to make it clear that Britain would not let its “own right arms be hindered until, like Lincoln, and the Northern States, they finished the work they were in.”⁵³

The same day that the *Daily Mail* quoted Lincoln’s words verbatim, the *Auckland Star* republished a section from “one of the most inspired war poems ever written”: the Battle Hymn of the Republic. According to the *Auckland Star*, Julia Ward Howe’s poem of 1861-2 expressed “the idealism animating the North.” Such idealism had been injected with a new element in the wake of Lincoln’s 22 September 1862 preliminary issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation. Howe expressed this with the following lines: “Mine eyes have seen the glory of the coming of the Lord. As He died to make men holy, let us die to make men free.” After acknowledging the “thousands of lines which had been written justifying our cause in this war,” the *Auckland Star* could not find anything “as pregnant than this call from the past.” Arguing that Britain currently fought “for a cause holier than that which inspired Howe’s words,” Mainstreamers could not find any logic in “a many-times-removed successor of Lincoln” proposing “to the battalions of righteousness that they should lay down their arms with their work not done.”⁵⁴ While going

⁵² “No: The British Answer to Mr. Wilson,” *Daily Mail*, 23 December 1916, 4.

⁵³ “Soundings,” *Observer*, 24 December 1916, 6.

⁵⁴ “The Insult,” *Auckland Star*, 23 December 1916, 4; “The War,” *Evening Post*, 26 December 1916, 4.

further than most Mainstreamers in its claim that Britain's cause against German militarism was "holier" than Lincoln's war against slavery, the *Auckland Star's* astonishment over Wilson's inability, possible unwillingness, to see the parallels between Britain's situation in the First World War with that of Lincoln and the North during the Civil War was shared throughout the mainstream.

From the perspective of advocates of mainstream historical discourse, the Lincolnia utilized to signal Britain's determination and resolve should have convinced President Wilson that British "hostility to a make-shift peace was as passionate and strong as American hostility to it was during the American Civil War."⁵⁵ On 10 January 1917, Britain issued its passionate and strong rebuttal to Wilson's "make-shift peace" proposal by demanding the following: Belgium and Serbia's restoration; the evacuation of French, Russian, and Romanian territory; the payment of indemnities; and the creation of "a stable regime in Europe based upon the principle of nationality and upon guarantees for the independence of small nations."⁵⁶ It appears the mainstream's Lincolnia campaign fell on deaf ears because towards the end of January 1917, Wilson gave a speech in which he expressed his determination to see the First World War end in a "peace without victory." As to be expected, Mainstreamers in Britain and the Dominions greeted Wilson's speech with hostility. The sacrifices made during the last two and a half years of total war required nothing less than a clear-cut military victory over Germany. Anything other than a peace with victory over German militarism would make the enormous loss of life

⁵⁵ "No: The British Answer to Mr. Wilson," *Daily Mail*, 23 December 1916, 4.

⁵⁶ Rothwell, *British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy, 1914-1918*, 64-65.

pointless. Moreover, it was felt that Britain and its Allies could not achieve their war-time goals by any other means than a complete victory over Germany.⁵⁷

To justify the desire and need for a victory peace, Mainstreamers in Britain and the dominions once again turned to Lincolnia to clarify that Britain was “going to carry on the war, as determined to see it through as was Lincoln.”⁵⁸ Two days after Wilson delivered his “Peace without Victory” speech, *The Times* reiterated the position it had taken before the speech by declaring that Britain and its Allies “believe a ‘victory peace’ to be as essential as Mr. Lincoln believed it essential in the Civil War.”⁵⁹ In *A Lasting Peace*, published in 1917, G.W. Prothero offered a similar dismissal of Wilson’s “peace without victory” through Lincolnia which emphasized the former president’s unwavering commitment to achieve peace through victory. “Everyone,” according to Prothero, “knows how Lincoln repudiated the idea of an inconclusive peace in the dark days of the Civil War.” Fortunately, though, Lincoln did not waver in his commitments to abolish slavery and reunite the Union. Consequently, Prothero asserted that: “There never was a more crushing victory than that of the North in 1865.” While advocates of alternative historical discourse would assert that a British military victory over Germany would lead to other wars, Prothero retorted by explaining that in the years and decades after the Civil War “peace was maintained, because the great questions at issue were settled once for all.”⁶⁰ While the North and the South never took up arms against each other again, it is a bit of a stretch to say “the greatest questions at issue” were settled with the North’s victory in 1865. The implementation of sharecropping, “slavery with a different name,” racial disenfranchisement,

⁵⁷ George L. Bernstein, “Yorkshire Liberalism during the First World War,” *The Historical Journal* 32, no. 1 (March 1989): 122.

⁵⁸ “Mr. Wilson Ideals and Our Humble Duty,” *Daily Mail*, 23 January 1917.

⁵⁹ “President Wilson on Universal Peace,” *The Times*, 22 January 1917, 9.

⁶⁰ G.W. Prothero, *A Lasting Peace* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1917), 38-40.

segregation and the lynching of thousands of African Americans in the South from the overthrow of Reconstruction through the world war challenged the argument that the victory of the North in 1865 settled “the great questions at issue.” Nevertheless, Mainstreamers like Prothero, claimed that permanent peace could come about through the full destruction of German militarism; this was the surest way to ensure that the First World War was the “war to end all wars.”

Prothero, who would lead the Foreign Office’s “Historical Section” which assisted British negotiators engaged in formulating a peace treaty at Versailles, was no stranger to the historical discursive battles being waged between the mainstream and Alternatives for he himself was an active participant on the mainstream side since the beginning of the war.⁶¹ Prothero’s Lincolnia of 1917 represented the first time he utilized the former president’s legacy rhetorically. This coupled with Prothero’s claim that “everyone” knew of Lincoln’s repudiation of peace without victory suggests that the Lincolnia campaign from a month earlier had succeeded in its duty, at least from Prothero’s perspective. The trick now was to get the current President of the United States to listen to the newest round of Lincolnia in the hopes he would understand that “anything less than total victory would condemn unborn generations to the hell of another war.”⁶²

Perhaps the best proof of Lincolnia being used to dismiss Wilson’s “peace without victory” speech came in February 1917 when David Lloyd George utilized this strategy to reiterate Britain’s ultimate commitment for a victory peace. 12 February 1917 marked the anniversary of Lincoln’s birthday. After receiving a request “for a tribute to Lincoln for publication in the United States on Lincoln Day” by Charles Grasty, a well-known American

⁶¹ See Chapter 2.

⁶² Albert Marrin, *The Last Crusade: The Church of England in the First World War* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1974), 228.

newspaperman living in London who would also take up an advisory role at Versailles, Lloyd George took advantage of the occasion to juxtapose Britain's contemporary situation with the one faced by the North during the Civil War. In his tribute to Lincoln, the British prime minister declared:

I believe the battle which we have been fighting is at bottom the same battle which your countrymen fought under Lincoln's leadership ... The American people fought not a war of conquest, but a war of liberation. We today are fighting not a war of conquest, but a war of liberation ... from that barbarous doctrine and inhuman practice which has .. stood revealed in all its deadly iniquity in the course of this war. In such wars for liberty there can be no compromise. They are either won or lost. In your case it was freedom and unity or slavery and separation. In our case military power tyrannously used will have succeeded in tearing up treaties and trampling on the rights of others, or liberty and public right will have prevailed. Therefore, we believe that the war must be fought out to a finish, for such an issue there can be no such thing as a drawn war. In holding this conviction we have been inspired and strengthened beyond measure by the example and the words of your great President.⁶³

This strain of Lincolnia included the rhetoric of all the other Lincolnia utilized during the month and a half which separated the arrival of Wilson's peace note from his "peace without victory" speech. Thus, Lloyd George used his Lincoln's Day Lincolnia both to explain why Britain would not accept anything less than a peace with victory, and to reiterate that Britain's war aims were consistent with American ideals.⁶⁴

While Lincoln Day 1917 provided Lloyd George with another opportunity to talk about how Britain fought "not a war of conquest, but a war of liberation," New Zealand's deputy prime minister had contradicted such a claim just a couple of days earlier during a speech at the Australian Corroboree in London. After Ward expressed his disappointment that Britain had not included Germany's captured colonies in its earlier response to Wilson, he went on to proclaim

⁶³ Charles H. Grasty, *Flashes from the Front* (New York: The Century Co., 1918), 27-29.

⁶⁴ Kerenek, "Distractions of Peace during War," 109.

that “Australia and New Zealand, whose blood had won the colonies in the Pacific were determined that they would never go back to the enemy.”⁶⁵ As the war progressed, it became clear that Australia and New Zealand wanted Germany’s former colonies for themselves. This would create issues for Britain who “did not want Great Britain’s pure and noble mission to liberate Belgium and France from the barbarism of Prussian militarism tainted by the odium of a colonial war of conquest and large-scale territorial acquisitions.”⁶⁶

There is no evidence to suggest whether Lloyd George’s Lincoln Day Lincolnia or any of the other Lincolnia utilized from December 1916 to February 1917 had an impact on Woodrow Wilson or the American people. Nevertheless, it is a fact that two months after Lloyd George’s Lincoln Day Lincolnia the United States of America entered the First World War on the side of Britain and its Allies. Incidentally, in the wake of America’s entry into the conflict advocates of mainstream historical discourse ceased utilizing Lincolnia for the purpose of dismissing peace offers.

While advocates of alternative historical discourse would not use Lincolnia in their campaign to explain why peace should be negotiated at this point the war, they did respond to the mainstream call for the destruction of Prussianism—its militarism and duplicity—by calling for the destruction of all militarism and duplicity. To demonstrate once again that Germany did not have a monopoly on militarism, Alternatives turned away from Britain’s triumphalist past of Pitt to a more unflattering one. On 16 December 1916, the *Herald* seemed to be articulating the mainstream line when it published a poem from English theatre director and conscientious objector George Harcourt Williams. “England fights; England fights / As oft she did of yore / In

⁶⁵ Richard G.H. Kay, “In Pursuit of Victory: British-New Zealand Relations during the First World War” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Otago, October 2001), 151.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 151.

the cause of freedom / To make an end of war.” If an advocate of mainstream historical discourse stopped reading Williams’ poem at this point they would have been satisfied to see an advocate of alternative historical discourse echoing a mainstream talking point. Such a feeling, however, would quickly dissipate had they read Williams’s poem to the end. The closing quatrain read: “England fights! England fights! / Once more the story’s told / But is it for humanity / Or safety of her gold?”⁶⁷ By questioning Britain’s motives in previous wars as well as the current one, Williams not only tapped into a central message articulated by advocates of alternative historical discourse at the beginning of the war, for he also asserted a point that other Alternatives would in the days ahead: Britain could end the war right now but refused to because its current position did not ensure the safety of its money. In other words, Britain would continue to fight until capitalists, newspaper men, and politicians secured their own interests at the expense of the people.

Williams’s poem posed an uncomfortable question: If England fought to protect its money instead of humanity in the present war then what was to say that England had fought to end war in the past? In other words, what if England’s past – and by extension present – was just as militaristic as Germany’s? Advocates of alternative historical discourse thought so. The *Labour Leader* found a connection between German and British militarism when it explained that the “Junker tongue” was audible in both Germany’s note and in the mainstream British press’ initial response to that note. One day after Northcliffe’s *Daily Mail* dismissed the note through its depiction of German history, the *Labour Leader* pronounced: “Our Junkers at home are out with their taunting cries.” Undoubtedly, one of the loudest British Junkers was Lord Northcliffe, given the prominent role he played in dismissing Germany’s peace note. Thousands

⁶⁷ “England Fights,” *Herald*, 16 December 1916, 10.

of miles away from the metropole, the *Maoriland Worker* confirmed Northcliffe's Junker designation when it stated: "the criminal Northcliffe section...of the capitalist press" bitterly insisted "that there shall be no cessation of the war for the discussion of the peace terms offered by the German Government" until its armies had been defeated in battle.⁶⁸ While not presenting Northcliffe as a criminal, the *Herald* in London nevertheless referred to the "savage manner in which the gramophone Press, owned and controlled by Lord Northcliffe and his friends, yelled No" to the peace negotiations. For the *Herald* this was just "one more proof of the downright lunacy" of the Northcliffe press and the broader mainstream position.⁶⁹

At this point in the conflict, Mainstreamers continued to use words such as "savage," "criminal," and "lunacy" to describe German militarism. The Alternative's appropriation of these words to describe the most powerful pressman and his comrades in Britain and the Dominions served two important purposes. First, it further connected Britain to militarism. Thus, cries like *Labour Leader's* rang out: "Once again we repeat it – the enemy everywhere is militarism." From this perspective, Northcliffe and the mainstream's constant emphasis on German militarism before, during, and after the First World War represented an attempt to hide their own militaristic beliefs. Hide they could no more. For "lovers of peace" in Britain, the Dominions, the allies, and even enemy countries they "must rouse themselves to a final fight for that enemy's (militarism's) overthrow."⁷⁰ To do so required recognizing just how much influence militarism had over the government. Here, recognition was given to Northcliffe's continuing influence, depicted as total, over Lloyd George. Two days after Northcliffe's *Daily Mail* first portrayed Germany's note as the most recent example of Prussianism, the *NZ*

⁶⁸ "The Offer of Peace," *Maoriland Worker*, 20 December 1916, 4.

⁶⁹ "Why We Say Yes," *Herald*, 30 December 1916, 3.

⁷⁰ "The German Note," *Labour Leader*, 14 December 1916, 2.

Truth explained to its readers that “peace is the last thing desired by the Northcliffe Press.” By now, any New Zealander reading either a mainstream or alternative newspaper would have known how powerful Northcliffe and his papers were. To make this power demonstrable clear though, *Truth* explained that Lloyd George had become “the darling of the Northcliffe Press,” for his refusal to consider peace at this point in the war.⁷¹ Undoubtedly, Lloyd George had reached this decision himself, but given the closeness of Lloyd George and Northcliffe during the recent conscription debate, the *Truth* portrayed Lloyd George’s decision as being the product of him taking orders from the press lord.

In the cartoon (figure 5.3), “Taking Orders,” the *NZ Truth* depicted the press lord, or monarch according to the crown on his head, taking the Prime Minister’s portfolio from a morose Herbert Asquith and passing it to an enthusiastic David Lloyd George. Northcliffe’s powerful newspapers on the ground—and in the case of the *Daily Express*, under the fancy footwear of Northcliffe—serve as a reminder of the important role they played in getting Asquith removed from 10 Downing Street. If such imagery was not clear enough, the words of Northcliffe as “King of the Vigilant Press” left no doubt:

I gave Mr. Asquith the sack,
Which really was only his dues;
For I think dear Lloyd George has the
knack
of more faithfully airing my views.⁷²

In addition to Northcliffe taking credit for Asquith’s removal from office, the newspapers at Northcliffe’s feet served to warn Lloyd George that he might one day find himself in Asquith’s position if he ever went against Northcliffe’s positions. Lloyd George had better keep “Taking

⁷¹ “Peace Intrigues: Was Asquith Set Aside?” *NZ Truth*, 16 December 1916, 1.

⁷² “Taking Their Order,” *NZ Truth*, 16 December 1916, 5.

Orders” from him. Undoubtedly, one of the most important orders Northcliffe barked at Lloyd George was under no circumstances should a negotiated peace be considered with Germany.



Figure 4.3: “Taking Their Orders.”

Of course, any orders Northcliffe issued to Lloyd George concerning Germany’s peace note were founded on the belief that was nothing more than a peace trick like those of Napoleon or Bismarck. *Labour Leader* dismissed as “preposterous” claims that Germany would use peace the way Napoleon or Bismarck had done. In an interesting historical comparison, the *Leader* claimed that saying Germany would use peace for “a period of further war-like preparation” would be like suggesting “that the Bourbons learned nothing and forgot nothing.” Upon their restoration in 1814, the Bourbons “did not deprive the peoples of all the rights they had won by the revolution.” Why? “They knew that that way led to the guillotine.” According to this perspective, at this point in the war with Germany having gained little—debatable point in itself—at such a cost would be enough to convince the German people “that the Junkers ... the Capitalist Press, and the other supporters of militarism led them astray and betrayed them to

commit a crime” of historic proportions. This realization that militarism did not pay would do more to destroy it than a knockout blow would.⁷³

Two days after the *Labour Leader* utilized its curious historical analogy to illustrate the costliness of militarism, the *NZ Truth* had a word to say on whether militarism paid off when it discussed the way Prussia treated France following the Franco-Prussian War. The *NZ Truth* appeared to agree that militarism did pay by recognizing that “It has always been common practice in warfare for the victorious party to demand of the defeated an indemnity of war.” At the end of the Franco-Prussian War, however, “Germany ... inaugurated a new policy” by not only demanding an indemnity but also exacting tribute” to the tune of £20,000,000 in the form of conquered territories. The *NZ Truth* asserted that Germany’s allegedly unprecedented demand endeavored to “crush France so effectively that she would be of little account for generations to come.”⁷⁴ In describing Prussia’s rapacious behavior at the end of the Franco-Prussian War, the *NZ Truth* found the answer to the question of whether militarism paid or not. Initially, it may have, for until August 1914 Germany benefitted financially from the actions it took at the end of the Franco-Prussian War. Eventually, however, developments revealed the great cost of militarism. The bitterness and revanchism of Prussia’s actions in 1871 birthed amongst the French coupled with the growing rhetoric about how righting the wrongs from the Franco-Prussian War had to be one of the conditions for the peace which ended the First World War revealed the ultimate futility of militarism.

In demonstrating how militarism haunted and ultimately destroyed those tempted by it, the *NZ Truth*’s article revealed the moderate position it represented within the broader alternative

⁷³ “The Maddening Crowd: The Real European Effort,” *Labour Leader*, 28 December 1916, 2.

⁷⁴ “Peace Talk,” *NZ Truth*, 30 December 1916, 6.

historical discourse. On the one hand, the *NZ Truth's* recognition of Germany's checkered history, as illustrated by the newspaper's constant interchanging of the terms Germany and Prussia, fit into one of the mainstream's central strategies: blaming and damning Kaiser Wilhelm II's Germany because of the sins of its predecessors. On the other hand, the *NZ Truth* also offered subtle warnings for Britons and those in the Dominions about the possibility of themselves falling prey to the same type of militarism that dictated Prussian policy in 1871. Thus, in highlighting the ways in which the Prussian peace of 1871 paved the way for the current war, the *NZ Truth* implicitly cautioned those in Britain and the Dominions not to "make a fetish of the war-god" by either advocating for or supporting a harsh, Prussian style of peace on Germany at the end of this war.⁷⁵ If those in Britain and the Dominions did not heed this warning then another conflict would surely be on the horizon.

4.3 Conclusion

As the next chapter will demonstrate, Alternatives would quickly come to see the peace that ended the First World War as a Prussian peace. History would quickly demonstrate they were accurate both in this perception and in their prediction that such a peace would lay the foundations for a future conflict. While time would eventually show their prescience, advocates of alternative historical discourse were in an unenviable position from December 1916 to February 1917. Undoubtedly, many people in Britain and New Zealand wanted peace to come sooner rather than later, but for that same majority now was not the time for peace. The stalemate on the Western Front, the disaster at Gallipoli, and German gains in Eastern Europe did not put Britain and its Allies in a strong position for any possible peace negotiations at the end of 1916 or the beginning of 1917. Britain's position at this point in the war, however, was

⁷⁵ "Christmas, 1916," *NZ Truth*, 23 December 1916, 4.

not all doom and gloom. Its blockade continued to cause serious headaches on the German domestic front. On Britain's own domestic front, David Lloyd George's replacement of Herbert Asquith as prime minister signaled a more robust war effort was on the horizon for Britain and its Empire. With the exception of Australia, the Dominions reconfirmed their commitment to the British Empire's war effort through the introduction of conscription. These final two factors, however, had yet to bear fruit. Better to wait and see how the new man at 10 Downing Street and the new troops from the Dominions did before sitting down at any negotiating table to discuss peace terms. Besides, as Mainstreamers readily pointed out, no real, lasting peace could not come from any negotiations at this point in the war because German militarism had yet to be defeated.

The increasing role the Dominions played in attempting to destroy German militarism, coupled with the presence of Massey and Ward in Britain when the German and American notes arrived, created an interesting dynamic within the British-New Zealand relationship. One of the ways this dynamic presented itself was in the campaign to either support or oppose the peace notes and Wilson's "peace without victory" speech through historical discourse. As this dissertation has demonstrated so far, historical discourse surrounding war related developments did not emerge with the notes of December 1916 or Wilson's speech of January 1917. Whether the topic was the origins of the war, conscription, or women's rights the presence of history in public discourse was noticeable prior to the third calendar year of the conflict. What was not noticeable prior to December 1916 was the presence of William Massey and Joseph Ward in the metropole. The arrival of New Zealand's prime minister and deputy prime minister shortly before the notes and the speech increased the presence of New Zealand in Britain. Due to its prime minister and deputy prime minister being in the metropole, the New Zealand press

increased its coverage of developments and debates in Britain, especially in the wake of the peace notes and Wilson's speech.

Within this increased coverage there contained a reflection of the discursive battles being waged by advocates of mainstream and advocates of alternative historical discourse in Britain around the topics of peace notes and peace speeches. In New Zealand, the positions taken by both Mainstreamers and Alternatives from December 1916 to February 1917 mirrored those taken by their respective comrades in Britain. Thus, historical discourse provided one of the mechanisms by which Britain and New Zealand remained inseparable going into the third calendar year of the First World War.

5. WOMEN'S ROLE IN SOCIETY AND WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE

In 1915, Nellie McClung—Canadian novelist, suffragist, and future member of the Alberta Legislative Assembly—wrote in her popular book, *In Times Like These*: “History, romance, legend and tradition having been written by men, have shown the masculine aspect of war, and have surrounded it with a false glory ... Our histories have followed the wars.” According to McClung, masculinity’s predominant role in the production of history made “Invasions, conquests, battles, sieges ... the subject-matter of our histories.”¹ Historians would continue to make armed conflict, and men’s leading role in it, the focus of their subject after four-and-a-half years of total war. Battles such as the Somme, Gallipoli, and Verdun proved central to histories of the war written in Britain and the Dominions. For many in Australia, New Zealand, and Canada the battles of the First World War took on special meaning because of the belief these transformed the Dominions into nations.

From 1915 until the Armistice, developments occurred in the realm of women’s suffrage that added a relatively novel subject-matter to history: women’s experiences during wartime. This was especially true in Canada and Britain, which both witnessed suffragists score major victories during the First World War. In Canada, women’s suffrage achieved its first successes at the provincial level with five provinces—Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, Ontario, and British Columbia—granting women the vote from January 1916 to April 1917. In 1917, the Canadian government granted the federal franchise to women in the military and to women whose male relatives were in the military. Finally, in 1918, white Anglophone and Francophone women over the age of twenty-one received the federal vote. As Canadian suffragists racked up

¹ Nellie McClung, *In Times Like These* (Toronto: Mcleod and Allen, 1915), 10.

victories, their British comrades also achieved success. In 1918, women won the parliamentary vote in Britain.

As suffragists and anti-suffragists would make clear, the First World War was not the first time in which women made history during armed conflict. References to Boadicea, Joan of Arc, and Florence Nightingale emphasized that women had performed the duties of warriors and nurses in past conflicts. Of course, Boadicea, Joan, and Nightingale were exceptional cases. More than likely the women who made history during the First World War will never be seen as being as exceptional as the “great women” of the past. Nevertheless, women like Nellie McClung or Louisa McKinney—the first women ever to be elected to a legislature throughout the British Empire—were exceptional in their own ways for they won victories for democracy at home all the while a broader war was being waged for democracy abroad. The new role of voter—or elected official, for the rare few—might not be as flashy as warrior or nurse, but women now had the opportunity to shape society directly through the franchise and political action.

By being the frontline soldiers in this history making battle, suffragists earned a spot alongside the great women of the past. Like history’s great women, suffragists achieved this position only after a long struggle. Anti-suffragists, especially in Britain, put up a strong resistance against women’s suffrage. Initially, anti-suffragism received its greatest support in the mainstream press. Over time, even members of the mainstream press would come to support, usually begrudgingly, women’s suffrage. Nevertheless, the fact that anti-suffragism first appeared and remained in the mainstream press is the reason anti-suffragists and Mainstreamers will be used interchangeably in this chapter. Conversely, suffragists and Alternatives will be synonymous throughout this chapter, because it was the alternative press which embraced and

advocated for the women's vote from the inception of the movement until its final victories at the end of the First World War.

5.1 Beginning of the Suffrage & Anti-Suffrage Movements

In both Britain and Canada, the suffrage movement emerged in the last half of the nineteenth century. According to Sophia A. van Wingerden and Brian Harrison, British suffragism materialized in 1866 when fifteen hundred women sent a memorial to Parliament asking for the franchise.² John Stuart Mill's subsequent motion to grant women the vote represented an important step in the inchoate movement because it represented the first time this topic was discussed in Parliament. Canadian historians agree that the women's suffrage movement arose in the North American Dominion during the 1870s. For Wayne Roberts, the genesis of Canadian suffrage can be traced to 1877 when Emile Stowe, Ontario's first female doctor, founded the Women's Literary Club, "a consciousness-raising group" that would come to be "the forerunner of the Canadian suffrage organization"—the Canadian Suffrage Association.³

It is little surprise that historians would pinpoint the beginnings of women's suffrage in Britain or Canada to petitions, the printed word, and the formation of organizations seeing that these were the main means by which suffragists fought for and ultimately obtained the vote. Fighting for and obtaining suffrage by these means applied not just to the British and Canadian contexts, for suffragist campaigns throughout the English-speaking world had similar experiences at this point in history.⁴ Suffragists in the British Empire's Australasian Dominions

² Sophia A. van Wingerden, *The Women's Suffrage Movement in Britain, 1866-1928* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999), xxii; Brian Harrison, *Separate Spheres: The Opposition to Woman Suffrage in Britain* (London: Routledge, 2012), 27.

³ Wayne Roberts, "Rocking the Cradle for the World': The New Woman and Maternal Feminism, Toronto 1877-1914," in *A Not Unreasonable Claim: Women and Reform in Canada, 1802-1920*, ed. Linda Kealey (Toronto: The Woman's Press, 1979), 20.

