Fighting Words: How Campaign Rhetoric Elicits Emotion, Attitude Change, and Violent Encounters

Fighting Words: How Campaign Rhetoric Elicits Emotion, Attitude Change, and Violent Encounters

by

Liam Hayes

Under the Direction of Sarah Allen Gershon, PhD

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in the College of Arts and Sciences

Georgia State University

2021

ABSTRACT

During the most recent presidential election, campaign rhetoric frequently took on an unusually aggressive tone. This shift in tone was matched by frequent displays of violent interactions between supporters and protestors at several campaign events. Further, once violent responses were elicited, these supporters were often applauded for their behavior and offered further support. These simultaneous trends offer new opportunities to research the ways in which campaigns attempt to influence voter behavior. Specifically, it is prudent to question how candidates stylize their rhetoric to elicit stronger behavioral responses from potential voters, and the effect that these appeals have on voters. Considering the historic nature of this election, I seek to investigate how candidates utilize rhetoric in campaign rally speeches to appeal to voters and elicit stronger displays of support. Using a content analysis of general election campaign rally speeches, cross-sectional survey data, and original experimental data, I examine the relationship between threat frames about immigrants in rally speeches, attitudes towards immigrants, and attitudes towards and willingness to engage in violence by individuals.

INDEX WORDS: Political psychology, Public Opinion, Political Behavior, Campaign Rhetoric, Political violence, Immigration Attitudes, Emotion

Fighting Words: How Campaign Rhetoric Elicits Emotion, Attitude Change, and Violent Encounters

by

Liam Hayes

Committee Chair: Sarah Allen Gershon

Committee: Sean Richey

Judd Thornton

Electronic Version Approved:

Office of Graduate Services

College of Arts and Sciences

Georgia State University

December 2021

DEDICATION

To my grandparents, Donald and Deanna Pressley, and my mother, Dorie Hayes – Wish you were here.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The completion of this dissertation would have been impossible without the help and support of so many. First, the training and support from the Department of Political Science at Georgia State University were indispensable to my success. Special thanks to Dr. Sarah Gershon for all of the advice, support and feedback that she has provided over the last several years. Additionally, special thanks to Dr. Judd Thornton and Dr. Sean Richey for their time and feedback throughout the planning and writing of this dissertation. I would also like to thank all of the participants and discussants at various SPSA conferences for their advice and suggestions as each of these chapters developed.

Additionally, I want to thank all of the friends and family that have supported me over the last several years. First, to my parent, Doug and Dorie Hayes, your support, love, and encouragement have been invaluable to me. I certainly would not have been able to complete this project without you in my corner. To my siblings, Nick Hayes and Brianna Noble, thank you for your support and reminding me who I am. Finally, I would be remise to neglect mentioning all of the friends that have helped me along the way. I cannot thank Kristina LaPlant, Bailey Fairbanks, Anna Fleming, and Natalie Rogol enough. Your contributions to who I am as a person, friend, instructor, and researcher are too numerous to mention, and I am truly grateful for your companionship and support over the last eight years. I would also like to thank Alec Prince. Our friendship may not have been the most straightforward, but I couldn't imagine someone better to endure a pandemic and dissertation with. Thank you for always believing in me, especially when I didn't believe in myself, and reassuring me that my ideas and arguments were, in fact, intelligible. Lastly, there are simply too many more friends that I would like to thank; know that your support and friendship are felt and appreciated.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

1 INTRODUCTION

"Part of the problem and part of the reason it takes so long [to kick out protesters] is nobody wants to hurt each other anymore." – Donald Trump speaking at a rally in St. Louis, Missouri, March 11, 2016

The specter of violence is certainly not uncommon to American politics. While one could certainly point to the number of assassinations, and attempted assassinations, of elected officials, a number of extreme cases of this political violence take place surrounding, or as a consequence of, elections. One need only look to the killing of Alexander Hamilton in a duel with Aaron Burr, which occurred as a result of the successful electioneering by Hamilton to deprive Burr the governorship of New York, to observe the centrality of violence in elections (Freeman 2002). However, the first prominent example of election violence on the part of individual citizens came out of supporters for the anti-Catholic political party, the "Know-Nothing" Party. The violence from these supporters culminated in "Bloody Monday", in which twenty-two people were killed by "poll watchers" in Louisville, Kentucky (Ramet and Hassenstab 2013). Following the Civil War, newly franchised African Americans frequently came into conflict with white supremacist paramilitary organizations, up to and including the Colfax Massacre of 1873, in which somewhere between fifty-two and one hundred-fifty African Americans were killed after occupying a Louisiana courthouse in an attempt to guarantee the certification of election results, which would have seen the election of a Republican governor (Valelly 2004).

Election violence remained routine between white supremacists and African-Americans (and Latinos) in the Jim Crow South and Southwest (Garrow 1978; May 2014; Berman 2016). Yet this started to change following the televised violent police suppression of the voting rights march in Selma, Alabama, leading to the passage of the Voting Rights Act (Garrow 1978; May 2014). This

VRA later had to be expanded to protect non-English speaking voters in an attempt to prevent continued violent suppression of Latino voters (Berman 2016).

Despite the long history of election and political violence in the United States widespread election violence on the part of individuals has remained significantly less common since the 1968 Democratic National Convention anti-war protests, and the violent response by the Chicago police (Kusch 2004). Yet, throughout the 2016 Presidential campaign an unusually aggressive tone was struck by both candidates and, frequently, their supporters. This tone was frequently employed in the rhetoric of the campaigns, both in interviews and in speeches at campaign rallies. More specifically, and as evidenced by the quotes referenced above, then candidate Trump advocated for the direct, and even violent, removal of protestors by his own supporters. Additionally, he frequently referred to protestors with insults, and even suggested that protestors had entered the country illegally. On the other side, then candidate Clinton referred to many of President Trump's supporters as belonging to a "basket of deplorables" (Reilly 2016). While each of these is a singular example, each exemplifies the ways in which the candidates, themselves, ratcheted up the level of aggression and hostility amongst their own supporters.

However, the most jarring displays of this hostile and aggressive tone came from the supporters themselves, exemplified by violent interactions between supporters and protestors. While rally attendees were frequently encouraged to assist security in the removal of protestors, protestors frequently clashed with supporters as they entered and exited rallies. Additionally, several instances of protestors attempting to rush stages held by the candidates, and even one case of a protestor attempting to seize the firearm of a security official, occurred over the course of the campaign. Furthermore, this unusual level of conflict was further stoked and supported after the fact by President Trump, who frequently offered encouragement, and even promises of financial support, to those supporters that were involved in violent confrontations with protestors.

This level of aggression and hostility is relatively unique in modern American politics, and, thus, inspires new questions. First, does campaign rhetoric drive emotional responses, particularly anger, fear, and disgust, amongst individuals? Second, what impact do these emotions have on the political attitudes and behaviors, including both conventional forms of participation (i.e. voting, volunteering with a campaign, etc.) and more unconventional behaviors, most specifically acts of violence?

I contend that campaign rhetoric can, at times, increase the propensity for hostility and violent behavior. This occurs when campaigns attempt to elicit feelings of fear, anger, and disgust amongst their participants. These emotions have had significant impact on voters, altering the structure and substance of attitudes and changing both the propensity to, and types of actions that individuals are likely to take to engage with campaigns and the political environment more broadly. However, anger and fear generally move in opposing directions. Yet, individuals experiencing anger are far more likely to espouse aggressive attitudes and preferences towards others, and potentially more likely to act on those aggressive tendencies through violent action (Brader, Groenendyk, and Valentino 2010). Meanwhile, individuals experiencing fear are far more likely to enter into a type of "fight or flight" mode, meaning that they will either disengage from politics or become more engaged, seeking out additional information (Marcus and Mackuen 1993; Brader 2006; Brader, Groenendyk, and Valentino 2010; Redlawsk, Cinetiini, and Emmerson 2010).

In order to elicit these specific emotions, campaigns will frequently rely upon methods of framing and priming issues, such that particular policy concerns and preferred emotions become key to an individual's decision making process. Evidence of candidates attempting to utilize framing or priming has historically focused on a candidate's reliance on policy areas that they own (Petrocik 1996; Druckman and Holmes 2004), or even attempts by candidates to prioritize their own personalities or other key traits (Funk 1999; Druckman 2001; Druckman 2004a; Druckman, Jacobs,

and Ostermeier 2004). More recently, research has begun to focus on attempts from candidates to frame specific emotions in their advertising or rhetorical appeals (Brader 2006), and the reliance on issues that have become so racially coded that candidates themselves no longer need to attempt to frame these issues themselves (Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002).

Because of these more recent trends in political science research, the reliance on specific frames to elicit key emotions, namely fear and anger, towards outgroups, like racial minorities, necessitates an examination of particular frames that have proven to be effective at producing the emotion in question. More specifically, the elicitation of fear, anger, and disgust are likely to occur when campaign rhetoric primes policies aimed directly at outgroup members and frames those outgroup members as being threatening to in-group members. Given the tone and rhetoric of the most recent presidential election, targeted outgroups are likely to include immigrants (particularly Latino immigrants), African Americans (especially members of Black Lives Matter), opposing partisans, and protestors, broadly. These particular outgroups suggest that racial threat hypotheses may provide a helpful framework for understanding the emotions produced by outgroup threat frames, and the likelihood that individuals exposed to those frame may be more inclined to engage in violent behavior.

Racial threat hypotheses broadly group outgroup threat frames into one of three categories: economic threat, loss of political power threats, and crime victimization threats. While each of these frames is successful in eliciting particular emotions under some conditions or time periods, economic threat frames have generally produced anger amongst individuals, while crime victimization threats routinely produce feelings of fear. As a result, these would appear to remain as particularly useful in exploring the elicitation of key emotions towards all outgroups.

Finally, to answer the last of the proposed questions, a link between emotion, aggression, and violent behavior needs to be established. After all, anger and aggression are both relatively

common, yet violent behaviors remain novel (Averill 1983). I borrow from affective intelligence, authoritarianism, and self-efficacy theories to assert that individuals who experience anger can be pushed to take violent action when they believe that they are more capable, or willing, to remove threatening individuals and groups from their environment. Furthermore, these individuals will believe that their violent actions were justified, or even supported by their preferred candidate.

More specifically, affective intelligence suggests that individuals experiencing anxiety can be prompted to be more actively engaged in the political environment, specifically inducing some individuals to become more actively engaged in the information search process (Brader 2006; Marcus, Nueman, and Mackuen 2000). Yet, research from political psychology has demonstrated a wide-ranging tendency for anxious individuals to either become more engaged with the threatening environment, or to retreat into a more protective position and cutting off further contact with the threatening environment (Brader 2006; Brader, Groenendyk, and Valentino 2010; Marcus and Mackuen 1993; Marcus, Nueman, and Mackuen 2000; Redlawsk, Cinetiini, and Emmerson 2010). Similarly, individuals experiencing anger as a result of exposure to a threatening environment were also likely to exhibit either aggressive or more protective behaviors (Brader, Groenendyk, and Valentino 2010). The conditions that lead to either of these behavioral responses to these emotional states remains poorly understood.

Consequently, I propose that an interaction between authoritarianism and internal efficacy mediates the influence of emotional responses to threatening stimuli. Authoritarianism has long been linked to the emotional states most commonly produced by threat; namely, disgust, anger, and fear (Mackey and Dempsey 2018; Milburn, Niwa, and Patterson 2014). In addition, increased level of authoritarianism has been consistently linked to increased levels of aggression and support for some forms of violence (Rickert 1998; Richey 2012). However, because of authoritarian's deference to authority (Altemeyer 1981, 1996), these individuals may not be entirely willing to engage in violent

behavior, themselves, without the correct conditions. I contend that these conditions can be induced either when the leader encourages that use of violence, or when an individual also possess a high level of internal efficacy.

1.1 Chapter Outline

The aim of this dissertation is to explore the impact that threat frames about immigrants in campaign rally rhetoric have on attitudes towards immigrants and political violence. To that end, a theoretical model is proposed and tested in three empirical chapters. The details and order of these chapters are described below.

First, in Chapter 2, the relevant literature is explored, and a theoretical model is proposed to explain the attitudinal and behavioral impacts of threat frames in campaign rhetoric. This theory suggests that individuals exposed to threat messages will exhibit more negative attitudes towards immigrants and more favorable attitudes towards political violence. Additionally, this exposure will induce a range of emotions in those exposed to them, and will activate authoritarianism, each of which will have effects on individuals' attitudes towards immigrants and political violence. Chapter 3 provides details for the two studies used to test this theory. First, an experimental survey was conducted on a nationally representative sample. Additionally, data from a national, cross-sectional survey conducted during the 2016 presidential election.

Chapters 4 through 6 each present empirical analyses to test the theoretical model presented in Chapter 2. The first of these, Chapter 4, explores the extent to which exposure to threat frames elicits negative emotions in those that are exposed to them. Furthermore, it suggests that individuals exposed to these threat messages will, largely, direct those emotions towards the subject of those threat messages, immigrants in this case. Chapter 5 further explores the effects of threat exposure by exploring the impact that this exposure has on attitudes towards immigrants and their cultural, economic, and criminal impact. Finally, Chapter 6 addresses the extent to which exposure to

threatening and violence approving messages alter individuals' attitudes towards, and willingness to engage in, acts of political violence.

2 REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS

The 2016 presidential election was marked by three overarching trends: a consistent policy focus on immigration, an unusual focus on the anger and anxiety being exhibited by voters, and a largely unprecedented amount of violence. These coinciding forces present new opportunities to investigate the causes of political violence in modern American politics. This dissertation advances a theory about the ability of threat rhetoric about immigrants to induce extreme emotional states in voters, which subsequently alters their attitudes towards those immigrants and the acceptability of political violence. This theory draws from literature on outgroup threats, emotion inducement in political contexts, and authoritarianism. Each of these literatures are explored below, and is followed by a detailed discussion of the theory developed here and the theoretical expectations derived from that theory.

2.1 Outgroup Threat

Given the role that immigration played in the 2016 presidential election, group position and racial threat hypotheses offer a useful framework for understanding how messaging about immigrants drove attitudes and behaviors in this election, and the intervening years. The group position model contends that judgments of issues will be informed by competitive and hostile feelings, which can be activated when individuals perceive that their in-group's position in the social hierarchy is being challenged (Blumer 1958). Blalock (1967) buildings on this model by focusing on the role that race plays in perceptions of group threat. This theory further contends that racialization of issues occurs as whites, in the face of growing minority populations advocate for racialized practices to protect their existing power by implementing state control over minorities (Blalock 1967). Evidence for group fears providing the impetus for opposition to race-based policies,

particularly school and neighborhood integration and affirmative action, has been consistently demonstrated (Bobo 1983, 2000; Bobo and Licari 1989; Bobo and Kluggel 1993; Sidarius, Pratto, and Bobo 1994, 1996; Bobo and Hutchings 1996).

Additionally, Blalock (1967) proposes three distinct forms of threat which increase racialization: economic threats, political threats, and symbolic threats. Later research has more narrowly focused symbolic threats into threats of crime victimization (Eitle, D'Alessio, and Stolzenberg 2002). Each of these types of threat has been associated with shifts in individuals' preferences and behavior, which will be explored before turning to some of the emotions that ca be produced by these threats.

2.1.1 Economic Threat

The literature has largely identified economic concerns of driving many of the attitudes and behaviors towards minority groups, though there is some mixed support for this hypothesis (Blumer 1958; Blalco 1967; Quillian 1995; Eitle, D'Alessio, and Stolzenberg 2002; Ceballos and Yakshko 2014; Kujow and Delisi 2020; Sanderson, Semyonov, and Gorodzeisky 2021). Further, this particular threat has been heavily researched, and has identified that most concerns around economic threats boil down to competition in the labor market and concerns about the impacts that large immigrant populations will have on government expenditures (Hainmueller, Hiscox, and Margalit 2015).

Beginning with the labor market competition theory, the prevailing argument has been that citizens and current residents may faced increased competition for the same number of jobs as more potential workers join the workforce. Consequently, those that anticipate greater risk from this possibility should be less likely to support increased immigration (Hainmueller, Hiscox, and Margalit 2015). Following this logic, both individual and environmental factors may lead to greater level of concern about the job market. At the environmental level, two measures of the overall economy

have been tested as predictors for attitudes towards immigrants: GDP and the unemployment rate. While GDP does not appear to have an impact on attitudes towards immigrants (Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet 2009), the unemployment rate does with attitudes towards immigrant declining as unemployment rises, and becoming more positive as the rate goes down (Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet 2009; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2017). Despite this link, Kuntz, Davidov, and Semyonov (2017) find absolutely no link between objective measures of the economy and attitudes towards immigration, suggesting that perceptions of the broader economy may be more important than actual objective measures (Kuntz, Davidov, and Semyonov 2017; McLaren, Boomgaarden, and Vliegenthart 2018).

At the other end, there has been a considerable amount of research looking into the link between individual's specific economic considerations and their attitudes towards immigrants. Broadly, individuals with lower socio-economic status are generally much more skeptical of allowing higher rates of immigration (Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2008; Jaime-Castillo, Marques-Perales, and Alvarez-Galvez 2016). More specifically, individual's level of education consistently improves individual's attitudes towards immigrants (Facchini and Mayda 2009; D'Hombres and Nunziata 2016; Huber and Oberdabernig 2016; Pryce 2018), but higher income rates are may actually diminish attitudes towards immigrants, especially if that income is in the same bracket as immigrants (Facchini and Mayda 2009; Hickel and Bredbenner 2020). Along similar lines, the most important individual level factor appears to be the relative skill-level of immigrants (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). Generally, immigrants with lower skill-levels always have lower levels of approval (Mayda 2006; Goldstein and Peters 2014). In contrast, immigrants with higher skill-levels are generally preferred, but when the economy is suppressed, such as during the Great Recession, higher-skilled citizens also oppose the immigration of higher-skilled immigrants (Goldstein and Peters 2014).

Finally, economic concerns also center around the perceived impact that immigrants may have on the government's resources and ability to provide services to those already in the country. For example, increases in the government's welfare spending generally coincides with declining attitudes towards immigrants (Jaime-Castillo, Marques-Perales, and Alvarez-Galvez 2016). However, this effect can be mitigated in countries that have a history of a strong, existing welfare state (Alvarez-Galvez et al. 2020).

Despite the robust level of research that economic threat has also produced the most conflicted results within the racial threat literature, with some authors finding no support for this hypothesis at all (Eitle, D'Alessio, and Stolzenberg 2002). Yet, while recognizing that the effects of this threat can be limited to specific time periods or regions, some support has been found. Most notably, economic threats have been associated with significant shifts in the size of municipal police forces and expenditures (Jacobs 1979). While this relationship on its own has only a distant relationship to the preferences and behaviors of individuals, it does suggest the extent to which individuals may act to protect their own group's position.

In addition, violent behavior can be drastically increased when the level of economic competition between racial groups increases (Liska and Chamlin 1984; Jacobs and Wood 1999). Specifically, interracial murder rates, especially killings of African Americans by whites, is significantly related the level of economic competition. Furthermore, the level of competition affects the interracial murder of whites, but this can be mitigated when racial minorities are represented by a mayor of the same race (Jacobs and Wood 1999).

2.1.2 Political Power Threats

The second major threat within racial threat theories focuses on the threat of the current racial majority losing their hold on political power, generally referred to as the political threat

hypothesis (Blalock 1967; Eitle, D'Alessio, and Stolzenberg 2002). As with the results for economic threat theories, political threat theories have found evidence to support the idea that majority groups will exert great state resources to protect their own political power. Jacobs and Tope (2008) find that as minority populations increase in size and violent crime rates increase, the majority population becomes more fundamentalist and increases their support for the Republican party and these candidates increase their reliance on law and order appeals. Additionally, white voters tend to become more racially conservative under these conditions (Avery and Fine 2012).

Furthermore, as minority populations increase, municipal police expenditures also increase, though this depends somewhat on regional and temporal variation (Greenberg, Kessler, and Loften 1975; Corzine, Creech, and Corzine 1983). These expenditures can also be increased as a result of mobilization efforts by racial minority groups, in addition to changes the size of these populations (Jackson and Carroll 1981). However, under some circumstances efforts to maintain political power by majority groups can be mitigated. For example, Brown and Warner (1991) suggest that when local government organizations are controlled by party machines, efforts to increase arrest rates of immigrants can be deflected. Yet, when reform institutions are present, arrest rates typically go up.

Quillian (1995) contends that the size of minority group populations, in conjunction with economic conditions, has a large impact on perceived group threat. This trend certainly continues for perceptions of immigrant populations. Ceballos and Yakshko (2014) find that perceived group threat is particularly important for immigrant populations. This perception is both a consequence of yearly immigration rates (Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet 2009), and the size of existing immigrant populations (Schlueter and Wagner 2008; Semyonov, Raiman, and Gorodzeisky 2008). These effects are only increased when the immigration is predominately from ethnic minorities (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2018). However, some of this can be mitigated by intergroup contact (Schlueter and

Wagner 2008; Walker 2014), though there is only mixed evidence that this fully mitigates the negative effects of increased population sizes and immigration flows.

In the face of these pressures, and despite efforts by racial majorities to protect their level of political power, as the minority population grows the balance of power tends to shift towards the minority group, generating greater senatorial representation (Avery and Fine 2012). Furthermore, the presence of Black mayors can greatly alter violent behavior, particularly the rate of interracial killings by African Americans. Yet, this does not hold true for interracial killings committed by whites (Jacobs and Wood 1999). Consequently, political threat and limitations in the representation of various racial groups tends to have large shifts both in the preferences of majority and minority racial groups, as well as generating shifts in the rate of violent behavior.

2.1.3 Crime Victimization Threats

In contrast to the two previous types of racial threat, the fear of crime victimization has received considerably more attention, historically, but has been relatively neglected in the context of immigration. As a result, the predictors and effects of fear of victimization can be broadly grouped into environmental factors and individual-level factors. While I will be discussing the crime threat literature in terms of the level of effect, a significant portion of the literature will also distinguish between the types of crime that escalate fear of victimization. As noted by Rountree (1998) individual- and contextual-level factors will all vary and, consequently, have varying effects depending on the type of crime in question. As a result, both the type of crime *and* the type of fear are crucial to understanding the full impact of the threat of crime victimization. Thus, as frequently as possible, the type of crime and the type of fear produced will be discussed as well.

Beginning with the environmental factors, a number of factors have been isolated which are significantly correlated with increased fear of victimization. First, fear of victimization is largely

based on the perception that one is at an increased risk of being victimized (Warr and Stafford 1983). This perception is greatly influenced by a number of factors, including the perceived proximity of racial minorities (Chiricos, McEntire, and Gertz 2001) and rapid shifts in the age and demographic makeup of their immediate community (Taylor and Covington 1993). Yet, the actual racial makeup of communities is far less important for individuals' level fear than the *perceived* racial makeup of their community, but only for whites (Chiricos, Hogan, and Gertz 1997). Yet, Liska, Lawrence, and Sanchirico (1982) find evidence that the racial composition of a community also impacts the amount of fear that racial minorities feel, as well.

Beyond the direct effect of racial composition, this factor also plays a large indirect effect on the amount of victimization fear that an individual experiences. Namely, racial composition is significantly related to the crime rate in a given community, such that communities with larger minority populations tend to have a higher crime rate (Liska and Bellair 1995). Yet, not all types of crime appear to have a significant impact on fear of crime. Rather, for whites, property crime and interracial crime rates produce a significant amount of fear (Liska, Lawrence, and Sanchirico 1982). Additionally, social disorganization enhances the impact that crime rates have on fear of crime (Rountree and Land 1996).

In addition, related to both disorganization and crime rates, Markowitz et al. (2001) find evidence that these two factors are part of a feedback loop which perpetuates fear of crime. In this loop, declining social cohesion generates increase crime rates and disorder, which, in turn, increases the level of fear that individuals have of being victimized. This then further decreases social cohesion. Similarly, social integration with one's community tends to decrease the perception that one is at risk for being victimized, decreasing the amount of fear that individuals express (Rountree and Land 1996).

While racial composition has a significant impact on a locale's crime rate, Liska and Bellair (1995) find that crime rate also significantly impacts a city's racial composition, suggesting a reciprocal relationship. This is specifically true for property crimes and robbery, broadly, which these authors contend explains white flight from cities. Additionally, the racial composition of a city significantly predicts arrest rates, independent of the actual crime rate in cities (Liska and Chamlin 1984). This is likely due to the real outcomes of perceived threats previously discussed.