⁴ Patricia Grimshaw pinpoints the beginning of New Zealand suffragism to an article Mary Muller wrote in 1869 entitled, "An Appeal to the Men of New Zealand." In this piece, Grimshaw utilized historical discourse to ask: "Do

and in a handful of states in the United States of America had already achieved impressive victories utilizing the same tactics, serving as models and inspiration for suffragists in Britain and Canada.

Advocating suffrage through petitions, the printed word, and organizing represented one of the clearest ways in which women increasingly engaged in the public sphere from the second half of the nineteenth century into the twentieth. Such a challenge to the cult of domesticity was likely to provoke a reaction. On the topic of British and Canadian suffragism the rise of suffragists produced their opponents, the anti-suffragists. Martine Faraut finds the first example of anti-suffragism in Britain in a June 1889 article in *The Nineteenth Century* entitled “An Appeal against Female Suffrage,” which was signed by 104 prominent women.⁵ In this appeal, female anti-suffragists in Britain articulated arguments against women’s suffrage that would remain prominent well into the First World War. In fairness, the “Appeal” recognized a public role for women, albeit one still rooted in the dominant separate spheres ideology of the day. The “Appeal” supported women’s new opportunities for “public usefulness” in ways such as voting for or becoming members of School Boards, Boards of Guardians, and other important public bodies. However, women’s emancipation in the public sphere had “reached the limits fixed by the physical constitution of women,” the signatories declared. When it came to “work for the state and their (women) responsibilities towards it must always differ essentially from those of men.” “To men,” asserted “An Appeal,” “belong the struggle of debate and legislation in Parliament.” According to “An Appeal,” many women recognized this fact which is why “the

you still burn for witchcraft? Why ... is the Juggernaut car of prejudice still to be driven on, crushing the crowds of helpless women beneath its wheels?” quoted in Patricia Grimshaw, *Women’s Suffrage in New Zealand* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2013), 29.

⁵ Martine Faraut, “Women Resisting the Vote: A Case of Anti-Feminism,” *Women’s History Review* 12, no. 4 (2003): 605.

mass of those immediately concerned in it are notoriously indifferent; there has been no serious and general demand for it.”⁶ From the publication of “An Appeal” up to the moment of enfranchisement, anti-suffragists “claimed emphatically that the majority of British women did not want the parliamentary vote.”⁷

While “An Appeal” represented one of the first times Mainstreamers collectively and publicly opposed women’s suffrage, the establishment of the Women’s National Anti-Suffrage League on 21 July 1908 marked an important moment in the movement. According to Mary Ward, a leading anti-suffragist who more than likely wrote the “Appeal of ’89,” anti-suffragists had “reached perhaps the crisis of the movement” during the first decade of the twentieth century. The urgency expressed by Ward stemmed from two developments in the first decade of the twentieth century. In February 1908, the House of Commons voted overwhelmingly—by 179 votes—for a second reading of the Women’s Enfranchisement Bill that would enfranchise significant numbers of women in Parliamentary elections. While the bill would ultimately die in Parliament, the increased support for suffrage in that body alarmed Ward. So too did the fact that membership in suffrage societies continued to increase throughout the opening years of the twentieth century.

In the wake of these developments Ward declared that “the women of today, who oppose female suffrage, can no longer content themselves with ‘Appeals.’” Looking back at the earlier “Appeal,” Ward saw “that the case put forth is substantially the same, but that the process of time has in some respects strengthened the older pleas, while in other it has made it necessary to add to them.” To rise to the occasion, anti-suffragists needed to publicize those new arguments

⁶ “An Appeal Against Female Suffrage,” *Nineteenth Century*, 25 (June 1889), 781-2.

⁷ Julia Bush, *Women Against the Vote: Female Anti-Suffragism in Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 3.

though “an active propaganda campaign.” This “active campaign” began with a manifesto issued by the Women’s National Anti-Suffrage League.⁸

In addition to maintaining the Appeal’s earlier arguments about separate spheres, women’s apparent apathy towards suffrage, and the existing political opportunities for women on school boards, etc. the manifesto added the following reasons why women should not get the vote. First, women’s influence “in social causes will be diminished rather than increased by the possession of the parliamentary vote.” Secondly, enfranchising women would disrupt marital harmony because it “would introduce political disagreement into the home.” Finally, “the danger which might arise from the concession of women’s suffrage ... is out of proportion to the risk run by those small communities which have adopted it.”⁹ In other words, women’s suffrage might work, though even this was contested, in places like Australia, New Zealand, Denmark, or individual states in the United States of America, but not in the British Empire’s metropole.

To get these arguments further into the discourse of the day, Ward urged Mainstreamers to begin “an active propaganda campaign.” This active campaign would appear in the pages of the *Anti-Suffrage Review*. With the creation of the Woman’s Anti-Suffrage League came the main mouthpiece for anti-suffragism: the *Anti-Suffrage Review*. By 1910, the league had run out of money which resulted in the *Anti-Suffrage Review* being taken over by the National League for Opposing Woman Suffrage, which established itself in the same year. From 1910 to 1918, the newspaper remained the main organ of anti-suffragists. Hence the important role it plays in this chapter.

Sources selected for this chapter which are representative of alternative historical discourse come from the major suffragist newspapers in Britain: *Vote*, *Common Cause*, *Votes*

⁸ “The Women’s Anti-Suffrage Movement,” *Nineteenth Century and After*, 343-346.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 346.

for Women, Suffragette, and Dreadnought. The suffrage newspapers chosen from Canada come from the provinces—Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, Ontario, and British Columbia—that granted women the right to vote prior to the Canadian Parliament enfranchising all Canadian women on 24 May 1918. The prairie provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta were the first in Canada to enfranchise women. An important supporter and advocate of women’s suffrage in Canada’s three prairie provinces was *The Grain Growers’ Guide*, which was a newspaper published by the Grain Growers’ Association. The Association’s alternative nature could be seen in its unwavering commitment “to change the competitive market within which prairie grain growers sold their product.”¹⁰ The commercial status quo was not the only one the Association aimed its sights on, for it also targeted the political status quo and hence the societal one too. In its first publication of August 1908, *The Guide* made it clear was a supporter of women’s rights—in addition to including women’s suffrage, this also included equal access to education, employment, and property rights—when it included a women’s page. The most influential parts of the women’s page were “The Women’s Sphere” and “The Country Homemaker.” In these sections of the prairie farm newspaper, women editors made it clear that, while they were advocating for changes in the existing order, they did not want the whole system to be overthrown.

Like *The Guide*, the *British Columbia Federationist*, *Industrial Banner*, and *Canadian Forward* all challenged the commercial and political status quo of the day. Unlike *The Guide*, these were socialist newspapers speaking for the urban proletariat. Seeing that class determined everything for the *B.C. Federationist*, the *Industrial Banner*, and *Canadian Forward*, they concluded that once industrial relations changed in favor of the proletariat then the rest—such as

¹⁰ *A Great Movement Underway: Women and the Grain Growers’ Guide, 1908-1928*, ed. Barbara E. Kelcey and Angela E. Davis (Winnipeg: The Manitoba Record, 1997), xv.

women's rights—would follow suit. The class analysis of these newspapers did not keep them from openly advocating for women's rights before, during, or after the war. The socialistic foundations of these newspapers required them to depict the war in class terms; nevertheless, their advocacy of women's suffrage continued alongside their class analysis of the war. For two of these newspapers, it was their class war analysis that caused them to arouse the ire of the Canadian government. The *Federationist* would be censored by the Canadian government in 1918 because of its "traitorous" depiction of the war. *Canadian Forward* had it even worse. In 1918 the *Forward's* radical views caused this Toronto-based newspaper to be outlawed.

The Canadian government's severe treatment of the *BC Federationist* and *Canadian Forward* more than likely had little to do with their advocacy of women's rights. If that had been the case, then *The Guide* and *Industrial Banner* would have suffered the same treatment. They did not. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume the Canadian government, or society at large, really did not fear women's suffrage. They had more things to worry about: class war and ethnic strife with the French-Canadians. When anti-suffragism appeared in the press it did so through the pens of prominent male writers, such as Stephen Leacock. Suffice it to say, most of the anti-suffrage discourse which appears throughout this chapter is primarily of British provenance.

5.2 The Great Women of the Past

Five years before Europe descended into the abyss of total war, Cicely Hamilton debuted her "Pageant of Great Women" in London. From 1909 to 1912, Hamilton's "Pageant" toured Great Britain exposing audiences to a "pantheon of heroic and learned women," who all made arguments in favor of women's suffrage.¹¹ The great women's advocacy of women's suffrage

¹¹ Amy Binns, "New Heroines for New Causes: How Provincial Women Promoted a Revisionist History through Post-Suffrage Pageants," *Women's History Review* 27, no. 2 (2018): 223-224.

brought suffragists ““into a noble alliance of great women serving a just and honourable cause.”¹² Doubly significant, suffragists played the great women each time the pageant ran. Suffragists, therefore, played history all the while they struggled to make their own.

The pantheon of great women contained four groups: the Rulers, the Saintly Women, the Artists, and the Warriors. The last group included the interesting trio of Boadicea, the ancient British warrior; Joan of Arc, the medieval French warrior; and Florence Nightingale, the modern nurse. There would have been no ambiguity surrounding the first two women in the warrior category. The inclusion of Nightingale into a category with Boadicea and Joan of Arc represented a more expansive definition of warrior. Nightingale might not have taken up weapons of war during the Crimean conflict; nevertheless, “The Lady of the Lamp” did fight on behalf of injured soldiers. In this war, woman as warrior took on a different meaning.

Suffragists’ strategy of utilizing history to promote their cause and broaden categories for women carried over into the First World War. In August 1914, the WSPU’s newspaper *Votes for Women* in London published a number of articles focusing on the roles women had played in previous wars. Undoubtedly one of the motivations for these articles was to demonstrate that, as women in the past had risen to the occasion by making significant contributions during armed conflicts, so too would the women of the present. Three days after Britain declared war on Germany, Evelyn Sharp, editor of *Votes for Women*, asserted that the women of the past, like those of the present, “may dread and deplore the coming of war,” but as always they were ready “to accept and fulfil whatever duties a state of war may seem to impose upon them, whether these involve suffering in silence or dying in the field.”¹³

¹² Rebecca Cameron, “From Great Women to Top Girls,” *Comparative Drama* 43, no. 2 (Summer 2009): 147.

¹³ “Women in War,” *Votes for Women*, 7 August 1914, 679.

For the British public, a woman from the latter category that they had a strong connection to was Boadicea. Prior to Boadicea playing a leading role in Hamilton's "Pageant of Great Women," the ancient warrior became something of a national heroine as seen in 1902 when the statue *Boadicea and Her Daughters* appeared outside of Parliament. The broader Victorian culture lionized Boadicea because she was both a patriot and a mother. Boadicea's dual nature, according to Marguerite Johnson, also served suffragists well because the ancient warrior "symbolized suffrage ideologies that challenged traditional definitions of femininity."¹⁴ Rather than being weak and domesticated, as many Victorian women were represented, Boadicea was forceful in the traditionally male dominated arena of war. What was to say that women, either mothers or not, in Britain and the Dominions could not also play a vital role outside the home?

Votes for Women its readership had familiarity with Boadicea when it stated: "It is hardly necessary to recall the fact that ... Boadicea took the field against the Romans with a force which included five thousand women, nearly all of whom died in fighting."¹⁵ References to Boadicea and her 5,000 female followers addressed a main argument the anti-suffragists had articulated in the prewar period: women's inability to actively participate in armed conflict disqualified them from the franchise. Thus, another reason why *Votes for Women* published articles stressing the important role women played in previous wars stemmed from the need to correct the anti-suffragists' purposeful ignoring or misrepresentation of "the part played by women" in previous wars. Unlike anti-suffragists, who were accused of following "the sound of the bugle" and consequently focusing exclusively on what was happening on the fighting front, suffragists

¹⁴ Marguerite Johnson, "Boadicea and British Suffrage Feminists," *Outskirts* 31 (November 2014): 2.

¹⁵ "Women in War," *Votes for Women*, 679.

emphasized how “women from time immemorial” had actively participated in defending the homeland by taking up arms.¹⁶

Referring to a more recent conflict, Annie Budgett wrote to the editors of *Votes for Women* informing them about “the way the women of Lyme Regis, Dorset, defended their town when hard pressed by the Royalists in 1644.” Given the suffragists’ claim that history books routinely failed to mention the various roles performed by women in past wars, it is interesting that in this “Letter to the Editor” Budgett pulled her information from “an old history of Lyme Regis, written by G. Roberts.” Unlike most historians of the seventeenth century, George Roberts recognized the part played by women in previous wars. In his telling of Lyme Regis’ eight-week long siege he gave women their due. After describing the “obstinate resistance” put up by the Parliamentarians in Lyme Regis, Roberts wrote: “The women, in the heat of the conflict ... regardless of danger, carried ammunition to the soldiers, and frequently assisted in keeping the lines.” Women’s assistance extended beyond just bringing soldiers supplies, for women also “showed themselves on the works” after the men became fatigued. Interestingly, the women reached the works incognito for they had dressed in “red cloaks and men’s hats.” One wonders whether the disguises were meant to fool the Royalists or Parliamentarians given that men from both sides would have viewed women assuming the masculine role of taking up arms ambivalently. Regardless, Parliamentarians would celebrate the role Lyme Regis’ women played in keeping the town from falling to Royalist forces. As Annie Budgett highlighted in her letter, the heroic efforts of Lyme Regis’ women “caused a comparison to be drawn between them and the celebrated Jean (sic) d’Arc” as evidenced by the publication in 1674 of a book of poetry

¹⁶ “Women in War-Time,” *Votes for Women*, 14 August 1914, 695.

by James Strong in 1674 entitled, “Joanereidos, or Feminine Valour; eminently discovered in West Country Women at the Siege of Lyme, 1644.”¹⁷

As can be seen with the title of Strong’s book, Joan of Arc’s image had changed quite drastically in the two centuries since her death. Whereas she was a heretic worthy of being burned at the stake in the fifteenth century, she was already the paragon of “feminine valour” by the seventeenth century. This relatively quick transformation of Joan’s image was noteworthy considering it was her leadership of French forces that succeeded in repulsing and ending the English Siege of Orléans. This pivotal moment turned the tide of the French during the Hundred Years’ War. In the aftermath of Orléans, Joan’s insistence on Charles VI being crowned King of France rather than the English pretender marked the beginning of the end of English possessions in France. From the French’s perspective, she was the defender of the French nation.

Initially, these aspects of Joan’s history were problematic for the English. Over the centuries, however, Joan’s image in the English-speaking world became respected, if not revered, for it was associated with freedom.¹⁸ This was especially true for the suffragists who utilized Joan’s image at the start of the twentieth century. A good example of this appeared during a large suffragist demonstration in London on 17 April 1909. The notorious Elsie Howey, who had just recently gotten out of jail after driving a van into Parliament, expressed her freedom by dressing up as Joan and riding a horse through the streets of London. Howey’s impersonation of Joan was not just symbolic, for like “the maid of Orleans,” Howey engaged in physical violence to further her cause.

¹⁷ “Women’s Defence of Lyme Regis,” *Votes for Women*, 14 August 1914, 695.

¹⁸ Gail Orgelfinger, *Joan of Arc in the English Imagination, 1429-1829* (University Park, Pennsylvania: Penn State University Press, 2019), 161-162.

Possibly this was the reason why, according to William Blanc, the image of Howey as Joan “quickly went around the world” appearing in the *Western Mail*—a newspaper from Perth, Australia—just one month after the demonstration took place. One year later and thousands of miles across the Pacific, Joan’s name appeared in the United States when the suffragist group, the Joan of Arc League changed its name to the Joan of Arc Suffrage League.¹⁹ Unlike Howey’s WSPU, the Joan of Arc Suffrage League pursued its goals non-violently. The fact that both a militant and non-militant group could utilize Joan’s image for women’s suffrage illustrated the flexibility of Joan as icon. As Robin Blaetz argues, this flexibility should not be surprising for Joan’s image changes “from one century to the next as she is used to serve causes that span the ideological spectrum.”²⁰ In the First World War, Joan’s image served to fight the ideology of separate spheres.

While *Votes for Women* embraced and celebrated the female warriors of the past, the non-militant *Common Cause* initially focused on the more traditional roles women performed during wartime. “As in the past, so today, women are ready to do their part in the work of alleviating the distress, misery, degradation, and chaos produced by the dogs of war.” Nevertheless, “the spirit” which animated women to perform the traditional roles of mending, clothing, feeding, and nursing now had to deal with “a deeper consciousness of motherhood, based not on nation or class, but upon the sacredness of the life of a common humanity.” Much of this awakening would have stemmed from the peace work women activists participated in prior to the war. The “spirit of hatred, vice, cruelty, and barbarism” between nations on display during the First World War reiterated just how much the world needed this “deeper

¹⁹ William Blanc, “Joan of Arc: A Character Formerly Endorsed by Feminists,” Retro News, last modified September 16, 2022, <https://www.retronews.fr/societe/long-format/2019/04/17/jeanne-darc-et-les-feministes>.

²⁰ Robin Blaetz, *Visions of the Maid: Joan of Arc in American Film* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2001), xi.

consciousness of motherhood” to be realized. It would only be realized, however, if women took inspiration from “the example of Baroness von Suttner, Josephine Butler, and Joan of Arc” for the purpose of delivering “the people, not only of our own, but of all nations, from the plague, pestilence, and famine” produced by warfare.²¹

The decision to create a triumfeminate of Suttner, Nobel peace prize winner in 1905, Butler, suffragist and successful campaigner against human trafficking and draconian legislation against alleged prostitutes, and Joan, a warrior and martyr, is curious but intriguing. Clearly this trio of heroines provided another illustration of the suffrage movement’s transnational outlook for Suttner was Austrian, Butler British, and Joan French. Moreover, they were all fighters, in one way or another, for justice and what was right. They made innumerable sacrifices for their causes. Thus, the *Common Cause* hoped “that we shall draw inspiration and courage from those, who seeing the light, did not flinch from any sacrifice, however, great, and who felt that now, and not tomorrow, is the appointed time.”²²

5.3 The Great Women of the Present

An indication that the time had arrived for women to take an active role in trying to end the war and stop future ones appeared in April 1915 when 1,000 women from the Western world held a peace conference at the Hague. “Women at the Hague,” as this conference came to be known as, had over 1,000 delegates from twelve countries indicating once again the transnational character of the women’s movement. In addition to the meeting getting a great deal of press, both supportive and in opposition, it also produced an International Committee for Permanent Peace which would become an important committee during and after the conflict.

²¹ “Women’s Peace Movement,” *Common Cause*, 18 September 1914, 439.

²² *Ibid.*, 439.

The *Anti-Suffrage Review* declared that Britain's two delegates, Chrystal Macmillan and Kathleen Courtney, were "so incapable of appreciating facts" that they "imagined their country to be engaged in a conflict over some academic question in regard to which there are two points of view and the possibility of a compromise."²³ Macmillan and Courtney's inability to "appreciate facts" undoubtedly came from resolutions passed by the Women at the Hague, especially the statement: "Since the mass of the people in each of the countries now at war believe themselves to be fighting not as aggressors but ... for their national existence, there can be no irreconcilable difference between them, and their common ideals afford a basis upon which a magnanimous and honorable peace might be established."²⁴ The *Review's* slight of its "own countrywomen" tapped into the alternative's prewar discursive argument that women should not get the vote due to them being ignorant of how international affairs worked.

In its 14 May 1915 issue, Christabel Pankhurst's *The Suffragette* made its feeling about peace talks clear by doubling down on the Joan of Arc imagery. On the issue's cover— (figure 5.1) —Joan, "The Great Patriot," stood triumphant. Of course, Joan's patriotism stemmed from her defense of France. According to *The Suffragette*, Joan's actions and the ultimate price she paid for defending her country, placed "her first in the ranks of humanity." Unlike Joan, the "Women at the Hague" were unpatriotic because they advocated for peace before Prussian militarism was destroyed. By assuming this position, the "Women at the Hague" demonstrated that they were not only unpatriotic, but also undeserving of being a full citizen with the franchise. "Women at the Hague," who were suffragists themselves, hurt the cause of women's suffrage given that patriotism was seen as mainstream society as being the main prerequisite for citizenship. For the "Women at the Hague," "who prattle of peace, where there is not peace,"

²³ "'Peace' Delegates," *Anti-Suffrage Review*, May 1915, 35-36.

²⁴ "Women and their Attitude to War," *BC Federationist*, 2 July 1915, 3.

The Suffragette found “lessons ... in the words and deeds of that warrior and patriot [Joan].” According to *The Suffragette*, Joan responded to the “half-hearted,” compromisers who advocated “treating with the enemy” by declaring: “We will ... at the point of the lance.”²⁵ If the British women who went to the Hague wanted women’s suffrage to become a reality they needed to drop their calls for peace and support the war against Prussian militarism unequivocally.

The occasion of the “Women at the Hague” provided Helena Gutteridge of the *BC Federationist* with an opportunity to address those in British Columbia who felt the war had been an “apparent set-back to the women’s movement.” “No one can have failed to notice, particularly in the Old Country, a somewhat primitive state of affairs exists at the present time. Men are fighting, women are nursing, knitting, and enduring.” While some would see women performing their traditional responsibilities as “a setback in their cause,” Gutteridge argued that this “apparent set-back to the woman’s movement is more surface than real, and those who have followed the trend of the movement for the last few years have no real cause for dissatisfaction.”²⁶ Readers of Toronto’s socialist newspaper, the *Industrial Banner*, who may not have followed the trend of the women’s movement, because they were focused on class issues, were informed that it “has given women the wonderful impetus which promised them to rebuild the ruins of the past.” Unsurprisingly, the *Banner* found the most important trends in the women’s movement to be rooted in “the growth of industrialism.” Thanks to industrialism women proved they could exceed men in some branches while holding their own in others. During the First World War, women continued to illustrate to “society that it must make room for them in the outside world,” especially when they were drafted into industrial work later in the

²⁵ “Joan of Arc as Patriot,” *The Suffragette*, 14 May 1915, 70.

²⁶ “Women and Their Attitude to the War,” *BC Federationist*, 2 July 1915, 3.

war. The *Banner* informed its readers that at least in a few locations—here the focus was on the American states Wyoming, Colorado, and Idaho—the outside world had finally granted women “the right of way” by fully enfranchising them.²⁷



Figure 5.1: “The Great Patriot”

While the vote did not have a whole lot of relevance for the “Women at the Hague,” they nevertheless made their own presence felt in the outside world by demanding an immediate end to the First World War. To strengthen her argument that the war caused only a surface level reversal of women’s gains, Gutteridge referred to a contemporary work by John D. Barry entitled “Women and War,” which anticipated that the First World War would drastically change the

²⁷ “Women’s Place in Society,” *Industrial Banner*, 14 January 1916, 4.

“position of women.” In the past women were expected to “accept war and have nothing to do with it, save as they could be of service in succoring the wounded and the sick.” Women, according to Barry, were even reproached because “they could not go out and fight themselves, inferior creatures that they were, incapacitated for this high service by their weakness.”²⁸ As we have seen, suffragists had already demonstrated the problematic nature of asserting that women in previous wars did “not go out and fight themselves.” That being said, suffragists did recognize the anomalous nature of Boadicea, Joan of Arc, and the women of the English Civil War

Gutteridge’s abrupt segue from Barry’s words to a discussion of “That Congress Again,” “Women at the Hague,” signaled her belief that this event was a “startling” example of how the First World War radically changed the position of women. Those who were “war mad,” like the *Anti-Suffrage Review* or even Pankhurst, failed to see that the “Women at the Hauge” “were sane and balanced enough to keep their heads cool even in the very midst of war hysteria.” The sanity and balance of the “Women at the Hague” was visible in the resolutions they passed for these revealed that “their very womanhood and mothering instinct was calling for better expression than by means of nursing, recruiting and Red Cross work.” Gutteridge’s words could be read as condescending to nurses, recruiters, and Red Cross workers, but surely she did not intend them to be so. Instead, Gutteridge juxtaposed these more traditional roles for women with the Women at the Hague to illustrate how the latter represented an expanded version of womanhood. Not a better womanhood per se, but an expanded version of it for sure.

In Canada there was less emphasis on women’s embrace of armed conflict in the past and more emphasis on the nurturing roles women assumed beyond the domestic sphere in previous

²⁸ “Women and Their Attitude to the War,” *BC Federationist*, 2 July 1915, 3.

conflicts. Undoubtedly much of this reticence on the part of Canadian suffragists stemmed from them being uncomfortable with the militant tactics embraced by a section of the British movement back in the Isles. As the First World War entered its second year, David K. Billings of *Toronto World* returned to the topic of traditional roles for women in warfare and the expanded version of womanhood, but only after addressing the “regular standby argument of the anti-suffragist that ‘women can’t fight’.” Billings asserted that women in the past “by their intelligence or fatal gift of beauty, have been the causes of war innumerable,” but “rarely if ever has the name of woman been found on the official reports of sanguinary battles, or in the gazettes of warring nations.” To be sure, “Boadicea and Joan D’Arc (sic) led their cohorts to victory,” but those were the exceptions. The real “heroine[s] of the battlefield,” according to Billings, were not history’s few female warriors but rather the Florence Nightingales of the previous century. After recognizing the historic role Nightingale played in the Crimean War, Billings highlighted how her legacy was visible during the “first great war in which women took a really active part”: the American Civil War. “It was in this war that the women were for the first time organized throughout the country to look after the general welfare of the soldiers on the field, and to alleviate the sufferings of the men in every way.” It was this work of Northern women, not them taking up arms, which “was largely responsible for the victory of the North in one of the world’s greatest wars.”²⁹

If the American Civil War provided women the first real opportunity to play an integral part in a war effort then the First World War proved to be the sequel. And it appeared that once again women’s contribution was made in the hospitals. As the First World War entered its second calendar year the *Anti-Suffrage Review* looked back over the months of war and declared:

²⁹ “Women and Her Work in War,” *Toronto World*, 15 August 1915, 2.

“Never was woman’s place more clearly defined than at the outbreak of this great world war.” “Woman’s place” was the hospital and women “nobly answered the call.” That is, until the suffragist showed up. The suffragists took advantage of this situation for the purpose of aiding “their sentiments, and to make shameless bids for the vote.” This should come as no surprise though for these were the same type of women, like Elsie Howey, “who horrified the civilised world” with all their illegal activities prior to the First World War. Thus, “these forerunners of the Huns,” as the *Anti-Suffrage Review* called suffragists, perverted traditional society by breaking conventions. The *Review*’s anti-German epithet is interesting considering suffragists depicted anti-suffragists as Prussian themselves for their opposition to democracy’s expansion.

For the *Review*, all was not lost, because the world still had its Florence Nightingales in nurses like Edith Cavell, who “gave her life for her country, for her God, for the womanhood of England” by devoting “her great gifts to the noblest work women can do”; that is: care for men.³⁰ Calling Cavell, the Florence Nightingale of the First World War, as the *Anti-Suffrage Review* did, makes sense. As nurses, both women cared for wounded soldiers. But Cavell was accused and found guilty by the German occupation forces for aiding the enemy by helping British soldiers—estimates go as high as 200—cross into the neutral Netherlands. While this point differentiated Cavell from Nightingale, neither one of these nurses trespassed on man’s domain by taking up arms like Joan of Arc did against the English during the Hundred Years’ War. Regardless, both Joan of Arc and Edith Cavell would be executed for supposed crimes they had committed during times of war. Joan of Arc’s death served as inspiration for the French as they continued their struggle against the English during the fifteenth century. Undoubtedly, this aspect of Joan the Arc influenced the Canadian *Morning Leader* to call Cavell the “English Joan

³⁰ “Woman’s Place,” *Anti-Suffrage Review*, January 1916, 6.

of Arc” thirteen days after she died in front of a German firing squad.³¹ In other words, when the *Morning Leader* called Cavell the English Joan of Arc it did so in the hopes that her death would spur the British Empire on to greater efforts as Joan’s death had done for the French.³²

As was seen in the previous chapter, by October 1915 a spur was indeed needed, for volunteers in the army had reached a wartime low. In September 1915, 71,617 British men volunteered for the army. September’s figure represented the third consecutive month in which monthly recruitment numbers did not hit 100,000 for the British military. The downward trend of the summer of 1915 came to halt, albeit a temporary one, with the number of volunteers increasing to 113,285 in October and 121,793 in November of 1915 respectively.³³ Katie Pickles and Guy Richardson attribute much of the monthly increases of October and November 1915 to Cavell propaganda.³⁴

Unfortunately for voluntarism, the uptick in recruits in October and November gave way to the lowest recruiting numbers of the war in December 1915: 51, 152. The precipitous decline in the number of volunteers in the last month of 1915 put the final nail in the coffin for voluntarism. In January 1916, Parliament debated and passed the Military Service Act. Intimating that if women had the vote then conscription would not have passed in Britain, *Common Cause* imagined their friends “the Anti-Suffragists saying thankfully to each other that

³¹ *Morning Leader*, 25 October 1915, 1 quoted in Guy Richardson, “Nurse, Martyr, Propaganda Tool: The Reporting of Edith Cavell in British Newspapers 1915–1920,” *Media, War & Conflict* 10, no. 2 (2016): 245.

³² From 1914 to 1915, an estimated 300,000 Canadian men volunteered. When conscription passed on 24 July 1917 130,000 Canadians had been killed or injured. The connection between Joan and Cavell continued into the postwar world with George Bernard Shaw in the preface of his play, *Saint Joan*, stressing the “agency of both women and the political nature of their trials. From: A.S. Fell and C. Sternberg, “Nurse-Martyr-Heroine: Representations of Edith Cavell in Interwar Britain, France and Belgium,” *Journal of War & Culture Studies* 11, no. 4 (2018): 278.

³³ W.J. Reader, *‘At Duty’s Call’: A Study in Obsolete Patriotism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), 102.

³⁴ Guy Richardson, “Nurse, Martyr, Propaganda Tool: The Reporting of Edith Cavell in British Newspapers 1915–1920,” *Media, War & Conflict* 10 (2): 246; Katie Pickles, “Edith Cavell – Heroine: No Hatred or Bitterness for Anyone?” *History Now* 3, no. 2 (1997): 4.

at any rate women have not had votes in time to take part in the controversy.” Tapping into the mainstream’s prewar discourse, *Common Cause* explained that from the anti-perspective the Military Service Act was the clearest case “of a Bill in no way concerning women, on which it would be monstrous were their opinion to count for anything at all.”³⁵

A Canadian who could have stood in for the *Common Cause*’s imaginary anti-suffragist was Stephen Leacock. As the British mainstream lionized Cavell and advocated for conscription, super-anti-conscriptionist Stephen Leacock addressed the “Woman Question” in *Maclean’s*, a Toronto-based magazine. Leacock traced the origins of the “Woman Question” back to when the machine age dispossessed women of their traditional responsibilities. “With each succeeding decade of the modern age things grew worse instead of better.” With his well-known sarcastic wit, Leacock explained that when things looked darkest for women “a deliverer rose up.” This preacher of Woman’s Rights “came as a new thing ... breaking glass. But in reality she was not a new thing at all.” “The Romans knew her as a sybil and shuddered at her. The Middle Age called her a witch and burnt her.” If the modern age robbed women of their traditional responsibilities then it also robbed men of being able to recognize the danger of allowing such women to go unchecked. Thus, because modern men “grew afraid of her” women “are going to get the vote.” Leacock predicted that “Within a very short time all over the British Isles and North America ... woman suffrage will soon be an accomplished fact.”³⁶

Leacock’s prediction, especially regarding Canadian suffrage, proved accurate. On 28 January 1916, Manitoba became the first province in the Dominion to grant women both the right to the vote and to stand for election. Suffrage’s most recent success in Western Canada buoyed suffragists in both Canada and Britain. On 2 February, the *Grain Growers’ Guide*

³⁵ “The Military Service Bill,” *Common Cause*, 14 January 1916, 538.

³⁶ Stephen Leacock, “The Woman Question,” *Maclean’s Magazine*, 1 October 1915, 7-9.

enthusiastically declared that the events in Manitoba were “a great step forward in the march of civilization.” The *Guide* congratulated Manitoba on “being the first province of Canada to recognize the rights of women to have a voice in making the laws which govern them.”

According to the *Guide*, it appeared as though the impact of Manitoba’s suffrage victory on the neighboring prairie provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan was immediate for both of those governments signaled they too were supports of women’s suffrage. Thus, in an effort not “to be outdone” by Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta passed their own suffrage bills in March and April 1916 respectively.³⁷

Interestingly, the *Anti-Suffrage Review* had little to say on the suffrage developments in Canada. Rather, as Canadian suffragists celebrated their victory in Manitoba and as they prepared for more victories, the *Review* focused its attention on the work of Miss Beatrice Dormer Maunder, a New Zealand nurse serving on the Western Front. Readers of the *Anti-Suffrage Review* would have been familiar with Maunder due to her being “a zealous and able comrade in distant days when the country rang with the Suffrage Controversy.” Maunder’s admirable work continued into the war. By 1916, she had established four highly reputable hospitals with the most recent one being located at Bourbourg, France. Maunder’s extreme competence and her belief that her cause was a “holy cause” increasingly brought “around her an ever-growing body of supporters from Britain and New Zealand.” Here, then, was a woman from the Dominions to emulate. Unlike Canadian and British suffragists, who wasted their words, time, and money for a cause that was not holy, Maunder was a woman “just of the type and fiber of Edith Cavell.”³⁸

³⁷ “The Country Homemaker,” *Grain Growers’ Guide*, 2 February 1916, 5.

³⁸ “Miss Dormer Maunder’s Hospital Work,” *Anti-Suffrage Review*, February 1916, 12.

In highlighting Maunder's work, the *Review* reiterated the work it and other antis believed women should be doing during the First World War. Nursing, not working for the vote, should be women's primary concern in this conflict, as it had been in previous ones. Additionally, the *Review's* connection of Maunder to Cavell demonstrated the important examples women in Britain and the Dominions continued to set for each other. The fact that Maunder, a staunch anti in the prewar period, attracted "an ever-growing body of supporters" not just from New Zealand but also from the metropole signaled the continued attractiveness of traditional female roles. Finally, Maunder's provenance from New Zealand provided the *Review* with an opportunity to highlight the type of Dominion woman people should be focusing on and emulating. From the *Review's* perspective focusing on the women from Manitoba, Alberta, and Saskatchewan who had either already won the vote or who were on the cusp of winning it was a waste. Those Canadian women were distracted and a distraction. Rather than focusing on obtaining the vote, women should take inspiration from Maunder and help the war effort by pursuing women's traditional role as a nurse.

If the *Review's* goal was to stop antis from taking inspiration from the progress of suffragists in Canada then it would have been depressed to read about developments in Canada during the first months of 1916. In reporting on suffrage's triumph in Manitoba, the *Industrial Banner* of London, Ontario expressed its belief "that public sentiment throughout Ontario would strongly approve of ... a bill along the lines of the Manitoba Suffrage Act." The *Banner's* optimism stemmed from the "rapidly gathering momentum" of the suffrage movement during the last decade. "To those readers who may not have kept track of the progress of the agitation," explained the *Banner*, "it may be surprising to learn that some thirty-six referendums that have been submitted to the voters in various municipalities have been endorsed, in most instances by

very substantial majorities.” The momentum of the suffrage movement in the years before the First World War coupled with “the splendid work and service they (women) have rendered in the present struggle ... have convinced hundreds who perhaps have not heretofore favored such a proposition to change their views.” Given these developments, the Ontario’s elected officials “should hesitate no longer, but legislate at once to enfranchise the women of Ontario.”³⁹

Unfortunately for the *Banner*, the Ontario government still had some convincing to do for it would not grant women the vote until April 1917. Nevertheless, the momentum was building.

Four days after the *Industrial Banner* emphasized the momentum of women’s suffrage to get the Ontario government to act favorably towards suffrage, Francis Marion Beynon of the *Grain Growers’ Guide* also reminded its readers “of the drudgery that has been undergone” by Manitoba suffragists, especially the Political Equality League of Manitoba. The *Guide* endeavored to disabuse those who claimed suffrage in Manitoba was “an easy victory” by highlighting the work of both the Political Equality League and the groups that preceded it. Probably the biggest event that marked “the changing of woman suffrage from a mere academic question to a live issue in Manitoba” was the Women’s Parliament in 1912, which took place two years to a day before the suffrage bill passed. Beynon attributed the “tremendous success” of the Women’s Parliament to the fact it turned the world upside down “thru the novelty of putting men, for one night, under the disabilities to which women were constantly subjected.” While the Women’s Parliament “added immeasurably to the prestige of the movement,” Beynon was quick to recognize that it was preceded by “long drab stretches of tedious detail and drudgery of which the public had no conception.” In closing, Beynon stated: “if there is any

³⁹ "Suffrage in Ontario," *Industrial Banner*, 4 February 1916, 4.

lesson in the success of the women of Manitoba for the less fortunate provinces of Canada, it is the necessity of getting a great body of people working on this reform.”⁴⁰

One of those in the “great body of people” responsible for making suffrage a reality in Manitoba was a British transplant: Miss S.H. Fenton, a former secretary for the Liverpool Branch of the Women’s Freedom League. As British suffragists had reported on suffrage successes in New Zealand and Australia before the war, they were now reporting on their sisters’ victory in Manitoba. While no evidence exists to indicate when Fenton arrived in Manitoba, we can assume she had been there for a least a few years from the *Vote*’s reporting that she “has had welcome opportunity to help in the Suffrage there.” Undoubtedly, Fenton’s suffrage work and connections back in Britain helped her in fighting for suffrage in Manitoba. At the same time, however, unlike in Britain, Fenton found herself in an environment in Western Canada where traditions and patriarchy were not as strong, given Manitoba had only been a province since 1870. The fact that Manitoba did not exist when the suffrage movement in Britain started would have depressed many British suffragists. Nevertheless, *The Vote* expressed its hope that Manitoba would be the ultimate catalyst for suffrage’s success in the metropole.⁴¹ In *Votes for Women*, Evelyn Sharp went further than hoping by proclaiming: “The women of our own country have every right to expect the Mother of Parliaments should choose this time also to heal an ancient sore.” Once the parliamentary matriarch granted “to British women the freedom for which British men are dying today” then the whole Empire “would be fully united.”⁴² That such a unification would come about because of acts originating in the Dominions would have been lost on no one.

⁴⁰ “The Country Homemaker,” *Grain Growers’ Guide*, 9 February 1916, 10.

⁴¹ “A Freedom Leaguer in Manitoba,” *The Vote*, 21 January 1916, 898.

⁴² “A Suffrage Stocktaking,” *Votes for Women*, March 1916, 148.

If the unity of the British Empire depended on the realization of women's suffrage then further proof of the Dominions leading the way materialized in February 1916 when Alberta and Saskatchewan committed themselves to it. With Saskatchewan and Alberta following the lead of Manitoba, women's suffrage, reported the *Industrial Banner*, "seems to have swept the three newest Canadian provinces like a prairie fire." The question now was whether antis could prevent the fire from engulfing all of Canada. From the *Banner's* perspective, antis "can certainly take but little comfort from the way things are shaping out in the Canadian west."⁴³ In the face of suffrage's progress, "the anti-suffragists are hard up for arguments that must fail to convince and are so far wide of the mark."⁴⁴ One of the arguments harmed by the suffrage victories on the scorched plains of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta was the claim that most women did not want the vote. Suffrage won by wide margins in each of those locations. While women did not have an official say in the matter, we can assume that the male politicians in Canada's three prairie provinces felt most women did want the vote.

Another anti-suffrage argument increasingly perceived to be "so far wide of the mark" was the claim that once women got the vote they would do nothing with it. Stephen Leacock maintained that once women received the vote, and recall he believed suffrage was coming, they were not going to do anything differently than men voters seeing that they would both be voting for male candidates. "Fortunately for us all they will not elect women ... the women's vote will not result in the setting up of female prime ministers and of parliaments."⁴⁵ Leacock's contention proved accurate. Canada has not elected a female prime minister or a parliament with

⁴³ "And Now its Saskatchewan," *Industrial Banner*, 18 Feb. 1916, 1.

⁴⁴ "None so Blind," *Industrial Banner*, 31 March 1916, 4.

⁴⁵ Leacock, "The Woman Question," 7-9.

a female majority in the decades following women's enfranchisement. Nevertheless, Leacock's broader prediction about women not electing women proved to be wide of the mark.

Within just a couple of months after getting the vote, women in Alberta made history by voting Louisa McKinney and Roberta MacAdams to the provincial legislature. In making Canadian history the women of Alberta also made British history, for McKinney and MacAdams became the first women ever to serve in a legislature throughout the British Empire. The historic nature of this event could be seen in the fact that New Zealand, the first Dominion to grant women suffrage, elected its first woman to office forty years after women received the vote there in 1893. In Australia, the second Dominion to grant women the vote, there was a seventeen-year wait after women received the vote in 1902 until the first woman was elected to office in 1919.

On the eve of such history making, the *Banner* addressed those anti-suffragists, like Leacock, who maintained the position that women would do nothing with the vote once they received it by referring to "an old but perfectly true saying that there are none so blind as they who do not desire to see." Of course, even with the election of McKinney and MacAdams enough time had yet to pass before observers could gain a fuller understanding of the impact of the women's vote in Canada. Fortunately for Canadian suffragists they could point to their sisters in the Antipodes to highlight just how impactful women were with the vote there. The *Banner* reminded its readers that when the Premier of Australia passed through Toronto a few years after Australian women received the vote he declared "the granting of the suffrage to women in that country had been the most beneficial legislation that had ever been placed upon its statute books." Australians, according to the *Banner*, were not the only Antipodeans who could make such assertions for "Apparently women suffrage has worked out well in New Zealand."⁴⁶

⁴⁶ "None so Blind," *Industrial Banner*, 31 March 1916, 4.

Discussion of suffrage in foreign countries, especially those countries where suffrage had become a reality, predated the First World War. From New Zealand women getting the vote in 1893 up to suffrage's most recent victory in Norway in 1913, suffragists and anti-suffragists used these instances and all the ones in between—Australia, Finland, and several states in the United States of America—to support their side's position during the decades immediately preceding the First World War.

Each September the trailblazers of women's suffrage, New Zealanders, commemorated the anniversary of women getting the vote in New Zealand. On such an occasion, one would think suffragists would be enthusiastic to refer to this pivotal moment in women's history. Not so, according to the *Anti-Suffrage Review*, for the twenty-first anniversary on 19 September 1914 “did not attract much attention among Suffragists.” “The absence of any cause for enthusiasm,” according to the seemingly giddy *Review*, stemmed from New Zealand women's apparent inability to bring about change in the areas they were most concerned with. Nevertheless, the *Anti-Suffrage Review* did find two recent examples of suffragists discussing suffrage in New Zealand, albeit in a slightly “apologetic note.”⁴⁷ The *Anti-Suffrage Review* selected recent publications by Ethel Snowden—a British labor, socialist, and suffrage leader in her own right—who visited New Zealand in 1914, before the First World War started, and by John Thomas Paul, who was a New Zealand politician, journalist, and suffrage supporter.⁴⁸

Ethel Snowden, wife of British Labor politician Philip Snowden, reported “that no special results of the women's vote are evident there, except in the one matter of the liquor traffic.” Mr. J.T. Paul from New Zealand echoed Snowden's assessment by stating: “Looking back over the

⁴⁷ “Woman Suffrage in New Zealand,” *Anti-Suffrage Review*, June 1915, 46.

⁴⁸ Raewyn Dalziel, “Presenting the Enfranchisement of Women Abroad,” in *Suffrage and Beyond: International Feminist Perspective*, ed. Caroline Daley and Melanie Nolan (New York: New York University Press, 1994), 52.

franchise period it is apparent that no revolutions have taken place, neither the fears of opponents not the early hopes of supporters have been fulfilled.”⁴⁹ According to Paul: “Women’s influence on industrialism has not been remarkable. Many improvements have certainly taken place ... But it is a little astonishing to know that New Zealand has not one fully-employed woman factory inspector.” New Zealand might not have had “one fully-employed woman factory inspector” since women obtained the franchise, but the *Anti-Suffrage Review*’s ellipsis left out important information from Paul’s article. Interestingly, the *BC Federationist* in Canada printed John Thomas Paul’s article in its entirety four months before the *Anti-Suffrage Review* selectively quoted from it. Thankfully the *BC Federationist* did not leave out the information the *Anti-Suffrage Review* did. In an article entitled, “The New Zealand Women and Voting: No Country Has Done More for the Women and Children,” the British Columbia newspaper explained: “A minimum wage of £1 per week has been secured for women in factories and shops, and it is no longer possible to employ young people without specific payment.” While establishing a minimum wage for women workers and outlawing the exploitation of young people would not have been the revolution suffragists would have hoped for it nevertheless represented progress. Thus, from Paul’s perspective, “the experiment” of women’s suffrage “has been more than justified.”⁵⁰

In discussing whether the women’s vote had produced any change in New Zealand, the *Anti-Suffrage Review* and the *BC Federationist* followed a prewar discursive practice of anti-suffragists and suffragists quoting “information on Australasian social progress and policy-

⁴⁹ “Woman Suffrage in New Zealand,” *Anti-Suffrage Review*, June 1915, 46.

⁵⁰ “The New Zealand Women and Voting: No Country Has Done More for the Women and Children,” *B.C. Federationist* (26 February 1915), 3.

making and on ‘women’s issues’” to support their side in the suffrage debate.⁵¹ As the different takes of the *Anti-Suffrage Review* and the *BC Federationist* on John Paul’s writing on New Zealand suffrage demonstrated, the “contested narrative” surrounding New Zealand suffrage in the years preceding the First World War carried over into the war.⁵²

Female suffrage in the Dominions was a topic of discussion when the Imperial War Conference and the Imperial War Cabinet met in April 1917. Henry Nevinston, one of the founders of the Men’s League for Women Suffrage, reminded readers of *Votes for Women* that the only representatives who “have enjoyed Woman Suffrage” were Australia, New Zealand, and the four Canadian suffrage provinces. Everyone else at the Conference, including Britain, “lagged behind” these progressive beacons dotted throughout the British Empire. While admiring the “free and energetic peoples” of these Dominions, Nevinston remained unconvinced that the “women among them are endowed with some special faculty which entitles them to the franchise and is denied to their kindred women in this country.” After failing to find any unique qualities that differentiated Dominion women from their British sisters, Nevinston returned to the experimental argument articulated by antis in the prewar period. “It used to be said,” explained Nevinston, “that Australian and New Zealand women might vote without danger to the State because those countries had no foreign or Imperial politics.”⁵³ In other words, when New Zealand and Australian women respectively received the vote anti-suffragists claimed it was not the end of the world given that neither one of these Dominions supposedly had any say over

⁵¹ Julia Bush, *Women Against the Vote: Female Anti-Suffragism in Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 10-1.

⁵² Raewyn Dalziel, “Presenting the Enfranchisement of Women Abroad,” in *Suffrage and Beyond: International Feminist Perspective*, ed. Caroline Daley and Melanie Nolan (New York: New York University Press, 1994), 46.

⁵³ “Shall Great Britain Lag Behind,” *Votes for Women*, April 1917, 252.

policy within the British Empire. British women, on the other hand, would have a say in imperial policy if they received the vote. Clearly, this would not do.

The “ludicrous” nature of this argument from Nevinson’s standpoint was already present before the war with Britain’s Australasian Dominions assuming increasing responsibilities for defense in the Pacific. Moreover, Australia’s rejection of conscription in two referendums in October 1916 and December 1917 demonstrated that Dominion’s agency when it came to “Imperial politics.” Finally, the convening of the Imperial War Conference and the Imperial War Cabinet in March 1917 made the antis’ argument even more ludicrous.⁵⁴ Representation in these novel bodies indicated the Dominions’ growing stature within the broader imperial structure. From here on out, Britain’s Australasian Dominions, as well as Canada and South Africa, would have an equal voice with that of Britain when it came to the Empire’s affairs.

The Imperial War Conference and Imperial War Cabinet ended their inaugural meetings in April and May 1917, respectively. While the promises of future conferences and cabinet meetings generated a lot of press in the spring of 1917, so too did two events which were directly related to women’s suffrage. On 15 May 1917, Britain’s Parliament received the Representation of the People Bill, which amongst other things would enfranchise women aged 30 and over. A day after the Representation of the People Bill reached the floor of the “mother of all Parliaments,” Prime Minister Robert Borden delivered an address in the Canadian House of Commons “in which he spoke of Federal Woman Suffrage as a certainty in the immediate future.”⁵⁵ Borden’s comments represented a reversal of the prewar and wartime practice of the Dominions being the tone setter for suffrage discussions. Of course, Britain’s Representation of

⁵⁴ The first Imperial War Conference met from 21 March – 27 April 1917. The first Imperial War Cabinet took place from 20 March – 2 May 1917.

⁵⁵ “The Outlook,” *Votes for Women*, June 1917, 265.

the People Bill had to some extent been inspired by suffrage developments within the Dominions, but at least in the spring of 1917 it was the metropole taking actions which produced a response from Canada.

As Britain and Canada debated enfranchisement bills, the suffrage press celebrated the work of the movement from its inception to the present day. Frederick Pethick Lawrence chose to focus on both the beginning of the “constitutional” side and the “militant” side of women’s suffrage. For the “constitutional side” the beginning was in May 1867, when John Stuart Mill presented the first Woman Suffrage petition to Parliament. Parliament’s “obdurate and even contemptuous” behavior towards this and other efforts on the part of the constitutional side to obtain women’s suffrage eventually brought about militancy in 1905. Recognizing the important roles played by both the constitutional and militant sides in keeping the movement going up to the First World War, Lawrence highlighted how the constitutional side “continued to peg away” throughout the conflict and it now appeared women’s suffrage was on the cusp of a major victory.⁵⁶ For Evelyn Sharp, “Woman Suffrage is a cause that was won in this country long before the summer of 1917.” Sharp pinpointed the day which marked “the real victory of our movement” to 17 June 1911, when a majority in the House of Commons “passed the Second Reading of the Conciliation Bill,” which would have enfranchised women on a large scale. As the government had done in 1908 it once again shut down women’s suffrage after the second reading. From the Government’s most recent “treachery” of 1911 until the Representation of the People Bill, women wandered “in the wilderness before reaching their promised land.”⁵⁷ The question was whether the House of Lords would torpedo it like the last time.

⁵⁶ “The Record of Half-a-Century,” *Votes for Women*, July 1917, 277.

⁵⁷ “It was a Famous Victory,” *Votes for Women*, July 1917, 276.

While suffragists hoped history would not repeat itself, anti-suffragists continued their fight in the press. The fear of suffragists now, according to the *Review*, was that the House of Lords would decide that the decision should be left up to the people in the most democratic sort of way: through the referendum. Anti-suffragists recognized that such a move would “throw a big onus on the House of Lords, but that body has shown itself on previous occasions a true reflex of popular opinion.”⁵⁸ While the *Review* agreed with the suffragists that the Referendum was “a revolutionary change in the constitutional machinery,” it did not share the suffragists’ claim that this disqualified it from being applied to this “problem” – women’s suffrage – “also without precedent in national history.” The referendum might have been revolutionary for old Britain, but “it has been unquestionably accepted as the very essence of popular government by the countries which started to build up a State from the very beginning according to democratic principles.”⁵⁹ One of the “democratic countries” undoubtedly being referred to here was Australia seeing that it had provided its citizens with the referendum from the founding of its government. In advocating becoming a little more Dominion-like, Lady Simon, the American wife of former Home Secretary Sir John Simon, asserted: “No measure for the introduction of Woman Suffrage ... ought to be proceeded with by the Government, until the question has been brought home to the constituencies by a General Election, or by a Referendum.”⁶⁰

Unlike in Britain, the constituencies in Australia included women. Australian women had participated in eleven referendums from 1906 to 1913. Of those eleven referendums only two passed. More recently, of course, the conscription referendum was voted down in October 1916. This most recent referendum in Australia was therefore paradoxical for antis. On the one

⁵⁸ “The House of Lords and Woman Suffrage,” *Anti-Suffrage Review*, September 1917, 66-67.

⁵⁹ “Suffrage and Democracy,” *Anti-Suffrage Review*, August 1917, 57-58.