Additionally, research into the effects of the fear of crime victimization must address the extent to which individual-level demographic factors affect the extent to which individuals view themselves as being more or less likely to be victimized. While a significant portion of the racial threat literature takes assumes that older individuals are more likely to believe that they may be a victim of crime, there remains some question about the robustness of these results. For example, LaGrange and Ferraro (1989) conclude that the significance of age as a predictor of fear of crime and victimization depends, largely, on the fear measure that is used. Additionally, Chiricos, McEntire, and Gertz (2001) find no evidence of this relationship at all. Furthermore, an individual's race plays a significant impact on their propensity to believe that they may be victimized. Specifically, they find that while whites are significantly more likely to highly estimate their potential victimization the closer they reside to a racial minority group. Yet this does not hold for African Americans (Chirios, McEntire, and Gertz 2001).

Finally, some authors have claimed that women are significantly more likely to believe that their potential for victimization is higher than men tend to (LaGrange and Ferraro 1989; Ferraro 1996). Ferraro (1996) suggests that this is due to the additional fear that women tend to exhibit because of the fear of sexual assault. Finally, he argues that the increased fear of victimization experienced by women is particularly significant in predicting fear of being victimized by personal crimes, but that this relationship holds for all times of crime.

Despite this previous research, results for the impact of criminalization on immigrants is far more mixed. Parrott et al. (2019) find that the way that stories about immigrants are framed has a large impact on how, exactly, immigrants are perceived. Along those lines, stories that focus on more "abstract" issues, like crime rates, appears to have only a minimal impact on attitudes towards immigrants (McLaren, Boomgaarden, and Vliegenthart 2018). In contrast, even minor, but specific crimes, like a history of parking tickets, can generate a large decline in attitudes towards Mexican immigrants (Short and Magana 2002). Furthermore, a focus on violent crimes may have the ability to increase mortality salience, which has a demonstrated ability to increase negative attitudes towards immigrants (Weise et al. 2012).

2.1.4 Outgroup Threat as a Frame in Campaign Messaging

While the above demonstrates a clear impact that immigrants, and perceptions of those immigrants, have on various attitudes, it is worth exploring the ability of campaigns and the media to directly influence the ways in which immigrants are viewed. There is at least some evidence that the ways in which immigrants are framed has a large impact on attitudes towards immigrants (Short and Magana 2002; Zuniga, Correa, and Valenzuela 2012; McLaren, Boomgaarden, and Vliegenthart 2018; Parrott et al. 2019). Specifically, focusing on political ramifications of immigration leads to more negative attitudes (Parrott et al. 2019), but abstract framing does not appear to alter attitudes (McLaren, Boomgaarden, and Vliegenthart 2018).

However, there are some limitations on the effectiveness of framing tactics from campaigns and the news media. First, and again as with the news media, framing from campaigns is significantly limited by the political knowledge of the electorate (Druckman and Nelson 2003; Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau 1995). To the extent that campaigns successfully prime and frame issues, they are dependent on an engaged and responsive electorate. Individuals cannot respond to primes or

frames that they do not receive. However, when voters are engaged enough to receive political messaging, frames from campaigns do appear to take hold (Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau 1995). Additionally, Druckman and Nelson (2003) suggest that individuals that are more engaged or knowledgeable about a campaign may actually be more likely to be susceptible to the framing efforts of campaigns. They find that highly engaged and knowledgeable individuals, generally, possess a lower need to evaluate the political messages that they receive, making them more likely to accept campaign messaging without further inspection.

Additionally, there remain significant concerns about the durability of framing effects from campaigns (Druckman and Nelson 2003; Keeter 1987; Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau 1995). While many individuals demonstrate an inability to remember facts of a campaign, even after only a short delay (Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau 1995), Keeter (1987) suggests that the short-term impacts of campaigns have become more important than longer-term aspects in more recent elections. Finally, the impact of a campaign's attempt to frame issues can potentially be entirely mediated by interpersonal discussion amongst voters, limiting the impact of framing to only the more isolated of observers (Druckman and Nelson 2003).

Despite overt attempts to prime specific issues and frame them in ways that are most beneficial to candidates, some issues have become so "coded" that candidates and the news media no longer need to intentionally frame these issues. This broadly includes policy domains such as government spending, taxation, and welfare policy, and is further enhanced using images of racial minorities to accompany these messages (Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002). Many of these messages are effective because of the racial frames that implicitly accompany them, and can be further explored by way of the racial threat hypothesis.

Finally, the specific kind of frame used can specifically generate emotions in those exposed to them, either negative or positive. And these emotions generate negative and positive attitudes

towards immigrants (Parrott et al. 2019). As a result, it is plausible that the emotions generated will have a large impact on attitude and behavior change among individuals. The impact that emotions is explored in further detail in the following section.

2.2 Emotion and Politics

2.2.1 Emotion and its Impact on Individual Behavior and Attitudes

The role of the emotions of voters became one of the defining features of the 2016 presidential elections, with commentators focusing on the level of anger that voters reported experiencing and economic anxiety playing a prominent role in defining political attitudes (Haq 2015; Salvanto 2015; Hook 2016; Lewis 2016). Even if this narrative has been challenged in the intervening years (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018), emotions have increasingly been seen as crucial to understanding, or even shaping, the attitudes and behaviors of voters. This is reflected in the pervasive attempts by campaigns to make individuals feel specific emotions. While research has focused on a number of politically relevant emotions, such as disgust (Schnall et al. 2008; Inbar et al. 2009; Inbar, Pizarro, and Bloom 2009; Banks and Valentino 2012; Inbar et al. 2012) or enthusiasm (Marcus and Mackuen 1993; Valentino et al. 2011), few emotions have had quite the pervasive impact as fear, sometimes referred to as anxiety, and anger. Both of these emotions have generally been demonstrated to alter the structure and substance of individuals' attitudes, as well as the effort and manner in which individuals will engage with the political process or the political environment more broadly.

Broadly, specific emotions are expected to have an impact on vote choice, rates of participation in elections (Rudolph, Gangel, and Stevens 2000; Valentino et al. 2011), interaction with the electoral information environment (Marcus and Mackuen 1993; Redlawsk, Cinetiini, and Emmerson 2010), and a variety of attitudes, ranging from broad ideologies to specific policy

preferences (Small and Lerner 2008; Inbar et al. 2009; Inbar, Pizarro, and Bloom 2009; Inbar et al. 2012). While this body of literature is notably large and broad, the more important aspects of this literature for answering the questions specified here, have been those that focus on types and rates of participation and attitudes. Each of these is detailed below, before turning to the question of how these emotions can be elicited by specific frames and the transition from emotion to violence.

First, the emotion that has seen the greatest amount of empirical support for its impact on attitudes is that of disgust (Schnall et al. 2008; Inbar et al. 2009; Inbar, Pizarro, and Bloom 2009; Banks and Valentino 2012; Inbar et al. 2012). Specifically, disgust is particularly relevant for attitudes towards morality issues (Schnall et al. 2008). Especially for issues related to homosexuality and abortion (Inbar et al. 2009; Inbar, Pizarro, and Bloom 2009). However, the impact of disgust on attitudes is not confined to individual policy or attitude dimensions. Rather, disgust has also been highly associated with conservatism (Inbar, Pizzaro, and Bloom 2009; Inbar et al. 2012) and a preference for some conservative candidates (Inbar et al. 2012).

Additionally, emotions have been linked to attitudes towards outgroups and various forms of racism. This is largely a by-product of the power of group cues to trigger emotions (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008). However, the specific emotion that is generated is highly dependent on the nature of the group cue that is being followed. For example, "old-fashioned" racism is more closely related to the generation of disgust. Meanwhile, symbolic racism is associated with the generation of anger (Banks and Valentino 2012). Similar results are found when the focus shifts to policy areas that are closely related to outgroup attitudes, namely welfare policy. Specifically, induced anger is correlated with a preference for decreased welfare spending, but induced sadness leads to a desire to increase spending (Small and Lerner 2008).

Turning to the impact that various emotions have on an individual's propensity for political engagement and the type of behavior that is likely to be undertaken, research has broadly focused on

three specific emotions: anger, enthusiasm, and fear or anxiety. Anger has generally seen the most robust results, and has been positively related to political participation (Valentino et al. 2011). More specifically, anger is associated with a greater propensity for engaging in more costly forms of engagement (Valentino et al. 2012), and increased information seeking, specifically (Brader 2006). Additionally, anger has been associated with greater levels of aggression and a preference for more punitive actions (Brader, Groenendyk, and Valentino 2010).

The impact of fear, used here to refer to both fear and anxiety, has also seen a substantial amount of focus. Anxiety has generally been associated with increased information seeking behavior (Redlawsk, Cinetiini, and Emmerson 2010). More specifically, anxious individuals have demonstrated increased attention to, and reliance on, campaigns for more information about the electoral environment (Marcus and Mackuen 1993). Addtionally, fear and anxiety have been demonstrated to provoke more defensive and even protective tendencies (Brader, Groenendyk, and Valentino 2010). Despite this, some researchers have reported only mixed results, and positive results were confined to only the least costly forms of participation (Valentino et al. 2011). These limitations may be due to anxiety relying on an interaction effect with internal efficacy to produce an effect. Rudolph, Gangrel, and Stevens (2000) demonstrate that anxiety can increase turnout rates, but only when internal efficacy is high. Rather, without high internal efficacy, anxiety is generally associated with decreased turnout rates.

Finally, to answer the last of the proposed questions, some research has addressed the impact of enthusiasm on participation, but have found only mixed results. However, when an effect is observed, enthusiastic individuals do tend to engage in more costly forms of participation (Valentino et al. 2011). Additionally, enthusiastic individuals tend to embrace their preferred candidate more closely, demonstrating greater levels of support (Marcus and Mackuen 1993).

2.2.2 Emotions and the Use of Violence

Thus far, a great deal of attention has been paid to framing effects utilized by candidates, the specific use of racial threat frames, the emotions that can be elicited from these frames, and the impact that emotions have on a variety of behaviors and attitudes. Yet, the provocation of aggression and violence has not been addressed. At the heart of these behaviors lies the experience of one of two emotions: anger or fear. While each of these emotions has a significant impact on aggressive and violent behaviors and attitudes, each tends to produce opposing forces (Lerner and Keltner 2001), and, thus, requires a closer look.

The first key to approaching the shift from emotional states to increased hostility, and violence, is that emotional states are linked to states of action readiness. States of action readiness are states that link emotional experiences and behavioral modes (i.e. fight or flight) (Fijda, Kuipers, and Schure 1989). Furthermore, different emotions will create unique action states, producing different responses, largely dependent on the perceived level of threat or risk (Lerner and Keltner 2001).

While a number of behavioral and attitudinal effects from experiencing fear have been previously addressed, what remains unexplored is the effect that real, or perceived, threat has on this relationship. As generally expected, individuals experiencing fear tend to be more risk averse (Lerner and Keltner 2001). Additionally, continued engagement with the information environment is dependent on the nature of the threat; in other words, how familiar a given threat is to the individual in question. As a result, when individuals are confronted with threat that are "familiar", they tend to cease seeking new information and become more entrenched in their prior preferences and attitudes (Mackuen et al. 2010). This has implications for how receptive these individuals will be to attempts at framing; namely, familiar entities that are framed to be threatening should be accepted as such fairly effectively (Druckman and McDermott 2008). Additionally, and a suggested previously, while

individuals experiencing fearful reactions tend to prefer more "defensive" actions (Brader, Groenendyk, and Valentino 2010), this should not, necessarily, be viewed as an aversion to aggression. As an example, Gadarian (2010) demonstrates that individuals experiencing fear as a consequence of being exposed to the threat of terrorism, tend to prefer more "hawkish", and aggressive foreign policies.

In contrast to the effect of fear, anger tends to encourage greater risk seeking behavior (Lerner and Keltner 2001; Druckman and McDermott 2008). In addition, anger is associated with increased aggression (Averill 1983) and a preference for punitive action (Brader, Groenendyk, and Valentino 2010). Yet, and as noted by Averill (1983), despite increased aggression, actually violent behavior remains uncommon. As a result, the question of what causes the shift from angry aggression to violence must be contended with.

2.3 The Role of Authoritarianism and Internal Efficacy

Up to this point, it is clear that candidates use messages in an attempt to alter attitudes, preferences, and behaviors of individuals. Additionally, we know that these messages are frequently based on threat frames, and that, depending on the type of threat, these threat frames produce specific emotions. Specifically, these threat frames produce either anger, fear, or disgust. These emotions, especially anger and fear, can have profound effects on individual-level behavior, particularly the level of aggression exhibited by individuals after being exposed to a threat. What remains unresolved is the conditions that must exist for individuals to shift from aggression to exhibiting violent behavior. I contend that the propensity to engage in violent behavior depends crucially on an individual's level of authoritarianism and internal efficacy. These psychological phenomena are further explored here individually before discussing how these factors will interact to mediate the impact of emotions on support for violence and one's propensity to engage in it.

While a number of conceptions and definitions of authoritarianism have been offered, I will be relying on the model developed by Stenner (2005). This approach conceptualizes authoritarianism as a dynamic interaction between a personality type and the political environment at a given point in time (Stenner 2005). Within this model, authoritarianism is marked by three components: authoritarian submission, which is expressed as a high degree of deference towards authority figures, authoritarian aggression, a general level of aggression towards members of outgroups and other deviants, and conventionalism, which is general rejection of changing social norms (Altemeyer 1981, 1988, 1996; Stenner 2005). Additionally, the expression of these specific components depends on the issues being stressed within the political environment. In particular, Stenner contends that authoritarianism is likely to be most prominent during times marked by concerns over normative threat, specifically surrounding "disrespect for leaders or leaders unworthy of respect, and a lack of conformity to or consensus in group values, norms, and beliefs (2005, 17-18)." Because so much of the 2016 election was marked by claims of corruption and concern over social issues which highlight the heterogeneity of our society, this conception of authoritarianism is likely to have a large impact on how messages from presidential candidates were received and interpreted, particularly those that highlight the potential threat posed by out group members.

While the link between authoritarianism and specific emotions is somewhat contested (Butler 2000), the link between authoritarianism and environmental threat remains fairly stable (Sales 1973). Critically, the existence of a threat does not, necessarily, cause a direct effect on the activation of authoritarian attitudes and behaviors (Feldman and Stenner 1997). Rather, the activation of authoritarians requires only a perceived or situationally induced threat (Doty, Peterson, and Winter 1991; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Lavine et al. 2002; McCann 2009; Rickert 1998; Richey 2012; Stenner 2005). Furthermore, Stenner (2005) contends that under periods of high normative threat, it is only authoritarian individuals that will be activated. As a result of these conclusions, messages

from candidates which emphasize the risks presented by a given outgroup are likely to alter the attitudes, preferences, and behaviors of many.

Furthermore, authoritarians that have been persuaded to believe that they face some societal threat have demonstrated a propensity to support more punitive or violent punishments for those that belong to the threatening group (Milburn, Niwa, and Patterson 2014; Richey 2012; Stack 2005). Specifically, the activation of authoritarianism has been linked to increased support for the death penalty (Stack 2005) and the use of torture (Richey 2012). Finally, the increased level of punitiveness demonstrated by authoritarians is further mediated by the individual's level of anger and hostile attribution bias (Milburn, Niwa, and Patterson 2014), highlighting the need to account for the specific emotion being experienced by a threatened individual.

While authoritarian aggression has lead those high in authoritarianism to support violent punishments from the government, there have been no direct tests of an authoritarian's propensity to directly engage in violent behavior themselves. Furthermore, the defining traits of authoritarianism support conflicting hypotheses about violent behavior. For instance, while authoritarian aggression may encourage authoritarians to behave aggressively, the conformity and deference to authority components may actually lead to the opposite. Consequently, I contend that an authoritarians likelihood of engaging in violent behaviors depends on their level of internal efficacy, or belief that they are equipped to deal with the threat that they are confronted with.

Internal efficacy is one of the components involved in protection motivation models, and helps to explain the behavior of individuals in response to threat communications (Maddux and Rogers 1983). Under this model, individuals respond to threatening messages and environments by either engaging in avoidant behaviors and thinking when efficacy is low. However, when efficacy is high, individuals are far more likely to take proactive steps to alleviate the threat (Bandura 1977; Bandura and Adams 1977; Maddux and Rogers 1983; Rippetoe and Rogers 1987; Witte and Allen

2000; Beck and Frankel 2008). Additionally, these messages lead to the greatest behavior shifts when high threat messages were combined with messages to increase internal efficacy (Witte and Allen 2000).

2.4 Theoretical Expectations

2.4.1 Theoretical Model

Given the existing state of the literature, and the nature of the 2016 presidential campaign, a number of theoretical expectations can be clearly advanced. I contend that campaign rhetoric which highlights the potential threat posed by outgroup members alters individual's attitudes and behaviors via the elicitation of negative emotions among those individuals. Specifically, campaign rhetoric in 2016 frequently highlighted the potential economic, criminal, and cultural threats that a rising immigrant population poses to American citizens. While the literature demonstrates some mixed evidence for the efficacy of some of these threats, all of these threats have been demonstrated to alter individual's attitudes towards immigrants and immigration policy. These same threat frames have additionally been linked to a greater level of hostility and preference for more punitive policies towards members of outgroups.

Hypothesis 1: Individuals exposed to threat frames will be more likely to express negative attitudes towards immigrants and will express greater support for more conservative immigration policies than those that are not exposed to threat frames

Hypothesis 2: Individuals exposed to threat frames will be more likely to express greater hostility and support for more punitive policies towards outgroup members than those that are not exposed to threat frames.

Furthermore, these threat frames are likely to elicit strong negative emotions in those that are exposed to them. The role of negative emotions has benefitted from an increased level of research in political science, particularly fear, anger, and disgust. Each of these emotions has been demonstrated to have a strong impact on individual behavior, including the exhibition of aggressive and protective behaviors, which may extend to violent behaviors. Additionally, more recent literature has begun to investigate the role that these negative emotions play in determining attitudes towards outgroups and their members.

Hypothesis 3: Individuals that report higher levels of negative emotions following exposure to threat frames will be more likely to express negative attitudes towards immigrants and will express greater support for more conservative immigration policies than those that do not report higher levels of negative emotions.

Hypothesis 4: Individuals that report higher levels of negative emotions following exposure to threat frames will be more likely to exhibit greater levels of hostility and more positive attitudes towards various forms of political violence than those that do not report higher levels of negative emotions.

Finally, these threat frames draw attention to the role that outgroups and their members play in changing the composition and make-up of a society. Changes around social norms and societal composition, especially when the resolution of that change is known, has been demonstrated to be the defining feature of the activation of authoritarian personalities. Consequently, individuals with higher levels of authoritarianism that are exposed to threat frames about outgroups are far more likely to exhibit hostile attitudes towards those outgroups. Further, authoritarianism is marked by some level of authoritarian aggression, which may lead to more favorable attitudes towards violence

and greater hostility towards outgroups, though the actual behavior of authoritarians may be mitigated by their level of internal efficacy.

The general relationships between each of these forces – outgroup threat, negative emotions, and the activation of authoritarianism – is depicted in Figure 2.1, below. Finally, more specific theoretical expectations for each of these forces and their impact on political attitudes and behaviors are detailed below.

Figure 2.1: Theoretical Model of Relationship Between Threat and Behavioral and Attitude Change



2.4.2 Crime Victimization Hypotheses

Crime victimization threat frames work to frame outgroups as a legitimate threat to the safety of in-group members by highlighting the proximity and demographic changes that may result from the proximity of outgroups (Warr and Stafford 1983; Taylor and Covington 1993; Chiricos, Hogan, and Gertz 1997; Chiricos, McEntire, and Gertz 2001). Additionally, these types of frames will specifically focus on changes in the overall crime rate and the type of crimes that have become

more common (Liska, Lawrence, and Sanchirico 1982; Liska and Bellair 1995; Rountree and Land 1996; Markowitz et al. 2001); a tactic that is particularly effective amongst whites when the utilized frame focuses on property and interracial crime (Liska, Lawrence, and Sanchirico 1982). As a result of these focuses in victimization threats, it is expected that individuals exposed to this type of threat frame will be considerably more likely to express feelings of fear than individuals that have not been exposed to this type of frame.

Hypothesis 5: Individuals exposed to the crime victimization threat frame will be more likely to report feeling higher levels of fear than those exposed to political power threats.

In addition to altering the emotional state of individuals, the crime victimization threat frame has generally been shown to have a large impact on individual-level attitudes towards outgroup members, as well as perceptions of crime rates. In particular, crime victimization threats alter the perceived crime rate (Liska and Bellair 1995), the level of social disorganization (Routhree and Land 1996; Markowitz et al. 2001), and the perceived likelihood that an individual will, themselves, be the victim of a crime (Warr and Stafford 1983). Consequently, it is reasonable to expect that campaign rhetoric which focuses on crimes committed by undocumented immigrants should negatively impact individual-level attitudes towards all immigrants. Particularly, individuals exposed to crime victimization threat frames should be more likely to believe that immigrants increase the crime rate. In addition, because of the link between victimization threats and the elicitation of fear, as explained above, it follows that individuals that experience greater levels of fear will also believe that higher rates of immigration are tied to higher crime rates.

Hypothesis 6: Individuals exposed to crime victimization threat frames will be more likely to believe that immigrants increase crime rates than those not exposed to a crime victimization threat.

Hypothesis 7: Individuals that report higher levels of fear following exposure to threat frames will be more likely to believe that immigrants increase crime rates than those that do not report a high level of fear.

Unlike individuals primed to feel anger, individuals experiencing fear are not, necessarily, inclined to engage in more violent behavior automatically. Rather, fear is most likely to produce a "fight or flight" response (Marcus and Mackuen 1993; Brader 2006; Brader, Groenendyk, and Valentino 2010; Redlawsk, Cinetiini, and Emmerson 2010); in which individuals may be more inclined to engage in more aggressive, and even violent behaviors, but may also be just as likely to disengage from the threatening stimuli. Because of this behavioral uncertainty in individuals primed to experience fear, I contend that emotional stimuli are not the sole factor needed to account for violence against outgroup members. Additionally, I argue that authoritarianism and internal efficacy can account for the missing link between the induction of fear and the production of violent behaviors.

Because authoritarians are activated by perceived and normative threat (Doty, Peterson, and Winter 1991; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Rickert 1998; Lavine et al. 2002; Stenner 2005; McCann 2009; Richey 2012), messages that emphasize the potential threat from members of outgroups are likely to appeal to authoritarians more than messages lacking this cue. Additionally, if authoritarians are the primary group to be affected by these types of messages, increased aggression towards outgroups should be expected as a result of authoritarian aggression (Altemeyer 1981, 1988, 1996; Stenner 2005). Despite the likelihood of threatening messages activating authoritarian aggression, violence remains relatively unusual (Averill 1983). I argue that this inconsistency is likely the result of an interaction between another component of authoritarianism, namely submission to an authoritarian leader, and an individual's own level of internal efficacy. Under protection motivation

theories, individuals with low internal efficacy are likely to engage in threat avoidant behaviors while individuals with high levels of internal efficacy are more likely to take proactive steps to mitigate the threat that they are face with Bandura 1977; Bandura and Adams 1977; Maddux and Rogers 1983; Rippetoe and Rogers 1987; Witte and Allen 2000). Consequently, I propose that an individual's likelihood of engaging in violence themselves, supporting the used of violence by others or their preferred leader, or simply seeking to disengage with the threat is largely dependent on their level of authoritarianism and efficacy. The expected response to threat under varying conditions of authoritarianism

Hypothesis 8: Individuals that report a high level of fear after exposure to a crime victimization threat frame and are also exposed to a violence approval message will be more likely to support the use of violence and to personally engage in violence than those that do not report high levels of fear following exposure.

Hypothesis 9: Individuals exposed to just the crime victimization threat frame with high levels of authoritarianism will support the use of violence by their political leader than those with a low level of authoritarianism.

Hypothesis 10: Individuals with high levels of internal efficacy that are exposed to the crime victimization threat frame and the violence approval message will be more likely to support the use of violence and will be more willing to personally engage in violence than those with lower levels of internal efficacy.

Hypothesis 11: Individuals with high levels of authoritarianism that are exposed to the crime victimization threat frame and the violence approval message will be more likely to support the use of violence and will be more willing to personally engage in violence than those with lower levels of authoritarianism.

2.4.3 Political Power Threat Hypotheses

Power threat frames attempt to present members of outgroups as a threat to the political power held by the majority group in a given community or electorate(Blalock 1967; Eitle, D'Alessio, and Stolzenberg 2002). In order to make this type of threat salient, this type of threat tends to focus on shifts and growth within the outgroup's population. In the case of the 2016 election, there was a large focus on immigration, especially focusing on the number of immigrants, legal or otherwise, which entered the country each year. Strongly implied in this rhetoric is that as the number of immigrants increases the amount of political power that is held by members of the in-group will begin to diminish drastically. As a result of this rhetorical focus, attitudes closely associated with old-fashioned racism should become much more prevalent, which is itself closely associated with the elicitation of disgust (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008).