⁶⁰ “Does the Country Want Woman Suffrage?,” *Anti-Suffrage Review*, August 1917, 60.

hand, it produced an unwelcomed result for opponents of suffrage given they were overwhelming supporters of conscription. On the other hand, it confirmed that when issues were sent directly to the people via a referendum it usually resulted in a “No” victory. Thus, the “weapon” that was the referendum was “double-edged” as further evidenced by the fact that “Australian women have shown no enthusiasm for such a laudable measure as Prohibition.” Nevertheless, “they were easily stampeded [sic] against Conscription, which the interests of the country, in contradistinction to the interests of the individual, required.”⁶¹ This would not be the case in a referendum in Britain over women’s suffrage, however, seeing that women did not possess the vote.

While recent developments surrounding conscription in Australia demonstrated the “double-edged” nature of the referendum, recent developments in Canada surrounding women’s suffrage provided “a grave warning to the people of Great Britain.” The gravity of the situation in Canada stemmed from the *Review’s* observation that “Conditions in Canada have been on all fours with those of this country” since suffragists in both locations “used the war as an argument for granting Woman Suffrage by legislative enactment without recourse to a referendum.”⁶² This though fit with the patterns of suffrage throughout the Dominions for: “In practically every single instance in the British Empire, Woman Suffrage has been introduced not as a result of the expressed wish of the people but owing to their apathy.” “An attitude of indifference” amongst the Australian and New Zealand people paved the way for women’s enfranchisement.⁶³ Eyes now turned to Canada to see if the North American Dominion followed the “suffrage through indifference” trend.

⁶¹ “The House of Lords and Woman Suffrage,” *Anti-Suffrage Review*, September 1917, 66-67.

⁶² “A Straightforward Issue,” *Anti-Suffrage Review*, May 1917, 34.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 34.

In Canada, the referendum was also being touted as the most democratic way to settle the issue of women's suffrage. Unlike Britain, however, it was the suffrage side which advocated for the referendum. Such advocacy stemmed from Borden's limited view of "Federal Woman Suffrage." As Canadians found out, just days after his return from the Imperial Cabinet and War Conference, Borden's version of suffrage only included those women who served in the military as nurses or who had a male relative serving in the armed forces. The decision to limit suffrage to just those women who had male relatives in the armed forces stemmed directly from the realization that the Canadian Parliament's passage of conscription on 29 April 1917 would trigger a federal election in the very near future. To legitimize Parliament's passage of conscription, Borden needed an election victory in December 1917. From his perspective, one of the ways to ensure such a victory was through the enfranchisement of supporters of conscription—which women who had male relatives in the armed forces were—while disenfranchising those who might be opposed to it, namely naturalized citizens of Canada.⁶⁴ Borden also disenfranchised many women from the Western Provinces and Ontario who did not have male relatives in the armed forces.

In response to the controversial nature of the War Time Elections Act and the Military Voters Act Francis Marion Beynon, former editor of the "Country Homemakers' Page" in the *Grain Growers Guide*, expressed her bafflement at "how any person opposing a referendum on the question of conscription can ever again profess to believe in democracy." Beynon found it "still more inconceivable how any persons supporting ... the recent Franchise Act can ever again pose as a loyal citizen of Canada." While Beynon regretted that Borden's move could not

⁶⁴ Joan Sangster, *One Hundred Years of Struggle: The History of Women and the Vote in Canada* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2018), 194.

be undone, she declared “it can be repudiated.”⁶⁵ One way supporters of suffrage attempted to repudiate Borden was by depicting his War Time Elections Act as a bill “that out Prussians the Huns.”⁶⁶

By the time conscription and limited women’s enfranchisement passed in Britain’s North American Dominion, Canadians had come to know Prussianism as the unscrupulous, autocratic, and militaristic ideology that started the First World War. Those who stood in the way of democracy’s expansion in Britain and Canada were portrayed as Prussians. Just as the Prussian label was applied to pro-imperialists and pro-conscriptionists in the preceding two chapters, anti-suffragists also received this label for their opposition to democracy’s expansion in Britain and Canada. In a war supposedly being fought for democratic values, what could be more Prussian than denying the franchise to women, especially as they played an increasingly significant role in the war effort? From the perspective of advocates of alternative historical discourse then, the mainstream’s anti-suffrage position once again revealed that there were Prussians “in our midst.” This was another indication that Germany did not have a monopoly on Prussianism.

In tapping into this existing discourse surrounding Prussianism, suffragists sought to convince their fellow Canadians they were experiencing “the same sort of Prussianism” with Borden’s War Time Elections Act. As Germany treated the 1839 Treaty recognizing Belgian neutrality as a “scrap of paper” in August 1914, so Borden did the same thing to the naturalization certificates of naturalized Canadians as well as to the franchise won by women out West and Ontario with his War Time Elections Act.⁶⁷ According to the *BC Federationist*, the most “Prussianized methods” used in the War Time Elections Act “states you must be for

⁶⁵ “Democracy,” *Canadian Forward*, 10 December 1917, 5.

⁶⁶ “The War Time Election Act: A Fitting Climax,” *BC Federationist*, 14 September 1917, 8.

⁶⁷ “A Scrap of Paper,” *Acadian Recorder*, 19 Sept 1917, 2.

Prussian methods”—i.e. support conscription—“otherwise you are disfranchised.” “The Disfranchisement Act,” as the *Canadian Forward* called Borden’s War Time Elections Act, was “the greatest danger that has confronted the people of this country since the franchise was granted.”⁶⁸ While the *Canadian Forward* did not specify which franchise— male, female, or both—it was talking about, it did not matter. The message was clear: Prussianism threatened the British Empire from both inside and out. It was up to Canadians on the home front to wage war against Prussianism as their husbands, sons, and brothers were doing on the Western Front.

While war was still being fiercely waged on that Western Front, British suffrage scored a major victory when the Representation of the People Act passed Parliament in January 1918, and subsequently received the Royal Assent a month later. The female suffrage component of this bill gave the parliamentary vote to women who met a minimum property qualification and who were over the age of thirty. Additionally, the Representation of the People Act gave women aged twenty-one and over the franchise at the local government franchise. For this latter category of women, they would have to wait another decade before getting the parliamentary franchise. The Representation of the People Act’s property and age qualifications caused some within Britain to criticize the bill for being discriminatory, especially against the lower classes. Nevertheless, for many within Britain even though the Representation of the People Act did not enfranchise all adult women, the bill was still a historic victory.

The historical nature of the act received attention from *Punch* magazine. In its January 1918 edition, *Punch* depicted Joan of Arc as a tattered, but not defeated suffragist. Holding the banner of “Women’s Franchise,” Joan looks triumphantly to the heavens with her sword sheathed. The battle for women’s suffrage in Britain during the First World War, especially after

⁶⁸ “Reaction and Liberty,” *Canadian Forward*, 10 November 1917, 1.

the WSPU ended its prewar militancy, did not include suffragists taking up arms for their cause. As this chapter has demonstrated, the press was a central battlefield for suffragists and one of their weapons was historical discourse—both past and present. Joan’s appearance as a suffragist at the end of the suffrage campaign illustrates the earlier point made about Joan of Arc: her image was adaptable. At the start of the conflict, it was Joan’s image as a military hero that suffragists utilized to illustrate the significant roles women had played in previous wars.



Figure 5.2: “At Last”

The roles women played during the First World War were varied. Sometimes a role did not deviate too far from traditional gender roles. Nursing, for example, was not considered threatening to established gender relations because nurses continued the caring and comforting work women performed for men in peacetime. The industrial work performed by women during

the First World War had the potential to overturn gender norms; however, even this was seen as unlikely given it was assumed women would go back to the domestic sphere when peace returned. It was in the realm of suffrage that women in Canada and Britain made history. Consequently, women's suffrage shifted the focus of historical discourse from that of the past to that of the present. Joan's return as a champion of suffragism—something that would have been totally alien to her—signaled a new era in history. Whereas in the past women had to perform heroic work like defending the nation or pioneering the field of nursing to be mentioned in the annals of history, women during the First World War forced their way into history by fighting for and receiving the vote.

In customary fashion, the *Anti-Suffrage Review* lamented the victory of women's suffrage in Britain. "The die is cast," exclaimed the *Review*, "and Britain alone of the Great Powers has conferred the parliamentary franchise." Up to this historical moment, "the experiment" of women's suffrage "has been confined to unimportant States" whose "responsibilities ... hitherto have been local rather than international." In a parting shot at Australia, the *Review* highlighted the insignificance of Australia in the international arena when it referred to Australia's rejection of conscription. "Australia rejects conscription. If she decided ... to withdraw every one of her soldiers from the War, the Allied cause would not, on that account, go under." Probably not, but a big fuss sure was made when Australians, women included, twice rejected conscription. Nevertheless, because of "the smallness of its population and its freedom from international commitments, the Commonwealth, equally with other Suffrage States, such as ... Saskatchewan, can indulge with more or less impunity in political experiments."⁶⁹ As in the case of Australia, one could debate that Saskatchewan "experimenting" with suffrage was as insignificant as the

⁶⁹ "Woman Suffrage," *Anti-Suffrage Review*, February 1918, 10.

Review claimed given it was the second out of three prairie provinces to grant women the vote at the provincial level during the first half of 1917. The fact these three prairie provinces paved the way for more suffrage victories at both the provincial and federal level in a Dominion that by 1918, in theory at least, had an equal voice with Britain suggests this suffrage experiment in Saskatchewan had ramifications far beyond the local.

As the *Anti-Suffrage Review* downplayed suffrage in the Dominions and lamented Britain going the way of the Dominions, *Votes for Women* struck a triumphant tone in the wake of Representation of the People Act receiving the Royal Assent. “It adds greatly to the joy of Suffragists in their hour of victory to know that Great Britain, slow though she has been to take action, is the first among sovereign states to enfranchise her women.”⁷⁰ This observation clearly had markers in mind with which to compare Britain’s suffrage campaign. Of course, some of the few comparable suffrage campaigns came from Britain’s own Dominions. The length of time from start to finish for the suffrage campaigns in New Zealand, Australia, and Canada was much smaller than that of the British campaign. Nevertheless, *Votes* asserted confidently: “The probable effect of her (Britain’s) example is incalculable.”⁷¹ It would only take three months for *Votes for Women*’s estimation to be proven accurate.

The trend of one suffrage victory followed quickly by another one held true in the case of the British Atlantic. Following the metropole’s example from a few months earlier, Canada’s Parliament passed the Women’s Franchise Act in May 1918. This act repealed the earlier limited women’s suffrage of the War Time Elections Act by extending the vote to all women who were British subjects, twenty-one years and older. While wrongs from earlier appeared to be righted

⁷⁰ “The Outlook,” *Votes for Women*, February 1918, 329.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 329.

with the repeal of the War Time Elections Act, the Women's Franchise Act had issues of its own from a democratic perspective in that it did not grant suffrage to Black, Asian, or Indigenous women. Suffragists may have depicted Borden's policies as being anti-democratic in 1917, but in 1918 they showed their own limited view on democracy by overwhelming supporting the Women's Franchise Act.

5.4 Conclusion

From the start of the First World War until the granting of women's suffrage in Britain and Canada during the first half of 1918, both sides in the discourse over women's suffrage utilized history to buttress their own arguments about the appropriate place for women in society. The initial focus of historical discourse within the broader discussion on women's suffrage focused on women in the past who had proven themselves in war as either warriors or nurses. From the suffragist side, evocations of previous female warriors—such as Boadicea or Joan of Arc—and previous nurses—Florence Nightingale and Edith Cavell after 1915—served to illustrate the unlimited range of women during wartime. For anti-suffragists, women warriors served to reemphasize the militaristic wing of the suffragist movement. The latter category of nurses served anti-suffragists well given that nursing was an appropriate expansion of women's role in society per the prewar concept of gender roles. In this more public role, women continued to be the nurturer of men.

While female nurturers and fighters from the past would continue to be mobilized throughout the conflict, the topic of suffrage experienced a resurgence by 1916. Of course, suffrage occupied a fair amount of attention in prewar discussions surrounding the appropriate role for women in society. The suffrage issue carried over into the First World War, especially as the Canadian prairie provinces granted women the provincial franchise in those locations. As they had in the prewar period, the earlier examples of New Zealand and Australia continued to

play a role in the historical discourse surrounding women's suffrage. After 1916, however, attention moved across the Pacific to Canada which appeared to be on the cusp of being the most recent Dominion to teach the metropole about democracy. Borden's War Time Elections Act soon revealed this was not to be the case. Britain showed Canada the way with the Representation of the People Act followed shortly by Canada's Women Franchise Act.

At the beginning of this chapter, Canadian suffragist Nellie McClung emphasized the central roles men and war had on the production of history. The experiences of the First World War would not alter this; men and war would remain the dominant subject-matter of history for decades to come. Nevertheless, suffrage's historic victories in Canada and Britain from 1916 to 1918 did add a new chapter to history. This new chapter did not produce a caesura that would separate the likes of Boadicea, Joan of Arc, and Florence Nightingale from Nellie McClung, the Pankhursts, or Evelyn Sharp. Canadian and British suffragists were linked to "great women" of the past by the fact they all fought for justice and what was right. Just as it was right for Boadicea and Joan to fight on behalf of their people, it was right for Canadian and British suffragists to fight for democracy's expansion at home.

6. THE PEACE CONFERENCE AND THE PEACE ITSELF

On the eve of the Paris Peace Conference, the New Zealand *Evening Post* pondered whether it would “succeed where the Congress of Vienna failed?” Admitting that a “historian of the twenty-first century will be in a better position to answer that question than we are today,” the *Post* nevertheless believed the peace conference from a century earlier provided “guidance from the circumstances and the consequences, the mistakes and the successes, of the previous experiment.”¹ The *Post*’s reference to the Congress of Vienna represented the continuation of a main strand of historical discourse which existed in Britain and the Dominions during the last two years of the First World War. As the *Manitoba Free Press* recognized, several months after the *Evening Post* posed its question: “During the last two years of the war much has been said and written about the Congress of Vienna and the ensuing Holy Alliance.”² In this chapter, the final two years of the war will be under the microscope to examine the historical discourse that was built around the Congress of Vienna and the ensuing Holy Alliance.

As with all the historical discourse surveyed thus far in this dissertation, the discourse built around the Congress of Vienna coincided with history being made. In this chapter, a main focus will be on the history being made by the Dominions, especially the Australasian Dominions, during the last two years of the First World War and into the peace conference. Of major historical importance from the perspective of the Dominions was their separate representation at the peace conference and their subsequent membership in the League of Nations. Additionally, territory captured by Australian and New Zealand forces at the beginning of the conflict appeared ripe for annexation by 1918 and 1919. As the Dominions continued to

¹ “1814-1919,” *Evening Post*, 25 January 1919, 4.

² “Peace Settlements – 1815 and 1919,” *Manitoba Free Press*, 22 September 1919, 9.

write their own history, they and the metropole continued to refer to the past for the purpose of shaping the present and the future. This coexistence revealed that even as world historical events happened all around them, the history of the past still impacted their lives in a myriad of ways.

From the time the United States entered the First World War in April 1917 until the end of the Paris Peace Conference in June 1919, advocates of mainstream and alternative historical discourse utilized the last congress which sought to rebuild Europe following a continent-wide conflict.³ In utilizing the Vienna Congress in this way, Mainstreamers and Alternatives hoped the future conference would avoid some of the errors of 1814-15.⁴ The Congress of Vienna's presence in historical discourse predated America's entry into the First World War. As we saw in Chapter Two, the Napoleonic Wars and the subsequent Vienna Congress were present in historical discourse from the very beginning of the First World War. Nevertheless, America's abandonment of neutrality in favor of belligerency did cause the presence of the Congress of Vienna in historical discourse to increase from April 1917.

It would be several months before the military position of Britain and its Allies benefited from America's entry into the war; however, America's decision to join the conflict boosted the confidence of Mainstreamers and Alternatives in Britain and the Dominions so much that they started to analyze "in detail the possible shaping of a future settlement after a military victory."⁵ As the previous chapter demonstrated, "peace through victory" had become a major war aim for

³ The more recent Congress of Berlin in 1878 was seen as important, especially for helping create instability in the Balkans, but it did not receive near as much attention from advocates of mainstream and alternative historical discourse in Britain and the Dominions as the Congress of Vienna did. For references to the Congress of Berlin see: "Peace Conferences," *The Times*, 19 October 1918, 8; "Why Have a Peace Conference?," *Evening Post*, 21 October 1918, 7; "The Peace Conference," *Auckland Star*, 21 January 1919, 4; "Peace and Internationalism," *Australian Worker*, 28 February 1918, 17; "The Irish Issue in its International Aspect," *The Advocate*, 8 March 1919, 6.

⁴ C.K. Webster, *Congress of Vienna, 1814-15* (London: Oxford University Press, 1919), iii.

⁵ John Mueller, "Changing Attitudes towards War: The Impact of the First World War," *British Journal of Political Science* 21, no. 1 (January 1991): 20.

the mainstream, and even for some Alternatives, in Britain and the Dominions by 1917. Again, “peace through victory” meant the only way to build a permanent peace was through the destruction of Prussianism. Of course, for the mainstream this meant the destruction of *German* Prussianism while Alternatives meant the destruction of all “Prussianism”—that of Britain included. The discourse surrounding the origins of the war, conscription, women’s suffrage, and rumors of peace illustrated that, by 1917, Prussianism had come to mean a variety of negative things: expansionist militarism, subservience to the State, disregard for individual rights, and in general an inherently undemocratic spirit. As with the discourse surrounding rumors of peace before America’s entry into the war in April 1917, the perceived Prussianism of Britain, and the broader Empire, historically and currently came under the spotlight of Alternatives. In this context, the question was whether British and Dominion Prussianism would impact the negotiations at Versailles and if it did would this make the peace which ended the First World War worse than the peace which ended the Napoleonic Wars? For Alternatives, only through a full victory over all Prussianism could a permanent, perpetual peace come into existence after hostilities ended.

6.1 Self-Determination versus the Holy Alliance

America’s entry into the First World War ensured that Woodrow Wilson would play an important part in shaping the discourse surrounding the future peace conference and the consequent peace. Vladimir Lenin was another person outside the British Empire who would also make significant contributions to the discourse being surveyed in this chapter. The important contributions from Wilson and Lenin stemmed from the belief that they both seemed to have their own formulas for a peaceful new world order. For our purpose, the focus here will be mainly on Woodrow Wilson, seeing that he became an ally of the British Empire and Lenin did not. Nevertheless, it is important to note that one crucial principle—self-determination—

which has come to be attributed to Woodrow Wilson in fact originated with Lenin. Three days after the United States declared war on Germany, Lenin and the Bolshevik-controlled Petrograd Soviet convinced the provisional government to issue a statement of its war aims, which included self-determination. According to Erez Manela, such a statement “represented the first instance that a belligerent government invoked the term ‘self-determination’ as the basis for its war aims.” Lenin may have been the first in this respect, but his actions stemmed less from a desire to see the oppressed peoples of the world liberated and more from his belief that this principle “was an important tool for undermining the capitalist-imperialist world order.”⁶ This Bolshevik strategy was on its fullest display on 29 December 1917 when the Bolsheviks, who now controlled the revolution, issued their peace plan through Trotsky. In referring to that plan—which proposed granting self-determination to Finland, Lithuania, Ukraine, Moldova, Estonia, Belarus, Poland, and Latvia—to Arthur Hansome, special correspondent of the London *Daily News*, Trotsky asked if the British Empire was willing to “give the right of self-determination to the peoples of Ireland, Egypt, India ... etc.?”⁷ If the British Empire refused to do this then, all the while advocating for self-determination in enemy countries, it would be an example “of the most naked, the most cynical imperialism.”⁸ Anticipating that the British Empire would not grant self-determination to these possessions, Trotsky declared in an interview on the eve of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations: “If we were really logical we would declare war on

⁶ Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 37.

⁷ The following countries of old Tsarist Russia “received” self-determination before the end of the First World War: Finland (6 December 1917), Lithuania (11 December 1917), Ukraine (autonomy 22 November 1917, independence 22 January 1918), Moldova (autonomy 15 December 1917, independence 6 February 1918), Estonia (22 April 1918), Belarus (25 March 1918). Poland (11 November 1918) and Latvia (18 November 1918) received self-determination after the signing of the Armistice.

⁸ Address from the Bolsheviks “To Peoples and Governments of Allied Countries,” 31 December 1917 quoted in Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment*, 38.

Britain now for the sake of India, Egypt, and Ireland. You have read our peace declaration.”⁹

Ironically, it would actually be the British who unofficially declared war on the Bolsheviks by sending in troops to Russia for the purpose of aiding the White Army.

In putting forth his plan for a peaceful new world order, American President Woodrow Wilson was also critical of imperialism, albeit in a more general way than Trotsky. The foundation for Wilson’s vision of a new world order stemmed from his belief “that the root of the problems of Europe in 1914 lay in the autocratic, multinational empires that simultaneously denied self-determination and democratic control of their subjects, and in an anarchical system of international relations.”¹⁰ From the time America entered the First World War to when diplomats gathered in Paris during the first half of 1919 to settle the peace terms of this horrendous conflict, “Wilson’s vision for the postwar world was disseminated to a growing global audience.”¹¹ At the heart of the American president’s vision were the two objectives of self-determination, with its corollary “no annexations,” and the League of Nations.

Wilson referred to the origin story of the war to assert his self-determination principle. “This war,” declared Wilson, “had its roots in the disregard of the rights of small nations and of nationalities.”¹² In going back to Germany's invasion of Belgium in August 1914, Wilson trod a well-worn discursive path within the English-speaking world. By tying nationalities into the origin story, Wilson presented his belief that “frustrated nationalisms” also caused the First

⁹ “Interview with Trotsky,” *Canadian Forward*, 25 January 1918, 5.

¹⁰ Alan Sharp, “Reflections on the Remaking of Europe: 1815, 1919, 1945, Post-1989,” *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 8 (1997): 6-7.

¹¹ Derek Heater, *National Self-Determination: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy* (London: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 53.

¹² “President Wilson’s Speech,” *Daily Telegraph*, 13 February 1918, 8.

World War.¹³ Thus, in discussing the disregard for the rights of small nations and the disregard for nationalistic ambitions, Wilson's two most promising and controversial ideas started to crystallize: self-determination and the League of Nations. In Britain and the Dominions these objectives inspired, and concerned, both Mainstreamers and Alternatives for they appeared "to be the herald of a new era in international affairs."¹⁴

The differing views of Lenin and Wilson for the postwar settlement contributed, and largely shaped, discourse in Britain and the Dominions from 1917 until the Armistice. An early indication of this came on 5 January 1918 during an "historic" speech by David Lloyd George.¹⁵ At the Trades Union Congress, the British prime minister proclaimed his words reflected "not merely the mind of the Government, but of the nation and the Empire as a whole," With such a force behind him, Lloyd George declared: "The days of the Treaty of Vienna are long past." In that previous epoch, "the future of European civilization" was left to the "arbitrary decisions of a few negotiators striving to secure by chicanery or persuasion the interests of this or that dynasty."¹⁶ Lloyd George's negative depiction of the Congress of Vienna would not have been surprising to a British public that, for quite some time, had viewed the peace of 1815 as flawed.

As early as the first half of the nineteenth century, many in Britain had come to see Vienna as a failure because it attempted "to suppress ... the two doctrines that were to be the political foundations of the nineteenth century: liberalism and nationalism."¹⁷ Of course, both liberalism and nationalism grew during and because of the Napoleonic Wars. Policies such as the

¹³ Alan Sharp, "The Genie that Would Not Go Back into the Bottle: National Self-determination and the Legacy of the First World War and the Peace Settlement," in *Europe and Ethnicity: The First World War and Contemporary Conflict*, eds., Seamus Dunn and T.G. Fraser (London: Routledge, 1996), 9.

¹⁴ Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment*, 6.

¹⁵ "Untitled," *Age*, 8 January 1918, 4.

¹⁶ "British War Aims," *The Times*, 7 January 1918, 7.

¹⁷ Richard Langhorne, "Reflections on the Significance of the Congress of Vienna," *Review of International Studies* 12, no. 4 (October 1986): 313.

Napoleonic Code gave many Europeans their first taste of liberalism in action. The problem with this first experience with liberalism was that it was imposed by Napoleonic France. The consequent growth of nationalism in reaction to Napoleonic France's hegemony over Europe did not die with Bonaparte's defeat in 1815; nationalism would only grow as the nineteenth century progressed. The same was true for liberalism. The growth of liberalism and nationalism in the decades following the Congress of Vienna did not occur without opposition.

The main source of opposition to liberalism and nationalism was the Holy Alliance, which was made up of the monarchist powers of Prussia, Austria, and Russia. According to Mark Jarrett, "Among liberals and nationalists, the 'Holy Alliance' was viewed as an instrument of repression and became a term of abuse." "The failure of the system," he continues, "was caused by its identification with the preservation of an autocratic and aristocratic way of life. The alliance was on the wrong side of history."¹⁸ In fairness to the British, they recognized this almost immediately, which is why they did not become an active member of the conservative Holy Alliance. Britain did, however, become a participant in the post-Vienna Congress System. The Congress System was a general agreement among the great powers—Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and France—of the nineteenth century to maintain the European balance of power through periodic official consultations with each other. While the Congress System represented "the first international organization set up by fully sovereign states," it quickly collapsed largely due to disagreements over how to stop the spread of liberalism, democracy, secularism, etc.¹⁹

¹⁸ Jarrett, *The Congress of Vienna and Its Legacy*, 367.

¹⁹ Langhorne, "Reflections on the Significance of the Congress of Vienna," 321.

One year before the First World War, C.K. Webster, who would play an important role at Versailles because of his writings on the diplomatic settlement of 1815, observed. “It is nearly one hundred years since the Congress of Vienna met,” explained Webster, “yet there has not been produced a standard work to which we can turn with confidence for a complete and detailed exposition of transactions which rearranged the whole map of Europe.” This was not to say that works on the Congress of Vienna had not appeared in the century since. “Often its errors have been exposed and its principles criticised, the exact methods by which it sought to achieve its purposes are to a certain extent still unknown.”²⁰ As Lloyd George’s speech of 5 January 1918 indicated, and as the subsequent discussion of historical discourse will illustrate, the negative view of the Congress held by many in Britain and its Empire during the antebellum period carried over into the First World War.