Hypothesis 12: All individuals that are exposed to a political power threat will be more likely to report higher levels of disgust than those exposed to victimization threats

In addition to effecting individuals' emotions, this type of frame is expected to have a large impact on various issue positions related to mitigating an increasing outgroup population. In the past, this type of framing has been associated with greater support for stricter adherence to the law and greater support for law enforcement. As a result, it may be likely for individuals exposed to power threat frames to demonstrate attitude change similar to those exposed to crime victimization threat frames. Additionally, because this frame is so focused on the consequences of an outgroup's population supplanting the in-group as the majority group within a given area, it is plausible that this threat should also have a large impact on attitudes towards the perceived consequences of an increasing immigrant population. Specifically, this threat is likely to alter beliefs about the impact of immigrants on the culture of the country. Finally, experiencing disgust has a large impact on an

individual's behavior and attitudes. As disgust is linked to issues of morality and old-fashioned racism (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008), higher levels of disgust should be linked to a stronger belief that immigrants harm the culture of the country they are immigrating to.

> *Hypothesis 13:* Individuals exposed to political power threat frames will be more likely to believe that immigrants have a negative impact on American culture than those that are not exposed to a political power threat frame.
>
> *Hypothesis 14:* Individuals that report higher levels of disgust following exposure to threat frames will be more likely to believe that immigrants harm American culture than those that do not report a high level of disgust.

However, unlike anger and fear, there has been only limited inquiries into the behavioral effects of disgust. Despite this deficiency, there are some things that are known about the effect of disgust that can provide some insights about how likely it is for individuals experiencing disgust to engage in violence, or support others engaging in violence. First, widespread belief that a racial minority's population is growing and threatening to replace the current majority group is associated with increased violent crime rates, including increased interracial murder rates (Jacobs and Wood 1999; Avery and Fine 2012). As a result, it would be reasonable to expect that experiencing disgust should greatly increase one's propensity to support and even engage in violence. However, disgust is also deeply tied to issues of morality (Schnall et al. 2008; Inbar et al. 2009; Inbar, Pizarro, and Bloom 2009). Thus, violence may not be a particularly common response to disgust, unless that behavior comes to be viewed as morally good. Furthermore, protection motivation theory has generally demonstrated that disgust produces either protective or proactive responses, depending on an individual's level of personal efficacy (Bandura 1977; Bandura and Adams 1977; Maddux and Rogers

1983; Rippetoe and Rogers 1987; Witte and Allen 2000; Beck and Frankel 2008). As a consequence of these three findings, disgust poses a complex problem for anticipating behavioral outcomes.

I contend that, as with anger and fear, the missing link between emotion and behavior change is one's level of internal efficacy and authoritarianism. However, the interactions between these two forces will vary slightly for individuals experiencing disgust as a result of exposure to a political power threat frame. Specifically, from just initial threat frame, the interaction between efficacy and authoritarianism will elicit the same behavioral change from those framed to feel disgust as from those framed to experience fear or anger.

In contrast to the two prior emotions, however, encouragement to engage in violence from a leader will have a much larger impact on individuals feeling disgust. More specifically, for individuals feeling disgust, messages encouraging specific behaviors as a means of overcoming a proposed threat can drastically increase an individual's level of internal efficacy. In turn, that increase in efficacy can lead to an individual taking much more proactive behaviors to overcome a threat, rather than the protective behaviors which may have been previously expected (Witte and Allen 2000).

> *Hypothesis 15:* Individuals that report higher levels of disgust after exposure to a political power threat will be more likely to support the use of political violence by others, including a political leader, than those that do not report a high level of disgust after exposure to a political power threat.
>
> *Hypothesis 16:* Individuals that report higher levels of disgust after exposure to a political power threat and also receive a violence approval message will be more likely to support the use of political violence by others and to engage in violence themselves, than those that were not exposed to a violence approval message.
>
> *Hypothesis 17:* Individuals exposed to just the political power threat frame with high levels of authoritarianism will be more likely to support the use of violence by their

political leader than those with low levels of authoritarianism exposed to the same messages.

Hypothesis 18: Individuals exposed to the political power threat frame and the violence approval message with high levels of internal efficacy will be more likely to support the use of violence and will be more willing to personally engage in violence than those with a low level of internal efficacy.

Hypothesis 19: Individuals exposed to the political power threat frame and the violence approval message with high levels of authoritarianism will be more likely to support the use of violence and will be more willing to personally engage in violence than those with a low level of authoritarianism exposed to the same messages.

In order to test the theory an experimental survey was deployed to a nationally representative sample, which is paired with data from a large, cross-sectional survey collected during the 2016 presidential election. Details of these two studies are discussed in the following chapter, before turning to the empirical analysis of this data, beginning in Chapter Four.

3 THE METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

This dissertation tests the hypothesized effects of exposure to threat through campaign communication on attitudes towards immigrants and political violence. While this relationship is hypothesized to rely on individual-level psychological processes, it is necessary to determine the extent to which these processes play out at the aggregate level. Consequently, this dissertation relies on data from both an experimental survey and large, cross-sectional survey conducted during a presidential campaign. The design and details of these two studies are detailed here.

3.1 Experimental Design and Survey Sample

In an attempt to determine the underlying psychological processes of individuals' attitudes towards immigrants and political violence an experimental survey design was utilized. Using a 2x2 experimental design, two different threat frames about undocumented immigrants and a message encouraging the use of violence were presented to participants. The first of these threat frames, referred to as the crime victimization threat, highlights instances of violence crimes committed by undocumented immigrants; while the other, the political power threat, emphasizes the number of immigrants admitted into the country each year and their relative size as a proportion of the overall population. The breakdown of these treatment conditions is depicted in Table 3.1. In addition, a control group is also utilized, participants in the control group, simply, did not receive any of the threat or violence approval messages.

Table 3-1: Experimental Treatment Conditions

	Crime Victimization Threat	Power Threat
No Violence Approval	Treatment 1	Treatment 3
Violence Approval	Treatment 2	Treatment 4

Each of the three treatment messages used in this experiment were directly taken from public statements Donald Trump made at campaign rallies during the 2016 presidential election. Both of the threat messages were taken from Donald Trump's 2016 immigration policy announcement speech, delivered in Arizona. Additionally, the violence approval message was delivered by Trump during a campaign rally speech in St. Louis, Missouri on March 11, 2016. While the violence approval message remained the same from the original transcript, both of the threat frames that were presented to participants in this study were edited for two specific ends. First, both messages were, relatively, long and differed considerably in length. Consequently, both messages were shortened to be, approximately, 150 words in length. Secondly, many politicians have particular modes of speaking that are highly identifiable, of which, Donald Trump is no exception. As a result, the more recognizable aspects of Donald Trump's rhetorical style have been removed. The text of each treatment, as presented to participants, are in Table 3.2[1].

[1] Unedited transcripts and Flesch-Kincaid scores are available in Appendix A.

Table 3-2: Treatment Transcripts

Crime Victimization Threat	Political Power Threat	Violence Approval
Countless innocent American lives have been stolen because our politicians have failed in their duty to secure our borders and enforce our laws. I have met with many of the parents who lost their children to sanctuary cities and open borders. Countless Americans who have died in recent years would be alive today if not for the open border policies of this administration. Like Grant Ronnebeck, a 21-year-old convenience store clerk from Mesa, Arizona. He was murdered by an illegal immigrant gang member previously convicted of burglary, who had also been released from federal custody. Another victim is Kate Steinle. Gunned down in the sanctuary city of San Francisco, by an illegal immigrant, deported five previous times. A 2011 report from the Government Accountability Office found that illegal immigrants and other non-citizens, in our prisons and jails together, had around 25,000 homicide arrests to their names.	We've admitted 59 million immigrants to the United States between 1965 and 2015. Many of these arrivals have greatly enriched our country. But we now have an obligation to them and to their children to control future immigration as we are following previous immigration waves. To ensure assimilation, integration, and upward mobility, we want to ensure that it works. Within just a few years immigration as a share of national population is set to break all historical records. The time has come for a new immigration commission to develop a new set of reforms to our legal immigration system in order to achieve the following goals. To keep immigration levels measured by population share within historical norms. To select immigrants based on their likelihood of success in U.S. society and their ability to be financially self-sufficient. We take anybody. Come on in, anybody. Just come on in. Not anymore.	Part of the reason it takes so long to remove protestors is nobody wants to hurt each other anymore. And honestly protestors realized that there are not any consequences to protesting, anymore. Our country has to toughen up. These protestors are bringing us down, and there's no reason for it. Protestors are so bad for our country. The contribute nothing.

Participants for the experimental study were recruited online through Qualtrics, in Fall 2019. The study population was additionally matched to U.S. census data on race, gender, education, and income. Summary statistics for these demographic factors are provided in Table 3.3. This information was prompted at the beginning of the survey. Respondents were then assigned to either

of the threat treatments or the control group. Participants that received either of the threat treatments were asked about their emotional state after their exposure, and then either received the violence approving message or did not[2]. Participants were then asked a series of questions about a range of political attitudes.

Table 3-3: Summary Statistics

	Qualtrics - Experimental Sample					ANES - Cross-Sectional Sample				
	Coefficient	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	N	Coefficient	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	N
Age	2.573	1.697	0	5	300	2.918	1.631	0	5	4149
Women	0.514	0.501	0	1	296	0.529	0.499	0	1	4218
White	0.720	0.45	0	1	300	0.811	0.392	0	1	4237
Education	1.160	0.819	0	2	300	2.752	1.545	0	5	4226
Income	1.087	0.753	0	2	300	1.572	1.165	0	3	4068
Partisan Identity	0.863	0.837	0	2	300	2.859	2.152	0	6	4247

3.2 Dependent Variables from the Experimental Study

3.2.1 Chapter 4: The Emotional Impact of Threat Exposure

The empirical chapters for this dissertation are divided into three. The first of these, Chapter 4, looks at the emotional effects of exposure to a threat stimulus. Participants were asked how much they felt each of eight distinct emotions. Four of these emotions are generally more positive: hope, pride, happiness, and relief. The other four emotions are broadly negative: anger, fear, disgust, and sadness. Answer responses for each of these emotions ranged from "not at all" to "extremely", creating a five-point scale. Only participants' rating of their negative emotions are utilized, and each is regarded as individual dependent variables. The emotion matrix that was presented to respondents can be viewed in Table 3.4.

[2] Robustness checks to ensure randomization are provided in Appendix A.

Table 3-4: Emotion Matrix for Experimental Survey

	Not at all (1)	A little (2)	Somewhat (3)	Very (4)	Extremely (5)
How hopeful did the previous excerpt make you feel?	○	○	○	○	○
How angry did the previous excerpt make you feel?	○	○	○	○	○
How afraid did the previous excerpt make you feel?	○	○	○	○	○
How proud did the previous excerpt make you feel?	○	○	○	○	○
How happy did the previous excerpt make you feel?	○	○	○	○	○
How worried did the previous excerpt make you feel?	○	○	○	○	○
How disgusted did the previous excerpt make you feel?	○	○	○	○	○
How relieved did the previous excerpt make you feel?	○	○	○	○	○
How sad did the previous excerpt make you feel?	○	○	○	○	○

Additionally, after respondents provided an over-all evaluation of their emotions, they were asked to briefly explain what about the message they had read made them feel the emotions they reported. Responses to this prompt were evaluation to determine if participants' emotions were directed towards the perceived messenger of the threat frame, or towards the threatening group from the message (i.e. undocumented immigrants). Statements indicating that respondents' emotions were directed towards immigrants were coded as +1, while those directed towards the messenger

were coded as -1. Ambiguous messages were coded as 0, and responses that were either left blank, or were unrelated, were dropped from the analysis.

3.2.2 Chapter 5: Attitudes Toward Immigrants and Immigration Under Conditions of Threat

The second empirical chapter addresses respondents' attitudes towards immigrants and immigration policy. This chapter utilizes seven dependent variables, grouped into four broad categories: beliefs about the economic impact of immigrants, attitudes about the cultural impact of immigrants, beliefs about the criminal impact of immigrants, and general immigration policy preferences. Question and response wordings directly mimic those that were used on the 2016 American National Election Study and are displayed in Table 3.6. Each of these measures and its' coding is discussed in detail below.

Table 3-5: Question Wording for Chapter 5 Dependent Variables

Economic Impact of Immigrants	
How likely is it that recent immigration levels will take jobs away from people already here?	• Extremely likely • Moderately likely • Slightly likely • Slightly unlikely • Moderately unlikely • Extremely unlikely
Immigrants are generally good for America's economy.	• Agree strongly • Agree somewhat • Neither agree nor disagree • Disagree somewhat • Disagree strongly
Cultural Impact of Immigrants	
How important do you think it is that everyone in the United States learn to speak English?	• Very important • Somewhat important • Not very important • Not at all important
America's culture is generally harmed by immigrants.	• Agree strongly • Agree somewhat • Neither agree nor disagree • Disagree somewhat • Disagree strongly
Criminal Impact of Immigrants	
Immigrants increase crime rates in the United States.	• Agree strongly • Agree somewhat • Neither agree nor disagree • Disagree somewhat • Disagree strongly
General Immigration Policy	
What comes closest to your view about what government policy should be toward unauthorized immigrants now living in the United States?	• Make all unauthorized immigrants felons and send them back to their home country. • Have a guest worker program that allows unauthorized immigrants to remain in the United States in order to work, but only for a limited amount of time. • Allow unauthorized immigrants to remain in the United State and eventually qualify for U.S. citizenship, but only if they meet certain requirements like paying back taxes and fines, learning English, and passing background checks. • Allow unauthorized immigrants to remain in the United States and eventually qualify for U.S. citizenship, without penalties.
Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose building a wall on the U.S. border with Mexico?	• Favor • Oppose • Neither favor nor oppose

The first category of dependent variables assesses participants' beliefs about the economic impact of immigrants and is addressed through two distinct measures. First, respondents were asked how likely it is that an immigrant would take a job from a current American citizen or resident. Responses for this measure were placed on a six-point ordinal scale, ranging from "extremely unlikely" to "extremely likely". The second question asked respondents whether they believed that immigrants are generally good for the American economy. Answers were placed on a five-point ordinal scale, ranging from strong disagreement, on the low end, to strong agreement.

The second category of dependent variables addresses the kind of cultural impact that participants believe immigrants have on American society. This attitude was also assessed through two separate dependent variables. The first of these measures the extent to which participants believed that it is important for everyone in the United States to be able to speak English. Responses to this question were coded on a four-point ordinal scale, from "not at all important" to "very important". The second of these cultural variables asked participants how much they agreed that American culture is generally harmed by immigrants. Responses to this prompt were coded on a five-point ordinal scale with responses ranging from strong disagreement to strong agreement.

The third category of variables used to measure participants attitudes towards immigrants address the believed impact that immigrants have on American crime rates. This belief was measured with a single question which simply asked respondents how much they agreed that immigrants increase the crime rate. Responses to this prompt were also placed on a five-point scale, spanning strong disagreement to strong agreement.

Finally, the last category of variables utilized in Chapter 5 addresses individual's preferences towards broad aspects of immigration policy. As with prior categories for this chapter, this category again makes use of two distinct measures. The first of these measures asks respondents what their preferred policy towards undocumented immigrants would be. Answers were placed on a four-point

ordinal scale, with higher values indicating a preference for a more punitive policy. More specifically, responses coded as 0 indicate a preference for undocumented immigrants to be allowed to remain in the country and begin the naturalization process without any penalties. In contrast, responses coded at the highest value indicate a preference for a policy which would treat all undocumented immigrants as felons and deport them to their country of origin. The final measure asked participants whether they supported or opposed building a wall on the Southern border. Responses to this question were simply coded dichotomously, with a value of 1 indicating support for the construction.

3.2.3 Chapter 6: The Psychological Determinants of Attitudes Towards Political Violence

The third empirical chapter focuses on participants' attitudes towards, and willingness to engage in, political violence. These attitudes are assessed through five separate dependent variables, broadly grouped into two categories. Specific wording for each of these questions and their possible answers are displayed in Table 3.7.

Table 3-6: Question Wording for Chapter 6 Dependent Variables

Attitudes Towards Political Violence	
When protestors get "roughed up" for disrupting political events, how much do they generally deserve what happens to them?	• A great deal • A lot • A moderate amount • A little • Not at all
How much do you feel it is justified for people to use violence to pursue their political goals in this country?	• A great deal • A lot • A moderate amount • A little • Not at all
Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the U.S. government torturing people who are suspected of being terrorists to try to get information?	• Favor • Oppose • Neither favor nor oppose
Propensity to Engage in Violence	
How hard is it for you to control your temper?	• Extremely hard • Very hard • Moderately hard • A little bit hard • Not hard at all
When provoked, how likely are you to hit someone?	• Extremely likely • Very likely • Moderately likely • Slightly likely • Not likely at all

The first of these categories attempts to ascertain general attitudes towards various forms of political violence and contains three variables. The first two questions in this category focus on acts of violence perpetuated against "average" citizens and ask participants whether they believe that political violence is justifiable and whether some protestors deserve to be rough up or not. Answers for both of these questions are coded on a five-point ordinal scale, with answer options ranging from "not at all", at the low end, to "a great deal", at the high end. The third variable in this category address the extent to which participants would support the use of violence by the government itself and asks participants whether they approve of a government policy to

torture suspected terrorists. Responses to this question included opposition, support, and neither opposition nor support as a middle option.

The second category of dependent variables for this chapter address factors that may indicate that a participant may engage in violence themselves, political or otherwise. This category contains two separate measures: difficulty of controlling one's temper and their likelihood of hitting someone once they are provoked. Responses to each of these questions were coded on a five-point ordinal scale, and ranged from "not hard/likely at all" to "extremely hard/likely", respectively.

3.3 Independent Variables from the Experimental Survey

The independent variables used throughout this dissertation are relatively consistent across empirical chapters and can be broadly considered in one of four categories. First across each chapter, treatment exposure serves as an overarching consideration. However, in Chapter 4 treatments 1 and 2, and 3 and 4, are pooled based on the threat treatment that participants were exposed to. Because emotion data was collected from participants prior to their exposure to the violence approval message, participants in groups 2 and 4 should not behave substantially differently from those in groups 1 and 3, respectively. However, in Chapter 5 and 6 these participants are treated as belonging to their own treatment, and participants in the control group are held as the comparison group.

The second broad category of variables focuses on the demographic and political identities of respondents. With the exception of political tolerance, data for each of these variables was collected prior to treatment exposure. Among these variables was respondent age, race, gender, education and income levels, and partisan identification. Both race and gender are implemented dichotomously with higher values indicating non-white and female respondents, respectively. All other variables are treated ordinally, with higher values reflecting higher levels of each variable. The

partisanship variable contains three categories with a value of 0 indicating Democratic respondents and 2 indicating Republican respondents. Finally, the political tolerance variable is an index of a total of twelve questions and were collected at the end of the survey. These questions assess a respondent's tolerance for four contentious groups – Black Live Matter, Antifa, the Alt-Right, and DACA recipients – in three areas of political life. Responses for each of these questions were combined in an additive index, and then recoded into a three-point ordinal scale. Values of 0 reflect a low level of political tolerance, while values of 2 reflect a high level of political tolerance.

In Chapters 5 and 6, two key variables of interest are added to the analysis: internal efficacy and authoritarianism. Both of these variables are additive indexes and were asked directly prior to treatment exposure. The internal efficacy relies on four questions which asses the amount of control that respondents felt they had over their lives. Each of these four questions was coded dichotomously, resulting in index values ranging from 0 to 8. This index was then recoded to a three-point scale, with a value of 1 centering around the mean value for the index. The 0 and 2 values were then placed one standard deviation above and below this mean value. Consequently, a value of 0 indicates a low level of efficacy, while 2 indicates a high value of efficacy. Similarly, the authoritarianism scale used here also relies on four separate questions. Answers to each of these questions were originally coded on a four-point scale, resulting in index values that ranged from 0 to 12. As with the internal efficacy measure, authoritarianism was also recoded to a three-point ordinal scale, with a value of 1 reflecting the mean value of the thirteen-point scale, and 0 and 2 reflecting values one standard deviation above and below the mean, respectively. These questions and answer options are available in Table 3.8.

Table 3-7: Internal Efficacy and Authoritarianism

Internal Efficacy	
When you do make plans ahead of time, do you usually get to carry out things the way you expected, or do things usually come up to make you change your plans?	• Have to change plans • Things work out as expected • Don't know/It depends
Do you think it is better to plan your life a good way ahead, or would you say life is too much a matter of luck to plan ahead very far?	• Too much luck to plan ahead • Plan ahead • Don't know/It depends
Have you usually felt pretty sure your life would work out the way you want it to, or have there been times when you haven't been sure about it?	• Haven't been sure • Pretty sure • Don't know/It depends
Some people feel they can run their lives pretty much the way they wat to, others feel the problems of life are sometimes too big for them. Which one are you most like?	• Problems of life too big • Can run own life • Don't know/It depends
Authoritarianism	
Please tell me which one you think is more important for a child to have: Independence or respect for elders	• Independence • Respect for elders • Both • Neither
Which one is more important for a child to have: Curiosity or good manners	• Curiosity • Good manners • Both • Neither
Which one is more important for a child to have: Obedience or self-reliance	• Obedience • Self-reliance • Both • Neither
Which one is more important for a child to have: Being considerate or well behaved	• Being considerate • Well behaved • Both • Neither

Finally, Chapters 5 and 6 also include participants' emotional reactions to the threat frames as independent variables of interest. These question wordings, answer responses are identical to those in Chapter 4. These can be reviewed in Table 3.4.

3.4 Cross-Sectional Data from 2016 ANES

In addition to the experimental survey, chapters 5 and 6 also make use of cross-sectional data from the 2016 American National Election Study. Because question wording used in the experimental survey was, largely, identical to that on the 2016 ANES, there are only slight differences in variables utilized and their coding. Specifically, all of the dependent variables are identical to those used in the experimental survey. Similarly, the demographic and political factors and authoritarianism measures are the same. Of these variables, only the political tolerance questions differ, though in a minor way. In the ANES survey, the contentious groups used in these prompts were liberals, conservatives, Black Lives Matters members, and the Tea Party. The question wording, beyond these groups, and response coding were otherwise identical. The other differences between these two studies are detailed below.

The first major difference between the two studies is the lack of ability to directly control which threat frames, if any, participants were exposed to. However, in an attempt to assess how much these messages may have filtered into participants in the cross-sectional study, two measures assessing individual's attention to the political landscape are used here. First, participants were asked how interested in political campaigns they were. This measure was coded on a three-point ordinal scale, ranging from "not very interested" to "very interested". Second, participants were asked how generally interested in politics and the government they were. These responses were coded on a four-point scale, ranging from "not at all interested", at the low end, and "very interested", at the high end.

Second, and again because participants' exposure to campaign messages or threat frames could not be controlled, emotion data for participants in the cross-sectional survey are not available. This has two effects throughout this dissertation. First, Chapter 4 is not able to make comparisons

to the cross-sectional sample, and this data is excluded from that chapter. Second, these variables can not be used in Chapters 5 or 6 as independent variables.

Finally, measures of internal efficacy were not included as part of the 2016 ANES questionnaire. As a result, a measure of one's satisfaction with their own life is substituted in cross-sectional analysis. This question simply askes participants if there are generally satisfied with their life, as a whole. This variable was originally coded as a five-point ordinal scale but was recoded to a three-point ordinal scale with a value of 0 indicating a general dissatisfaction, 1 indicating moderate satisfaction, and 2 indicating a high level of life satisfaction. The wording for each of these substituted measures are detailed in Table 3.10.

Table 3-8: American National Election Study Question Wording

Campaign Message Exposure	
Some people don't pay much attention to political campaigns. How about you? Would you say that you have bee […] in the political campaigns so far this year?	• Very much interested • Somewhat interested • Not much interested
How interested would you say you are in politics? Are you […]?	• Very interested • Somewhat interested • Not very interested • Not at all interested
Life Satisfaction	
All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Would you say that you are […]?	• Extremely satisfied • Very satisfied • Moderately satisfied • Slightly satisfied • Not satisfied at all

The theory outlined in Chapter 2 is tested using these two data sources through the next three chapters. Chapter 4 begins this by addressing the role that threat plays in emotion generation, and the demographic and political factors that may mediate that relationship. As such, it relies exclusively on data from the experimental survey to measure and develop these hypotheses.