To make it clear that the type of behavior which was on display during the Congress of Vienna would not reappear whenever the future peace conference met, Lloyd George stated: “we feel that government with the consent of the governed must be the basis of any territorial settlement in this war.”²¹ Two days later, *The Times* responded to the “consent of the governed” comment by affirming that “we stand firmly on the basis of what has recently been called ‘self-determination’.”²² Amongst the peoples and places Lloyd George included in this principle were Alsace-Lorraine, Poland, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and Germany’s former colonies. As will be seen, the territories of the latter two empires would frustrate those diplomats at Versailles who endeavored to create a better peace than the one established at Vienna a century earlier.

²⁰ Webster, “England and the Polish-Saxon Problem at the Congress of Vienna,” 49.

²¹ “British War Aims,” *The Times*, 7 January 1918, 7.

²² “For Peace or War,” *The Times*, 7 January 1918, 7.

In the days and months following Lloyd George's speech, newspapers in the Dominions confirmed that the British prime minister spoke for them. The *New Zealand Herald* declared that "For the first time the principle of nationality is to settle international boundaries and determine empires."²³ Thus, there would be "no repetition of the Congress of Vienna."²⁴ The *Manitoba Free Press* agreed, believing such a commitment "marks the commencement of a new phase in human progress." The older diplomacy of utilizing "the smaller—even the smallest—states as the mere pawns in the international game of catch-as-catch-can is for the future forbidden."²⁵ Similarly, the *Australian Worker* explained that at the "infamous Congress of Vienna," the "destinies of the peoples of Europe were settled by a glittering group of scheming soulless politicians, sent there by Europe's kings and financiers."²⁶

For those kings and financiers, the only consideration was "The aggrandisement of dynasties."²⁷ Thus, according to the *Sydney Morning Herald*, the diplomats at the Congress of Vienna "thought that they could ensure peace by disposing of nationalities without their consent."²⁸ In other words, the "delegates had believed that men can be shifted from one ruler to another without regard to race or tradition."²⁹

How did the diplomats at the Congress of Vienna get away with such behavior? Simple. As the *Herald* explained: "In 1815, democracy did not exist."³⁰ Consequently, the people of a century ago were "pawns of the world chessboard" being played by "the cold, calculating, self-

²³ Mr. Lloyd George's Speech," *NZ Herald*, 8 Jan 1918, 4.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 4.

²⁵ "Self-Determination," *Manitoba Free Press*, 9 Jan. 1918, 11.

²⁶ "A World in the Making," *Australian Worker*, 17 October 1918, 17.

²⁷ "The Rise of Nationalism," *NZ Herald*, 14 February 1918, 4.

²⁸ "The President to Congress," *Sydney Morning Herald*, 13 February 1918, 10.

²⁹ "A League of Nations," *Sydney Morning Herald*, 17 August 1918, 12.

³⁰ "Disarmament in the Peace Treaty," *Herald*, 11 August 1917, 7.

centered hands of leaders.”³¹ In 1917-1918, however, things were different. “Now democracy is strong, and in spite of the war it is daily growing stronger.”³² As we have seen with the expansion of suffrage in Canada and Britain, democracy had indeed grown stronger over the course of the First World War. Democracy’s growth at the citizen level was matched by demands for the democratic control of foreign policy. As the *New Zealand Herald* explained, “there is a demand ... to invade the mysteries of the Chancelleries of Europe ... and to establish for the first time some sort of democratic control in a sphere hitherto sacred to kings and statesmen.”³³

Democracy’s growth coupled with the scale of the First World War convinced many within Britain and the Dominions that Congress of Vienna style diplomacy was obsolete. It was believed that the future peace conference would not be another Congress of Vienna because it would be “swayed by higher considerations than the relative power of dynasties.”³⁴ Unlike the diplomats at the Congress of Vienna, the peacemakers at the future settlement would “conclude the treaty not alone but in close harmony with the entire people.”³⁵ Consequently, peace at the end of the First World War was not going to be “a question of rearranging maps and huckstering territory” as it was in 1815. No, the issue at the future settlement would be “a question—nothing less—of placing the whole polity of the world on a sure foundation of righteousness and freedom.”³⁶

³¹ “A World in the Making,” *Australian Worker*, 17 Oct 1918, 17.

³² “Disarmament in the Peace Treaty,” *Herald*, 11 August 1917, 7.

³³ “The Rise of Nationalism,” *NZ Herald*, 14 February 1918, 4.

³⁴ “The Allies Pawns,” *Daily Express*, 28 January 1918, 3.

³⁵ “Points of Discussion,” *Manchester Guardian*, 14 September 1918, 6.

³⁶ “Greatest Drama in History,” *The Times*, 14 September 1918, 6.

While Mainstreamers, and to a lesser extent the Alternatives, were hopeful that a peace unlike any other would follow the First World War, there were some who cautioned about just accepting this as fact. As the *Alberta Non-Partisan* highlighted, at the end of the Napoleonic Wars people believed a new era lay before them because they were being fed “all the high-sounding mottoes and declarations which are doing service today.”³⁷ In a sobering tone, the *New Zealand Herald* explained there were no guarantees that the peace which ended the First World War would be any more successful than the Congress of Vienna at creating a new world order. “To be candid, there is no reason why the attempts to secure the peace of the world after this war should be any more successful.”³⁸

On of the surest ways of putting a foundation of righteousness in place was through the principle of self-determination. As Trotsky intimated though, self-determination would be tricky for Britain and the Dominions largely because the British Empire possessed territories—specifically Ireland, Egypt, and India—which had legitimate claims to home rule. Furthermore, the British Empire’s capturing of German colonies and Ottoman lands during the First World War proved problematic from the perspective of self-determination. Surely the peoples in these lands should be able to determine whether they wanted to replace one master—either the Germans or the Ottomans—with another one—Britain or the Dominions—or whether they wanted no master at all. Within four months of the beginning of the First World War, all of Germany’s Pacific colonies had surrendered to Australasian forces.³⁹ As the conflict was in its infancy, New Zealand took the Samoan Islands from the Germans while Australia occupied German New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, and the Solomon Islands. Almost immediately

³⁷ “Untitled,” *Alberta Non-Partisan*, 14 November 1917, 14.

³⁸ “The Rise of Nationalism,” *NZ Herald*, 14 February 1918, 4.

³⁹ For an overview of Germany’s Pacific Empire see, Peter J. Hemenstall, *Pacific Islanders under German Rule: A Study in the Meaning of Colonial Resistance* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2006).

after these acquisitions, the governments of Australia and New Zealand made it clear they intended to keep these territories for themselves—and for the British Empire of course.⁴⁰ The Chief of the Imperial War Staff, Sir William Robertson, recognized in 1916 that these acquisitions could be troublesome in the future due to New Zealanders and Australians demanding the colonies for themselves. According to Robertson, the fact the Samoan Islands were “the first conquest of a young people” made it highly probable that New Zealanders would “attach a high sentimental value” towards them. The same sentiments applied to Australia’s recently acquired possessions.⁴¹ Roberson’s observations proved to be accurate, for the governments of New Zealand and Australia did produce some headaches over the issue of Germany’s former Pacific colonies.

Britain’s two Pacific Dominions also played a vital role in capturing crucial lands from the Ottoman Empire. Coinciding with America’s entry into the First World War was the British Empire’s push in Ottoman territory. By April 1917, British forces had recaptured all the Sinai Peninsula from the Ottomans and were beginning to make inroads into the Ottoman territory of Palestine with the First Battle of Gaza. Several months would separate the First Battle of Gaza from Britain’s eventual conquering of Palestine by the end of 1917. Throughout the entire Palestine campaign, the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps soldiers played a crucial role, which undoubtedly led the *Dominion* back in New Zealand to see the campaign “as marking the beginning of a new crusade for the ousting of the Turk from the Holy Land.” According to the *Dominion*, the prospect of the British Empire ousting “the Turk who is wholly unfit to rule” would be viewed positively by Palestinians given their potential liberators had already

⁴⁰ WM. Roger Louis, *Great Britain and Germany's Lost Colonies* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 9.

⁴¹ “Memorandum by Robertson, Secret, 30 August 1916, Austen Chamberlain Papers,” quoted in Louis, *Great Britain and Germany's Lost Colonies*, 46.

demonstrated in neighboring Egypt how much better they were at ruling than the Ottomans. “The prosperity of India and Egypt under British rule is an impressive object-lesson which is not likely to be forgotten when the time comes for the national and territorial arrangement” of the Ottoman Empire.⁴² Thus, self-determination need not apply to the peoples of the Ottoman Empire, once it ceased to exist, because they would now be in the civilizing hands of the British Empire.

While the *Dominion* would not advocate for Australasians to administer former Ottoman territory, it nevertheless utilized historical discourse to make the case for why Britain should administer lands captured by ANZAC forces in the Middle East. According to William Louis, such a case was part of a larger process of the British Empire “to establish as a matter of historical truth that Britain ruled in the interest of indigenous inhabitants.”⁴³ One of the reasons why Britain had to establish such historical truth stemmed from the fact that individuals within Britain, its Dominions, and the world believed this was not the case given the campaign waged by advocates of alternative historical discourse.

In response to New Zealand and Australia occupying former German colonies and making inroads into Ottoman territory, advocates of alternative historical discourse turned to the British Empire’s recent past to see if “it really is Peace and Free Nationality that our rulers have at heart.” A writer calling himself “The Light of History” illuminated for readers of *Canadian Forward* what happened in the years and decades after Napoleon’s defeat. Just one year after defeating Napoleon, “Light” ironically explained, Britain “began to enjoy the perpetual tranquility which Napoleon’s downfall was to herald by bombarding Algiers, perhaps by way of

⁴² “The New Crusade,” *Dominion*, 7 April 1917, 8.

⁴³ Louis, *Great Britain and Germany's Lost Colonies*, 99-100.

a firework celebration of universal peace.” In fairness to the British, the attack on Algiers in 1816 was an attempt to end the slave trade there. The rest of the instances highlighted by “The Light of History” were not so altruistic. Demonstrating that in the century following Napoleon’s defeat the “White Man’s Burden was well upon us,” he highlighted British militarism in Burma, West Africa, South Africa, Afghanistan, Aden, China, India, Persia, Tibet, and New Zealand.⁴⁴ As Jurgen Osterhammel has argued, the periphery indeed served “as a safety valve for European tensions” as well as “a field for trying out new weapons” in the century between the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the start of the First World War.⁴⁵ Given the numerous instances of British militarism during the long nineteenth century, *Forward* thought the “guarantees of perpetual peace and the freedom of small nations will not be entirely secured by the smashing of the Huns.”⁴⁶ In other words, Britain may defeat the Hunnish behavior of Germany but Britain’s own Hunnish behavior, on display across the globe, would remain.

While “The Light of History” enumerated plenty of instances of British militarism carried out in the name of the “White Man’s Burden” in the nineteenth century, the author failed to include the violence meted out to Louis Riel and the Metis people of Canada in 1885 during the Northwest Rebellion. Such an exclusion from the list possibly revealed *Canadian Forward’s* own blindness to colonial violence perpetrated in its own back yard. “Light” did, however, recognize violence against the Māori: “In 1863, honour or something called us to New Zealand, where we stayed killing people for their own good until 1866.”⁴⁷ Coincidentally, a few months later, the *Maoriland Worker* offered its readers a paraphrased copy of the earlier article from

⁴⁴ “A Defender of the Rights of Small Nations,” *Canadian Forward*, 10 April 1917, 1.

⁴⁵ Jurgen Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 472.

⁴⁶ “A Defender of the Rights of Small Nations,” *Canadian Forward*, 1.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 1.

Canada. Before highlighting the earlier thirty-plus examples of British militarism, it gave a nod to the discursive battles being waged: “In these days when history is being re-written ... we weigh in our little contribution.” The *Worker's* contribution to the rewriting of history dripped with irony. After giving “the knock-out blow to the militarist Napoleon,” Britain helped “put the liberties of Europe on a sure and unassailable foundation, without which we had not sheathed the sword.” Britain’s sheathing of the sword against Napoleon might have brought about a measure of peace in Europe but outside of Europe it was another story. Britain’s desire for peace, especially within its Empire, would “always” be undermined by “some barbarous race” who “would compel us reluctantly to put right upon a sure foundation.”⁴⁸ Apparently the same thing was occurring in the Pacific and in the Ottoman lands. So why expect anything different?

If the British Empire’s prewar mentality and treatment of subjugated peoples influenced how it would treat conquered territories at the end of the First World War, then one could be sure that the peace would not be a lasting one. H. N. Brailsford, a founding member of the League of Nations Union in Britain, made a similar observation in the wake of the Bolsheviks publishing several secret treaties that the Entente had made prior to the revolution. All these treaties “had the effect of portraying the Allies as cynically carving up subject peoples among themselves.” As Brailsford explained, under the governments of Asquith and Lloyd George the British Empire with other Entente nations “have made among themselves a series of treaties by which they claim to decide the future destiny of a large part of Europe and the Near East.” Brailsford proceeded to focus on the 1915 Treaty of London to highlight how Congress of Vienna-style diplomacy already threatened to undermine the future peace conference. Per the 1915 Treaty of London, which resulted in Italy declaring war on the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Italy would

⁴⁸ “Keeping the Peace in a Turbulent World,” *Maoriland Worker*, 23 January 1918, 5.

receive Northern Dalmatia if the Allied Powers emerged triumphant from the war. These treaties, asserted Brailsford, would tie the hands of the British government. “To all arguments, from no matter what quarter they may come, they will have to reply, ‘I have promised: I must keep my word.’” If this was the case, then Britain would be doing the exact same thing as the diplomats in Vienna had done a century earlier. When Talleyrand asked Tsar Alexander for his take on international law, the latter replied: “I have promised Saxony to the King of Prussia.” At “this future Congress of Vienna,” according to Brailsford, Lord Robert Cecil would play the role of Alexander by declaring: “I have promised Dalmatia to the King of Italy.”⁴⁹ In one of the many ironies of the First World War, if the peace which ended it was to be different than that of 1815, then the 1915 Treaty of London, along with all the other secret treaties agreed upon during the war, needed to be handled like the 1839 Treaty of London: as “a mere scrap of paper.”

6.2 League of Nations versus the Concert of Europe

Brailsford’s casting of Lord Robert Cecil as the future representative of Britain at the peace conference is interesting given that at the time, February 1918, he was the Minister of Blockade, perhaps an unlikely position from which to demonstrate one’s credentials as a peacemaker. Nevertheless, by the time Brailsford offered his commentary Cecil had become the best-known supporter of the League of Nations.⁵⁰ In fact, J.A. Thompson has argued that, by 1918, Cecil “was more closely identified in the public mind with the League than any other person.”⁵¹ While the public may have identified Cecil with the League, Brailsford himself, according to Henry R. Winkler, was “the most outstanding advocate of real international

⁴⁹ H.N. Brailsford, “The Game of Barter,” *Herald*, 23 February 1918, 7.

⁵⁰ Sakiko Kaiga, *Britain and the Intellectual Origins of the League of Nations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 148.

⁵¹ J.A. Thompson, “Lord Cecil and the ‘Great Experiment’,” *Peace Research* 16, no. 1 (January 1984): 10.

government during the war years.”⁵² Brailsford’s depiction of Cecil, the advocate of new diplomacy, as a Congress of Vienna type diplomat is intriguing because it suggests that the journalist believed that even those who were committed to new ideas could still fall victim to the old diplomacy.

By 1918, “the league idea had been christened a ‘good thing’ by the mainstream of British politics” because it appeared to be the surest way to keep the peace.⁵³ As mentioned before, the creation of a League of Nations was seen as something that must happen at the end of the First World War. During its last two years, “the idea of a league of nations gained widespread support as well as political backing, which served to place it on the agenda of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.”⁵⁴ In Canada, the *Manitoba Free Press* took note of this development: “The serious attention which is now being given by British statesmen to the proposal for a league of nations to enforce peace after this war is one of many symptoms of the growing demand for a different and better international order.”⁵⁵

Just because British statesmen were warming to the idea of the League of Nations only in 1918 did not mean that the idea for that new order was completely novel. As the *Ottawa Citizen* recognized: “The idea of a universal league of peoples such as would bring perpetual peace has a history of centuries behind it.”⁵⁶ Similarly, Lord Curzon traced the intellectual origins of the League of Nations back to the seventeenth century. “The idea of a League of Nations is very familiar to students of the past,” he said in the House of Lords. “It has played a great part in the

⁵² Henry R. Winkler, *The League of Nations Movement in Great Britain, 1914-1919* (New Brunswick, 1952), 33.

⁵³ George W. Egerton, “The Lloyd George Government and the Creation of the League of Nations,” *The American Historical Review* 79, no. 2 (April 1974): 423.

⁵⁴ Kaiga, *Britain and the Intellectual Origins of the League of Nations*, 127.

⁵⁵ “A League of Nations,” *Manitoba Free Press*, 25 Feb. 1918, 9.

⁵⁶ “A League of Nations,” *The Times*, 27 June 1918, 10.

thought and literature of the 16th and 17th (sic) centuries and has been advocated by many authoritative and learned men.”⁵⁷ The *Ottawa Citizen* went on to highlight some of these men when it claimed the Duke of Sully—minister of Henry of Navarre from 1596 to 1610—as the “first practical sponsor of such a league.” The Canadian newspaper explained that after Sully “the Abbe St. Pierre and Jean Jacques Rousseau lent their geniuses to the task and Immanuel Kant ... advocated its attainment with his matchless talents and lofty idealism.”⁵⁸ Unfortunately during these centuries the idea for some type of international organization “failed to attract the interest or support of rulers or statesmen.” Thus, the idea of a league of nations “remained of purely intellectual interest” until, as we will see shortly, the nineteenth century.⁵⁹

The growing support British statesmen had for a new international order founded on a league of nations did not translate into automatic support from the Dominions. Antipodean Dominions especially were overwhelmingly unimpressed with the proposed League of Nations, as there was no guarantee that they would be represented in this new body. In New Zealand, Prime Minister William Massey believed “a strong British Empire was a greater guarantor of peace than any league of nations.”⁶⁰ Additionally, Massey and his government viewed the League of Nations suspiciously because of the fear that this international body would take over the administration of the captured German colonies of Samoa and Nauru. This fear was not unfounded, for many supporters, including Wilson himself, publicly discussed the idea that any captured German colony should be brought under the control of the League of Nations, not just one nation or Empire. The Australian government’s hostility to the League of Nations was also

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁵⁸ “The League of Nations,” *Ottawa Citizen*, 19 December 1918, 18.

⁵⁹ Richard Langhorne, “Reflections on the Significance of the Congress of Vienna,” *Review of International Studies* 12, no. 4 (October 1986): 315.

⁶⁰ Gerald Chaudron, *New Zealand in the League of Nations: The Beginnings of an Independent Foreign Policy* (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Company, 2012), 10.

partly attributable to this fear, but partly also to Prime Minister Hughes's utter contempt for Wilson's idealism.⁶¹ According to W.J. Hudson, Hughes viewed "war as being rather like a risky stock market play in which the winner should profit, and the loser suffer." From Hughes's perspective, "Wilson and the League ... jeopardized the profit that Australia properly could anticipate from a heavy investment of blood and money on the winning side."⁶²

In Canada, the government of Robert Borden generally favored the League of Nations. He did so, firstly, because he wanted to maintain, and strengthen, relations with the United States. What better way than to support one of the American president's most cherished goals? Secondly, unlike Australia and New Zealand, Canada had not conquered any territory outside of Europe. Therefore, they did not view the League of Nations with the same suspicion as Australia and New Zealand. This does not mean, though, that the Canadian government lacked territorial aspirations of its own. As Philip Wigley has pointed out, Canada had claims on the U.S. Alaska Panhandle, Denmark's Greenland, the French islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, and, last but not least, the British West Indies.⁶³

Of course, it was not just statesmen who demanded that a better world order come into being after the First World War. "One thing is certain," declared the *Canadian Forward*, "people will not easily tolerate a return to the precarious conditions of prewar days. They recognize that the old methods have ended in disaster."⁶⁴ As we have seen, among these "old methods" was the Congress of Vienna's refusal to recognize self-determination, underpinning

⁶¹ W.J. Hudson, *Australia and the League of Nations* (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1980), 5; Roger C. Thompson, *Australian Imperialism in the Pacific: The Expansionist Era 1820-1920* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1980), 211.

⁶² Hudson, *Australia and the League of Nations*, 19.

⁶³ Philip Wigley, *Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth: British-Canadian Relations 1917-1926* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 46-47.

⁶⁴ "The Aims of Labor," *Canadian Forward*, 10 August 1918, 2.

which was the system—the Concert of Europe or the Balance of Power—put in place after Napoleon’s defeat. It was this system to which advocates of mainstream and alternative historical discourse turned to show the counter-ideal to the postwar world they envisaged.

If we recall, at the beginning of the First World War a popular line of the mainstream was that Britain and its Empire had to go to war against Germany to defend its traditional policy of preserving the balance of power in Europe. Recall, too, that the advocates of alternative historical discourse challenged this narrative throughout the conflict. Nevertheless, Mainstreamers, such as the Australian *Argus*, maintained all the way until the end of the First World War that “For the fourth time in history the British are warring for the protection of the nation-states of Europe from the sinister domination of one of their number.”⁶⁵ According to the *Manitoba Free Press*, this most recent defense of the balance of power had “exposed the rottenness of the old diplomatic situation in Europe. “The meretricious institution,” explained the Canadian prairie newspaper, “mis-named the ‘Concert of Europe’ and the dangerous condition of false security masquerading under the deceptive formula of the ‘balance of power’ out to be condemned and banished, never to return.”⁶⁶

Brailsford made it clear what would happen if the Concert of Europe and the balance of power were not banished. Tapping into his classical education, Brailsford wrote: “The Balance of Power resembles the flux of Heraclitus. There is only one thing which may always with safety be affirmed of it: it oscillates.”⁶⁷ According to Brailsford, the Balance of Power system may have succeeded in keeping widespread peace, even for almost a century. Nevertheless, the fact remained that at some point the system would fail and large-scale war would break out. As

⁶⁵ “The German Colonies,” *Argus*, 15 June 1918, 7.

⁶⁶ “Belgium’s Future,” *Manitoba Free Press*, 6 November 1918, 11.

⁶⁷ H.N. Brailsford, “The League of Nations,” *English Review* (October 1918): 93.

the First World War clearly revealed, warfare in the modern world produced death and destruction on an unimaginable and unprecedented scale. From Brailsford's perspective, the time had come to move away from this unstable system, for if it was reconstructed another war far more cataclysmic would ensue. Or, as the paper Brailsford wrote for often, the *Herald* put it: if "a handful of men wedded to the ideas of the nineteenth century ... call the tune ... our children will find a piper of doom insistent on the payment of his bill."⁶⁸

For most advocates of mainstream and alternative historical discourse, the balance of power had been shattered by the First World War. At least one advocate of mainstream historical discourse, however, contested this belief. The *Evening Post* of New Zealand recognized that, though it has become "common practice to condemn the theory and the operation of this principle," it would still be "folly to declare the balance of power obsolete" until something better came along to replace, what it called "the best check upon Napoleonism known to the civilised world."⁶⁹ Once again, Wilhelmine Germany was connected to Napoleon. Here the purpose was to reiterate that, while the system erected after Napoleon's defeat was not perfect, it nevertheless succeeded in keeping Europe free from continental war for almost a century.

Most within Britain and the Dominions did not share the *Evening Post's* assessment. Be that as it may, the questions remained: what could replace the defunct Concert of Europe and balance of power? "At the present moment," the *Canadian Forward* declared, "there is only one proposition which can be regarded as practical and concrete ... and that is the proposal to form a League of Nations to guarantee the peace and security of the world."⁷⁰ Two days after Germany

⁶⁸ "Way of the World," *Herald*, 28 December 1918, 2.

⁶⁹ "Hertling and Balfour," *Evening Post*, 1 March 1918, 6.

⁷⁰ "The Aims of Labor," *Canadian Forward*, 10 August 1918, 2.

signed the Armistice, Lord Robert Cecil echoed this sentiment when he explained: “there remains no other method by which peace can be safeguarded except ... a League of Nations.” Recognizing, though, that “there are many who are convinced that the whole thing is just a dream born of war-weariness and sentiment,” Cecil admitted: “it would be folly to ignore the strength of the case of those who doubt whether such an organization can ever materialize. They can point with undeniable force to previous history.”⁷¹ As Lord Curzon, another staunch supporter of the League of Nations, admitted: “We have had at different times in history a number of League of Nations, the last of which, the famous Holy Alliance of 1815, foundered ingloriously upon the rocks of reasons with which we are all familiar.”⁷²

Undoubtedly, some of this familiarity stemmed from the historical discourse being examined in this chapter. The *Vancouver Sun* agreed with Lord Curzon’s assertion that there had been attempted leagues in the past: “History has seen one such league. It was known as the Holy Alliance. It was formed after the Napoleonic wars, and its real object was to prevent the peoples of the earth from discarding their autocratic rulers.”⁷³ Arthur Balfour, Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs, echoed the *Sun*’s assessment during an Edinburgh speech in which he stated: “There has been a League of Nations in the past ... It was called the Holy Alliance, and it has left a name of infamy for the dynastic selfishness and the reactionary folly of which it was severally and collectively guilty.”⁷⁴ Similarly, the *Ottawa Citizen* pointed out that the “idea of a universal league of peoples such as would bring perpetual peace” was seized on by Alexander I of Russia and, while his “project commenced with the best intentions,” it eventually “took the form of the Holy Alliance and degenerated into a compact between the autocrats of Russia,

⁷¹ “World Peace,” *The Times*, 13 November 1918, 6.

⁷² “A League of Nations,” *The Times*, 27 June 1918, 10.

⁷³ “The League of Nations,” *Vancouver Sun*, 27 October 1918, 6.

⁷⁴ “Mr. Balfour’s Indictment,” *The Times*, 11 January 1918, 7.

Prussia, and Austria to support one another in suppressing liberal and revolutionary movements.”⁷⁵

The condemnation of the Congress of Vienna then stemmed not only from its refusal to recognize self-determination, but also because of its responsibility in helping birth the Holy Alliance, which was the main mechanism by which subsequent attempts at self-determination were put down. As we have seen, it was hoped that self-determination would be granted at the future peace conference. If that was the case, it would then be up to the League of Nations to promote, support, and protect the newly established nations. If these things did not take place, then the League of Nations was going to be nothing more than a “second unholy Alliance” that would be “used as a weapon against the European people struggling for liberty.”⁷⁶

The fact that the Melbourne *Truth* took such a Eurocentric view revealed something of a blind spot for this reliable representative of the alternative press. Of course, Europeans would not be the only peoples “struggling for liberty” in the postwar world. *Truth*’s statement also revealed the growing belief in Australia and New Zealand that the captured German colonies in the Pacific should be excluded from questions of self-determination.⁷⁷ Much of this belief was justified by appeals to “national security,” arguing that the only way Australasians could be secure in the postwar world was if these islands were under their control and no one else’s.