4 THE EMOTIONAL IMPACTS OF EXPOSURE TO THREAT FRAMES

What impact does exposure to threat frames in campaign communications have on individuals? Do individuals that receive these the threat frames experience different emotions? Do different kinds of threat generate different emotions than others? Using data from an experimental survey, this chapter answers each of these questions.

The results in this chapter demonstrate that, in general, threat frames wielded by political candidates do have a real impact on the individuals that receive these messages. Individuals exposed to these kinds of messages tend to exhibit higher levels of negative emotions. This impact is furthered by those individual's race, gender, and partisanship. Finally, individuals exposed to these kinds of messages are most likely to experience those negative emotions directed towards the group that is established as the threat by these frames. Each of these are further explored here.

4.1 Theoretical Expectations and Hypotheses

As discussed in Chapter 2, a growing body of political science research has identified individual-level emotions as having a sizable impact on attitudes and behavior. However, before the relationship between emotion and behavior and attitudes can be fully examined, the question of how specific emotions can be generated in individuals must be explored. Just as candidates can be expected to prime specific issues (Petrocik 1996) and even their own personalities and traits (Funk 1999; Duckman 2004; Druckman, Jacobs, and Osetermeier 2004), we may also expect candidates to attempt to prime voters to *feel* specific emotions about various policy areas. One specific type of frame that may be particularly adept at priming emotions in those that are exposed to it are racial threat frames.

Blumer's group position model contends that competitive and hostile feelings towards outgroups can be activated when individuals believe that their in-group's position is being challenged

by outgroups (Blumer 1958). Additionally, Blalock (1967) not only demonstrates the powerful impact of racialized threat frames, but also identifies three distinct types of threat that are particularly impactful: economic threats, political threats, and symbolic threats – later focused into threats of crime victimization by Eitle, D'Alessio, and Stolzenberg (2002). Of these types of threat frame, political threat and victimization threats have largely produced the most consistent results.

Political power threat frames attempt to frame outgroup members as threatening to the continued political dominance of the ingroup because of their increasing numbers within the community and electorate. Implied in this rhetoric is the idea that if immigration at current rates is allowed to continue the power of the currently dominant ingroup will continually diminish until it is ultimately eclipsed by that of immigrants. As a result of this rhetorical focus, old-fashioned racism should become much more prevalent, which is itself closely associated with the elicitation of disgust (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008). Consequently, it should be expected that individuals exposed to this type of threat frame should be much more likely to report feeling disgusted.

H_1: All individuals that are exposed to a political power threat will be more likely to report higher levels of disgust than those exposed to victimization threats.

Crime victimization threat frames are also frequently used in political rhetoric, and focuses on instances of violent crimes perpetuated by members of the targeted racial group against others, with the intention of increasing the perceived risk of being victimized among those that received the message, thus increasing the level of fear that individuals experience (Warr and Stafford 1983). Further, it is only the *perception* of this possibility that has an impact (Chiricos, Hogan, and Gertz 1997; Chiricos, McEntire, and Gertz 2001), which these threat frames are particularly positioned to alter. Consequently, it should be expected that individuals exposed to crime victimization threat frames should report higher levels of fear than individuals that do not receive this type of message.

H_2: Individuals exposed to the crime victimization threat frame will be more likely to report feeling higher levels of fear than those exposed to political power threats.

Finally, it is reasonable to expect that not all respondents will respond to these threat frames in the same way. Rather, various demographic and political factors are likely to have a large impact on the kinds of emotions that individuals report experiencing, and the strength with which they report experiencing those feelings. For example, age and gender (LaGrange and Ferraro 1989; Ferraro 1996), and race (Chiricos, McEntire, and Gertz 2001) generally alter the level of fear that individuals express after exposure to crime victimization threats. Additionally, these demographic and political factors may alter the "target" of the respondent's emotions; consequently, some respondents may feel fear or disgust at the group targeted in the threat, immigrants in this case, while other may express feeling these emotions towards the perceived messenger of these frames.

H_3: Older respondents will be more likely to report higher levels of negative emotions than younger respondents in response to exposure to threat frames and will direct those emotions towards the targeted group, rather than the perceived messenger.

H_4: White respondents will be more likely to report higher levels of negative emotions than non-white respondents following exposure to threat frames and will direct those emotions towards the targeted group, rather than the perceived messenger.

H_5: Women will be more likely to report higher levels of negative emotions than men after exposure to threat frames and will direct those emotions towards the targeted group, rather than the perceived messenger.

H_6: Partisans will be more likely to report higher levels of negative emotions than Independents in response to exposure to threat frames.

H_{6b}: Republicans, in contrast to Democrats, will direct those emotions towards the targeted group, rather than the perceived messenger.

H_{6c}: Democrats, in contrast to Republicans, will direct those emotions towards the perceived messenger, rather than the targeted group.

4.2 Data and Methods

4.2.1 Dependent Variables

For this chapter, the primary focus is the emotional response that participants experienced after being exposed to the assigned threat treatment and the target of that emotion. Following the approach of Marcus et al. (2006), participants were asked to report how much they felt each of eight distinct emotions: hope, anger, pride, fear, happiness, disgust, relief, and sadness. For each of these emotions, respondents could report feeling the emotion on a scale from not at all to extremely, creating a five-point scale. Each of the four negative[3] emotions that participants were assessed on are treated as individual dependent variable.

In addition, respondents were asked to explain what about the threat treatment made them feel the emotion that they reported. Responses to this prompt were coded to reflect whether respondents indicated that their emotions were primarily directed towards the perceived messenger of the threat frame (-1) or the threatening group implied by the message (+1), illegal immigrants in

[3] For a greater discussion of the conceptual differences between each of the "negative" emotions – anger, fear, disgust, and sadness – refer to Chapter 2. For a broader review of relevant theories and competing methods of measurement see Brader and Marcus (2013).

this case. Finally, responses that were ambiguous in the direction of the respondent's emotions were coded as 0, and responses that were left blank or were unrelated were dropped.

Finally, respondents' emotional responses were collected after threat treatment exposure, but before exposure to the violence approval message. Consequently, the data for this chapter is pooled into only two conditions: exposure to the crime victimization threat frame, and exposure to the political power threat frame. As a final note, emotion responses were not collected for participants assigned to the control condition, resulting in their exclusion from this analysis.

4.2.2 Independent Variables

The primary independent variable for this analysis is just which threat participants were exposed to; however, a number of demographic variables remain of interest to this analysis. Each of these variables were collected prior to threat exposure as part of the study's pre-test and include respondent's age, race, gender, and partisan identification. Respondent age and partisan identification are both coded ordinally. Values for participant's age range from 0, indicating respondents aged between 18 and 24, and 5, indicating respondents aged 65 and over. Partisanship contains 3 categories with 0 indicating Democrats, and 2 indicating Republicans. Gender is included as a dichotomous variable, with 0 indicating male and 1 indicating female. Finally, the race and ethnicity of participants is treated as a categorical variable. Labels to indicate the respondent's self-identified race are provided for ease of interpretation.

4.3 Experimental Results

Before exploring how participants' individual characteristics impact their emotional responses to threat frames utilized in campaign rhetoric, the emotional impact of just those frames needs to be explored. As theorized, respondents exposed to threat frames are expected to experience higher levels of negative emotions. In particular, respondents exposed to the crime

victimization threat frame should report higher levels of fear (hypothesis 1) and those exposed to the political power threat frame should report higher levels of disgust (hypothesis 2). Figure 4-1, below, displays reported means and 95 percent confidence intervals for each of the four negative emotions assessed in the experimental survey, by threat treatment.

As demonstrated, regardless of which threat frame respondents were exposed to, on average, respondents reported feeling each of the assessed negative emotions to a moderate extent. Of these emotions, respondents reported feeling disgust and sadness at higher levels than either anger or fear. Additionally, across all emotions, the political power threat produced the strongest emotional responses. As a result of this analysis, hypothesis 1 does not appear to receive any level of support. Respondents in the crime victimization threat treatment groups did not report higher levels of any negative emotions, including fear, than those in the political power threat groups. Additionally, they did not report higher levels of fear than other negative emotions. In contrast, participants assigned to the political power threat condition reported higher average levels of disgust than other negative emotions and exhibited higher average levels of each emotion than participants in the crime victimization threat treatments. Consequently, there is considerably more support for hypothesis 2.



Figure 4-1: Mean Levels of Negative Emotions by Treatment Condition

From the above we can generally conclude that threat frames used in campaign rhetoric do appear to have some impact on individuals that are exposed to them, though this effect may be marginal in some cases. What remains unclear is which individuals are most susceptible to these messages. I have theorized that some individuals may be more likely to report higher levels of negative emotions depending on their age, gender, and racial and partisan identifications. Each of these will be explored in turn, beginning with the impact of respondent age on their emotional responses to threat frames.

The next series of hypotheses to be addressed here address the extent to which key demographic factors alter the impact that threat frame exposure has on individuals, and the actor that those emotions are directed towards. The first of these, hypothesis 3, asserts that older

participants will report higher levels of negative emotions than younger respondents, and will direct those emotions towards the group that is targeted by the threat message, immigrants. A two-way ANOVA analysis of each of the four negative emotions was run for all participants, divided between the two threat treatment conditions. While participants age on its own is not a statistically significant factor on the level of negative emotions that a participant reported, when interacted with the assigned threat treatment, it begins to approach statistical significance for the level of fear that participants reported feeling (p=0.181). Marginal predictions for each the negative emotions tested here are depicted in Figure 4-2, below.



Figure 4-2: Mean Level of Emotion by Respondent Age

As can be seen above, participants in each age group tended to report similar levels of each of the provided emotions, regardless of treatment condition. However, those participants that received the political power threat condition did tend to report higher levels of each emotion than similarly aged participants that received the Crime Victimization threat. Additionally, while age is not a statistically significant predictor of the levels of disgust and anger that participants reported feeling, there is a dramatic increase in the level of these emotions that the oldest respondents reported feeling, particularly amongst those exposed to the political power threat frame. Despite this, it is hard to assert that age has a durably significant impact on the level of emotion felt by participants, as the reported levels are remarkably consistent across the age range, again, with the exception of the oldest participants. Consequently, the first portion of hypothesis 3, that older respondents feel negative emotions to a greater extent than younger respondents, is not supported by this analysis.

For the second portion of this hypothesis, we need to look at the extent to which participants are more likely to indicate feeling these negative emotions towards the perceived messenger of the threat frame, or at the target (immigrants) of the frame themselves. An ANOVA reveals that while a respondent's age, on its own falls just short of reaching statistical significance ($p=0.1017$), the threat condition that participants are exposed to fails to reach statistical significance ($p=0.2274$). Consequently, Figure 4-3 does reveal that older participants are more likely to report that immigrants are the target of their emotional responses, there is no clear difference between those responses and the threat treatment that they were exposed to. This is in contrast to the impact of the threat treatment for most other age groups, which reveal that there is a greater likelihood of participants directing their emotions towards immigrants if they have been exposed to the political power threat than when they are exposed to the crime victimization threat.



Figure 4-3: Predictive Margins for the Target of Participant Emotion by Age

The next demographic factor that may have an effect of the level of negative emotion that participants report experiencing after threat frame exposure is participant race. As theorized in hypothesis 4, it should be expected that white participants reported feeling a higher level of negative emotions following exposure to either threat treatments. Similarly to results for participant age, participants' race generally has a positive impact on how much respondents report each negative emotion; however, this factor is only statistically significant for participants that reported feeling a higher level of sadness (p=0.100). Marginal predictions are reported in Figure 4-4 below.



Figure 4-4: Mean Level of Negative Emotion by Respondent Race

As demonstrated in the figure above, regardless of the threat treatment that participants were exposed to, white participants were much more likely to report higher levels of each negative emotion than non-white participants. Furthermore, with the exception of fear, white participants that received the political power threat were more likely to report higher levels of each emotion than those that received the crime victimization threat frame. This is contrast to non-white participants that were more likely to exhibit a similar behavior after being exposed to the crime victimization threat. While, again, race was only statistically significant in predicting the level of sadness that participants reported feeling, these trends in the racial impact on the emotional response to threat exposure is clear and provides some level of support for hypothesis 4.

Again, the second portion of hypothesis 4 concerns which actor participants reported their emotions being directed towards, either the messenger or immigrants. Unlike the impact of age on the reported target of participants' emotions, the threat condition is statistically significant (p=0.0801), but respondent race is not statistically significant (p=0.2797). Despite this, and similarly to emotion responses, respondent race does have a general impact on how likely a respondent is to indicate that their emotions are directed towards immigrants. As displayed in Figure 4-5 below, in general, white respondents are more likely to direct their emotions towards immigrants than are non-white respondents. However, this is mostly true for non-white respondents that receive the crime victimization threat frame, as those that received the political power threat were more similar in the direction of their emotions to white respondents that received either threat treatment.



Figure 4-5: Predictive Margins for the Target of Participant Emotion by Race

Next, participants' gender is expected to result in different emotional reactions to exposure to the threat treatments (hypothesis 5). In particular, women are generally expected to report feeling higher levels of negative emotions, particularly fear and disgust, and are more likely to direct those emotions towards the target of the message, in this case immigrants. Again, an ANOVA analysis is run to look at the impact of threat exposure on men and women for each of the negative emotions measured in this study. Generally, these results indicate that women report higher levels of sadness (p=0.048), and there is a marginal level of support for the idea that women are more likely to feel disgust (p=0.150) and anger (p=0.178) after treatment exposure. Marginal predictions for each of the negative emotions are reported in Figure 4-6 below.

Figure 4-6: Mean Level of Emotion by Respondent Gender

As with race, participants' gender has a significant impact on the level of each negative emotion that respondents reported feeling, regardless of threat frame that they are exposed to. In every emotion, except for fear, women were dramatically more likely to report feeling each emotion to a far great extent than men. However, while there appears to be little difference in the type of threat that women are exposed to, men reported higher levels of each emotion after being exposed to the crime victimization threat frame than the political power threat frame, with the exception of fear.

What remains unclear about how men and women emotionally react to threat treatments are whether they are more likely to direct those emotions towards the message sender or the subject of the message. Similar to the impact of race, while the threat treatment that participants does have a significant impact on the target of respondent's emotions ($p=0.0916$), gender does not appear to have a significant impact ($p=0.2584$). Despite this, there is a clear general trend between emotion target and respondent gender depicted in Figure 4-7 below. Generally, women were more likely to indicate that their emotions were directed towards the targeted group in the threat treatment, immigrants, and that this is particularly true for women that were exposed to crime victimization threat frame. However, respondents were slightly less likely to indicate that their emotions were directed towards immigrants if they had received the political power threat, regardless of their gender.



Figure 4-7: Predictive Margins for the Target of Participant Emotion by Gender

Finally, participants' partisan identifications are likely to have a strong impact on how individuals respond to messages about threat. In particular, and as theorized in hypotheses 6 and 7, both Democrats and Republicans are likely to have similar emotional reactions, but will likely direct those emotions at different actors. While not true across all negative emotions, partisanship does appear to have a statistically significant impact on the level of fear that individuals report feeling ($p=0.108$), and approaches statistical significance for the reported level of anger ($p=0.151$). Marginal predictions for each negative emotion is displayed in Figure 4-8 below.



Figure 4-8: Mean Level of Emotion by Partisanship

As depicted in the above figure, regardless of the emotion in question, participants that received the political power threat frame were nearly universal in their likelihood of reporting higher levels of negative emotions than participants that received the crime victimization threat frame. Additionally, except for participants that expressed sadness at their assigned threat message, Republicans were most likely to report higher average levels of each negative emotion than either Democrats or Independents. Given these results, the first portion of hypothesis 6, that Republicans will report higher levels of negative emotions is supported. However, given that Democrat's negative emotions are either lower or on par with both Independents and Republicans, it is hard to assert that the first portion of hypothesis 7 is supported by these results.

Turning to the second portion of each of these hypotheses though, where participants are directing these negative emotions needs to be addressed. A two-way ANOVA analysis reveals that respondent partisanship does have a statistically significant impact on the reported direction of their emotional responses (p=0.0023), but threat treatment does not reach the level of statistical significance (p=0.1847). This relationship is demonstrated in Figure 4-9. From this, it is clear that Republicans were far more likely to indicate that immigrants were the intended target of their emotions, especially when exposed to the political power threat frame. Democrats, on the other hand, were most likely to be more ambiguous in the stated direction of their emotions, or to direct those emotions towards the perceived messenger of the threat frame, especially in the case of those exposed to the crime victimization threat frame.



Figure 4-9: Predictive Margins for Emotion Target by Partisanship

4.4 Chapter Conclusions and Implications

The results above demonstrate a fairly mixed level of support for the hypotheses developed in this chapter. While the crime victimization threat did not appear to have a particularly significant impact on the type or level of emotion that respondents reported, the political power threat did have a significant impact on the type and level of emotion. Additionally, while older respondents exposed to either threat frame did generally report higher levels of negative emotion and were more likely to direct those emotions towards immigrants, this factor does not appear to have a significant impact. In the case of race, white respondents were only found to report feeling sadness at a significantly higher level than non-white respondents. Furthermore, while white respondents were generally more likely to indicate that their emotions were directed towards immigrants, this failed to reach a level of statistical significance. In contrast, women did report significantly higher levels of negative emotions than did men, with the sole exception of fear, but did not appear to be more likely to direct those emotions towards immigrants than the perceived messenger of the threat frame. Finally, respondents' partisanship was expected to affect both the level of negative emotion exhibited and whether that emotion was directed towards either immigrants or the perceived messenger. While partisanship was found to have a statistically significant impact on the expression of fear and anger, the substantive impact of this factor was relatively small. Additionally, while Republicans were significantly more likely to direct their expressed emotions towards immigrants than Democrats did, it is hard to argue that Democrats were really directing their emotions towards the perceived messenger of the threat frame.

Ultimately, the results in this chapter demonstrate a clear link between exposure to threat frame messages that play a frequent role in campaign communications and the elicitation of negative emotions. In particular, political power threat frames appear to be particularly powerful in this regard. Additionally, by and large, individuals were most likely to direct these emotions towards the

target of the threat frame, in this case, undocumented immigrants. This further suggests that these threat frames are adept at generating negative associations with the targets of these threats, an association that will be particularly important as this research turns towards about the outgroup directly, and indirectly, referenced in these frames. Moreover, the evidence that these threat frames do in fact generate greater negative emotions, and the theoretical evidence which suggests that these emotions play an important role in attitudes towards violence, a topic that will be further explored in a later chapter.

Beyond the theoretical implications of this analysis, the results presented here offer a number of broader consequences. First, the generally robust performance of the political power threat frame appears despite the minimal level of focus that political science research has, thus far, paid to it. Consequently, these results suggest a growing importance in addressing the impact of these forms of threat, particularly because these threats can be quite subtle, as in the excerpt used in this research. Furthermore, while crime victimization threats, when they are utilized, have been criticized in more recent elections, political power threats are rarely commented upon. This is likely because, as in the message that is used in this study, these "threats" are commonly a simple statement of how many people are immigrating into the country. Despite their relatively innocuous nature, the analysis in this chapter suggests that these messages are at least as effective as victimization threats, and therefore, necessitate a greater level of scrutiny going forward.

Secondly, while many of the theoretical relationships tested here fail to achieve statistical significance or have only a minimal substantive impact on respondents' emotions, this analysis is a particularly challenging and unnatural situation for individuals to confront these threat messages. Respondents in this study were only exposed to one form of threat frame, at a single instance, and absent many of the additional spectacles that accompany modern campaigning. Each of the messages used as treatments in this study appeared numerous times throughout the 2016

presidential election, have been used in various electoral contests in the intervening years[4], and have been widely used by political commentators. While there is some mixed evidence for the impact of repetitive exposures to political frames (Chong and Druckman 2007; Druckman, Fein, and Leeper 2012), there is some evidence to suggest that repeated exposure to issue frames and greater diversity in the number of communicators of a frame results in persistent and stronger attitude change (Cacioppo and Petty 1989; Lecheler et al. 2015; Enst, Kuhne, and Wirth 2017). Given the results presented here, it may be likely that the hypothesized relationship would be enhanced when placed in their more natural contexts or when delivered multiple times.

Despite these limitations, the analysis in this chapter has generally demonstrated that threat frames used in campaign messaging do have an impact on the emotions experienced by those that receive them, and that these respondents will direct those emotions towards different targets, depending on a number of demographic factors. This is an important first step in understanding the impact that campaign messaging has on individual's attitudes and behaviors. These questions are addressed in subsequent analyses in the following chapters.

[4] One prominent example is Michael Williams' "Deportation Bus" and Brian Kemp's "So Conservative" advertisements in Georgia's 2018 gubernatorial race.

5 ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANTS UNDER CONDITIONS OF THREAT

What impacts the attitudes that individuals hold towards immigrants? What role does campaign messaging and the use of threatening rhetoric have on these attitudes? Do induced emotions alter these attitudes? This chapter answers each of these questions using data from an experimental survey conducted in October 2019 and from a cross-sectional survey conducted in fall 2016.

The results in this chapter demonstrate the complex relationship between threat exposure, emotions and individual psychology, and attitudes towards immigrants. Generally, exposure to threat frames do not appear to have a direct impact on attitudes towards immigrants, as measured in a variety of ways. In contrast, emotions appear to play a rather large role in predicting these attitudes, though this effect appears to be diminished once individual demographic factors are accounted for. Additionally, participants in the experimental survey seem to behave far differently than those in the cross-sectional survey. All of these results highlight the tenuous and constraint relationship that any single factor has on attitudes towards immigrants. Each of these conclusions are explored in greater detail below.

5.1 Theoretical Expectations

Previous research has demonstrated that different forms of threat used in campaign messaging are likely to produce different emotions in individuals that are exposed to them (Warr and Stafford 1983; LaGrange and Ferraro 1989; Ferraro 1996; Chiricos, McEntire, and Gertz 2001; Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008). This relationship is likely to be particularly important for attitudes towards immigrants because of the intertwined nature of threat, emotion, and attitudes towards members of outgroups.

The ability for different threat frames to produce different emotions in the individuals exposed to them has generally been supported in a diverse body of research. Social position theory

proposes that attitude positions towards other social groups will be informed by hostile emotions, especially when one perceives that their social position is threatened by outgroup members (Blumer 1958). Further, these hostile positions in the wake of perceived threat from outgroups will lead to the racialization of specific issues as the result of a preference for state control over minority groups (Blalock 1967). Further, Brader, Valentino, and Suhay (2008) demonstrate that that group cues can trigger emotions, with different emotions resulting in different "types" of racism. For example, "old-fashioned" racism is associated with disgust, while symbolic racism is associated with anger (Banks and Valentino 2012).

In addition, a clear link between expressed emotions and policy preferences and ideology has been routinely demonstrated in social science research (Small and Lerner 2008; Inbar et al. 2009; Inbar, Pizarro, and Bloom 2009; Inbar et al. 2012). In addition to the link between various emotions and several manifestations of racism discussed above, research has generally supported the idea that specific emotions will also play an important role in policy preferences for key issues. For example, disgust generally impacts attitudes towards morality issues (Schnall et al. 2008; Inbar et al. 2009; Inbar, Pizzaro, and Bloom 2009), while fear is more associated with protective tendencies, effecting related policy concerns (Brader, Groenendyk, and Valentino 2010). Finally, different emotions can even produce contradictory preferences over the same policy areas, as evidenced by divergent preferences for welfare spending depending on whether anger or sadness is produced in individuals (Small and Lerner 2008).

> *Hypothesis 1:* Individuals exposed to threat frames will be more likely to express negative attitudes towards immigrants and will express greater support for more conservative immigration policies than those that are not exposed to threat frames.
>
> *Hypothesis 2:* Individuals that report higher levels of negative emotions following exposure to threat frames will be more likely to express negative attitudes towards immigrants and will

express greater support for more conservative immigration policies than those that are not exposed to threat frames.

As a result of these trends in prior research, the link between specific threat frames, negative emotions, and attitudes directed towards immigrants necessitates further research. While a number of different types of threat frames have been identified, the specific threat frames explored in this paper focus on the threat of being the victim of some violent crime and the threat to political power that is posed by a particular minority group growing in size. Beginning with the crime victimization threat frame, the threat of victimization has generally been shown to have an impact on the perception of crime rates and social disorganization (Liska and Bellair 1995; Roundtree and Land 1996; Markowitz et al. 2001), as well as the perceived likelihood that they will be victimized personally (Warr and Stafford 1983). Consequently, it is expected that campaign rhetoric which focuses on crimes committed by immigrants should negatively impact attitudes towards all immigrants by increasing the likelihood of an individual believing that immigrants increase the crime rate, that current immigration levels should be lowered, and that a wall should be built along the southern border. Additionally, because of the link between victimization threats and expressed levels of fear, these same expectations should also hold for those that express higher levels of fear, regardless of the specific threat frame they are exposed to.