One of the ways Australasians attempted to sell this national security argument was by depicting it as the equivalent of American’s Monroe Doctrine. As reported by the *NZ Truth*, Hughes on his first visit abroad emphasized to President Wilson “that the Monroe Doctrine

⁷⁵ "The League of Nations," *Ottawa Citizen*, 19 December 1918, 18.

⁷⁶ "Passive Pacifists," *Truth*, 16 February 1918, 6.

⁷⁷ Stephen Tillman, *Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 69-70.

should be applied to the Pacific Archipelago” because “the need for protection of civilised and native communities in the Pacific was infinitely greater in our time than when the Monroe Doctrine was formulated.”⁷⁸ Ironically, one of the reasons the United States of America established the Monroe Doctrine was to keep the “Holy Alliance” in Europe from squashing the independent movements afoot in Latin and Central America from the 1820s on, though it would also come to use the Monroe Doctrine to strengthen and consolidate its power in the Western Hemisphere.

Unfortunately for Germany’s former colonized a similar thing could be said about Australasia’s Monroe Doctrine. As Australians seized the German colony of New Guinea, the *Age* celebrated the consummation of a decades-old goal of Australian sub-imperialists.⁷⁹ “We have long since realized that we have a Pacific Ocean destiny, and for some years past we have been striving to attain Imperial recognition of our right to enforce a definite Pacific Ocean policy.” Thanks to the First World War “an unexpected path has been opened to the furtherance of our ambition.”⁸⁰ Sounding very much like imperialists in Australia and the United States from the nineteenth century, the *Age* articulated a line that many in the Antipodes had come to believe, by the end of the First World War.

While a consensus increasingly existed on Australasian expansion into the Pacific, a few dissenting voices could still be heard. The *Bulletin* warned that there would be lasting problems if the “Hands off Policy” meant “that while other hands are to be kept away,” Australian hands turned “the Pacific into an Australian lake.” At the root of those problems was the fact that

⁷⁸ “We Want Samoa,” *NZ Truth*, 22 June 1918, 1.

⁷⁹ For a thorough overview of Australian sub-imperialism before the First World War, see: Luke Trainor, *British Imperialism and Australian Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

⁸⁰ “Untitled,” *Age*, 12 August 1914, 8.

groups of people in that “Australian lake” had “rights as definite as our own.”⁸¹ By revealing that it viewed non-Europeans differently than Mainstreamers and many Alternatives, the *Bulletin* made it clear that happenings in the Pacific played an important role in whether peace and stability would follow the First World War.

If the *Bulletin* felt Pacific Islanders had rights of their own, the same could not be said for New Zealand’s Prime Minister, William Massey. According to the *NZ Truth*, Massey, while in Britain for Imperial War Cabinet meetings, declared: “Hands off Samoa.”⁸² In response to the New Zealand government’s position towards Samoa, New Zealand Alternative Harry Holland organized a campaign to highlight why New Zealand should not go the way of imperialists. In 1918, Holland published a short pamphlet entitled that illustrated how Samoa’s history “teems with interest and towers with tragedy” thanks in large part to the colonial powers of Britain, America, and Germany treating the Samoans “like pawns in a game by trading gamblers.”⁸³ Sounding very much like the historical discourse built around the Congress of Vienna, Holland stated : “What strikes the reader is the way in which these territories and peoples were bartered with little or no consideration for their own wishes.”⁸⁴ As we have seen, one of the main criticisms of the Congress of Vienna and the diplomacy of old was that aristocrats consistently “bartered” away the rights of common peoples. Of course, Europeans transferred their tradition of bartering away peoples’ rights to the non-European world over the course of the nineteenth century. The Samoans represented just one of the numerous groups to have experienced this. The novelty of the situation during the First World War came from the fact that Australians, and

⁸¹ “Peace and Freedom in the Pacific,” *The Bulletin*, 20 June 1918, 6-7.

⁸² “We Want Samoa,” *NZ Truth*, 22 June 1918, 1.

⁸³ Harry Holland, *Samoa: A Story that Teems with Tragedy* (Wellington, New Zealand: Maoriland Worker Printing and Publishing Company, 1918), 3.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 16.

New Zealanders, were the ones who appeared to be doing the bartering and not the Europeans themselves.

Undoubtedly, Holland was targeting the New Zealand prime minister when the former declared: “Today we are told by the advocates of annexation that the Samoans are quite incapable of governing themselves, and that this is one strong reason why we should undertake their government.”⁸⁵ The problem with the position, once again, was that such arguments were increasingly being challenged by Wilson’s concept of self-determination. Additionally, as Holland explained, the argument that “they cannot govern themselves” was inaccurate because the Samoans had a clearly delineated, hierarchical society and government when the Europeans had first arrived in the islands.⁸⁶ Holland asserted “that no people whatever is good enough to hold other people in subjection,” for “all peoples are capable of governing themselves according to their own genius and in the light of their own historical period.”⁸⁷ By taking these positions Holland and a few others, like the *Bulletin* and *Canadian Forward*, positioned themselves to be supporters of a new historical period based on self-determination and respect for all peoples, not just Europeans. The likes of the *Age*, Massey, and Hughes also reflected a new historical period in that they were on the cusp of achieving what their predecessors had desired but never achieved: territorial acquisitions via sub-imperialism. The actualization of sub-imperialism beyond the borders of Australia and New Zealand also reflected a new historical period for Britain and the Empire.

⁸⁵ Holland, *Samoa*, 4.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 4. Here Holland referred to the work by Reverend J.B. Stair, a Church of England Missionary, who wrote *Old Samoa, or Flotsam and Jetsam from the Pacific Ocean* (New Zealand: Papakura, 1893).

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 19.

In between the old and new stood the United States of America. America's role was crucial here for, unlike in the past, a non-European power would have a major say in settling European and global affairs. Given the American president's public commitments to self-determination and the League of Nations and America's growing power, it appeared as though the ending of the First World War would produce a new chapter in human history. Summing this up nicely, the *Evening Post* in New Zealand argued: "the entry of America into world-politics put ... a European balance of power out of date." This reordering of affairs, the *Evening Post* believed, "provides a magnificent opportunity for a reconstruction on comprehensive and enduring lines."⁸⁸ Austen Harrison of the *English Review* agreed, arguing that, had America not become a belligerent in 1917, then "the great war would have ended in the old way." Had America maintained its neutrality, argued Harrison, then "nothing much really ... would have happened" at the end of the conflict. Per history, the victors would usurp territory and resources leading to further animosities, guaranteeing another war.⁸⁹

From *The Times'* perspective, America's entry into the First World War ensured the future peace conference would not be "another Congress of Vienna," given that America "is not interested in our territorial questions as such." Furthermore, America increasingly had the upper hand seeing that Europe was "no longer master of her own house, of her own dynasties, even her own civilizations."⁹⁰ In the void left by Europe's decline, the United States "has stepped in, not to destroy, but to construct."⁹¹ Whereas Europe's destruction came about because of historical mistakes, America's constructive work would come about because of its separation from that history. According to *The Times*, America being "so distant from our territorial problems in

⁸⁸ "A World Trusteeship," *Evening Post*, 10 January 1919, 6.

⁸⁹ Austen Harrison, "The League of Nations Again," *English Review* (October 1918): 298-299.

⁹⁰ "President Wilson in London," *The Times*, 27 December 1918, 7.

⁹¹ Harrison, "The League of Nations Again," 298-299.

Europe,” ensured that its major impact on peace discussions and negotiations came “in the realm of ideas.”⁹² Out of the many ideas being offered up by the United States, those of self-determination and the League of Nations were most influential because they presented the possibility of something new. These ideas, according to *The Times*, would be “of enormous value,” for they offered the surest way the Versailles did “not repeat the errors of the Vienna Congress.” The best way to ensure history did not repeat itself was by allowing the United States to refer “European proposals to the test of the ideal.” For their part, Europeans would need to be “constantly plunging American ideals in the cold bath of facts.” “The chief hope of the world,” asserted *The Times*, “lies in the double reference backwards and forwards from facts to ideals and from ideals to facts.”⁹³ The peace which ended the First World War, therefore, would need to be a synthesis between the history of the past and the history of the present. The real challenge would be whether it was possible to strike a synthesis between the two without one dominating the other.

6.3 Versailles: A New World Order or History Repeating Itself?

As peace and diplomacy replaced warfare at the end of 1918, other Mainstreamers remained confident that the peace which ended the First World War would be different than any before it. In expressing such confidence, the mainstream once again utilized the Congress of Vienna. An example of this can be seen with C. K. Webster’s *Congress of Vienna, 1814-15* that the British delegation travelled with as it made its way to Paris in at the end of the First World War. In his memoirs, Harold Nicolson, who served as Lloyd George’s secretary at Versailles, recollected the impact Webster’s writing had on him and his colleagues:

⁹² “President Wilson in London,” *The Times*, 27 December 1918, 7.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 7.

After perusing this slim and authentic little volume with great care I felt I knew exactly what mistakes had been guided by the misguided, the reactionary, the after all pathetic aristocrats who had represented Great Britain in 1814. They had worked in secret. We, on the other hand, were committed to ‘open covenants openly arrived at’; there would be no such secrecy about proceedings; the peoples of the world would share in our every gesture of negotiation. At Vienna, again, they had believed in the doctrines of ‘compensations’ ... We for our part were liable to no such human error.⁹⁴

Of course, those “pathetic” British diplomats who went to Vienna were not the only ones to fall prey to human error in 1814-15. Nor, of course, would British diplomats be the only ones “liable to ... such human error” at Versailles in 1919. On the topic of British representation at Versailles, the one big difference between it and Vienna pertained to the position occupied by the Dominions. Unlike in 1814-15, when the British Empire was represented only by British diplomats, in 1919 it had representatives from Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. This was another indication of the growth in the stature of the Dominions and came about only through persistent politicking on the part of their leaders.

Suffice it to say, the historical importance of the Dominions getting a seat at the peace table made them just as confident as Nicholson in the prospect of establishing a peace without precedent. Three days into the peace conference, the *Auckland Star* stated: “The most terrible adversity in history has helped to cultivate a detestation of the bad old ways of kings and ministers. Men are determined to do all in their power to do justice to nations and make war cease.”⁹⁵ The *Montreal Gazette* confidently asserted that at Versailles: “There will be no secret treaties, no combination of nations to preserve the balance of power, no offensive and defensive alliances.”⁹⁶

⁹⁴ Harold Nicolson, *Peacemaking, 1919* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1965), 31-2.

⁹⁵ “The Peace Conference,” *Auckland Star*, 21 January 1919, 4.

⁹⁶ “The Congress,” *Montreal Gazette*, 20 January 1919, 8.

The central question that dominated preliminary discussions at Versailles was whether territorial questions or the League of Nations were to be considered first. As Erez Manela has argued, Wilson emphasized from the very beginning of the conference that the establishment of a League of Nations mattered more to the United States than “the specific territorial settlements to emerge from the conference.”⁹⁷ At the beginning of the peace conference, then, Wilson did not abandon self-determination, for he believed any disputes arising because of this ideal would be best dealt with in the newly established League of Nations, and not the peace conference. After listening to Wilson make his case for why the League of Nations should be considered first, George Lansbury, editor of the *Herald*, reported: “Wilson is one of the rare men who appear in history with a mission for the better of humanity.”⁹⁸ Wilson succeeded in taking the all important first step in his mission, for as *The Times* reported shortly after his speech, “the project of the League of Nations has been put in the forefront of the deliberations of the Conference.” Consequently, the League was to be “the foundation of the Palace of Peace” that was being built at Versailles.⁹⁹ According to his biographer, A. Scott Berg, Wilson fully believed that the League of Nations would be “the chassis on which the framework of the peace could sit and the future of international cooperation could advance.”¹⁰⁰

During the first month of the peace conference, the main topic of discussion was the League of Nations; this was in large part because of Wilson insisting it take priority over everything else.¹⁰¹ While it was hoped that the League of Nations might become “the foundation” of the Palace of Peace being constructed at Versailles, concerns remained over how

⁹⁷ Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 60.

⁹⁸ “From Paris,” *Herald*, 1 February 1919, 6.

⁹⁹ “The League and its Trustees,” *The Times*, 28 January 1919, 9.

¹⁰⁰ A. Scott Berg, *Wilson* (New York: G. Putnam’s Sons, 2013), 533.

¹⁰¹ Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment*, 60.

stable that groundwork was. From the beginning, it appeared as though it would be weakened by a party within the peace conference which wanted it “to become a second Vienna Conference and fail,” according to the *Herald*.¹⁰² Within this party, two factions existed. One faction, led by French Premier Clemenceau, remained “in favor of the old system maintaining the Balance of Power.”¹⁰³ While Wilson wanted this old system “consigned to oblivion,” his continental allies increasingly expressed concerns about abandoning “a familiar and well-tested formula.”¹⁰⁴ Additionally, those European powers had no desire to see the concept of self-determination applied to the territories already under their control.

The other faction within the “fail” camp, represented by Hughes and Massey, wanted the League of Nations to fail because of the fear that it, and not the Dominions of Australia and New Zealand, would take over control of the captured territories of the German and Ottoman Empires. In other words, this second faction wanted the League of Nations to fail because of the belief it would take the historic action of granting self-determination to the colonized. Ironically, then, it was the British Empire’s newest Dominions, Australia, and New Zealand, which engaged in the behavior of the past when it came to refusing self-determination. Australia, which twice voted down conscription, a decision that some feared would harm Australia's position at the future peace conference, was the Dominion most adamant about retaining captured German colonies—and, thanks to the Treaty of Versailles, would indeed gain the most valuable territory. Hypothesis: Australia won the grudging respect of the metropole because of its sacrifices, but

¹⁰² “The Conference,” *Herald*, 1 February 1919, 6.

¹⁰³ “Wilson and Clemenceau,” *NZ Truth*, 25 January 1919, 1.

¹⁰⁴ Alan Sharp, “The Genie that Would Not Go Back into the Bottle,” in *Europe and Ethnicity: World War I and Contemporary Ethnic Conflict*, ed. Séamus Dunn and T.G. Fraser (London: Routledge, 1996), 16.

also because of its fiercely independent spirit, as evidenced both by the results of their conscriptions referendums and by the actions of its premier, William Hughes.

It appeared as though the forces of the past scored a victory against the “chassis of Versailles,” for the word “self-determination” did not appear anywhere in the League of Nation’s covenant. Nevertheless, Wilson’s covenant did hold some promise for those seeking self-determination, as the president did include the “mandate principle for the governance of colonial possessions of the defeated powers.”¹⁰⁵ The covenant’s inclusion of the mandate principle did not come about without a fight. Once again, “a fierce contest of wills between Wilson and Hughes” commenced over the mandate principle with the American president winning this fight.¹⁰⁶ The biggest issue Hughes had with the mandate principle was that it appeared to give the League authority to “exercise oversight over colonial territories.” Moreover, the mandate principle assured the mandates would be “governed according to the interests of the populations.” Consequently, the mandate principle envisioned “the eventual independence of Germany’s former colonies,” because surely the people of these lands had an interest in self-determination.¹⁰⁷

On the topic of the mandate principle, *The Times* explained that the mandates “will not be Protectorates of the old-fashioned kind.” Instead, they would be “managing trusteeships” in which the trustee’s only purpose was “to develop the ward’s estate subject only to the restraints of law.” According to *The Times*, the people of Great Britain and the broader Empire should recognize this idea of trusteeship since it “is the theory which we have translated into politics in

¹⁰⁵ Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment*, 63.

¹⁰⁶ Andrew J. Crozier, “The Establishment of the Mandates System 1919-1925: Some Problems Created by the Paris Peace Conference,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 14, no. 3 (July 1979): 485.

¹⁰⁷ Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment*, 63.

the Constitution of the British Empire.”¹⁰⁸ As Stephen Stanton observed a decade before the First World War started, the British Empire had “no Constitution distinct from the British constitution itself” seeing it managed not only Britain’s domestic affairs but the Empire’s as well. Consequently, the British government “has established local machinery of government within the colonies.” In its “most enlightened and efficient methods of managing this machinery, the British government granted self-government to the people who were ready for it.”¹⁰⁹ Prior to Stanton’s article, only Canada and Australia had reached that rarefied position of being able to govern themselves domestically. In 1907 and 1910, New Zealand and South Africa, respectively, joined the ranks of Canada and Australia when these locations received Dominion status from the British government. These examples illustrated that once a people, with the help of the British Constitution, developed their “estates” to a satisfactory point then the metropole was willing to relinquish a great deal of control. The same idea, at least according to *The Times*, would be applicable to any territory allocated to Britain under the mandate system. Given these observations, *The Times* asserted that the League of Nations with its trustee principle “is no new-fangled idea forced upon us from without.”¹¹⁰

While the trustee principle may not have been some “new-fangled idea” for the British Empire, its application on a global scale did augur a new world order. “The old diplomacy has been routed,” asserted the Canadian *Globe*, as evidenced by the fact that the League of Nations would be given responsibilities that would make it “an active agent in the protection of the rights

¹⁰⁸ “The League and its Trustees,” *The Times*, 28 January 1919, 9.

¹⁰⁹ Stephen B. Stanton, “Is the British Empire Constitutionally a Nation?” *Michigan Law Review* 2, no. 6 (March 1904): 431.

¹¹⁰ “The League and its Trustees,” *The Times*, 9.

of nations, great and small.”¹¹¹ Undoubtedly, the main duty the *Globe* referred to here for the purpose of protecting the rights of nations was that of mandates and trusteeships.

In the end, optimists, like the *Globe*, were disappointed with how the League of Nations applied a multi-tiered grading system for the various mandates. Australia and New Zealand benefitted greatly from the way in which their mandates were assigned, for they escaped “virtually all the provisions of mandatory administration.”¹¹² With imperialists clearly in control of the League, the mandate system became a tool for the further usurpation of territory and resources.¹¹³ The once seemingly optimistic *Herald* in London responded to the apparent obliteration of self-determination by returning to historical discourse centered on the Congress of Vienna. “All the talk of a new era of peace and democracy,” which figured so prominently in both mainstream and alternative historical discourse during the last two years of the war, had been abandoned with the substitution of the mandate principle for self-determination. From the *Herald*’s perspective, the Versailles Peace Conference’s failure to recognize “the new currents of democracy and internationalism” demonstrated that it was “a body still imbued with ideas of the old Europe.” Consequently, the diplomats at Versailles “committed the capital folly” from a century earlier when they “tried to put the new wine into old bottles.”¹¹⁴ For the *Herald*, the “new wine” of self-determination could not be put in the “old bottles” of imperialism, even if the latter had the new label of trusteeship.

Agreeing with its comrade on the other side of the world, the *Maoriland Worker* stated in an article entitled “Another Scrap of Paper” that the League of Nation’s covenant “might have

¹¹¹ “The League of Nations,” *Globe*, 15 April 1919, 6.

¹¹² Crozier, “The Establishment of the Mandates System,” 485.

¹¹³ Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment*, 63.

¹¹⁴ “The Clique of Nations,” *Herald*, 22 February 1919, 11.

had some reason for existence in 1815.” In 1919, however, it had no reason to exist for “it is an archaism” because it included “no provisions for and no suggestion of self-determination.” Thus, the people of colonial empires “will be no freer after the plan is adopted than before it was drafted.” The Covenant was also “imperialistic” for the victors, Dominions included, were positioned to incorporate Germany’s former colonies into the Empire. Hence, even after a war for democracy, “empires will still be empires.”¹¹⁵ Here it was: Britain’s old possessions of Ireland and India—not to mention Egypt and others—would not only be maintained but they would now exist side-by-side with newly acquired territories in Africa and the Pacific. The difference between the old and the new came from the fact that the newly acquired territories were now possessions of the Dominions, which, while still part of the British Empire, were growing more independent-minded because of their individual experiences during the First World War.

In highlighting Ireland’s and India’s continued subjugation, the *Worker* returned to a trope employed by Alternatives since the beginning of the First World War: Britain could not be a defender of small nations, given that it oppressed small nations itself throughout its Empire. In depicting the League Covenant as “Another Scrap of Paper,” the *Maoriland Worker* also circled back to another claim Alternatives had made since August 1914: Prussianism was not limited only to Germany, as the mainstream claimed, for Britain and its Empire also had plenty of examples of it in the past. It was now on display in real time with Britain supporting its Dominions in their seizure of lands populated by peoples who more than likely did not desire replacing one white occupying force with another one. Like the earlier 1839 Treaty of London, which Germany violated with its invasion of Belgium in August 1914, the League Covenant was

¹¹⁵ “Another Scrap of Paper,” *Maoriland Worker*, 28 May 1919, 5.

doomed, because Britain and its Empire had no intention of respecting it when it came to the granting of self-determination eventually through the mandate system.

Across the Tasman Sea, the *Australian Worker* highlighted the hypocrisy of Britain with “The Jingo’s Song.” According to the *Worker*, Mainstreamers in Britain and the Dominions sang in unison:

With all our strength we’ll fight
 For rights of little nations,
 And help by gun and sword
 Their self-determination;
 Each people, by our aid,
 Shall give their own sire-land-
 Meaning, of course, all those,
 Save Egypt, India, Ireland

Democracy shall rule
 (In lands that don’t affect us),
 And tyrants – not our own-
 Shall fear us and respect us.
 No foreign yoke shall be
 In any far or nigher land;
 But this does not apply
 To Egypt, India, Ireland!¹¹⁶

In an article about Britain’s continued refusal to grant self-determination to three territories where there were movements for independence, the *Australia Worker’s* exclusion of New Guinea and Samoa, amongst other captured colonies, is interesting, given that Australia and New Zealand were now singing the same song as “the jingo’s.” More interesting is that such an exclusion came from one of the staunchest representatives of the alternative press to date. Maybe the *Australian Worker* believed the mandate system would eventually succeed in granting the newly acquired territories self-determination. Or, maybe, in its efforts to depict Britain as

¹¹⁶ “The Jingo’s Song,” *Australian Worker*, 27 March 1919, 10.

hypocritical through references to past and present wrongs the *Australian Worker* became blinded by its own government's hypocrisy. Whatever the reason, two things were clear: the territorial extent of the British Empire expanded thanks to the League Covenant; and the Dominions played an extremely important role in such an expansion.

6.4 Conclusion

Time would reveal that a peace built on such a foundation would not last one-fifth the time that the Congress of Vienna endured. Whether the British Empire's refusal to grant self-determination to Ireland, India, Egypt, New Guinea, Samoa, etc. had anything to do with such a short peace is debatable. Surely, though, this did not help. Many diplomats and commentators sought to make the peace which ended the First World War different than the peace that ended the Napoleonic Wars, or any previous wars for that matter. The historical discourse surrounding the Congress of Vienna was a clear reflection of such sentiment. Overall, most people within Britain, its Empire, and the world at the time recognized by refusing self-determination, a key component to any new world order, the diplomats at Versailles damned the future by repeating the supposed mistakes of the past. This collision of the old with the new paved the way for a precarious future.

7. CONCLUSION

By the end of the First World War, if not well before then, the majority of people recognized the conflict that began in August 1914 and ended in November 1918 was a watershed event in human history. Nevertheless, in what has been called the first modern war, history remained relevant, as revealed in the discursive battles waged between advocates of mainstream and alternative historical discourse in Britain and the Dominions; this has been a central argument of this dissertation. Initially, such an argument might not appear to be an argument at all. Surely, an imperial system which saw the metropole utilize historical discourse for the purpose of binding the Dominions ever closer with it during the prewar period would continue to pursue such a course of action when faced with its biggest challenge ever. And yet, much of the historiography, especially from scholars of the modernist school, on the First World War asserts that the unprecedented nature of this conflict caused a rip in the fabric of time, which divorced the past from the present and the future. While recognizing that for many people a caesura did indeed separate their pre-August 1914 lives from their post-November 1918 lives, this dissertation has demonstrated that history, at least for advocates of mainstream and alternative historical discourse, still served as a grounding mechanism in the face of unprecedented experiences. Beyond this, history also served to shape the discourse around some of the most pressing matters of the day: the origins of the war; conscription; women's suffrage; rumors of peace; and the peace conference itself.

While journalists, editors, and other contributors deployed all kinds of histories during the First World War, the focus here has been primarily on European, "American," "Anglo-Saxon," British, imperial/naval, and colonial histories. It was these histories Mainstreamers and Alternatives turned to repeatedly for the purpose of shaping the discourse surrounding some of

the most important topics of the day. On the origins of the war, advocates of mainstream history in Britain, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand had recourse to European, British, and imperial/naval histories to explain why Britain went to war in August 1914. Conversely, Alternatives deployed European, British, and colonial histories to challenge the mainstream assertions that Britain always came to the defense of attacked nations and that Germany had a monopoly on Prussianism. By highlighting numerous examples of British aggression against colonial peoples throughout the Empire prior to the First World War, Alternatives questioned whether the British Empire's motives in the First World War were as altruistic as the mainstream asserted.

On conscription, Mainstreamers had to move away from British history due to the fact that Britain had very little experience with conscription in the past—except for Cromwell's New Model Army, and Chapter Four demonstrated how negative references to this could be. To counter the negative associations people may have had with conscription, especially considering that Alternatives depicted conscription as the epitome of Prussianism, Mainstreamers turned their attention to American history, specifically to Lincoln. As discussed in Chapter 3, prior to the First World War Lincoln had entered the pantheon of Anglo-Saxon greats for his unswerving commitment to expanding freedom during the American Civil War. Part of that commitment entailed Lincoln making the controversial decision to implement conscription in 1863. For Mainstreamers in Britain and Australia, Lincoln's decision needed to guide Britain and the Empire, for it demonstrated that even great defenders of freedom recognized that even a great defender of democracy like Lincoln recognized that in emergencies one sometimes had to suspend one's principle for the sake of a larger goal. Alternatives disagreed on two grounds. First, once one embraced Prussianism, through something like the enforcement of conscription,

one never went back. Secondly, unlike the mainstream which claimed that conscription helped Lincoln and the North win the Civil War, Alternatives pointed to the riots and discontent that engulfed the North following the passage of conscription in 1863. From the perspective of Alternatives, Lincoln's enactment of conscription made the war effort more difficult because it introduced domestic turmoil during an already trying time. Thus, according to Alternatives, Lincoln's introduction of conscription should not serve as an example; rather, it should serve as a warning of what would happen in Britain and the Empire if conscription were enacted.