Hypothesis 3: Individuals exposed to crime victimization threat frames will be more likely to believe that immigrants increase crime rates than those not exposed to a crime victimization threat.

Hypothesis 4: Individuals that report higher levels of fear following exposure to threat frames will be more likely to believe that immigrants increase crime rates than those that do not report a high level of fear.

Next, the political power threat frame, which focuses on the number of immigrants entering the country and the implied threat to the in-group's current hold on political power, should increase the prevalence with which attitudes consistent with "old-fashioned" racism occur (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008). This type of frame is, thus, expected to have a large impact on various issue positions related to mitigating an increasing outgroup population. Historically, this type of framing has been associated with greater support for stricter adherence to the law and greater support for law enforcement. As a result, it may be likely for individuals exposed to power threat frames to demonstrate attitude change similar to those exposed to the crime victimization threat frame. However, we should also expect the political power threat frame to effect attitudes concerning the impact of immigrants on American culture, which we wouldn't necessarily expect for those that are exposed to the crime victimization threat. Additionally, because of the link between "old-fashioned" racism and disgust, similar expectations should also apply for those that express higher levels of disgust, regardless of the specific threat frame they are exposed to.

Hypothesis 5: Individuals exposed to political power threat frames will be more likely to believe that immigrants have a negative impact on American culture than those that are not exposed to a political power threat frame.

Hypothesis 6: Individuals that report higher levels of disgust following exposure to threat frames will be more likely to believe that immigrants harm American culture than those that do not report a high level of disgust.

Finally, the diverging impacts that anger and sadness have on spending policies (Small and Lerner 2008) should carry over to beliefs that individuals hold about the impact of immigrants on the economy. Generally, we should expect individuals that feel higher levels of anger following

exposure to either of the threat frames to believe that immigrants have a negative impact on the economy, while those that feel sadness should generally believe the opposite. In addition, these beliefs should have spill over effects on to an individual's general attitudes towards immigrants, broadly.

Hypothesis 7: Individuals exposed to threat frames will be more likely to believe that immigrants hurt the economy than those that are not exposed to a threat frame.

Hypothesis 8: Individuals that report higher levels of anger following exposure to threat frames will be more likely to believe that immigrants hurt the economy than those that do not report a high level of anger.

5.2 Data and Methods

5.2.1 Dependent Variables

This chapter is interested in individual- level attitudes towards immigrants following exposure to threat frames and messages condoning the use of violence. To this end, these attitudes will be assessed through seven dependent variables, broadly grouped into one of four categories: beliefs about the economic impact of immigrants, attitudes about the impact of immigrants on American culture, attitudes about the propensity of immigrants to affect crime rates, and general attitudes towards immigrants.

The first of these categories, economic impact, is measured through the use of two variables. The first asks how likely the respondent believes it is that immigrants take jobs from American citizens, while the second asks whether the respondent generally agrees that immigrants are good for the economy. Each of these questions is coded ordinally, with higher values indicating that respondents strongly believe that immigrants take jobs from Americans and that they harm the economy, respectively.

The second category, the impact of immigrants on American culture, is also assessed through the use of two measures. These questions ask how important it is that immigrants learn to speak English and whether American culture is harmed by immigrants. Again, both of these questions is coded ordinally, with higher values indicating greater belief that immigrants harm American culture and should learn to speak English. The impact of immigration on crime rates is measured with a single variable which simply asks how much the respondent agrees that immigrants increase crime rates. Again, this is measured ordinally with higher values indicating a greater level of agreement.

The last category, general attitudes, is addressed through two separate measures, each asking respondents about their support or opposition to various policies towards immigrants. First, respondents were asked about their preferred policy towards undocumented immigrants. This question is coded ordinally, with higher values indicating a preference for a stricter policy, ranging from allowing all unauthorized immigrants to remain in the United States and becoming eligible for citizenship to making all unauthorized immigrants felons and sending them back to their country of origin. The second variable in this category is dichotomous and ask respondents whether a wall should be built along the Southern border, with a value of one indicating support.

5.2.2 Independent Variables

The primary independent variables for this analysis are one's level of internal efficacy and authoritarianism. For each of these, I make use of the measures used on the 2016 American National Election Study. Internal efficacy is measured with an index of four separate questions which assess how much control over their own lives respondents reported feeling. Each of these questions was coded dichotomously and then combined into an additive measure, resulting in values from 0, indicating a low level of internal efficacy, to 8, indicating a high level of internal efficacy. This measure was then reduced to a 0 to 2 measure, with a value of 1 centering around the mean

value for the index and 0 and 2 placed one standard deviation above and below this mean value. These measures were asked as part of the pre-test before treatment conditions were assigned, and then again as part of the post-test after treatment exposure.

Similarly, the authoritarianism scale used on the ANES asks four questions, each focused on attitudes towards child rearing. These questions were individually coded from 0 to 3, and then added as an index. This resulted in values ranging from 0, indicating a low level of authoritarianism, to 12, indicating a high level of authoritarianism. Finally, as with the internal efficacy measure, the authoritarianism index measure was recoded to reduce the number of categories. This reduced measure ranges from 0 to 2, with 1 indicating a moderate level of authoritarianism and centered around the mean of the original additive index. The other two values of this reduced measure are placed at one standard deviation above and below the mean, respectively. The four questions used in this measure were asked as part of the pre-test before treatment conditions were assigned.

The second set of independent variables address respondents' emotional responses to their assigned treatment prompt these emotional responses were measured with a series of self-reported values across eight distinct emotions. The emotions are broadly grouped into positive emotions – hope, pride, happiness, and relief – and negative emotions – anger, fear, disgust, and sadness. Respondents were asked to report how much they felt each of these emotions, with answer options ranging from "not at all" to "extremely". These answers were coded ordinally from 0 to 4.

The final group of independent variables included in this analysis are a variety of demographic factors: age, gender, race, education, and income. Additionally, participants' partisanship and political tolerance are included here, as well. Race is coded as a dichotomous variable, with 1 indicating the respondent being white, and a value of 0 indicating all other races and ethnicities. Gender is included as a dichotomous variable, with 0 indicating male and 1 indicating female.

All other demographic factors are included as ordinal variables. The coded values are age range from 0, indicating respondents aged between 18 and 24, and 5, indicating respondents 65 and over. The education variable ranges from not having a high school diploma, coded as 0, to possessing an advanced degree, coded as 4. Next, the income variable originally included 11 categories, but following the standard used for the internal efficacy and authoritarianism measures, was reduced to 3 categories with 1 indicating the mean income level and 0 and 2 being one standard deviation above and below that mean value. Respondents' partisanship includes 3 categories; Democrats coded as 0, Independents coded as 1, and Republicans coded as 2.

Finally, the political tolerance measure is an additive index variable, combining twelve separate questions. These questions asked respondents to report how acceptable they would find it for members of the Alt-right, Antifa, Black Lives Matter, and Dreamers and DACA recipients to hold a public rally, have a book at their local library, or to teach at a local college or university. Each of these questions utilize a seven-point scale, with 0 indicating strong disagreement (i.e. low tolerance) with the action, and 6 indicating strong agreement (i.e. high tolerance) with the action. The total index has values ranging from 0 to 72. This measure is treated as continuous for the predicted probabilities analysis, and only the mean, low standard deviation, high standard deviation, and maximum values are reported.

5.3 Experimental Results

Generally, and as previously theorized, individuals exposed to negative threat frames as part of campaign rhetoric are expected to hold more negative attitudes towards immigrants. Additionally, specific threat frames are expected to disproportionately impact beliefs in relevant domains. For example, individuals exposed to threat frames that focus on crime rates are expected to espouse more negative attitudes about the impact of immigrants on crime rates. These relationships are expected, in addition, to have an impact on attitudes towards immigrants across policy domains.

Furthermore, the emotional responses produced by threat exposure are also expected to impact individuals' attitudes, again, specific emotions are expected have differing levels of impact, depending on the specific attitude in question. These expectations will be discussed in detail where appropriate.

To test the proposed hypotheses three separate two-way ANOVAs are conducted for each of the seven previously discussed dependent variables: one for just the treatment effects, one for just emotion effects, and finally, one to assess the interaction between the treatment conditions and the emotions they produce. The results for each of these models is discussed in greater detail.

5.3.1 Beliefs About the Economic Impact of Immigrants

The first group of dependent variables to be explored here concern individuals' attitudes about the impact of immigration on the economy. Two separate measures are utilized here to investigate this attitude: belief that immigration harms the economy and the belief that higher immigration levels make it harder for citizens to fine employment. Again, it is expected that participants exposed to either threat treatment, and those that report higher levels of anger in response to that exposure, will hold more negative attitudes about the impact of immigration on the economy.

Beginning with the first of these two measures, a two-way ANOVA reveals that individuals exposed to a threat treatment are significantly more likely to believe that higher immigration levels harm the economy ($p=0.0486$). Further analysis reveals that individuals that reported higher levels of anger ($p=0.052$) and disgust ($p=0.0676$) were also significantly more likely to believe that higher immigration levels harm the economy. In order to further understand the relationship between threat exposure and the negative emotions that occur as a result of that exposure, a two-way ANOVA of the interaction of these two forces was also conducted. The predicted margins of this interaction is reported in Figure 5-1 below.



Figure 5-1: Belief that Higher Levels of Immigration Harm the Economy

In the above figure, the impact of negative emotions in response to threat frame exposure is clear, even if not consistent across all emotions and treatments. However, there is, generally, a marked increase in the belief that immigration harms the economy as the reported level of emotion increases. This is particularly true among those that reported an extreme level of anger or disgust. With the exception of those that were only exposed to the political power threat, there is a marked increase in their belief in the negative relationship between immigration and the economy over those that reported feeling no anger or disgust.

The second measure used to assess individuals' beliefs about the economic impact of immigration asks respondents how much immigration effects the ability citizens to get a job. As with the previous measure, a series of two-way ANOVAs were used to examine the impact of threat

exposure and the emotions that are produced by those messages on this belief. In contrast to the previous measure, threat exposure, on its own, does not have a statistically significant impact on participants' beliefs about immigration's impact on the difficulty of getting a job (p=0.761). However, in addition to disgust (p=0.0405), fear (p=0.000) and sadness (p=0.0317) are both statistically significant. Additionally, anger experienced as a result of threat frame exposure falls just short of statistical significance at the 90 percent confidence level (p=0.1078). Given these results, an interaction between each of these emotions at treatment exposure is presented in Figure 5-2 below.



Figure 5-2: Belief that Immigrants Make it Harder for Citizens to Find Jobs

In the above figure there is, again, a clear upward trend in the belief that job prospects for citizens are harmed by high immigration levels as participants reported experiencing greater levels of

each negative emotion. While this trend continues to be somewhat dependent on the treatment condition that participants were assigned to and the particular emotion, the general shift does remain significant. Notably, in contrast to the previous measure, respondents exposed to the political power threat generally demonstrated larger variation in their beliefs about the economic impact of immigration than the previous measure suggested, though this trend does not hold across all emotions.

Given these results, there does appear to be a moderate level of support for the proposed hypotheses. When first exposed to a threat message, individuals did, generally, hold more negative beliefs about the impact of immigration, though this is dependent on the specific measure used. Additionally, respondents that reported feeling anger in response to this message were fairly consistent in reporting more negative attitudes about immigration.

5.3.2 Beliefs about the Cultural Impact of Immigrants

The next set of measures each attempt to assess how threat messages about immigrants impacts the attitudes that individuals hold about the cultural impact of immigrants. As theorized earlier, it is expected that individuals exposed to threat frames, particularly political power threats, should express more negative attitudes. Similarly, those participants that report feeling greater levels of negative emotions, and disgust in particular, should hold similarly negative attitudes about the cultural impact of immigrants. Two measures are used to assess these attitudes: the belief that immigrants harm American culture, and the believed importance of immigrants learning English.

Beginning with the belief that American culture is harmed by immigrants, a two-way ANOVA reveals that simple exposure to a threat message is not a statistically significant predictor ($p=0.3861$). In contrast, every negative emotion – fear ($p=0.0000$), disgust ($p=0.0389$), anger ($p=0.0209$), and sadness ($p=0.0055$) – that individuals reported as a result of exposure to a threat

were statistically significant predictors of this attitude. To further explore this effect, predictive margins for each of these emotion, by treatment condition, are displayed in Figure 5-3 below.



Figure 5-3: Belief that Immigrants Harm American Culture

The results displayed above generally demonstrate a clear positive relationship between the level of emotion expressed and the extent to which one believes that immigrants harm American culture while this relationship appears to be quite substantively large between respondents that reported not feeling a particular emotion and those that reported feeling an extreme amount of that emotion, there are some noticeable differences depending on which threat respondents were reacting to. Most noticeably, the largest differences appeared to occur in individuals that had received one of the political power threat treatments. Finally, while experiencing disgust following

threat exposure does have a significant impact on perceptions of the cultural impact of immigrants, this impact does not appear to be larger than any of the other emotions assessed here.

The second variable used to assess individuals" attitudes about the influence that immigrants have on American culture asks participants how important they believe it is for immigrants to learn English. Despite previous results, two-way ANOVAs reveal that neither treatment conditions, nor any negative emotions, have a statistically significant impact on the importance that any participants placed on learning English; though, experiencing sadness in response to threat message exposure does being to approach statistical significance ($p=0.1185$). The predictive margins in Figure 5-4, below, generally reflect these results. With the exception of participants in the second condition that received the crime victimization threat frame, results were fairly consistent across each treatment condition and across the self-reported levels of each emotion.



Figure 5-4: Believed Importance of Immigrants Learning English

5.3.3 The Impact of Immigration on Attitudes about Crime Rates

Next, this paper looks to address the effect that threat frame exposure has on beliefs that immigrants negatively effect crime rates. Unlike the previous attitude areas, this relationship is explored using a single question, which simply asks respondents whether they think that immigrants increase crime rates or not. As with some of the previous results, a two-way ANOVA of the impact of threat frames on this attitude indicates that there is not a statistically significant relationship (p=0.9622). However, similar two-way ANOVAs of each negative emotion reveals that several emotions are statistically significant. Specifically, fear (p=0.0000), anger (p=0.0001), and sadness (p=0.017) all appear to have a significant impact on the belief that immigrants increase crimes rates.

Again, predictive margins for each of these relationships, by treatment group, are presented in Figure 5-5 below.



Figure 5-5: Belief that Increased Immigration Increases Crime Rates

As demonstrated above, as the level of each emotion increases participants are far more likely to believe that immigrants increase crime rates. This positive relationship appears to be most substantive among participants that reported experiencing fear or anger. For both of these emotions there is a consistent and dramatic increase in belief that immigrants increase crime rates between participants that reported not feeling these emotions and those that reported experiencing an extreme level of the same emotion. Finally, while threat exposure, on its own, is not statistically significant, across all emotions those that were exposed to the political power threat frame were

consistently more likely to believe that immigrants increase crime rates. Given these results, the expectation that participants that experience fear in response to threat exposure does appear to be supported. However, the expectation that exposure to crime victimization threats will increase this belief is not supported by this analysis.

5.3.4 Threat Exposure and General Immigration Policy Preferences

The final set of dependent variables to be addressed here concern just general attitudes towards immigration policies. The two variables used to assess this concept ask participants what their preferred policy for unauthorized immigrants and whether they generally support building a wall on the southern border. Similarly to previous variables, it is expected that participants exposed to threat frames will be more likely to favor stricter immigration policies and to favor building a wall. Additionally, participants that report feeling higher levels of negative emotions should similarly favor stricter immigration policies.

Starting with respondents' immigration policy preferences, a two-way ANOVA of treatment effects reveals that simply exposing individuals to a threat message does not have a statistically significant impact on individuals' preferred immigration policy ($p=0.4141$). However, a number of emotions experienced following threat exposure do have a statistically significant impact on policy preference. Specifically, fear ($p=0.0001$) and disgust ($p=0.0271$), though anger does also fall just short of statistical significance ($p=0.1159$). Figure 5-6, below, displays the predictive margins for each emotion, by treatment condition.

The results presented above present a relatively subtle relationship between emotion and immigration policy preferences. Despite this, individuals that reported higher levels of fear were for more likely to prefer stricter immigration policies. Furthermore, there seems to be a similar, but more subtle, relationship between experiencing disgust in response to threat exposure and

immigration policy preferences. Additionally, the impact of disgust does appear to have a larger impact among participants that were exposed to the crime victimization threat frame.



Figure 5-6: Preferred Immigration Policy for Unauthorized Immigrants

Finally, the last measure asks whether respondents support building a wall on the southern border. Again, a two-way ANOVA of treatment condition suggests that threat exposure, on its own, does not have a statistically significant impact on support for the wall (p=0.8932). However, again, both disgust (p=0.0197) and anger (p=0.0005) do have statistically significant impacts, and both sadness (p=0.1382) and fear (p=0.1649) approach significance. As demonstrated by the predictive margins in Figure 7, the largest effects appear to occur amongst participants that reported an extreme amount of emotion. Interestingly, while at participants that received the political power

threat displayed the highest levels of support for building the wall, while indicating experiencing those high levels of negative emotions, participants that were at more likely to support the wall while expressing only moderate levels of emotion tended to have received the crime victimization threat frame.



Figure 5-7: Support for Building a Wall on the Southern Border

5.4 Predictors of Attitudes Towards Immigrants

The remaining hypotheses address the relationship between internal efficacy and authoritarianism and various attitudes towards immigrants. To test these hypothesized relationships, an ordered probit was run for each dependent variable, with each model being run for each treatment condition individually. The first set of dependent variables will concern beliefs about the economic impact of immigration. This set, again, includes two measures: belief that immigrants are a

benefit to the American economy and beliefs about the likelihood of new immigrants taking jobs from current residents and citizens. The analysis for the first of these variables is presented in Table 5-1 below.

Table 5-1: Multivariate Analysis of Belief that Immigrants Harm the American Economy

	Control		Crime Victimization		Crime Victimization & Violence Approval		Political Power		Political Power & Violence Approval	
Internal Efficacy	0.091	0.022	-0.232	-0.485**	0.117	0.060	-0.030	-0.064	0.759**	0.519
	(0.130)	(0.136)	(0.196)	(0.231)	(0.202)	(0.264)	(0.239)	(0.280)	(0.332)	(0.451)
Authoritarianism	0.159	-0.006	-0.058	0.075	0.127	0.116	0.282	0.348	0.976***	1.034**
	(0.179)	(0.193)	(0.258)	(0.278)	(0.309)	(0.372)	(0.286)	(0.342)	(0.325)	(0.382)
Gender		0.519**		0.873**		0.930**		0.561		0.269
		(0.220)		(0.342)		(0.423)		(0.389)		(0.551)
Non-White		0.393		1.113**		0.266		-0.227		0.920
		(0.245)		(0.462)		(0.441)		(0.387)		(0.695)
Partisan Identification		0.436**		0.372*		0.789**		0.493**		0.723*
		(0.137)		(0.202)		(0.232)		(0.235)		(0.376)
Political Tolerance		-0.409**		-0.524**		-1.414**		-0.131		-0.240
		(0.159)		(0.263)		(0.327)		(0.321)		(0.351)
Fear				0.300		0.012		-0.072		-0.200
				(0.184)		(0.225)		(0.224)		(0.311)
Disgust				0.408*		0.120		-0.124		0.493
				(0.237)		(0.211)		(0.245)		(0.370)
Anger				-0.214		0.173		0.023		-0.074
				(0.221)		(0.257)		(0.228)		(0.234)
Sadness				-0.318		-0.040		-0.221		-0.277
				(0.219)		(0.283)		(0.213)		(0.328)
/cut1	-0.158	-0.141	-0.952**	0.046	-0.403	-0.524	-0.295	-0.470	1.775***	2.365*
	(0.267)	(0.438)	(0.441)	(0.761)	(0.506)	(0.892)	(0.473)	(0.859)	(0.671)	(1.409)
/cut2	0.649**	0.782*	-0.269	0.990	0.368	0.453	0.558	0.559	2.666***	3.552**
	(0.271)	(0.440)	(0.422)	(0.755)	(0.509)	(0.910)	(0.469)	(0.851)	(0.738)	(1.480)
/cut3	1.503***	1.770**	0.302	1.734**	1.101**	1.735*	1.758***	1.936**	3.637***	4.824**
	(0.290)	(0.462)	(0.423)	(0.779)	(0.527)	(0.965)	(0.531)	(0.904)	(0.788)	(1.532)
/cut4			1.105**	2.597**	1.827***	3.237**			3.943***	5.239**
			(0.465)	(0.828)	(0.556)	(1.003)			(0.798)	(1.549)
Observations	119	116	52	50	46	45	46	44	36	34
Pseudo R-squared	0.004	0.093	0.009	0.160	0.004	0.252	0.009	0.133	0.152	0.258

Across all treatment conditions, a number of significant trends emerge. First, while both internal efficacy and authoritarianism are hypothesized to have a significant impact on an individual's attitudes towards immigrants, this is only true for participants that were exposed to both the political power threat frame and the violence approval message, and, in the case of internal efficacy, those that received only the crime victimization threat. While participants in the crime victimization treatment group with higher levels of internal efficacy were less likely to believe that

immigrants are good for the economy. Those that received the political power threat and violence approval message were more likely to believe that immigrants benefit the economy. Additionally, high authoritarians in this treatment group were also, generally, more likely to believe that immigrants are a positive force on the economy.

While emotions, especially anger, are hypothesized to increase the likelihood of individuals believing that immigrants have a negative impact on the economy, this generally does not play out in the experimental results. While there is some mixed evidence of higher levels of some negative emotions increasing one's belief that immigrants harm the economy, these results are inconsistent and rarely rise to the level of statistical significance. The one exception to this is among respondents that reported feeling higher levels of disgust in response to exposure to the crime victimization threat, but were not exposed to the violence approval message. Among these respondents, individuals that reported higher levels of disgust following threat exposure were significantly more likely to believe that immigrants do not benefit the economy.

Finally, several of the included demographic factors appear to have a statistically significant impact on attitudes towards the economic impact of immigrants. Among these, both gender and partisanship have significant and positive impacts on belief that immigrants are a detriment to the economy. However, perhaps more interesting is the impact of political tolerance. Results in Table 5-1 demonstrate that individuals with higher levels of political tolerance are less likely to believe that immigrants harm the economy. However, this relationship appears to only be statistically significant for those in the control group or either of the crime victimization threat treatment groups. As demonstrated in Figure 5-8 below, with the exception of those that received both the political power threat and violence approval messages, individuals with lower levels of political tolerance were more likely to believe that the economy is harmed by immigrants. However, among the crime victimization treatment group, even respondents with high levels of political tolerance demonstrated

a nearly 20 percent probability of strongly disagreeing with the idea that immigrants are a benefit to the economy.



Figure 5-8: Belief that Immigrants are a Detriment to the American Economy by Political Tolerance

The second measure used to address attitudes towards the economic impact of immigrants is the belief that immigrants take jobs from American citizens and residents. Table 5-2 below displays the results of the ordered probit analyses for each treatment group. As with previous analyses, both internal efficacy and authoritarianism continue to be inconsistently significant. For internal efficacy, higher levels of efficacy was associated with a lower likelihood of believing that immigrants take jobs; however, this is only statistically significant for those in either the control group or those that received the crime victimization threat, but not in conjunction with the violence approval message. In contrast, authoritarianism appears to only have a statistically significant impact among those exposed to the political power threat treatment without the violence approval message. Among

these respondents, belief that immigrants take jobs appears to increase as one's level of authoritarianism does.