Lincolnia's dominating role in the discourse surrounding conscription was almost matched in quantity in the discourse surrounding rumors of peace and peace offerings that materialized from December 1916 to January 1917. Again, the German and American peace offers of December 1916 were not the only peace proposals during the First World War—there were seven that followed. The position of the United States in this situation undoubtedly proved to be one of the reasons Lincolnia played an important role in this history war. With the United States sending a peace note in December 1916 and Wilson's controversial "Peace without Victory" speech of January 1917, Mainstreamers utilized Lincolnia to criticize Wilson for failing to measure up to his illustrious predecessor. Additionally, the Lincolnia utilized by the mainstream in this context illustrated that Lincoln's refusal of peace proposals during the Civil War occurred because slavery had yet to be destroyed. In 1916, it was Prussianism that had yet to be destroyed. Therefore, like Lincoln in his fight for freedom, the British Empire could not consider any peace before it won its battle for freedom with the defeat of Prussianism.

Lincolnia was not the only history to be deployed by Mainstreamers and Alternatives in the wake of the German and America's peace notes of December 1916. The usual suspects—British, French, and German history—also played an important role in the historical discourse

surrounding the German and American peace notes. For the mainstream, British history supplied the example of how Pitt stood steadfast in his commitment to defeat Napoleonic France. The mainstream encouraged and expected Lloyd George to follow Pitt's example by forcefully reiterating Britain's position in the First World War: peace was not possible until Prussianism was destroyed. Of course, a central figure in the evolution of Prussianism was Otto von Bismarck. Mainstreamers turned to Bismarck's trickery with peace offerings to argue that Wilhelm's Germany was attempting the same, but the British Empire, being wise to German history, would not fall into the trap that had ensnared others in the past.

Alternatives responded to the mainstream's position that the destruction of Prussianism was the precondition for any possibility of peace by going back to British history, especially in Ireland, to highlight that Prussianism was not only to be found in Germany. By connecting Cromwell's brutal actions in Ireland in 1649 with Britain's response to the Easter Rebellion in 1916, advocates of alternative historical discourse demonstrated that Britain too had a long history of behaving militaristically towards others. So, while the mainstream argued that peace could not be considered until Prussianism was destroyed, Alternatives once again broadened the term Prussian to include British behavior in the past and present. The British Empire might be able to destroy German Prussianism but until it destroyed its own militaristic tendencies then there would never be peace.

The historical discourse surrounding women's place in society and women's suffrage in Britain and Canada primarily focused on European, British, and imperial histories. Initially, and especially in Britain, advocates of alternative history, such as suffragists, utilized British (Boadicea and the Women of Lyme Regis)—and European figures (—Joan of Arc)—to emphasize the heroic roles women had played in previous armed conflicts. Mainstreamers, by

contrast, emphasized women's more common and traditional role as nurses. Undoubtedly, much of this had to do with the mainstream's abhorrence of the tactics of the suffrage movement's militant wing. Keep in mind, though, that it was the actions of this small minority which allowed the mainstream to depict the whole suffrage movement as militaristic and destructive. As we have seen, the terms "militaristic" and "destructive" had become synonymous with Prussianism within days of the start of the First World War. So, too, had the term "anti-democratic" come to be synonymous with Prussianism. Interestingly, it was the perceived undemocratic element of the anti-suffrage mainstream which Alternatives utilized to depict opponents of women's suffrage in Britain and Canada as themselves "Prussians." As the British Empire, according to the mainstream, was fighting to bring about an end to German Prussianism, women in Canada and Britain, the Alternatives asserted, were fighting to end Prussianism at home. After the militant wing of the suffrage movement suspended their activities with the outbreak of hostilities in August 1914, the fight against Prussianism at home became peaceful. Nevertheless, the victory over anti-suffrage Prussianism was seen as being just as heroic as the feats of Boadicea, the Women of Lyme Regis, and Joan of Arc.

Women's victories in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta during the winter and spring of 1916 was not the first-time that women in the British Empire had obtained the franchise. By the start of the First World War, New Zealand women had been voting for over two decades, while Australian women had possessed the franchise for more than a decade. The Canadian Parliament could not even claim to have beaten the British Parliament to granting women the vote in federal elections; the metropole had enfranchised British women over the age of thirty a few months before Canada did the same thing in May 1918. Nevertheless, it was the prairie provinces of Canada that made history by being the first belligerent to grant women the vote

during the First World War. Additionally, the prairie province of Alberta became the first ever legislature in the British Empire to have a woman—Louise McKinney—serve in it. As Australia made history by being the only Dominion to reject conscription, Canada did so in the realm of women's suffrage. In both cases, it was the history made by the Dominions that presented potentially divergent pathways between the peripheries and the metropole.

If the discourse surrounding women's suffrage saw an elevation of imperial history, so too did the discourse surrounding the peace conference and the peace that was supposed to result. As with women's suffrage, a great deal of the elevation of imperial history occurred because of the history being made in the First World War by the Dominions, especially Australia and New Zealand, regarding territorial acquisitions. The territories in question—German New Guinea for Australia and Samoa for New Zealand—were captured by Australian and New Zealand forces in August and September 1914. From the beginning, the mainstream assumed these territories would come under the control of the Antipodean Dominions if the British Empire emerged victorious. Of course, this presented potential problems for the British Empire, given that it was supposedly fighting first for the rights of small nations and then eventually for self-determination. Little attention was directed at this issue until peace became a real possibility following the entry of the United States into the war.

America's entry into the conflict in 1917 increased the chances that a final showdown on the Western Front was close at hand. Consequently, peace once again became a central topic in Britain and the Dominions. Advocates of mainstream and alternative historical discourse turned to the Vienna Congress to sketch out how the peace which was to end the First World War would be different from the peace that followed the Napoleonic Wars a century earlier. Both Mainstreamers and Alternatives could agree that the Vienna Congress failed because it imposed

on the peoples of Europe a system inimical to democratic liberalism. For almost a century, the Vienna Congress was discussed and depicted negatively in Britain and then the Dominions. Undoubtedly, the decades-long negative depiction of the Vienna Congress contributed to the war-time consensus held by Mainstreamers and Alternatives as to why the last major peace conference failed.

The First World War amplified the discourse surrounding the Vienna Congress, as Mainstreamers and Alternatives blamed it for the untenable system that eventually paved the way for the First World War. The Vienna Congress birthed the Holy Alliance and the Concert of Europe. These two systems, along with the refusal of the Great Powers to recognize the claims of nationalities, eventually failed because they attempted to crush liberalism and nationalism. The nineteenth century made it clear to the reactionary powers on the continent that liberalism and nationalism would and could not be crushed. From the British perspective, the Congress of Vienna significantly strengthened Prussianism and helped elevate Prussia, and subsequently the German Empire, in continental Europe. Thus, after Prussianism had been defeated militarily, the last step in Prussianism's full destruction would come when the British Empire and its allies devised a different system than the one established by the Congress of Vienna.

The biggest differences that would separate the peace of 1919 from the peace of 1815 would be the way in which the former was predicated on self-determination and the creation of a League of Nations. Here was where the Dominions' attempt to make history collided with the mainstream's narrative of the past. Australia's claim on New Guinea and New Zealand's claim on Samoa appeared to contradict both the British Empire's commitment to small nations and their self-determination.

In anticipation of the peoples of New Guinea and Samoa not being granted self-determination, advocates of alternative history once again turned back to British and imperial history to point out that this should come as no surprise; this type of behavior was what the British Empire was founded on. As Alternatives utilized British and imperial history to challenge the mainstream argument that Britain always fought on the side of the oppressed, so they would pursue a similar strategy from 1917 to 1919, warning that history would not be on the side of the New Guineans or the Samoans. Just as the British subjugated the Irish, Indians, Egyptians, and others during the preceding centuries, it appeared as though Australia and New Zealand were on the cusp of doing something similar in the Pacific. The British refusal to grant self-determination to the Irish, Indians, Egyptians, and others at the end of the First World War, coupled with Australia's and New Zealand's acquisition of New Guinea and Samoa, revealed to Alternatives at least that British Prussianism was alive and well at the end of a conflict that was meant to end such behavior.

From the first shots fired in August 1914 to the final pen stroke on the Versailles Peace Treaty in 1919, history played an important role in the discursive battles between the groups I have labelled as Mainstreamers and Alternatives. The origins of the war, conscription, rumors of peace and peace proposals, women's suffrage, and the peace conference were some of the most pressing issues in Britain and the Dominions throughout the First World War. The fact that the discourse surrounding these issues contained a robust and historical component throughout four-and-a-half years of total war demonstrates history's staying power in the face of unprecedented experiences. This demonstration challenges the "Historical Break" school of thought, according to which it was those unprecedented experiences that caused the past to be divorced between the present and the future.

In conjunction with the challenges to the “Historical Break” interpretation, this dissertation contributes to the “Historical Continuity” school of thought but in a slightly different way than the other secondary literature from this perspective. The overwhelming majority of works that come from the “Historical Continuity” interpretation have countered “Historical Break” assertions by examining how many individuals and groups within Britain managed their grief after the war by turning to traditional forms of mourning and remembrance.¹ I concur with these historians that such forms of mourning and remembrance demonstrate that the past continued to be relevant and available for Britons, Canadians, Australians, and New Zealanders after the First World War. In this dissertation, I have illustrated numerous ways of how the past was used in Britain and the Dominions throughout the hostilities. My findings give a more nuanced perspective on the availability and relevancy of history in the First World War, but this dissertation also fits into the “Historical Continuity” school of thought, because it illustrates how there was a continuity of the past during and after a war so often understood as marking a definitive break with the past.

The discursive battles between advocates of mainstream and alternative history represented one of the clearest examples of the continuity of the past in Britain and the Dominions during the First World War. The foundations for the “history wars” fought in Britain and the Dominions throughout the First World War were established in the nineteenth century. This was true in both a literal and figurative sense. Many of the people and events referred to by

¹ Jay Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Stefan Goebbel, *The Great War and Medieval Memory: War Remembrance and Medievalism in Britain and Germany, 1914-1940* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Martin Evans and Ken Luan, *War and Memory in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Berg, 2007); Alex King, *Memorials and the Great War in Britain: The Symbolism and Politics of Remembrance* (Oxford: Berg, 1998); Bourke, *Dismembering the Male: Men's Bodies, Britain and the Great War*; John Gillis, ed., *Commemoration: The Politics of Remembrance* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); Adrian Gregory, *The Silence of Memory: Armistice Day, 1919-1946* (Oxford: Berg, 1994).

Mainstreamers and Alternatives alike were drawn from the preceding century: Napoleon; the Congress of Vienna; Lincoln; and Bismarck. But this was also the period in which the discursive battlefield between the mainstream and alternative press first became noticeable. Much of this had to do with the efforts of the mainstream to build a “Greater Britain.” Recall, advocates of Great Britain endeavored to draw the white settlers in the Dominions closer to the metropole by emphasizing a common racial heritage and history. This effort on the part of the mainstream produced a reaction from opponents who offered a counter the mainstream premise that the British Empire was built solely by and for white Britons. The divide between the mainstream and alternative press became more pronounced during the South African War, with both sides summoning history to either support or opposed the war effort. In the interval between the end of the South African War and the start of the First World War, the divide between the mainstream and alternative press did not widen significantly. It became a gulf only with the outbreak of the First World War.

Of course, the historical discourse surrounding the five topics discussed in this dissertation existed side-by-side with history being made. This fact was most pronounced when the topics of conscription, women’s suffrage, and the peace conference were being discussed through the prism of history. Discussions of the origins of the war and rumors of peace were responses to “events”—Germany’s invasion of Belgium and the peace notes from Germany and the United States—that would prove to be of historical significance, especially the first, but they were not novel in an historical sense. More powerful nations had attacked weaker nations in the past and peace notes and rumors of peace had circulated in previous wars. A slightly similar point could be made surrounding the issues of conscription and the peace conference. These, especially the latter, had played crucial roles in pervious wars. The novel aspects of

conscription, the peace conference, and women's suffrage in Britain and the Dominions during the First World War were related to the role that the Dominions played; the Dominions made history in all three of these areas. Australians made history when they rejected conscription in two referendums. The Prairie Provinces of Canada made history when they granted women the right to vote in 1916. Australians and New Zealanders made history at the Versailles Peace Conference when they were able to acquire lands outside of their domain. All the White Dominions made history when they were granted membership into the League of Nations.

I argue that these examples of history being made were just as important in shaping the identities of Australians, New Zealanders, and Canadians as Gallipoli and the Somme. Gallipoli and the Somme, amongst numerous other brutal battles, were fought in the name of the British Empire. The enormous sacrifices made by the ANZACs, on the Gallipoli peninsula and in the Holy Land, and the Canadian soldiers up and down the Western Front undoubtedly contributed to a sense within the Dominions that the possibility of a new, unprecedented path had just presented itself. This new path did not necessarily have to diverge from the path of the metropole and the broader British Empire. As the hostile position of Australia and New Zealand towards the proposed League of Nations revealed, many in the Dominions still felt a strong, if not even stronger, connection to the British Empire in the wake of the First World War. And yet, Australia and New Zealand, along with Canada, did join the League of Nations. As mentioned previously, several scholars argue that this moment represented the birth of national identities in these Dominions.

Were these instances enough to cause Australians, Canadians, and New Zealanders to want full self-determination away from the British Empire? In a global sense, this seems unlikely. Nevertheless, when these more localized events are considered alongside the bigger

events—like Gallipoli and the Somme—that Australians, Canadians, and New Zealanders participated in, then a fuller picture begins to emerge. The fuller picture reveals that, just as heroic deeds on distant battlefields helped new identities for the Dominions to emerge, so too did actions taken by Canadians, Australians, and New Zealanders on their home fronts. The latter did not end Britannic nationalism; yet they did call it into question, by introducing the possibility of new historical epochs for the Dominions.

Surely, in a total war there were other areas beyond conscription, women's suffrage, and demands for territorial acquisitions that represented challenges to the status quo in the relationship between Britain and the Dominions. A possible area for future research would be to distinguish these and ascertain whether they were discussed through the lens of historical discourse. Beyond looking at historical discourse in Britain and the Dominions, another area of future research might broaden the examination of historical discourse in other important locations in the British Empire, such as South Africa, India, or Ireland. One wonders whether the types of histories deployed in the Dominions would possess the same allure in other corners of the British Empire. Finally, a third area of future research would be to consider the ways in which the historical discourse in Britain and the Dominions during the First World War contributed to the richer historiographical landscape that emerged over the course of the twentieth century and continues into the twenty-first century.

APPENDICES¹

¹ Parliamentary Recruiting Committee, "He Did his Duty. Will You Do Yours?," London, Poster No. 20. <https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/1435>.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Archival and Digital Collections

newspapers.lib.sfu.ca/bcf-collection
newspapers.library.wales
open.library.ubc.ca
paperpast.natlib.govt.nz
peel.library.ualberta.ca/newspapers/ANP/
trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/

Newspapers and Periodicals

Australian Newspaper and Periodicals

Advocate (Melbourne)
Age (Melbourne)
Argus (Melbourne)
Australian Worker (Sydney)
Hamilton Spectator (Victoria)
Labor Call (Victoria)
Truth (Melbourne)
Sydney Morning Herald

British Newspapers and Periodicals

Daily Herald (London)
Daily Mail (London)
Forward (Glasgow)
Labour Leader (London)
Manchester Guardian
Pioneer (Merthyr Tydfil)
Round Table (London)
Scotsman (Edinburgh)
The Times (London)

Canadian Newspaper and Periodicals

Alberta Non-Partisan
Daily Colonist (British Columbia)
Globe and Mail (Toronto)
Industrial Banner (Toronto)
Montreal Gazette
Ottawa Citizen
Ottawa Journal
Western Clarion (British Columbia)
Winnipeg Free Press

New Zealand Newspapers and Periodicals

Dominion (Wellington)
Maoriland Worker (Christchurch)
Marlborough Express (Marlborough)
New Zealand Herald (Auckland)
Pelorus Guardian (Marlborough)
Truth (Auckland)

Books and Pamphlets

[published correspondence and diaries, diplomatic, official, and parliamentary reports, contemporary political texts and historical studies, memoirs, etc.]

“Abraham Lincoln and the Civil War.” *Round Table*, no. 18 (March 1915): 312-324.

Barker, Ernest. “Nietzsche and Treitschke: The Worship of Power in Modern Germany.” *Oxford Pamphlets* no. 20: Oxford University Press, 1914.

Brailsford, H.L. *Persia, Finland, and our Russian Alliance*. London: The Independent Labour Party, 1915.

Bryce, James. *Report on the Committee of Alleged German Outrages*. London: Macmillan & Company, 1915.

Dawson, William Harbutt. *What is Wrong with Germany?* London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1915.

Ehrlich, Ludwik. “Poland, Prussia, and Culture.” *Oxford Pamphlets* no. 87. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1914.

Fisher, H.A.L. *Militarism: German and British*. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1914.

_____. *The War and Its Causes*. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1914.

Fletcher, C.R.L. “The Germans, Their Empire, and How They Made It.” *Oxford Pamphlets* no. 6. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1914.

Fyfe, Thomas Alexander. *Employers and Workmen under the Munitions of War Acts 1915-1917*. London: William Hodge, 1918.

Gardiner, Samuel Rawson. *1649-1660*. Vol.1, *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate*. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1894.

Grasty, Charles H. *Flashes from the Front*. New York: The Century Co., 1918.

- Hassall, Arthur. *The War and Its Causes*. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1914.
- Harrison, Austen. "Towards a New Europe." *English Review* (November 1918): 448-457.
- Higgins, A.P. "The Law of Nations and the War." *Oxford Pamphlets* no. 24. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1914.
- Holland, Harry. *Samoa: A Story that Teems with Tragedy*. Wellington, New Zealand: Maoriland Worker Printing and Publishing Company, 1918.
- Kennedy, J.M. *Nietzsche*. London: T. Werner Laurie, Ltd., 1914.
- Macdonald, Ramsey. *Imperialism: Its Meaning and Tendency*. London: The Independent Labour Party, 1900.
- McClung, Nellie. *In Times Like These*. Toronto: Mcleod & Allen, 1915.
- Muirhead, J.H. *German Philosophy in Relation to War*. London: John Murray, 1915.
- Naumann, Friedrich. *Central Europe*. Trans. Christabel M. Meredith. London: P.S. King and Son, 1916.
- Prothero, G.W. *A Lasting Peace*. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1917.
- Riddell, George Allardice. *Lord Riddell's War Diary: 1914-1918*. London: I. Nicholson & Watson, 1933.
- Stanton, Stephen B. "Is the British Empire Constitutionally a Nation?" *Michigan Law Review* 2, no. 6 (March 1904): 429-445.
- Webster, C.K., *Congress of Vienna, 1814-15*. London: Oxford University Press, 1919.

SECONDARY SOURCES

Articles, Chapters, and Books

- Adams, R.J. Q. "Asquith's Choice: The May Coalition and the Coming of Conscription, 1915-1916." *Journal of British Studies* 25, no. 3 (1986): 145-176.
- _____. "Andrew Bonar Law and the Fall of the Asquith Coalition: The December 1916 Cabinet Crisis." *Canadian Journal of History* 32, no. 2 (1997): 185-200.
- Adams, R.J.Q., and Philip P. Poirier. *The Conscription Controversy in Great Britain, 1900-1918*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1987.

- Amos, Keith. *The Fenians in Australia: 1865-1880*. Kensington: New South Wales University Press, 1988.
- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*. Revised Edition. New York: Verso, 1991.
- Anderson, Olive. "The Political Uses of History in Mid-Nineteenth Century England." *Past and Present* 36 (1967): 87-105.
- Andrews, E.M. *The Anzac Illusion: Anglo-Australian Relations during World War One*. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- Archer, Robin. "Labour and Liberty: The Origins of the Conscription Referendum." In *The Conscription Conflict and the Great War*, edited by Robin Archer, Joy Damousi, Murray Goot, and Sean Scalmer, 37-66. Melbourne: Monash University Press, 2016.
- Aschheim, Steven E. *The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany, 1890-1990*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992.
- Atkinson, David C. *The Burden of White Supremacy: Containing Asian Migration in the British Empire and the United States*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017.
- Attewell, Nadine. *Better Britons: Reproduction, National Identity, and the Afterlife of Empire*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988.
- Bailey, Charles E. "The British Theologians in the First World War: Germanophobia Unleashed." *The Harvard Theological Review* 77, no. 2 (1984): 195-221.
- Baker, Paul. *King and Country Call: New Zealanders, Conscription, and the Great War*. Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1988.
- Beaumont, Joan, ed. *Australia's War*. New South Wales: Allen & Unwin, 1995.
- _____. *Broken Nation: Australians in the Great War*. New South Wales: Allen and Unwin, 2013.
- Beckett, Ian. "The British Army, 1914-1918: The Illusion of Change." In *Britain and the First World War*, ed. John Turner, 117-139. London: Unwin Hyman, 1988.
- Becker, Annette. "The Avant-Garde, Madness, and the Great War." *Journal of Contemporary History* 35, no. 1 (2000): 71-84.
- Behm, Amanda. "Settler Historicism and Anticolonial Rebuttal in the British World, 1880-1920." *Journal of World History* 26, no. 4 (2015): 785-813.

- Belich, James. *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Angloworld*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Bell, Duncan. "Dissolving Distance: Technology, Space, and Empire in British Political Thought." *History of Political Thought* 30, no. 1 (2009): 166-191.
- _____. *The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860-1900*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007.
- Berg, A. Scott, *Wilson*. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 2013.
- Berger, Carl. *The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism, 1867-1914*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013.
- Bernstein, George L. "Yorkshire Liberalism during the First World War." *Historical Journal* 32, no. 1 (1989): 107-129.
- Biagini, Eugenio, and David Blight, et al. "Interchange: The Global Lincoln." *The Journal of American History* 96, no. 2 (September 2009): 462-499.
- Binns, Amy. "New Heroines for New Causes: How Provincial Women Promoted a Revisionist History through Post-Suffrage Pageants." *Women's History Review* 27, no. 2 (2018): 221-246.
- Black, Jeremy. *The British Empire: A History and a Debate*. Farnham: Ashgate, 2015.
- Blaetz, Robin. *Visions of the Maid: Joan of Arc in American Film*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2001.
- Bogacz, Ted. "A Tyranny of Words: Language, Poetry, and Administration in England in the First World War." *Journal of Modern History* 58, no. 3 (1986): 643-668.
- Bongiorno, Frank. "Anti-Conscription in Australia: Individuals, Organisations and Arguments." In *The Conscription Conflict and the Great War*, edited by Robin Archer, Joy Damousi, Murray Goot, and Sean Scalmer, 68-91. Melbourne: Monash University Press, 2016.
- Bonnett, Alastair. "How the British Working Class Became White: The Symbolic (Re)formation of Racialized Capitalism." *Historical Sociology* 11, no. 3 (1998): 316-340.
- Bosco, Andrea. *The Round Table Movement and the Fall of the 'Second' British Empire (1909 – 1919)*. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017.
- Bossenbrook, William J. *The German Mind*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1961.
- Bourne, J.M. *Britain and the Great War: 1914-1918*. London: Edward Arnold, 1989.

- Bourke, Joanna. *Dismembering the Male: Men's Bodies, Britain and the Great War*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.
- Brand, Carl F. "The Reaction of British Labor to the Policies of President Wilson during the World War." *American Historical Review* 38, no. 2 (1933): 263-285.
- Brunauer, Esther Caukin. "The Peace Proposals of December, 1916-January, 1917." *Journal of Modern History* 4, no. 4 (1932): 544-571.
- Bridgwater, Patrick. *Nietzsche in Anglosaxony: A Study of Nietzsche's Impact on English and American Literature*. New York: Leicester University Press, 1972.
- Brown, Robert Craig and Cook, Ramsey. *Canada, 1896-1921: A Nation Transformed*. McClelland and Stewart Limited: Toronto, 1974
- Brown, Judith, and William. Roger Louis, eds. *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, Vol. 4. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Bruntz, George. *Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire in 1918*. New York: Arno Press, 1972.
- Buitenhuis, Peter. *The Great War of Words: British, American, and Canadian Propaganda and Fiction, 1914-1933*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987.
- Buckner, Phillip, ed. *Canada and the British Empire*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- _____. "Reinventing the British World." *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs* 92, no. 368 (2003): 77-88.
- Burk, Kathleen. "Great Britain in the United States, 1917-1918: The Turning Point." *International History Review* 1, no. 2 (1979): 228-245.
- Bush, Julia. *Women Against the Vote: Female Anti-Suffragism in Britain*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Cameron, Rebecca. "From Great Women to Top Girls." *Comparative Drama* 43, no. 2 (Summer 2009): 143-166.
- Cavell, Janice. "The Imperial Race and the Immigration Sieve: The Canadian Debate on Assisted British Migration and Empire Settlement, 1900-30." *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 34, no. 3 (2006): 345-367.
- Chambers, Frank P. *The War Behind the War: 1914-1918: A History of the Political and Civilian Fronts*. London: Faber and Faber, 1939.
- Chaudron, Gerald. *New Zealand in the League of Nations: The Beginnings of an Independent Foreign Policy*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2012.