Table 5-2: Multivariate Analysis of Belief that Immigrants Take Jobs

	Control		Crime Victimization		Crime Victimization & Violence Approval		Political Power		Political Power & Violence Approval	
Internal Efficacy	-0.197	-0.251*	-0.259	-0.360*	-0.056	-0.285	0.028	-0.221	-0.116	-0.245
	(0.127)	(0.130)	(0.196)	(0.217)	(0.198)	(0.256)	(0.233)	(0.267)	(0.270)	(0.433)
Authoritarianism	0.043	0.0435	-0.149	-0.063	0.461	0.376	0.867***	0.656*	0.459	0.229
	(0.172)	(0.182)	(0.260)	(0.278)	(0.310)	(0.357)	(0.289)	(0.337)	(0.296)	(0.363)
Gender		-0.001		-0.128		-0.697*		-0.116		0.281
		(0.206)		(0.323)		(0.394)		(0.364)		(0.591)
Non-White		-0.048		0.282		-0.534		-0.131		0.605
		(0.229)		(0.417)		(0.424)		(0.360)		(0.641)
Partisan Identification		-0.075		0.338*		0.190		0.105		0.295
		(0.128)		(0.196)		(0.206)		(0.221)		(0.350)
Political Tolerance		-0.333**		-0.056		-0.530**		-0.016		-0.339
		(0.152)		(0.252)		(0.254)		(0.314)		(0.367)
Fear				0.345**		0.387*		0.257		0.784**
				(0.172)		(0.217)		(0.203)		(0.310)
Disgust				0.013		-0.022		0.013		-0.010
				(0.214)		(0.195)		(0.223)		(0.421)
Anger				-0.047		0.140		0.23		-0.423*
				(0.206)		(0.228)		(0.223)		(0.242)
Sadness				-0.011		0.202		-0.285		0.219
				(0.201)		(0.277)		(0.207)		(0.369)
/cut1	-1.252***	-1.860**	-1.588***	-0.826	-0.921*	-1.38	-0.642	-1.081	-0.678	-0.308
	(0.272)	(0.437)	(0.468)	(0.740)	(0.518)	(0.881)	(0.487)	(0.840)	(0.527)	(1.269)
/cut2	-0.888***	-1.476**	-1.023**	-0.217	-0.58	-0.939	-0.376	-0.801	-0.269	0.123
	(0.266)	(0.431)	(0.445)	(0.730)	(0.505)	(0.863)	(0.471)	(0.829)	(0.531)	(1.273)
/cut3	-0.377	-0.964**	-0.703	0.143	0.0237	-0.256	0.347	-0.0302	0.12	0.688
	(0.265)	(0.428)	(0.437)	(0.724)	(0.502)	(0.862)	(0.457)	(0.817)	(0.531)	(1.277)
/cut4	0.283	-0.262	-0.208	0.707	0.782	0.768	1.411***	1.086	0.405	1.167
	(0.264)	(0.420)	(0.432)	(0.728)	(0.514)	(0.884)	(0.482)	(0.839)	(0.529)	(1.271)
/cut5	0.693***	0.105	0.169	1.143	1.752***	2.038**	2.221***	2.025**	0.696	1.723
	(0.265)	(0.418)	(0.433)	(0.736)	(0.538)	(0.901)	(0.529)	(0.866)	(0.527)	(1.279)
Observations	119	116	52	50	46	45	46	44	36	34
Pseudo R-squared	0.006	0.019	0.01	0.075	0.015	0.156	0.063	0.089	0.02	0.221

Additionally, for this measure, the included demographic factors perform much less consistently, only political tolerance remains statistically significant across more than one treatment condition. In this case, political tolerance continues to have a negative impact on this belief, but only

among participants in either the control group and the crime victimization and violence approval treatments.



Figure 5-9: Belief that Immigrants Take Jobs from Current Residents by Level of Fear

Finally, participants' emotional responses to threat exposure have a significant impact on one's likelihood of believing that immigrants take jobs from current citizens and residents. While disgust and sadness do not play a statistically significant role, regardless of the treatment condition, anger has a significant and negative impact on the belief that immigrants take jobs among those that were exposed to both the political power threat and violence approval messages. In contrast, across nearly every treatment condition, feeling fear in response to either threat treatment has a significant and positive impact on believing that immigrants take jobs from existing citizens and residents. The sole exception to this is those respondents that received the political power threat, but not the

violence approval message. However, and as displayed in Figure 5-9 above, even respondents in this treatment group follow the same trends exhibited by respondents in the other treatment groups. This figure shows a clear, and sometimes dramatic, increase in one's probability of strongly believing that immigrants take jobs as their reported level of fear increased. For example, those that reported feeling no level of fear following exposure to the crime victimization threat and were then exposed to the violence approval message had a less than 5 percent probability of strongly believing that immigrants take jobs. However, for those that reported an extreme amount of fear under the same conditions exhibited an approximately 40 percent probability of believing the same.

The next set of variables focus on attitudes about the cultural impact of immigrants. Again, this section utilizes two dependent variables: one concerning the belief that immigrants harm American culture and one about how important it is for all immigrants to learn English. The results for the first of these are displayed in Table 5-3 below.

Table 5-3: Multivariate Analysis of Belief that Immigrants Harm American Culture

	Control		Crime Victimization		Crime Victimization & Violence Approval		Political Power		Political Power & Violence Approval	
Internal Efficacy	-0.038	-0.088	-0.378*	-0.488**	0.082	-0.166	-0.231	-0.352	-0.197	0.233
	(0.127)	(0.130)	(0.201)	(0.225)	(0.201)	(0.259)	(0.235)	(0.271)	(0.268)	(0.451)
Authoritarianism	-0.207	-0.206	-0.399	-0.375	0.295	0.538	0.275	0.257	0.563*	0.323
	(0.176)	(0.186)	(0.267)	(0.285)	(0.308)	(0.382)	(0.277)	(0.338)	(0.302)	(0.411)
Gender		-0.034		0.254		-0.034		-0.014		1.347**
		(0.208)		(0.325)		(0.400)		(0.368)		(0.633)
Non-White		-0.185		0.473		-0.342		-0.656*		-0.248
		(0.233)		(0.424)		(0.424)		(0.375)		(0.652)
Partisan Identification		0.068		0.091		0.475**		-0.066		0.566
		(0.130)		(0.199)		(0.217)		(0.225)		(0.369)
Political Tolerance		-0.307**		-0.245		-0.868**		-0.138		0.324
		(0.152)		(0.252)		(0.279)		(0.315)		(0.360)
Fear				0.496**		0.147		0.370*		0.791**
				(0.184)		(0.220)		(0.213)		(0.319)
Disgust				0.097		-0.451**		-0.215		-0.150
				(0.214)		(0.223)		(0.229)		(0.483)
Anger				-0.214		0.450*		0.098		-0.061
				(0.213)		(0.265)		(0.221)		(0.234)
Sadness				-0.152		0.048		0.110		0.318
				(0.208)		(0.276)		(0.206)		(0.413)
/cut1	-0.942***	-1.499**	-1.567***	-1.171	-0.482	-1.352	-1.020**	-1.558*	-0.386	2.185*
	(0.268)	(0.429)	(0.464)	(0.741)	(0.509)	(0.889)	(0.478)	(0.856)	(0.528)	(1.271)
/cut2	-0.450*	-0.973**	-1.003**	-0.503	0.135	-0.640	0.121	-0.318	-0.045	2.701**
	(0.264)	(0.422)	(0.445)	(0.731)	(0.508)	(0.884)	(0.452)	(0.820)	(0.529)	(1.295)
/cut3	0.107	-0.382	-0.443	0.135	1.054**	0.457	0.825*	0.555	0.539	3.879**
	(0.266)	(0.418)	(0.441)	(0.731)	(0.523)	(0.897)	(0.466)	(0.837)	(0.526)	(1.372)
/cut4	0.723***	0.239	0.493	1.044	1.841***	1.538*	1.484***	1.492*	0.850	4.659**
	(0.269)	(0.416)	(0.454)	(0.750)	(0.551)	(0.902)	(0.517)	(0.900)	(0.528)	(1.420)
Observations	119	116	52	50	46	45	46	44	36	34
Pseudo R-squared	0.004	0.017	0.029	0.098	0.008	0.150	0.015	0.094	0.034	0.325

As with prior results, authoritarianism and internal efficacy continue to fail to consistently play a role in attitudes towards immigrants. Only internal efficacy appears to have a statistically significant impact on the belief that immigrants harm American culture, and even then, this only appears to be true amongst participants that received the crime victimization threat frame without the violence approval message. Furthermore, at least for beliefs about the cultural harm caused by immigrants, the included demographic factors largely fail to have a consistent impact on this belief across treatment conditions.

The one demographic factor that produces a statistically significant result across treatment conditions is one's level of political tolerance. Across all but one treatment condition, higher levels of political tolerance is associated with lower levels of belief that immigrants harm American culture, with this relationship being statistically significant among those in either the control group and those that received both the crime victimization threat and the violence approval message. As demonstrated in Figure 5-10 below, most participants, especially those in the previously mentioned treatments, were significantly less likely to believe that immigrants harm American culture as they reported higher levels of political tolerance. The only exception to this trend is among those that received the political power threat and violence approval messages who were nearly twice as likely to believe that immigrants harm American culture at moderate and high levels of political tolerance than those with only a low level of political tolerance.



Figure 5-10: Belief that Immigrants Harm American Culture by Political Tolerance

Finally, emotions experienced following treatment exposure continue to play a significant role in attitudes towards immigrants. However, these emotions continue to be inconsistent across treatment conditions. Despite this, across nearly all treatments fear generates a significant and positive impact on the belief that immigrants harm American culture. While this relationship is observable amongst participants from all but the crime victimization and violence approval condition, the overall shifts are relatively small and inconsistent across treatment conditions, complicating the overall takeaway about the relationship between fear and beliefs about the cultural impact of immigrants.

The second variable being utilized to assess attitudes about the cultural impact of immigrants is the believed importance of everyone in the United States learning to speak English. As demonstrated in Table 5-4 below, once a multitude of factors are taken into consideration, few individual factors emerge as having a significant impact on this belief. Internal efficacy has a significant impact for only two treatment conditions and only in the most limited of models. Furthermore, authoritarianism is only statistically significant for individuals exposed to the political power threat and violence approval messages, and also appears to have an impact in opposition to expectations and is not repeated in other treatment conditions. Finally, there are no demographic factors or emotions that provide any consistently significant effects.

Table 5-4: Multivariate Analysis of Believed Importance of Immigrants Learning English

	Control		Crime Victimization		Crime Victimization & Violence Approval		Political Power		Political Power & Violence Approval	
Internal Efficacy	-0.020	-0.085	0.093	-0.091	-0.405*	-0.481	0.484*	0.513	0.455	0.265
	(0.140)	(0.145)	(0.215)	(0.262)	(0.229)	(0.293)	(0.292)	(0.405)	(0.286)	(0.463)
Authoritarianism	-0.147	-0.271	0.231	0.574	0.384	0.528	0.304	0.248	-0.817**	-1.123**
	(0.197)	(0.212)	(0.293)	(0.353)	(0.339)	(0.424)	(0.332)	(0.578)	(0.344)	(0.447)
Gender		-0.419*		-0.243		0.074		1.580**		0.702
		(0.231)		(0.383)		(0.462)		(0.583)		(0.624)
Non-White		-0.039		0.214		0.923**		0.790		0.889
		(0.254)		(0.470)		(0.450)		(0.509)		(0.716)
Partisan Identification		0.230		0.717**		0.146		0.433		0.282
		(0.147)		(0.266)		(0.247)		(0.320)		(0.398)
Political Tolerance		-0.119		-0.376		0.045		-0.634		-0.272
		(0.174)		(0.317)		(0.281)		(0.563)		(0.405)
Fear				0.223		0.151		-0.424		0.119
				(0.191)		(0.237)		(0.300)		(0.311)
Disgust				-0.235		-0.227		0.068		0.147
				(0.252)		(0.235)		(0.342)		(0.451)
Anger				0.109		-0.063		0.643		-0.175
				(0.244)		(0.261)		(0.397)		(0.264)
Sadness				0.292		0.385		-0.266		0.123
				(0.229)		(0.306)		(0.363)		(0.350)
/cut1	-1.665***	-2.122**	-1.741***	-1.067	-1.384**	-0.026	0.885	1.789	-2.050***	-1.468
	(0.318)	(0.517)	(0.584)	(0.923)	(0.572)	(0.947)	(0.556)	(1.333)	(0.686)	(1.453)
/cut2	-1.232***	-1.679**	-0.846*	-0.227	-0.992*	0.442			-1.211**	-0.762
	(0.297)	(0.499)	(0.487)	(0.873)	(0.553)	(0.944)			(0.580)	(1.391)
/cut3	-0.301	-0.743	0.257	1.251	-0.017	1.538			-0.446	0.205
	(0.285)	(0.486)	(0.466)	(0.861)	(0.540)	(0.960)			(0.564)	(1.374)
Observations	119	116	52	50	46	45	46	44	36	34
Pseudo R-squared	0.002	0.033	0.007	0.202	0.041	0.153	0.055	0.322	0.099	0.179

Moving to the third category of dependent variables, the extent to which individuals believe that immigration affects crime rates, is examined with a single variable. This question simply asks respondents how much they agree or disagree with the statement that higher immigration rates increase the crime rate in America. These responses are again analyzed by treatment condition and are presented in Table 5-5 below.

Table 5-5: Multivariate Analysis of Belief that Immigrants Increase the Crime Rate

	Control		Crime Victimization		Crime Victimization & Violence Approval		Political Power		Political Power & Violence Approval	
Internal Efficacy	0.060	0.014	-0.190	-0.338	-0.097	-0.311	0.185	0.048	0.196	0.250
	(0.127)	(0.130)	(0.194)	(0.216)	(0.198)	(0.253)	(0.235)	(0.271)	(0.269)	(0.408)
Authoritarianism	0.045	0.031	-0.142	-0.017	0.455	0.414	0.436	0.442	0.516*	0.398
	(0.175)	(0.185)	(0.257)	(0.274)	(0.314)	(0.358)	(0.279)	(0.335)	(0.291)	(0.350)
Gender		-0.242		0.145		-0.213		0.191		0.415
		(0.209)		(0.326)		(0.385)		(0.367)		(0.556)
Non-White		-0.349		0.720*		-0.091		-0.445		-0.384
		(0.235)		(0.420)		(0.419)		(0.370)		(0.647)
Partisan Identification		0.168		0.163		0.299		0.235		0.322
		(0.130)		(0.197)		(0.209)		(0.224)		(0.344)
Political Tolerance		-0.156		-0.194		-0.316		-0.150		0.063
		(0.152)		(0.254)		(0.250)		(0.317)		(0.343)
Fear				0.402**		0.189		0.268		0.504*
				(0.175)		(0.216)		(0.207)		(0.297)
Disgust				-0.030		-0.131		-0.243		-0.393
				(0.213)		(0.199)		(0.228)		(0.389)
Anger				-0.019		0.289		0.378*		0.228
				(0.205)		(0.243)		(0.224)		(0.228)
Sadness				-0.050		-0.014		0.077		0.061
				(0.204)		(0.272)		(0.206)		(0.330)
/cut1	-0.846***	-1.366**	-1.401***	-0.586	-0.625	-0.851	-0.739	-0.688	-0.082	0.433
	(0.267)	(0.429)	(0.453)	(0.732)	(0.508)	(0.869)	(0.482)	(0.858)	(0.517)	(1.164)
/cut2	-0.350	-0.846**	-0.770*	0.179	-0.110	-0.186	-0.007	0.077	0.407	0.969
	(0.265)	(0.426)	(0.436)	(0.727)	(0.499)	(0.861)	(0.455)	(0.820)	(0.536)	(1.189)
/cut3	0.324	-0.156	-0.078	0.998	0.888*	0.945	0.990**	1.277	1.333**	2.304*
	(0.268)	(0.424)	(0.431)	(0.737)	(0.519)	(0.883)	(0.469)	(0.826)	(0.561)	(1.226)
/cut4	0.927***	0.455	0.371	1.546**	1.597***	1.719*	1.628***	2.065**	1.491***	2.522**
	(0.271)	(0.420)	(0.431)	(0.746)	(0.543)	(0.897)	(0.499)	(0.874)	(0.560)	(1.224)
Observations	119	116	52	50	46	45	46	44	36	34
Pseudo R-squared	0.001	0.016	0.007	0.086	0.017	0.090	0.021	0.101	0.037	0.174

As with the previous dependent variable, neither internal efficacy or authoritarianism are statistically significant; though these two variables do generally move in the expected direction. Furthermore, of all of the included demographic factors, only race is statistically significant, and only for participants that received only the crime victimization threat frame. Finally, only two emotions appear to have a significant impact on the belief that immigration increases the crime rate. Of these two emotions, only fear has a significant impact across treatment groups. Individuals that reported feeling fear in response to the crime victimization threat frame and did not receive the violence

approval message, and those that felt fear in response to the political power threat and were then exposed to the violence approval message were more likely to believe that immigrants increase the crime rate. As demonstrated in Figure 5-11, participants in both of these treatment groups that reported feeling no amount of fear had about a 40 percent probability of strongly disagreeing with the idea that immigrants increase crime rates. However, those that expressed an extreme level of fear exhibited a 65, for those in the crime victimization threat group, to 80 percent probability of strongly agreeing with the same statement.



Figure 5-11: Belief that Immigrants Increase the Crime Rate by Level of Fear

The final set of attitudes analyzed here address broader policy preferences that individual may hold around immigration. Again, this category is made up of two separate measures. The first asks respondents which of four policy positions they would prefer the official policy of the federal government towards undocumented immigrants. The second of these measures simply asks

participants whether they support or oppose the construction of a wall along the southern border. The analysis for the first of these variables is presented in Table 5-6 below.

Table 5-6: Multivariate Analysis of Preferred Policy Towards Undocumented Immigrants

	Control		Crime Victimization		Crime Victimization & Violence Approval		Political Power		Political Power & Violence Approval	
Internal Efficacy	-0.205	-0.285**	-0.106	-0.127	0.002	-0.206	0.029	-0.096	-0.158	-0.128
	(0.129)	(0.134)	(0.202)	(0.229)	(0.205)	(0.262)	(0.242)	(0.283)	(0.265)	(0.387)
Authoritarianism	-0.138	-0.203	-0.021	0.207	0.495	0.316	-0.019	-0.285	0.387	0.158
	(0.177)	(0.189)	(0.268)	(0.294)	(0.318)	(0.362)	(0.278)	(0.341)	(0.290)	(0.323)
Gender		0.054		0.184		-0.333		0.343		-0.174
		(0.213)		(0.342)		(0.409)		(0.391)		(0.550)
Non-White		-0.198		0.399		0.243		0.715*		-0.348
		(0.239)		(0.436)		(0.428)		(0.392)		(0.653)
Partisan Identification		0.355**		0.078		0.075		0.065		0.302
		(0.136)		(0.205)		(0.215)		(0.233)		(0.341)
Political Tolerance		-0.210		-0.116		-0.106		-0.438		-0.321
		(0.157)		(0.263)		(0.258)		(0.328)		(0.337)
Fear				0.379**		0.406*		0.589**		0.446
				(0.181)		(0.228)		(0.230)		(0.291)
Disgust				-0.193		0.045		-0.372		0.129
				(0.232)		(0.206)		(0.242)		(0.355)
Anger				0.324		0.166		0.124		0.013
				(0.226)		(0.239)		(0.230)		(0.220)
Sadness				-0.041		-0.149		-0.119		-0.531
				(0.210)		(0.284)		(0.216)		(0.339)
/cut1	-1.305***	-1.611**	-1.573***	-0.613	-0.549	-0.391	-1.339***	-1.713*	-0.708	-1.579
	(0.282)	(0.444)	(0.480)	(0.782)	(0.521)	(0.876)	(0.507)	(0.904)	(0.533)	(1.181)
/cut2	-0.189	-0.399	-0.244	1.073	0.771	1.160	0.129	0.163	0.258	-0.496
	(0.265)	(0.429)	(0.445)	(0.785)	(0.517)	(0.874)	(0.456)	(0.849)	(0.528)	(1.163)
/cut3	0.396	0.173	0.415	1.817**	1.487***	1.899**	0.730	0.818	0.794	0.228
	(0.266)	(0.427)	(0.443)	(0.794)	(0.542)	(0.890)	(0.471)	(0.855)	(0.536)	(1.157)
Observations	119	116	52	50	46	45	46	44	36	34
Pseudo R-squared	0.010	0.044	0.002	0.113	0.021	0.106	0.000	0.129	0.020	0.117

Like many of the previously discussed measures, neither authoritarianism nor internal efficacy are statistically significant across nearly any treatment conditions. Though, it should be acknowledged that internal efficacy does move in the expected direction across every treatment condition. Additionally, no demographic factors are consistently significant across treatment conditions. However, there are a few important trends in the impact of emotions on individual attitudes. First, while it is not statistically significant for participants in any treatment condition, participants that expressed feeling disgust following either threat message and were exposed to the

violence approval message were more likely to prefer a stricter policy towards undocumented immigrants. However, disgusted participants that were not exposed to the violence approval message were less likely to prefer a stricter policy towards undocumented immigrants.

In addition, fear exerts a significant and positive impact on an individual's propensity to prefer harsher policies for undocumented immigrants across nearly every treatment condition. Even for participants that received both the political power threat and the violence approval message fear approaches a statistically significant level. Predicted probabilities across these treatment conditions reveals that for participants that expressed feeling no level of fear were overwhelmingly likely to prefer a policy which allows undocumented immigrants to remain in the country and the provision of some pathway towards citizenship. However, respondents that reported an extreme level of fear exhibited somewhere between a 50 percent, for those that received only the crime victimization threat, and an 80 percent probability, for those in either of the political power threat conditions, of preferring that all undocumented immigrants be deported and charged with a felony.



Figure 5-12: Preference for Deporting All Undocumented Immigrants by Level of Fear

The final belief about immigration policy to be examined here is support for constructing a wall along the southern border. As demonstrated in Table 5-7 below, internal efficacy, again, continues to fail to provide a significant impact on one's attitudes towards immigration policy. However, in contrast to prior measures, authoritarianism does appear to play a significant role, at least under some conditions. Specifically, while authoritarianism does appear to increase support for constructing a wall, it is only statistically significant for individuals that were exposed, either, to the crime victimization threat without the violence approval message or those exposed to the political power threat and the violence approval message. As demonstrated in Figure 5-13, individuals with higher levels of authoritarianism are significantly more likely to support the construction of a wall on the southern border. For example, low authoritarians exposed to the crime victimization threat had a

nearly 60 percent probability of opposing the construction of a wall, while high authoritarians under the same conditions exhibited only a 20 percent probability of opposing the construction of a border wall.

Table 5-7: Multivariate Analysis of Support for Building a Wall on the Southern Border

	Control		Crime Victimization		Crime Victimization & Violence Approval		Political Power		Political Power & Violence Approval	
Internal Efficacy	-0.186	-0.345**	0.136	0.152	0.136	0.172	0.191	0.144	0.233	-0.268
	(0.138)	(0.149)	(0.218)	(0.298)	(0.225)	(0.329)	(0.258)	(0.324)	(0.294)	(0.486)
Authoritarianism	0.004	-0.135	0.137	0.866**	0.494	0.483	-0.054	0.067	0.789**	0.992**
	(0.190)	(0.211)	(0.279)	(0.362)	(0.348)	(0.449)	(0.304)	(0.379)	(0.327)	(0.452)
Gender		-0.581**		0.442		0.281		0.416		0.417
		(0.234)		(0.461)		(0.492)		(0.440)		(0.652)
Non-White		0.006		0.814		1.380**		-0.171		1.607*
		(0.259)		(0.600)		(0.542)		(0.413)		(0.857)
Partisan Identification		0.539**		1.136**		0.653**		0.889**		0.585
		(0.146)		(0.277)		(0.258)		(0.277)		(0.454)
Political Tolerance		-0.360**		-0.594		-0.527		0.181		-0.661
		(0.175)		(0.381)		(0.348)		(0.358)		(0.447)
Fear				0.235		-0.119		0.040		0.673*
				(0.250)		(0.272)		(0.237)		(0.400)
Disgust				-1.163**		0.008		-0.212		-0.336
				(0.419)		(0.274)		(0.263)		(0.535)
Anger				1.110**		0.672*		0.122		0.037
				(0.415)		(0.367)		(0.258)		(0.280)
Sadness				0.334		-0.212		-0.002		-0.233
				(0.325)		(0.345)		(0.227)		(0.431)
/cut1	-0.375	-1.042**	0.203	2.674**	0.604	2.412**	0.147	1.256	0.894	1.562
	(0.280)	(0.476)	(0.462)	(0.999)	(0.557)	(1.083)	(0.482)	(0.979)	(0.585)	(1.507)
/cut2	0.238	-0.283	0.647	3.584**	1.061*	3.168**	0.783	2.063**	1.621***	2.691*
	(0.280)	(0.470)	(0.466)	(1.052)	(0.566)	(1.116)	(0.492)	(0.997)	(0.611)	(1.542)
Observations	119	116	52	50	46	45	46	44	36	34
Pseudo R-squared	0.007	0.127	0.005	0.404	0.025	0.310	0.006	0.152	0.091	0.387



Figure 5-13: Opposition for Building a Wall Along the Southern Border by Authoritarianism

Additionally, of the included demographic factors, only participant partisanship is statistically significant across most treatment conditions, with Republicans being more likely to support the construction of a border wall. Lastly, of the included emotions anger appears to be the only emotion to be statistically significant across multiple treatment conditions, notably the two crime victimization threat conditions. As demonstrated in Figure 5-14 below, individuals in these two conditions that reported no level of anger in response to this threat exhibited between a 65 and 100 percent probability of oppose building a wall on the southern border. In contrast, those that reported an extreme level of anger exhibited a less than 20 percent probability of opposing the construction of a wall along the United States-Mexico border.



Figure 5-14: Support for Building a Wall Along the Southern Border by Level of Anger

5.5 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Attitudes Towards Immigrants

As with prior chapters[5], the question wording used in the experimental study are identical to those questions in the 2016 American National Election Study. Consequently, the data used here is identical to the coding utilized in the prior section. Additionally, and as in the prior chapter, there are two notable exceptions to this policy. First, the internal efficacy measure has again been replaced with a measure of life satisfaction. This measure is coded ordinally, with a value of 0 indicating dissatisfaction and 2 indicating a high level of satisfaction. Secondly, two measures of political interest and campaign involvement are substituted as an indication of a respondent's likelihood of

5

having been exposed to campaign communications and messages. Each of these variables are coded ordinally with 3-point scales, with higher values indicating greater levels of interest or engagement.

5.5.1 Evidence from the 2016 American National Election Study

As with the previous section, discussion will begin with the two measures assessing attitudes towards the economic impact of immigrants, analyses for these two variables are presented in Table 5-8 below. Starting with the belief that immigrants diminish the number of jobs available to current residents and citizens, both of the variables of interest – authoritarianism and life satisfaction – are statistically significant and appear to have conflicting impacts on this belief. As demonstrated by the predicted probabilities in Figure 5-15, individuals with high levels of authoritarianism were significantly less likely to believe that it is "not likely" that immigrants take jobs than those with low levels of authoritarianism, while also being about 10 percentage points more likely to believe that it is "extremely likely" that immigrants take jobs from current residents and citizens. In contrast, life satisfaction has a negative impact on one's belief that immigrants take jobs. This is best observed through the, roughly 10 percentage point increase in one's likelihood of believing that immigrants are unlikely to take jobs when they report high levels of life satisfaction, as demonstrated in Figure 5-16, below.

Table 5-8: Cross-Sectional Analysis of Attitudes Towards the Economic Impact of Immigrants

	Jobs	Economy
Age	0.058***	-0.034**
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Women	0.141***	-0.016
	(0.043)	(0.044)
Non-white	0.299***	-0.121**
	(0.056)	(0.057)
Education	-0.077***	0.012
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Income	-0.099***	-0.023
	(0.020)	(0.021)
Partisan Identification	0.174***	-0.069***
	(0.010)	(0.010)
Authoritarianism	0.225***	-0.073**
	(0.029)	(0.029)
Political Knowledge	0.013	0.049
	(0.034)	(0.034)
Life Satisfaction	-0.180***	0.027
	(0.031)	(0.032)
Political Tolerance	-0.074*	-0.066
	(0.040)	(0.040)
Attention to Political Campaigns	0.019	-0.002
	(0.038)	(0.039)
Attention to Politics & Government	-0.017	0.022
	(0.030)	(0.031)
cut1	-0.235**	-0.603***
	(0.109)	(0.111)
cut2	1.002***	-0.254**
	(0.111)	(0.111)
cut3	1.709***	0.521***
	(0.113)	(0.111)
N	2769	2767
pseudo R-sq	0.084	0.012



Figure 5-15: Belief that Immigrants Take Jobs by Authoritarianism



Figure 5-16: Belief that Immigrants Take Jobs by Level of Life Satisfaction

Additionally, virtually every included demographic factor is statistically significant, with the vast majority of these variables moving in the expected direction. In contrast, neither of the political exposure measures are statistically significant, despite expectations. Furthermore, these two factors appear to move in conflicting directions, and even flip directions for the second economic attitude.

Turning to the second measure assessing attitudes, like the previous variable, authoritarianism plays a significant and negative role in the belief that immigrants are a benefit to the American economy. As demonstrated in Figure 5-17, individuals with a low level of authoritarianism had an approximately 25 percentage point probability of strongly believing that immigrants are a benefit to the economy, but those with a high level of authoritarianism exhibit an only 15 percentage point probability of the same. However, in contrast to the previous measure, life satisfaction is not statistically significant, though it does move in the expected direction. Finally, while all included demographic factors continue to move in consistent directions, only age, race, and partisanship remain statistically significant.



Figure 5-17: Cross-Sectional Belief that Immigrants Benefit the American Economy by Authoritarianism

The second category of variables to address here concern attitudes about the cultural impact of immigrants. Like the previous category, two measures are used to gauge individual attitudes: whether the respondent believes that immigrants harm American culture and how important they believe it is for everyone to learn English. The analysis for both of these measures are presented Table 5-9 below.

Table 5-9: Cross-Sectional Analysis of Attitudes Towards the Cultural Impact of Immigrants

	Culture	English
Age	-0.007	0.155***
	(0.014)	(0.016)
Women	0.023	0.117**
	(0.044)	(0.049)
Non-white	0.069	0.079
	(0.057)	(0.061)
Education	-0.075***	-0.104***
	(0.016)	(0.018)
Income	-0.057***	-0.048**
	(0.021)	(0.023)
Partisan Identification	0.110***	0.148***
	(0.010)	(0.012)
Authoritarianism	0.222***	0.210***
	(0.029)	(0.032)
Political Knowledge	-0.016	-0.007
	(0.034)	(0.038)
Life Satisfaction	-0.065**	-0.035
	(0.032)	(0.036)
Political Tolerance	-0.035	-0.060
	(0.040)	(0.046)
Attention to Political Campaigns	0.046	0.096**
	(0.039)	(0.043)
Attention to Politics & Government	-0.146***	-0.042
	(0.031)	(0.034)
cut1	-0.233**	-1.226***
	(0.111)	(0.127)
cut2	0.593***	-0.610***
	(0.111)	(0.124)
cut3	1.787***	0.359***
	(0.117)	(0.123)
N	2769	2771
pseudo R-sq	0.049	0.085

Beginning with the belief that immigrants harm American culture, both of the primary variables of interest are statistically significant and move in the expected directions. However, while higher levels of life satisfaction is associated with a lower likelihood of believing that American culture is harmed by immigrants, a predicted probabilities analysis reveals an extremely small substantive impact, suggesting only a marginal impact. In contrast, authoritarianism has both a significant and positive impact on this belief. Furthermore, as demonstrated in Figure 5-18, authoritarianism appears to have a large substantive impact. For example, while low authoritarians exhibited a greater than 40 percent probability of strongly disagreeing with the statement that immigrants harm American culture, but high authoritarians only had about a 20 percent probability of the same.



Figure 5-18: Belief that Immigrants Harm American Culture by Authoritarianism

Additionally, both of the culture impact measures were significantly impacted by one measure of exposure to political messages. For the belief that immigrants harm American culture, general attention to politics and government has a significant and negative impact on this belief. Specifically, individuals were slightly more likely to strongly disagree with the belief that immigration harms culture, with those that had no interest in government exhibiting an approximately 25 percent probability of selecting this option but those that were very interested exhibiting a greater than 30 percent probability of the same.



Figure 5-19: Belief that Immigrants Harm American Culture by Interest in Politics and the Government

In contrast to the belief that immigrants harm American culture, demographic factors appear to play a much larger role in the believed importance of learning English; however, all of these relationships appear to move in expected directions. Additionally, one of the measures of campaign exposure, attention to political campaigns, continues to be statistically significant, but in this case appears to have a positive impact on the belief that it is important to learn English. Despite this, predicted probabilities for this relationship appears to suggest a relatively minor and does not have a substantially significant impact.

Finally, while life satisfaction does not appear to have a statistically significant impact on the believed importance of learning English, despite continuing to move in the expected direction, authoritarianism continues to have a statistically significant and positive impact on this belief. As demonstrated in Figure 5-20, below, there is both a slight decline in the belief that learning English is not at all import and authoritarianism increases and a fairly significant increase in believing it is

extremely important, from about a 55 percent probability to about a 70 percent probability. Interestingly, there is a simultaneous dip in the probability of believing that learning English is somewhat important, which is likely the result of the increased probability in believing that it is extremely important.



Figure 5-20: Believed Importance of Immigrants Learning English by Authoritarianism

Next, an analysis of cross-sectional attitudes about the impact of immigrants on crime rates is presented in Table 5-10. Like previous attitudes, relatively few of the included demographic factors are statistically significant. While all of these factors appear to move in the expected direction, the lack of statistical significance for the respondent age and gender variables is somewhat unexpected. In contrast, several of the key factors are statistically significant.

Table 5-10: Cross-Sectional Analysis of Attitudes Towards the Impact of Immigrants on Crime Rates

	Crime
Age	0.021
	(0.014)
Women	0.017
	(0.044)
Non-white	0.060
	(0.057)
Education	-0.057***
	(0.016)
Income	-0.059***
	(0.021)
Partisan Identification	0.083***
	(0.010)
Authoritarianism	0.114***
	(0.029)
Political Knowledge	0.013
	(0.035)
Life Satisfaction	-0.038
	(0.032)
Political Tolerance	-0.058
	(0.040)
Attention to Political Campaigns	-0.061
	(0.039)
Attention to Politics & Government	-0.117***
	(0.031)
cut1	-0.328***
	(0.112)
cut2	0.254**
	(0.111)
cut3	1.495***
	(0.116)
N	2767
pseudo R-sq	0.029

First, life satisfaction is not statistically significant, but does move in the expected, negative direction. Authoritarianism, however, is statistically significant and also moves in the expected direction, suggesting that those with higher levels of authoritarianism are more likely to believe that immigrants increase crime rates. This trend is certainly supported by the predicted probabilities presented in Figure 5-21, which demonstrates steady declines in disagreeing that immigrants increase crime rates and steady increases in agreeing in believing that do increase crime rates as the reported level of authoritarianism increases.



Figure 5-21: Belief that Immigrants Increase the Crime Rate by Authoritarianism

Finally, one of the measures of campaign and political interest is, again, statistically significant. While the measure for campaign interest and engagement is not statistically significant, the measure for more general political news attention is. However, despite expectations, both of these appear to have a negative impact on the belief that immigrants increase the crime rate. Yet, predicted probabilities in Figure 5-22 demonstrate that, while there are steady increases in the likelihood of agreeing with this belief as attention to politics increases, these increases are all relatively small; suggesting that the impact of paying attention to politics is not substantively significant.



Figure 5-22: Belief that Immigrants Increase the Crime Rate by Interest in Politics and Government

The final group of dependent variables focus on individuals' attitudes towards general immigration policy proposals and is again, assessed using two variables: one's preferred policy towards undocumented immigrants and one's support or opposition to constructing a wall on the southern border. The results for each of these measures is presented in Table 5-11 below.

Table 5-11: Cross-Sectional Analysis of Attitudes Towards Immigration Policies

	Policy	Wall
Age	0.018	0.071***
	(0.014)	(0.016)
Women	-0.022	-0.007
	(0.045)	(0.049)
Non-white	0.200***	0.262***
	(0.058)	(0.064)
Education	-0.066***	-0.119***
	(0.016)	(0.018)
Income	-0.031	-0.082***
	(0.021)	(0.023)
Partisan Identification	0.194***	0.315***
	(0.011)	(0.012)
Authoritarianism	0.191***	0.237***
	(0.030)	(0.033)
Political Knowledge	0.013	0.036
	(0.035)	(0.038)
Life Satisfaction	-0.065**	-0.161***
	(0.032)	(0.035)
Political Tolerance	-0.118***	-0.121***
	(0.041)	(0.044)
Attention to Political Campaigns	0.012	0.097**
	(0.040)	(0.042)
Attention to Politics & Government	-0.081**	-0.003
	(0.032)	(0.034)
cut1	-1.011***	0.829***
	(0.115)	(0.122)
cut2	0.979***	1.535***
	(0.115)	(0.124)
cut3	1.553***	
	(0.116)	
N	2749	2768
pseudo R-sq	0.085	0.185

Beginning with the question of what the United States' policy should be towards undocumented immigrants, as with many of the prior measures in this chapter, each of the primary variables of interest are statistically significant. Starting with an individual's level of satisfaction with their life, results are consistent with prior results and expectations; individuals with a higher level of satisfaction with their lives tend to report a preference for more lenient policies towards undocumented immigrants. This trend is, generally supported by predicted probabilities, however the overall shifts in preferences are fairly minute with the overwhelming preference, regardless of satisfaction, being for a policy that allows undocumented immigrants to remain in the country but only qualify for citizenship after paying a penalty. These results are largely the same for the impact of attention to politics on policy preference. While individuals that paid more attention to politics were

also more likely to favor a more lenient policy, the predicted probabilities are very consistent across attention levels, indicating a relatively minor substantive impact.

In contrast to each of these results, individuals with higher levels of authoritarianism were significantly more likely to prefer a stricter policy towards undocumented immigrants, in accordance with prior results and expectations. However, somewhat like the two previous factors, the predicted probabilities, as shown in Figure 5-23, suggest a somewhat constrained substantive impact. While many of the probabilities remain fairly consistent across the authoritarianism spectrum, there is a greater shift in the probability of preferring the strictest policy for undocumented immigrants than is present for those prior key factors. Specifically, while individuals will a low level of authoritarianism exhibit a 15 percent probability of preferring the most stringent policy option, those at the highest level of authoritarianism have a nearly 20 percent probability of preferring the same policy.



Figure 5-23: Belief that Undocumented Immigrants Should be Deported by Authoritarianism

Finally, the factors which significantly impact one's likelihood of supporting the construction of a wall on the southern border is largely impacted by the same factors which impact one's policy preference towards undocumented immigrants. One notable exception to this is that the amount of attention that is paid to politics and government is not statistically significant, but the amount of attention that one paid 2016 political campaigns does have a statistically significant impact. While individuals that were more attentive to political campaigns were more likely to support building a wall, the overall shifts in preferences were relatively small, resulting in only about a 5 percentage point increase in support, as demonstrated in Figure 5-24 below.



Figure 5-24: Support for Building a Wall on the Southern Border by Level of Attention to Campaigns

Additionally, both authoritarianism and level of satisfaction that someone feels with their life are both statistically significant. As with most prior measures of attitudes towards immigrants, authoritarianism has a positive impact on one's likelihood of supporting the building of a wall. As displayed in Figure 5-25, individuals with a low level of authoritarianism were overwhelmingly likely to oppose the construction of the wall, with a nearly 60 percent probability of opposing this construction, individuals with a high level of authoritarianism had little more than a 40 percent probability of opposing the wall. In contrast, while low authoritarianism individuals exhibited an about 20 percent probability of supporting the construction of the wall, high authoritarianism individuals had a roughly 35 percent probability of supporting the wall.



Figure 5-25: Support for Building a Wall on the Southern Border by Authoritarianism

Finally, an individual's level of satisfaction with their life had a significant and negative impact on supporting the wall. As is shown in Figure 5-26, below, these overall shifts appear to be relatively small. Despite this, the overall trend is relatively clear and consistent across the life

satisfaction range and demonstrates a clear increase in opposition to building a wall and decreased support for building the wall as satisfaction increases.



Figure 5-26: Support for Building a Wall on the Southern Border by Level of Life Satisfaction

5.6 Conclusions & Implications

The results presented above reveal several trends in the impact that threat exposure has on the attitudes that individuals hold towards immigrants. First, and despite expectations, in nearly all cases assessed here, exposure to threat frames appears to have only a minimal impact on individuals' attitudes towards immigrants. Rather, ANVOA analyses suggest that the primary factor informing these attitudes is the emotions that are generated by threat exposure.

However, the multivariate analyses of both the experimental and cross-sectional data call these broad conclusions into question. Across all treatment conditions and measures, no emotion emerges as a consistent predictor of an individual's attitudes towards immigrants. Frequently, once all

theoretically factors are accounted for, no emotion produces a statistically significant result. Furthermore, the cross-sectional analyses reveal that in nearly every case, measures assessing the likelihood of an individual encountering one, or more, of these threat frames statistically predicts one's attitudes towards immigrants.

In addition, for participants in the experimental sample, authoritarianism is not consistently a significant factor in individual attitudes towards immigrants. However, in the cross-sectional sample, it is statistically, and substantively, significant for virtually every measure of attitudes towards immigrants. The divergent results presented by these two data sources and the literature suggest a number of directions for future research.

First, much of the previous literature suggests that economic concerns are not actually the driving force behind animus towards immigrant populations, despite historic expectations. Rather, the main driver of this animosity appears to be cultural and political concerns. The results presented here, echo these conclusions. While, again, neither threat frame is statistically significant in predicting attitudes, there does appear to be a much more discernable difference in attitude between those exposed to a political threat frame and those exposed to a victimization threat. This discrepancy is deserving of a much greater level of direct research than it has thus far received.

Similarly, while threat frames did not appear to have a direct impact on individuals' attitudes in the experimental survey, they do appear to play a role in the attitudes of those in the cross-sectional survey. This discrepancy could be due to a multitude of reasons. Chief among these is the possibility that issues around immigration, broadly, were simply more salient to Americans during the 2016 presidential election than they were in the fall of 2019. Along similar lines, those in 2016 certainly had more opportunities to be exposed to the threat frames used in the 2019 experimental survey and were likely exposed to these threats multiple times. In contrast, those in the experimental survey

were only exposed to one form of these threat frames, at a single time-point. This may simply have not been enough to significantly alter attitudes on single issues around immigration.

Finally, the emotional responses to threat frame were only available for participants in the experimental survey, and further, only to those that received on of the threat treatments. Given the ambiguity in the impact that both of these factors have on individual attitudes towards immigration, greater effort should be extended to disentangling these two factors – such as attempting to elicit emotion from participants without the use of a threat frame or political message.

6 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERMINANTS OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS POLITICAL VIOLENCE

What causes some individuals to be more accepting of, or willing to engage in, violence? What role does threatening messages have on the political engagement of individuals? What role do authoritarianism and internal efficacy have on these processes? This chapter answers these questions using data from an experimental survey.

The results in this chapter demonstrate that the psychological impact of exposure to threat frames as part of campaign communications have a real impact on the individuals that receive these messages. Individuals exposed to these messages are significantly more likely to approve of various forms of political violence, and a more likely to indicate a greater proclivity towards violence themselves. This impact is further enhanced in individuals that exhibit greater levels of authoritarianism. Additionally, these relationships are not confined to just experimental studies, but similar trends played out among the broader electorate during the 2016 presidential election.

6.1 Theoretical Expectations

This chapter focuses on the impact of threat frames as part of campaign rhetoric on attitudes towards violence and individual willingness to personally engage in that violence. As discussed previously, differing forms of threat frames are likely to produce different emotions in individuals (Warr and Stafford 1983; LaGrange and Ferraro 1989; Ferraro 1996; Chiricos, Hogan, and Gertz 1997; Chiricos, McEntire, and Gertz 2001; Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008). The results in Chapter 4 generally support this proposition. Additionally, Chapter 4 demonstrates that specific demographic factors play an important role in determing *how much* individuals will experience negative emotions in response to these threat frames, as well as the actor or group that they direct these emotions towards. This chapter is particularly interested in exploring to what extent different

emotions are likely to result in variations in behavioral responses. For example, neither fear nor disgust are considered particularly "active" emotions. As a result, individuals primed to experience either fear or disgust are not, necessarily, more inclined to engage in more violent behaviors. Rather, fear is more likely to produce a "fight or flight" response (Marcus and Mackuen 1993; Brader 2006; Brader, Gorenendyk, and Valentino 2010; Redlawsk, Cinetiini, and Emmerson 2010), in which individuals may be more inclined to engage in more aggressive, and even violent behaviors, but may also be just as likely to disengage from the threatening stimuli. Because of this behavioral uncertainty in individuals primed to experience fear, I contend that emotional stimuli are not the sole factor needed to account for violence; authoritarianism and internal efficacy can account for the missing link between the induction of fear to the production of violent behaviors.

> H_1: Individuals exposed to a racialized threat frame will be more likely to support and engage in political violence than those that are not exposed to such frames.
> H_2: Individuals that report a high level of fear after exposure to a crime victimization threat frame and are also exposed to a violence approval message will be more likely to support the use of violence and to personally engage in violence than those that do not report high levels of fear following exposure.
> H_3: Individuals that report higher levels of anger following exposure to a crime victimization threat frame will be more likely to support the use of violence and to personally engage in violence than those that do not report a high level of anger following exposure to a crime victimization threat frame.

Because authoritarians are activated by perceived and normative threat (Doty, Peterson, and Winter 1991; Feldmann and Stenner 1997; Rickert 1998; Lavine et al. 2002; Stenner 2005; McCann 2009; Richey 2012), messages that emphasize the potential threat from members of outgroups are likely to appeal to authoritarians more than messages lacking these cues. Additionally, if authoritarians are the primary group to be affected by these types of messages, increased aggression towards outgroups should be expected as a result of authoritarian aggression (Altemeyer 1981, 1988, 1996; Stenner 2005).

Despite the likelihood of threatening messages activating authoritarian aggression, violence remains relatively unusual (Averill 1983). I argue that this inconsistency is likely the result of another component of authoritarianism, submission to an authoritarian leader, which may be dependent on an individual's own level of internal efficacy. Under protection motivation theories, individuals with low levels of internal efficacy are likely to engage in threat avoidant behaviors, while individuals with high levels of internal efficacy are more likely to take proactive steps to mitigate the threat that they are faced with (Bandura 1977; Bandura and Adams 1977; Maddux and Rogers 1983; Rippetoe and Rogers 1987; Witte and Allen 2000). Consequently, I propose that an individual's likelihood of engaging in violence themselves, supporting the use of violence by others of their preferred leader, or simply seeking to disengage with the threat is largely dependent on their level of authoritarianism and efficacy. Finally, based on the above assumptions, I expect to find the following:

> H_4: Individuals exposed to just the crime victimization threat frame with high levels of authoritarianism will support the use of violence by their political leader than those with a low level of authoritarianism.
> H_5: Individuals with high levels of internal efficacy that are exposed to the crime victimization threat frame and the violence approval message will be more likely to support the use of violence and will be more willing to personally engage in violence than those with lower levels of internal efficacy.
> H_6: Individuals with high levels of authoritarianism that are exposed to the crime victimization threat frame and the violence approval message will be more likely to support the use of violence and will be more willing to personally engage in violence than those with lower levels of authoritarianism.

While disgust has been growing in importance in political science research, there are relatively few expectations for the impact of disgust on the exhibition of aggression, hostility, or violence. Despite this deficiency, there are some things that are known about the effect of disgust, which can provide some insights into the likelihood of individuals experiencing disgust to engage in violence or support other engaging in violence. First, widespread belief that a racial minority's population is growing and threatening to replace the current majority group is associated with increased levels of discussed, increased violent crime rates, including increased interracial murder

rates (Jacobs and Wood 1999; Avery and Fine 2012). As a result, it would be reasonable to expect that experiencing disgust should greatly increase one's propensity to support and even engage in violence. However, disgust is also deeply tied to issues of morality (Schnall et al. 2008; Inbar et al. 2009; Inbar, Pizzaro, and Bloom 2009). Thus, violence may not be a particularly common response to disgust, unless that behavior comes to be viewed as morally good. Furthermore, protection motivation theory has generally demonstrated that disgust produces either protective or proactive responses, depending on an individual's level of personal efficacy (Bandura 1977; Bandura and Adams 1977; Maddux and Rogers 1983; Rippetoe and Rogers 1987; Witte and Allen 2000; Beck and Franekl 2008). As a consequence of these findings, I contend that, as with fear, the missing link between emotion and behavior change is one's level of internal efficacy and authoritarianism.

> H_7: Individuals that report higher levels of disgust after exposure to a political power threat will be more likely to support the use of political violence by others, including a political leader, than those that do not report a high level of disgust after exposure to a political power threat.
> H_8: Individuals that report higher levels of disgust after exposure to a political power threat and also receive a violence approval message will be more likely to support the use of political violence by others and to engage in violence themselves, than those that were not exposed to a violence approval message.
> H_9: Individuals exposed to just the political power threat frame with high levels of authoritarianism will be more likely to support the use of violence by their political leader than those with low levels of authoritarianism exposed to the same messages.
> H_{10}: Individuals exposed to the political power threat frame and the violence approval message with high levels of internal efficacy will be more likely to support the use of violence and will be more willing to personally engage in violence than those with a low level of internal efficacy.
> H_{11}: Individuals exposed to the political power threat frame and the violence approval message with high levels of authoritarianism will be more likely to support the use of violence and will be more willing to personally engage in violence than those with a low level of authoritarianism exposed to the same messages.