- Churchill, Randolph S. *Lord Derby: King of Lancashire*. New York: Putnam, 1960.
- Claeys, Gregory. *Imperial Sceptics: British Critics of Empire, 1850-1920*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Cline, Catherine Ann. "British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles." *Albion* 20, no. 1 (1988): 43-58.
- Clive, John. "The Use of the Past in Victorian England." *Salmagundi* nos. 68-69 (1985-86): 48-65
- Coombes, Annie E. *Rethinking Settler Colonialism: History and Memory in Australia, Canada, Aotearoa New Zealand and South Africa*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006.
- Cork, Richard. *A Bitter Truth: The Avant-Garde and the Great War*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994.
- Cosgrove, Richard. "A Usable Past: History and the Politics of National Identity in Late Victorian England." *The Parliamentary History Yearbook* 7, no. 1 (2008): 30-42.
- Covington, Sarah. "The Odious Demon from Across the Sea, Oliver Cromwell, Memory and the Dislocations of Ireland." In *Memory before Modernity*, ed. Erika Kuijpers, Judith Pollmann, Johannes Müller, and Jasper van der Steen, 149-164. Leiden: Brill, 2013.
- Crozier, Andrew J. "The Establishment of the Mandates System 1919-1925: Some Problems Created by the Paris Peace Conference." *Journal of Contemporary History* 14, no. 3 (July 1979): 483-523.
- Dalziel, Raewyn. "Presenting the Enfranchisement of Women Abroad." In *Suffrage and Beyond: International Feminist Perspective*, ed. Caroline Daley and Melanie Nolan, 42-64. New York: New York University Press, 1994.
- Darwin, John. *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World System, 1830-1970*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Davey, Arthur. *The British Pro-Boers, 1877-1902*. Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1978.
- DeGroot, Gerard. *Blighty: British Society in the Era of the Great War*. London: Longman, 1996.
- Demm, Eberhard. "Propaganda and Caricature in the First World War." *Journal of Contemporary History* 28, no. 1 (1993): 163-192.

- De Nie, Michael. "The London Press and the American Civil War." In *Anglo-American Media Interactions, 1850-2000*, ed. Joel H. Wiener and Mark Hampton, 129-154. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
- Denman, Terence. "'Ethnic Soldiers Pure and Simple': The Irish in the Late Victorian British Army." *War in History* 3, no. 3 (1996): 253-273.
- Douglas, Roy. "Voluntary Enlistment in the First World War and the Work of the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee." *Journal of Modern History* 42, no. 4 (1970): 564-585.
- Eddy, John and Deryck Schreuder, eds. *The Rise of Colonial Nationalism: Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa First Assert the Nationalities, 1880-1914*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1988.
- Egerton, George W. "The Lloyd George Government and the Creation of the League of Nations." *American Historical Review* 79, no. 2 (1974): 419-444.
- Eksteins, Modris. *Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989.
- Ellis, John S. "'The Methods of Barbarism' and the 'Rights of Small Nations': War Propaganda and British Pluralism." *Albion* 30, no. 1 (1998): 49-75.
- Evans, Martin, and Ken Luan. *War and Memory in the Twentieth Century*. Oxford: Berg, 2007.
- Faraut, Martine. "Women Resisting the Vote: A Case of Anti-Feminism." *Women's History Review* 12, no. 4 (2003): 605-621.
- Farr, Martin. "A Compelling Case for Voluntarism: Britain's Alternative Strategy, 1915-1916." *War in History* 9, no. 3 (2002): 279-306.
- Farish, Matthew. "Modern Witnesses: Foreign Correspondents, Geopolitical Vision, and the First World War." *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 26, no. 3 (2001): 273-287.
- Fell, Alison S., and Claudia Sternberg. "Nurse-Martyr-Heroine: Representations of Edith Cavell in Interwar Britain, France and Belgium." *Journal of War & Culture Studies* 11, no. 4 (2018): 273-290.
- Fest, W.B. "British War Aims and German Peace Feelers: December 1916-November 1918." *Historical Journal* 15, no. 2 (1972): 285-308.
- Fitzhardinge, L.F. *The The Little Digger 1914-1952*. Vol. 2, *A Political Biography of William Morris Hughes*. Sydney: Angus and Robertson Publishers, 1979.
- Fletcher, Ian Christopher. "Coloring the World." *Peace & Change: A Journal of Peace Research* 40, no. 2 (2015): 226-33.

- _____. "Double Meanings: Nation and Empire in the Edwardian Era." In *After the Imperial Turn: Thinking With and Through the Nation*, ed. Antoinette Burton, 246-59. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003.
- _____. "Reframing the Edwardian Crisis: Contentious Citizenship in the British Empire before the First World War." *World History Bulletin* 29, no. 2 (2013): 37-42.
- _____. "Right to the Empire?: British Imperial Citizenship before the First World War." In *Unmooring the Komagata Maru: Charting Colonial Trajectories*, ed. Rita Kaur Dhamoon, Davina Bhandar, Renisa Mawani, and Satwinder Kaur Bains, 35-55. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2019.
- Ian Christopher Fletcher, Laura E. Nym Mayhall, and Philippa Levine, eds. *Women's Suffrage in the British Empire: Citizenship, Nation, and Race*. London: Routledge, 2000.
- Foucault, Michel. "Society Must Be Defended": *Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976*. Translated by David Macey. New York: Picador, 1997.
- Foster, Leonie. *High Hopes: The Men and the Motives of the Australian Round Table Movement*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1987.
- Fraser, Peter. "Lord Beaverbrook's Fabrications in *Politicians and the War, 1914-1916*." *Historical Journal* 25, no. 1 (1982): 147-166.
- Fraser, Peter. "British War Policy and the Crisis of Liberalism in May 1915." *Journal of Modern History* 54, no. 1 (1982): 1-26.
- _____. "The British 'Shells Scandal' of 1915." *Canadian Journal of History* 18, no. 1 (1983): 69-86.
- French, David. *British Strategy and War Aims*. Winchester, Mass.: Allen and Unwin Inc., 1986.
- _____. *The Strategy of the Lloyd George Coalition: 1916-1918*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.
- _____. "The Meaning of Attrition, 1914-1916." *English Historical Review* 103, no. 47 (1988): 385-405.
- Gillis, John, ed. *Commemoration: The Politics of Remembrance*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- Goebbel, Stefan. *The Great War and Medieval Memory: War Remembrance and Medievalism in Britain and Germany, 1914-1940*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Goodlad, Graham. "British Governments, War, and Society, 1793-1918." *History Review*, no. 55 (2006): 9-14.
- Goldstein, Erik. "Historians Outside the Academy: G.W. Prothero and the Experience of the Foreign Office Historical Section, 1917-1920." *Historical Research* 63, no. 151 (June 1990): 195 – 211.

- Gopal, Priyamvada. *Insurgent Empire: Anticolonial Resistance and British Dissent*. London: Verso, 2019.
- Gorman, Daniel. *Imperial Citizenship: Empire and the Question of Belonging*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006.
- _____. "Lionel Curtis, Imperial Citizenship and the Quest for Unity." *The Historian* 66, no. 1 (2004): 67-96.
- Grainger, John D. *The British Navy in the Baltic*. Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2014.
- Green, Leanne. "Advertising War: Picturing Belgium in First World War Publicity." *Media, War & Conflict* vol. 7, no. 3 (December 2014): 309-325.
- Greenhalgh, Elizabeth. "Why the British were on the Somme in 1916." *War in History* 6, no. 2 (1999): 147-173.
- Gregory, Adrian. *The Silence of Memory: Armistice Day: 1919-1946*. Oxford: Berg, 1994.
- _____. *The Last Great War: British Society and the First World War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Grimshaw, Patricia. *Women's Suffrage in New Zealand*. Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2013.
- Grob-Fitzgibbon, Benjamin. "The Curious Case of the Vanishing Debate over Irish Home Rule: The Dominion of Canada, Irish Home Rule, and Canadian Historiography." *American Review of Canadian Studies* 45, no. 1 (2015): 113-128.
- Guinn, Paul. *British Strategy and Politics: 1914 to 1918*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965.
- Gullace, Nicoletta F. "Sexual Violence and Family Honor: British Propaganda and International Law during the First World War." *American Historical Review* 102, no. 3 (1997): 714-747.
- Haste, Cate. *Keep the Home Fires Burning: Propaganda in the First World War*. London: Allen Lane, 1977.
- Harrison, Brian. *Separate Spheres: The Opposition to Woman Suffrage in Britain*. London: Routledge, 2012.
- Harrison, Charles. *English Art and Modernism, 1900-1937*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994.
- Hazlehurst, Cameron. "Asquith as Prime Minister, 1908-1916." *English Historical Review* 85, no. 336 (1970): 502-531.

- Heathorn, Stephen. "The Mnemonic Turn in the Cultural Historiography of Britain's Great War." *The Historical Journal* 48, no. 4 (2005): 1103-1124.
- Heater, Derek. *National Self-Determination: Woodrow Wilson and his Legacy*. London: St. Martin's Press, 1994.
- Hempenstall, Peter J. *Pacific Islanders under German Rule: A Study in the Meaning of Colonial Resistance*. Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2006.
- Hoover, A.J. *God, Germany and Britain in the Great War: A Study of Clerical Nationalism*. New York: Praeger, 1989.
- Hopkin, Deian. "Domestic Censorship in the First World War." *Journal of Contemporary History* 5, no. 4 (1970): 151-169.
- Horne, John and Alan Kramer. *German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994.
- Hudson, W.J. *Australia and the League of Nations*. Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1980.
- Hyam, Ronald. "The British Empire in the Edwardian Era." In *Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. 4: *The Twentieth Century*, eds. Judith Brown and William Roger Louis, 47-63. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Hynes, Samuel. *A War Imagined: The First World War and English Culture*. New York: Maxwell International, 1991.
- Irish, Tomás. "Scholarly Identities in War and Peace: The Paris Peace Conference and the Mobilization of Intellect." *Journal of Global History* (2016): 365-386.
- Johnson, Matthew. "The Liberal War Committee and the Liberal Advocacy of Conscription in Britain, 1914-1916." *Historical Journal* 51, no. 2 (2008): 399-420.
- Kaiga, Sakiko. *Britain and the Intellectual Origins of the League of Nations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021.
- Kaufmann, Walter. *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974.
- Keegan, John. *The Face of Battle*. New York: Penguin, 1978.
- _____. *The First World War*. New York: Vintage Books, 2000.
- Kendle, John. *The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union*. Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1975.

- Kelcey, Barbara E., and Angela Davis, eds. *A Great Movement Underway: Women and the Grain Growers' Guide, 1908-1928*. Winnipeg: The Manitoba Record, 1997.
- Kerneck, Sterling. "The British Government's Reactions to President Wilson's 'Peace' Note of December 1916." *Historical Journal* 13, no. 4 (1970): 721-766.
- _____. "Distractions of Peace during War: The Lloyd George Government's Reactions to Woodrow Wilson, December, 1916-November, 1918." *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* 65, no. 2 (1975): 1-117.
- Keshen, Jeffrey. *Propaganda and Censorship in Canada's Great War*. Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1996.
- King, Alex. *Memorials of the Great War in Britain: The Symbolism and Politics of Remembrance*. Oxford: Berg, 1998.
- Koditscheck, Theodore. *Liberalism, Imperialism, and the Historical Imagination: Nineteenth-Century Visions of a Greater Britain*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
- Koss, Stephen, ed. *The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain. Vol. 2: The Twentieth Century*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984.
- Kramer, Paul. "Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule between the British and United States Empires, 1880-1910." *The Journal of American History* vol. 88, no. 4. (March 2002): 1315-1353.
- Kumar, Krishan. *The Making of English National Identity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Lake, Marilyn and Henry Reynolds. *Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men's Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Langhorne, Richard. "Reflections on the Significance of the Congress of Vienna." *Review of International Studies* 12, no. 4 (October 1986): 313-324.
- Lasswell, Harold. *Propaganda Technique in World War I*. Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1971.
- Leventhal, Fred N. *The Last Dissenter: H.N. Brailsford and His World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Ledger-Lomas, Michael. "The Character of Pitt the Younger and Party Politics, 1830-1860." *Historical Journal* 47, no. 3 (2004): 641-661.
- Leed, Eric J. *No Man's Land: Combat and Identity in World War I*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

Lester, Alan. *Imperial Networks: Creating Identities in Nineteenth-Century South Africa and Britain*. London: Routledge, 2001.

_____. "British Settler Discourse and the Circuits of Empire." *History Workshop Journal* 54, no. 1 (2002): 24-48.

Liddle, Peter H. *Voices of War: Front Line and Home Front*. London: Leo Copper, 1988.

Little, John Gordon. "H.H. Asquith and Britain's Man Power Problem, 1914-1915," *Historical Association* 82, no. 267 (1997): 397-409.

Lobell, Steven E. "The Political Economy of War Mobilization: From Britain's Limited Liability to a Continental Commitment." *International Politics* 43, no. 3 (2006): 283-304.

Louis, William Roger. *Great Britain and Germany's Lost Colonies*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967.

Lowenthal, David. *The Past is a Foreign Country*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Loveridge, Steven. *Calls to Arms: New Zealand Society and Commitment to the Great War*. Victoria: Victoria University Press, 2014.

Lutz, Ralph Haswell. "Studies of War Propaganda, 1914-1933." *Journal of Modern History* 5, no. 4 (1933): 496-516.

Maartens, Brendan. "The Great War, Military Recruitment, and the Public Relations Work of the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee, 1914-1915." *Public Relations Inquiry* 5, no. 2 (2016): 169-185.

Manela, Erez. *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Marquis, Alice Goldfarb. "Words as Weapons: Propaganda in Britain and Germany during the First World War." *Journal of Contemporary History* 13, no. 3 (1978): 467-498.

Marrin, Albert. *The Last Crusade: The Church of England in the First World War*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1974.

Martin, Laurence. W. *Peace without Victory: Woodrow Wilson and the British Liberals*. Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1958.

Martin, Nicholas. "Fighting a Philosophy: The Figure of Nietzsche in British Propaganda of the First World War." *Modern Language Review* 98, no. 2 (2003): 367-380.

- Marwick, Arthur. "The Impact of the First World War on British Society." *Journal of Contemporary History* 3, no. 1 (1986): 51-63.
- _____. *The Deluge: British Society and the First World War*. New York: W.W. Norton Company, 1965.
- Matikkala, Mira. *Empire and Imperial Ambition: Liberty, Englishness and Anti-Imperialism in Late Victorian Britain*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2011.
- McDermott, James. "Conscience and the Military Service Tribunals during the First World War: Experiences in Northamptonshire." *War in History* 17, no. 1 (2010): 60-85.
- McEwen, John. "Northcliffe and Lloyd George at War, 1914-1918." *Historical Journal* 24, no. 3 (1981): 651-672.
- _____. "The National Press during the First World War: Ownership and Circulation." *Journal of Contemporary History* 17, no. 3 (1982): 459-486.
- _____. "The Struggle for Mastery in Britain: Lloyd George versus Asquith, December 1916." *Journal of British Studies* 18, no. 1 (1978): 131-156.
- _____. "'Brass-Hats' and the British Press during the First World War." *Canadian Journal of History* 18, no. 1 (1983): 43-67.
- Medina, José. "Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance: Counter-Memory, Epistemic Friction, and Guerrilla Pluralism." *Foucault Studies* no. 12 (2011): 9-35.
- Messinger, Gary. *British Propaganda and the State in the First World War*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992.
- Milman, Brock. "A Counsel of Despair: British Strategy and War Aims, 1917-1918." *Journal of Contemporary History* 36, no. 2 (2001): 241-270.
- Miller, Carman. *Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War, 1899-1902*. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993.
- Moore, Gregory. "The Super-Hun and the Super-State: Allied Propaganda and German Philosophy during the First World War." *German Life and Letters* 54, no. 4 (2001): 311-330.
- Moore, Tod. "Liberal Imperialism in Australian Political Thought, 1902-1914." *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 43, no. 1 (2015): 58-79.
- Morgan, Kenneth. *Keir Hardie*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967.

- Morris, A.J.A. *The Scaremongers: The Advocacy of War and Rearmament 1896-1914*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984.
- Mueller, John. "Changing Attitude towards War: The Impact of the First World War." *British Journal of Political Science* 21, no. 1 (1991): 1-28.
- Nelson, Bruce. *Irish Nationalists and the Making of the Irish Race*. Princeton, N.J.: University of Princeton Press, 2012.
- Nicolson, Harold. *Peacemaking 1919*. New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1965.
- O'Farrell, Patrick. *Harry Holland: Militant Socialist*. Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1964.
- _____. *The Irish in Australia*. South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989.
- Orgelfinger, Gail. *Joan of Arc in the English Imagination, 1429-1829*. University Park, Pennsylvania: Penn State University Press, 2019.
- Osterhammel, Jurgen. *Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014.
- Panichas, George, ed. *Promises of Greatness*. New York: John Day, 1968.
- Parker, Joanne. *England's Darling: The Victorian Cult of Alfred the Great*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017.
- Pelling, Henry. *Modern Britain 1885-1955*. Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1960.
- Pennell, Catriona. *A Kingdom United: Popular Response to the Outbreak of the First World War in Britain and Ireland*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
- Pickles, Katie. "Edith Cavell – Heroine: No Hatred or Bitterness for Anyone?" *History Now*, no. 3 (1997): 1-8.
- Poole, Ross. "Memory, History and the Claims of the Past." *Memory Studies* 1, no. 2 (2008): 149-166.
- Porter, Bernard. *The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
- Potter, Simon. "Richard Jebb, John S. Ewart and the Round Table, 1898-1926." *The English Historical Review* vol. 122, no. 495 (February 2007): 105-132.

- _____. "Webs, Networks, and Systems: Globalization and the Mass Media in the Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century British Empire." *Journal of British Studies* 46, no. 3 (2007): 621-646.
- Pugsley, Christopher. *The Anzac Experience: New Zealand, Australia and Empire in the First World War*. Auckland: Oratia Books, 2016.
- Rappaport, Armin. *The British Press and Wilsonian Neutrality*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1951.
- Read, James Morgan. *Atrocity Propaganda 1914-1919*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941.
- Reader, W.J. *'At Duty's Call': A Study in Obsolete Patriotism*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988.
- Reeves, Nicholas. *The Power of Film Propaganda: Myth or Reality?*. London: Wellington House, 1999.
- Reeves, Nicholas. "Film Propaganda and Its Audience: The Example of Britain's Official Films during the First World War." *Journal of Contemporary History* 18, no. 3 (1983): 463-494.
- Reinermann, Lothar. "Fleet Street and the Kaiser: British Public Opinion and Wilhelm II." *German History* 26, no. 4 (2008): 469-485.
- Richardson, Guy. "Nurse, Martyr, Propaganda Tool: The Reporting of Edith Cavell in British Newspapers 1915-1920." *Media, War & Conflict* 10, no. 2 (August 2017): 239-253.
- Robb, George. *British Culture and the First World War*. New York: Palgrave, 2002.
- Robbins, Keith G. "Lord Bryce and the First World War." *Historical Journal* 10, no. 2 (1967): 255-278.
- Roberts, Wayne. "'Rocking the Cradle for the World': The New Woman and Maternal Feminism, Toronto 1877-1914." In *A Not Unreasonable Claim: Women and Reform in Canada, 1880-1920*, ed. Linda Kealey, 15-47. Toronto: The Woman's Press, 1979.
- Rodman, Barbee-Sue. "Britain Debates Justice: An Analysis of the Reparations Issue of 1918." *The Journal of British Studies* 8, no. 1 (1968): 140-154.
- Rothwell, V.H. *British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy, 1914-1918*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971.
- Ryan, W. Michael. "From 'Shells Scandal to Bow Street: The Denigration of Lieutenant-Colonel Charles a Court Repington." *Journal of Modern History* 50, no. 2 (1978): 1097-1120.

- Sanders, M.L. and Philip Taylor. *British Propaganda during the First World War, 1914-1918*. London: Macmillan, 1982.
- Sangster, Joan. *One Hundred Years of Struggle: The History of Women and the Vote in Canada*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2018.
- Schreuder, Deryck, and Stuart Ward, eds. *Australia's Empire*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Schudson, Micheal. "The Present in the Past Versus the Past in the Present." *Communication*, no. 11 (1989): 105-113.
- Semmel, Stuart. *Napoleon and the British*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.
- Sharp, Alan. "The Genie that Would Not Go Back into the Bottle: National Self-determination and the Legacy of the First World War and the Peace Settlement." In *Europe and Ethnicity: The First World War and Contemporary Conflict*, eds., Seamus Dunn and T.G. Fraser, 9-29. London: Routledge, 1996.
- _____. "Reflections on the Remaking of Europe: 1815, 1919, 1945, Post-1989." *Irish Studies in International Affairs* vol. 8 (1997): 5-19.
- Sheftall, Mark David. *Altered Memories of the Great War: Divergent Narratives of Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2009.
- Siak, Steven W. "The Blood That Is in Our Veins Comes from German Ancestors: British Historians and the Coming of the First World War." *Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies* 30, no. 2 (Summer, 1998): 221-252.
- Silbey, David. *The British Working Class and Enthusiasm for War, 1914-1916*. London: Frank Cass, 2005.
- Simkins, Peter. *Kitchener's Army: The Raising of the New Armies, 1914-1916*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988.
- Smith, Leonard. "Paul Fussell's *The Great War and Modern Memory*: Twenty-Five Years Later." *History and Theory* 40, no. 2 (2001): 241-260.
- Smith, Harold. "World War I and British Left Wing Intellectuals: The Case of Leonard T. Hobhouse." *Albion* 5, no. 4 (1973): 261-273.
- Snell, John L. "Benedict XV, Wilson, Michaelis, and German Socialism." *Catholic Historical Review* 37, no. 2 (1951): 187-214.
- Stevenson, John. *British Society 1914-45*. New York: Penguin Books, 1984.

- Stevenson, David. "The Failure of Peace by Negotiation in 1917." *Historical Journal* 34, no. 1 (1991): 65-86.
- Stromberg, Roland. *Redemption by War: The Intellectuals and 1914*. Lawrence, KS: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1982.
- Stubbs, John O. "Beaverbrook as Historian: 'Politicians and the War, 1914-1916' Reconsidered," *Albion* 14, nos. 3-4 (1982-83): 235-253.
- Taylor, Philip M. *British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century: Selling Democracy*. Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1999.
- _____. "The Foreign Office and British Propaganda during the First World War." *The Historical Journal*, 23, no. 4 (1980): 875-898.
- Tennyson, Brian Douglas. *Canada's Great War, 1914-1918: How Canada Helped Save the British Empire and Became a North American Nation*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015.
- Thompson, Andrew S. "The Language of Imperialism and the Meaning of Empire: Imperial Discourse in British Politics, 1895-1914." *Journal of British Studies* 36 (1997): 147-177.
- Thompson, Denise. "National Sorrow, National Pride: Commemoration of War in Canada, 1918-1945." *Journal of Canadian Studies* 3, no. 4 (1995-1996): 5-27.
- Thompson, J.A. "Lord Cecil and the 'Great Experiment'." *Peace Research* vol. 16, no. 1 (January 1984): 10-15.
- Thompson, J. Lee. "Fleet Street Colossus: The Rise and Fall of Northcliffe, 1896-1922." *Parliamentary History* 25, no. 1 (2006): 115-138.
- Thompson, Oliver. *Easily Led: A History of Propaganda*. Thrupp, U.K.: Sutton Publishing, 1999.
- Thompson, Roger C. *Australian Imperialism in the Pacific: The Expansionist Era 1820-1920*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1980.
- Tillman, Stephen. *Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919*. Princeton University Press, 1961.
- Townend, Paul. *The Road to Home Rule: Anti-Imperialism and the Irish National Movement*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2016.
- Townsend, Charles. *Easter, 1916: The Irish Rebellion*. London: Allen Lane/Penguin, 2005.

- Trainor, Luke. *British Imperialism and Australian Nationalism: Manipulation, Conflict and Compromise in the Late Nineteenth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- Turner, John, ed. *Britain and the First World War*. London: Unwin Hyman, 1988.
- Van Wingerden, Sophia. *The Women's Suffrage Movement in Britain, 1866-1928*. London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999.
- Vance, Jonathan. *Death So Noble: Memory, Meaning, and the First World War*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1997.
- Vann, J. Don and Rosemary T. VanArsdel, eds. *Periodicals of Queen Victoria's Empire: An Exploration*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996.
- Watt, D.C. "Every War Must End: War-time Planning for Post-war Security, in Britain and America in the Wars of 1914-1918 and 1939-45. The Roles of Historical Example and of Professional Historians." *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 28 (1978): 159-173.
- Walsh, Michael J.K., and Andrekos Varnava, eds. *The Great War and the British Empire: Culture and Society*. London: Routledge, 2017.
- Wallace, Stuart. *War and the Image of Germany: British Academics 1914-1918*. Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, 1988.
- Wiener, Joel H. and Mark Hampton, eds. *Anglo-American Media Interactions, 1850-2000*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
- Wiener, M.J. *An Empire on Trial: Race, Murder, and Justice under British Rule, 1870-1935*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Wigley, Philip G. *Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth: British-Canadian Relations, 1917-1926*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Wilcox, Craig. *Australia's Boer War: The War in South Africa 1899-1902*. South Melbourne, Victoria: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Wilkinson, Alan. *Dissent or Conform?: War, Peace and the English Churches 1900-1945*. London: SCM Press, 1986.
- Wilson, Trevor. *The Myriad Faces of War: Britain and the Great War, 1914-1918*. Oxford: Polity Press, 1986.
- Winkler, Henry R. *The League of Nations Movement in Great Britain, 1914-1919*. New Brunswick, 1952.

- Winter, Jay. *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
- Wohl, Robert. "Heart of Darkness: Modernism and its Historians." *Journal of Modern History* 74, no. 2 (2002): 573-621.
- Yearwood, Peter. "'On the Safe and Right Lines': The Lloyd George Government and the Origins of the League of Nations, 1916-1918." *Historical Journal* 32, no. 1 (1989): 131-155.
- Young, Robert J.C. *The Idea of English Ethnicity*. Malden, MA.: Blackwell Publishing, 2008
- Dissertations, Theses, and Research Papers
- Cahlan, Peter James. "The Treatment of Belgian Refugees in England during the Great War." Ph.D. thesis. McMaster University at Hamilton, Ontario, 1977.
- Kay, Richard G.H. "In Pursuit of Victory: British-New Zealand Relations during the First World War." Ph.D. diss., University of Otago, Dunedin, NZ, October 2001.
- Lee, Todd. "The Image of the Enemy: British Stereotypes of the Afrikaner during the South African War, 1899-1902." M.A. thesis. Georgia State University, 1993.
- Nicholson, William C. "Anglo-Saxonism at the Crossroads: U.S.-Canadian Responses to Japanese Immigration to North America, 1905-1914." Ph.D. dissertation. Georgia State University, 2004.

TERTIARY SOURCES

- Robert Cole, ed., *The Encyclopedia of Propaganda* (Armonk, NY: Sharpe Reference, 1998).