6.2 Data and Methods

6.2.1 Dependent Variables

This chapter is interested in individual level behaviors in the wake of political threats, and in particular, whether individuals will be more willing to engage in acts of violence. To this end, these behaviors will be assessed through five dependent variables, roughly grouped into two categories: the acceptability of political violence and willingness to personally engage in violence behaviors. Respondents were asked each of these questions after exposure to the threat treatments and the violence approval treatment, depending on which group the respondent was assigned to. For respondents in the control group, these questions were assessed after the demographics questions.

The first group of dependent variables, the acceptability of political violence, is assessed through three different measures: belief that political violence is sometimes justified, the belief that protestors that are "roughed up" deserve that treatment, and support for the use of torture for terrorists or those suspected of terrorism. The first two of these measures are used to address the extent to which respondents are willing to support violence perpetuated by "average" citizens. For each of these measures, respondents could choose options ranging from "not at all" to "a great deal". These answers were coded ordinally from 0 to 4. The torture support measure addresses the extent to which respondents will support violence wielded by government actors. Respondents could oppose, neither oppose nor support, or support this policy. These answers were coded ordinally from 0 to 2. The second group of dependent variables, measuring respondents' personal willingness to engage in violence, is addressed through two measures: how hard it is for the respondent control their temper, and how likely they are to hit someone once provoked. Responses for each of these measures range from "not hard/likely at all" to "extremely hard/likely". These answers were, again, coded ordinally from 0 to 4.

6.2.2 Independent Variables

The primary independent variables for this analysis are one's level of internal efficacy and authoritarianism. For each of these, I make use of the measures used on the 2016 American National Election Study. Internal efficacy is measured with an index of four separate questions which assess how much control over their own lives respondents reported feeling. Each of these questions was coded dichotomously and then combined into an additive measure, resulting in values from 0, indicating a low level of internal efficacy, to 8, indicating a high level of internal efficacy. This measure was then reduced to a 0 to 2 measure, with a value of 1 centering around the mean value for the index and 0 and 2 placed one standard deviation above and below this mean value. These measures were asked as part of the pre-test before treatment conditions were assigned, and then again as part of the post-test after treatment exposure.

Similarly, the authoritarianism scale used on the ANES asks four questions, each focused on attitudes towards child rearing. These questions were individually coded from 0 to 3, and then added as an index. This resulted in values ranging from 0, indicating a low level of authoritarianism, to 12, indicating a high level of authoritarianism. Finally, as with the internal efficacy measure, the authoritarianism index measure was recoded to reduce the number of categories. This reduced measure ranges from 0 to 2, with 1 indicating a moderate level of authoritarianism and centered around the mean of the original additive index. The other two values of this reduced measure are placed at one standard deviation above and below the mean, respectively. The four questions used in this measure were asked as part of the pre-test before treatment conditions were assigned.

The second set of independent variables address respondents' emotional responses to their assigned treatment prompt these emotional responses were measured with a series of self-reported values across eight distinct emotions. The emotions are broadly grouped into positive emotions – hope, pride, happiness, and relief – and negative emotions – anger, fear, disgust, and sadness.

Respondents were asked to report how much they felt each of these emotions, with answer options ranging from "not at all" to "extremely". These answers were coded ordinally from 0 to 4.

The final group of independent variables included in this analysis are a variety of demographic factors: age, gender, race, education, and income. Additionally, participants' partisanship and political tolerance are included here, as well. Race is coded as a dichotomous variable, with 1 indicating the respondent being white, and a value of 0 indicating all other races and ethnicities. Gender is included as a dichotomous variable, with 0 indicating male and 1 indicating female.

All other demographic factors are included as ordinal variables. The coded values are age range from 0, indicating respondents aged between 18 and 24, and 5, indicating respondents 65 and over. The education variable ranges from not having a high school diploma, coded as 0, to possessing an advanced degree, coded as 4. Next, the income variable originally included 11 categories, but following the standard used for the internal efficacy and authoritarianism measures, was reduced to 3 categories with 1 indicating the mean income level and 0 and 2 being one standard deviation above and below that mean value. Respondents' partisanship includes 3 categories; Democrats coded as 0, Independents coded as 1, and Republicans coded as 2.

Finally, the political tolerance measure is an additive index variable, combining twelve separate questions. These questions asked respondents to report how acceptable they would find it for members of the Alt-right, Antifa, Black Lives Matter, and Dreamers and DACA recipients to hold a public rally, have a book at their local library, or to teach at a local college or university. Each of these questions utilize a seven-point scale, with 0 indicating strong disagreement (i.e. low tolerance) with the action, and 6 indicating strong agreement (i.e. high tolerance) with the action. The total index has values ranging from 0 to 72. This measure is treated as continuous for the

predicted probabilities analysis, and only the mean, low standard deviation, high standard deviation, and maximum values are reported.

6.3 Experimental Results

6.3.1 Attitudes Towards the Use of Political Violence

The first group of dependent variables to be addressed all concern attitudes towards the general acceptability of political violence. The first question that must be answered here is whether exposure to a threat frame is enough to encourage recipients of those messages to be more supportive of political violence. A difference of means test was performed to examine the impact of threat frames and violence approval messages on these attitudes and is displayed in Figure 6-1 below.



Figure 6-1: Difference in Means of Attitudes about Political Violence by Treatment Condition

Across all three measures assessing support for political violence, there does tend to be slightly more support for political violence, especially for those receiving both the political power threat frame and the violence approval message. However, as theorized, these mean values are not statistically significant from participants in the control group. Despite this, the lack of a statistically significant difference between the treatment groups that received the violence approval message and the control group or the groups that received only the threat frames is in contrast to expectations, and fails to support hypothesis 1.

Despite this, there is still an expectation that the negative emotions generated by exposure to a threat frame should have a significant impact on an individual's support for the use of violence. As a result, a two-way ANOVA analysis for each negative emotion previously addressed and threat treatment reveals a much different picture. These analyses reveal that both anger ($p=0.1030$) and disgust ($p=0.1103$) fall just short of statistical significance, while the level of fear that an individual reports approaches statistical significance ($p=0.130$). Marginal predictions for each of these emotions are depicted in Figure 6-2 below.

As displayed below, individuals who reported feeling higher levels of fear, anger, and sadness, particularly when in response to exposure to the political power threat, were all more likely to believe that political violence was sometimes justifiable. In contrast, this figure also reflects the far more complex impact of disgust on attitudes towards the justifiability of political violence. Participants that experienced higher levels of disgust were somewhat more likely to believe that political violence is justifiable. However, there is little distinction between participants that reported feeling only a "little" disgust and those that felt an "extreme" amount of disgust. Despite this, as generally expected, feeling disgust in response to the crime victimization threat had no real impact on participants' attitudes towards the justifiability of political violence, and even decreased the justifiability of violence at higher levels.



Figure 6-2: Belief that Political Violence is Justifiable by Negative Emotion

The second measure used to explore attitudes towards political violence asks respondents the level to which they believe that protestors that are "roughed up" deserve to be. Here, analysis reveals that each of the negative emotion explored here plays a statistically significant role in an individual's support for this belief, with fear (p=0.0001), disgust (p=0.0097), anger (p=0.0790), and sadness (p=0.0029) all reach statistical significance. Again, marginal predictions of the substantive impact of these emotions by treatment condition are displayed in Figure 6-3 below.



Figure 6-3: Belief that Protestors Deserve to be "Roughed Up" by Negative Emotion

As seen above, feeling any of these emotions to a greater extent produces a rather large shift in a respondent's belief that protestors deserve to be roughed up. These shifts are particularly pronounced among those that feel higher levels of these emotions following exposure to the political power threat, which is further enhanced by those that are then subsequently exposed to the violence approval treatment. Across all emotions, individuals that reported not feeling any level of these emotions were most likely to report that protestors don't deserve to be roughed up at all, but those that reported feeling an extreme level of the given emotion trended towards reporting that protestors moderately deserved to be roughed up.

Finally, the last measure used here addresses the extent to which individuals will support the use of violence by a political leader, indicated through their support for the use of torture as an

interrogation method. Again, while treatment exposure did not produce statistically significant results, analyses of each negative emotion revealed consistently significant results. As with attitudes towards treatment of protestors, fear (p=0.0157), disgust (p=0.0336), anger (p=0.0031), and sadness (p=0.0096) all produced statistically significant results. Marginal predictions are again presented in Figure 6-4 below.



Figure 6-4: Support for the Use of Torture by Negative Emotion

In contrast to the previously discussed measures, negative emotions appear to have a smaller, but more consistent substantive impact on support for the use of torture. Both the impact of anger and fear are fairly emblematic of this torture support tends to steadily progress upwards as respondent's level of these two emotions increases, resulting in participants that reported feeling an extreme level of either of these emotions tending towards supporting the policy, as opposed to those

that felt none of the given emotion indicating either opposition or indifference towards the policy, depending on the treatment condition.

As for participants that reported higher levels of disgust and sadness, while there remains a slight positive relationship between these two emotions and support for the use of torture, this relationship is less consistent across the spectrum of these two emotions. This inconsistency in both emotions appears to be the result of a decline in support among participants that reported feeling very disgusted or sad following exposure to the political power threat treatment. While these results are inconsistent with the hypothesized relationships, it is not entirely unexpected given the divergent and contradictory behaviors that are sometimes observed among those experiencing disgust.

As a result of the preceding analyses, there is generally support for the theorized belief that individuals experiencing high levels of negative emotions following exposure to some forms of threatening messages will be more approving of the use of political violence. In particular, hypotheses 2, 8, and 9 are, thus far supported, in that individuals experiencing fear in response to the crime victimization threat frame and those experiencing disgust as a result of exposure to a political power threat were all more likely to indicate more favorable attitudes towards the use of political violence. However, hypothesis 3 is not support thus far, as individuals that reported higher levels of anger following exposure to crime victimization threats were not particularly supportive of the use of political violence. However, each of these hypotheses need further exploration in regards to the likelihood of an individual to personally engage in violence, which is explored further in the following section.

6.3.2 Likelihood of Engaging in Violent Behavior

The next group of measures explored here all concern an individual's propensity for engaging in violent behaviors themselves. This is assessed here through two measures: an individual's difficulty controlling their temper and their likelihood of responding with violence if

provoked. Again, a difference of means with 95% confidence intervals for each of these measures by threat condition is depicted in Figure 6-5. As demonstrated below, exposure to the violence approval message appears to result in a slight increase in an individual's propensity towards violence, particularly if that message was preceded by the political power threat frame. However, as with individual approval of political violence, just being exposed to a threat frame or violence approval message does not result in a statistically significant change in violence propensity.



Figure 6-5: Difference of Means for Violence Propensity by Treatment Group

Despite this, and as with the measures assessing support for political violence, there is still a large expectation that the emotions that individuals experience following threat exposure play a large role in determining their overall propensity for engaging in political violence. Again, a two-way

ANOVA for each negative emotion is used to assess this relationship. The marginal predictions for each of the negative emotions and their effect on a respondent's difficulty controlling their temper, by treatment condition is depicted in Figure 6-6, below. Unlike the previous analyses, only the level of fear that an individual reported experiencing rises to the threshold of statistical significance (p=0.0006). Yet, sadness (p=0.1064) falls just short of statistical significance, and disgust approaches statistical significance (p=0.1623), as well.



Figure 6-6: Difficulty Controlling Temper by Negative Emotions

As seen above, for each emotion, there is a steady increase in the level of difficulty that an individual reported in controlling their temper as their reported level of emotion increased. This relationship appears most obviously amongst individuals that were exposed to the political power threat frame, for which fear is a particularly emblematic example. Here, individuals that reported

feeling very fearful following exposure to the political power threat frame were considerably more likely to report difficulty controlling their individuals that reported feeling no fear at all. This relationship is further enhanced for individuals that felt very fearful, and were then given a message condoning the use of violence. Finally, while these relationships are certainly less clear for individuals that reported feeling higher levels of disgust or sadness, there is still a slight increase in the difficulty that individuals have controlling their temper, across all treatment conditions – though these relationships do still to be most apparent for those that are emotionally reacting to the political power threat frame.

Finally, the last variable used to assess an individual's propensity for personally engaging in violence is a respondent's reported likelihood of responding with violence if provoked into action. Here, as with the previous measure, only feeling fear is statistically significant in predicting one's likelihood of being provoked ($p=0.0089$), though feeling disgust does approach significance ($p=0.1563$). Again, predicted margins for each negative emotion, by treatment condition, are reported in Figure 6-7 below. As with the previous results, there is a steady increase in propensity of provocation for individuals that reported feeling higher levels of fear or disgust. This relationship is, again, particularly pronounced among those participants that were emotionally reacting to the political power threat, and even more so for those that were later exposed to a violence approval message.



Figure 6-7: Likelihood of Being Provoked into Violence by Negative Emotions

As with the attitudes towards the use of violence, the preceding analysis reveals some evidence for the theorized relationships between emotions and the propensity to engage in violence personally. Individuals that report experiencing greater levels of fear and disgust, in particular, do seem to be more likely to engage in violence, though that relationship is more strained for individuals experiencing disgust. Furthermore, these relationships were particularly notable amongst individuals that received the political power threat treatment, which were further enhanced by subsequent exposure to a violence approval message. However, feeling anger in response to threat exposure does not appear to have significant impact on propensity to engage in violence, despite the theorized relationship. Consequently, hypotheses 2, 8, and 9 all receive at least a minimal level of support, while hypothesis 3 remains unsupported to this point.

6.3.3 Predictors of Attitudes Towards Political Violence

The remaining hypotheses concern how internal efficacy and authoritarianism affect attitudes towards political violence after exposure to threat frames and a message approving the use of violence. To address these expectations an ordered probit was run for each dependent variable, with each model being run for each treatment condition individually. The first portion of each of the remaining hypotheses concerns attitudes towards political violence. Thus, the first dependent variables will concern the justifiability of political violence, how much protestors deserve to be roughed up, and support for the use of torture against those accused, or suspected, of committing acts or terrorism. The first of these to be addressed here is the question of whether political violence is ever justified. This analysis is presented in Table 6-1 below.

Table 6-1: Ordered Probit of Belief that Using Violence for Political Goals is Sometimes Justified

	Control		Crime Victimization Threat		Crime Victimization & Violence Approval		Political Power Threat		Political Power & Violence Approval	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Political Efficacy	-0.295**	-0.278*	0.136	0.416	0.090	-0.426	0.024	0.308	-0.169	-0.116
	(0.140)	(0.147)	(0.228)	(0.308)	(0.252)	(0.360)	(0.254)	(0.315)	(0.279)	(0.454)
Authoritarianism	-0.412**	-0.324	0.078	-0.074	0.798**	1.523***	0.027	0.545	-0.027	-0.086
	(0.198)	(0.212)	(0.305)	(0.386)	(0.346)	(0.469)	(0.288)	(0.383)	(0.295)	(0.370)
Women		-0.146		-0.862**		0.179		0.670		-0.283
		(0.239)		(0.430)		(0.519)		(0.488)		(0.716)
White		-0.844***		-0.161		-1.524***		-1.374***		-0.447
		(0.253)		(0.541)		(0.493)		(0.444)		(0.728)
Partisan Identification		-0.271*		-0.652**		-0.246		-0.503		0.038
		(0.149)		(0.295)		(0.264)		(0.319)		(0.414)
Political Tolerance		-0.058		0.155		-0.219		-0.136		0.191
		(0.176)		(0.343)		(0.318)		(0.408)		(0.395)
Anger				0.409*		0.394		0.476*		1.033*
				(0.223)		(0.311)		(0.280)		(0.545)
Disgust				-0.130		-0.625**		-0.672**		-1.095*
				(0.254)		(0.269)		(0.312)		(0.580)
Fear				0.031		0.575		0.074		-0.121
				(0.250)		(0.415)		(0.305)		(0.269)
Sadness				-0.185		-0.396		0.649**		0.408
				(0.239)		(0.386)		(0.295)		(0.381)
/cut1	-0.596**	-1.385***	0.694	0.190	1.509**	-0.356	0.279	0.777	-0.221	-0.184
	(0.282)	(0.478)	(0.504)	(0.996)	(0.622)	(1.145)	(0.494)	(0.972)	(0.551)	(1.307)
/cut2	-0.273	-1.028**	0.805	0.350	1.637***	-0.166	0.840*	1.622	-0.082	0.011
	(0.282)	(0.472)	(0.507)	(0.996)	(0.627)	(1.146)	(0.500)	(0.992)	(0.555)	(1.312)
/cut3	0.267	-0.432	1.442***	1.185	2.202***	0.702	1.182**	2.154**	0.583	0.953
	(0.280)	(0.463)	(0.518)	(1.001)	(0.657)	(1.148)	(0.506)	(1.019)	(0.552)	(1.324)
/cut4	0.531*	-0.138	1.816***	1.752*	2.751***	1.551	1.291**	2.320**	0.955*	1.513
	(0.281)	(0.463)	(0.533)	(1.038)	(0.696)	(1.178)	(0.511)	(1.031)	(0.550)	(1.330)
N	119	116	52	50	46	45	46	44	36	34
Pseudo R-squared	0.031	0.092	0.004	0.160	0.054	0.269	0.000	0.270	0.004	0.185

First, it is hypothesized that respondents with high levels of authoritarianism should be more likely to respond to their assigned treatment conditions far differently than those with lower levels of authoritarianism. Specifically, participants with high levels of authoritarianism that receive only a threat frame should not be more supportive of the use of political violence by individuals (*Hypotheses 4* and *10*), but those authoritarians that also receive a message encouraging the use of violence should be more supportive of its use (*Hypotheses 5* and *11*), regardless of who the perpetrator of that violence is.

For most of the treatment conditions, results are mostly inconclusive, and in the case of those that received the political power threat and violence approval message, contradictory. While those that received just the political power threat frame were more inclined to believe that political violence can be justified, those that received the same threat message and the message encouraging the use of violence were less likely to support the justifiability of political violence. Despite neither of these results being statistically significant, these results are in contrast with those that are theoretically expected.

In contrast, authoritarianism is statistically significant, under some models, for two treatment conditions. For individuals in the control condition, receiving neither a threat treatment or the violence approval treatment, authoritarians were less likely to believe that political violence can sometimes be justified, though this result does not hold once the demographics of respondents are accounted for. A predicted probability analysis reveals that low authoritarians with no exposure to a threat message are likely to indicate that political violence is not at all justified approximately 50 percent of the time, but high authoritarians believe the same approximately 80 percent of the time. In contrast, participants exposed to both the crime victimization threat frame and the violence approval messages were far more likely to claim that there was a great deal of justification for political violence. Additionally, low authoritarians were, approximately, 80 percentage points more likely to claim that there was no justification for political violence. Meanwhile, high authoritarians were only slightly more likely to indicate that political violence was not at all justifiable, with a nearly equal probability of indicating that violence is justifiable a great deal of the time.

Next, it is hypothesized that individuals with higher levels of internal efficacy that are exposed to either threat frame and the violence approving message will be more likely to support the use of political violence (*Hypotheses 6* and *12*). Again, the evidence provided in Table 6-2 above is mostly inconclusive, and even contradictory, depending on the treatment condition and model.

Individuals that expressed higher levels of internal efficacy after treatment exposure when exposed to the political power threat treatment before the violence approval message were all less likely to believe that political violence is justifiable. In contrast, those that received the crime victimization threat frame instead were, mostly, likely to believe that violence was justifiable. However, this positive relationship is reversed once the emotions felt by respondents are added to the model. While none of these results are statistically significant, they do move the opposite direction of expectations. Finally, an individual's sense of internal efficacy is statistically significant for individuals in the control group; though, these individuals were also less likely to believe that political violence was justifiable.

Finally, and as partially explored earlier in this chapter, anger and disgust continue to play an important role in understanding individuals' attitudes towards the justifiability of political violence. While individual ANOVAs for these emotions fell just short of statistical significance, once the other negative emotions and demographic factors are included, both of these emotions are consistently statistically significant and provide counteracting pressures on individuals exposed to threat and violence approving messages. Beginning with the impact of disgust, individuals exposed to a political power threat were significantly less likely to believe that violence is justifiable, despite expectations. Predicted probabilities of this relationship are observable in Figure 6-8 below.



Figure 6-8: Belief that Political Violence is Justifiable by Level of Disgust

As demonstrated above, individuals in either political power threat condition and those that received the crime victimization threat and the violence approval message were all less likely to believe that political violence is sometimes justifiable. However, the impact of disgust varies greatly between each of the treatment conditions. In the case of those that received the crime threat and the violence approval message, feeling greater levels of disgust results in relatively inconsistent probabilities of believing that violence is not at all justifiable, with individuals that felt somewhat disgusted nearly universally rejecting the use of violence, but those that felt either a little disgusted or a lot of disgust having only an approximately 60 percentage probability of believing that political violence can not be justified. Meanwhile, individuals that received either of the political power threat conditions experienced a fairly consistent increase in belief that political violence cannot be justified

as their reported levels of disgust increased. However, there is a marked difference between participants in these two conditions, given that those that received the additional violence approval message were considerably more likely to believe that there was a great deal of justifiability for political violence than those respondents that did not received this approval message. While these results do not yet support the hypothesized relationship between the feeling of disgust and support for political violence, they do provide continued support for the notion that disgust plays a complex, and sometimes contradictory, role in determining individual behavior.

In addition to disgust, anger also plays an important role in predicting an individual's attitudes towards the use of political violence. The results in Table 6-1 above demonstrate that anger has a positive impact on an individual's support for the justifiability of political violence across several treatment conditions. As demonstrated in Figure 6-9 below, while respondents are most likely to believe that violence is not at all justifiable regardless of their reported level of anger or treatment exposure, individuals that received either political power threat saw a consistent, if small, increase in their probability of believing that political violence was some level of justifiable as their reported level of anger. Additionally, there is a similar trend among individuals that were exposed to the crime victimization threat and violence approval message, those this relationship is not statistically significant. As a result of these findings, *Hypothesis 3* does see some support, despite the impact of anger not being confined to those individuals that are exposed to a crime victimization threat frame.



Figure 6-9: Belief in the Justifiability of Political Violence by Level of Anger

The next measure for assessing support for political violence asks individuals how much they believe that protestors thar are roughed up deserve to be. As viewed in Table 6-2 below, internal efficacy is not a statistically significant variable under any of the treatment conditions. Thus, while it does move in the expected direction in many cases, for at least this variable, *hypotheses 6* and *10* continue to not be statistically supported. In contrast, authoritarianism is significantly associated with greater support for the belief that protestors deserve to be roughed up for those participants that received, either, the crime victimization threat frame, of the political power threat frame and the violence approval message.

Table 6-2Ordered Probit of Belief that Protestors Deserve to be Roughed Up

	Control		Crime Victimization Threat		Crime Victimization & Violence Approval		Political Power Threat		Political Power & Violence Approval	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Political Efficacy	-0.0897	-0.155	-0.129	-0.0945	0.105	-0.0873	0.160	-0.104	0.0281	0.258
	(0.128)	(0.132)	(0.200)	(0.226)	(0.207)	(0.265)	(0.239)	(0.275)	(0.260)	(0.430)
Authoritarianism	0.00453	-0.0459	0.371	0.714**	0.401	0.387	0.192	0.0253	0.917***	1.101***
	(0.176)	(0.186)	(0.272)	(0.310)	(0.312)	(0.353)	(0.274)	(0.332)	(0.305)	(0.393)
Women		-0.0465		-0.177		0.783*		-0.0425		0.112
		(0.212)		(0.342)		(0.408)		(0.381)		(0.555)
White		-0.291		0.149		-0.00731		-0.915**		-0.860
		(0.236)		(0.452)		(0.420)		(0.383)		(0.675)
Partisan Identification		0.307**		0.386*		0.563**		0.202		0.505
		(0.133)		(0.214)		(0.221)		(0.233)		(0.365)
Political Tolerance		-0.219		-0.383		-0.273		0.124		-0.202
		(0.154)		(0.272)		(0.249)		(0.326)		(0.343)
Anger				0.148		0.237		0.146		0.244
				(0.178)		(0.220)		(0.216)		(0.317)
Disgust				0.0775		0.0436		0.0654		-0.757
				(0.227)		(0.199)		(0.239)		(0.466)
Fear				-0.0497		0.0684		0.522**		-0.340
				(0.215)		(0.233)		(0.229)		(0.234)
Sadness				0.276		-0.00566		-0.399*		1.017**
				(0.218)		(0.282)		(0.214)		(0.400)
/cut1	-0.560**	-0.961**	-0.269	0.922	-0.0253	0.930	-0.190	-0.723	0.251	0.503
	(0.267)	(0.434)	(0.441)	(0.800)	(0.512)	(0.869)	(0.459)	(0.853)	(0.517)	(1.157)
/cut2	0.176	-0.164	0.366	1.670**	0.753	1.729*	0.450	0.0761	1.016*	1.641
	(0.266)	(0.430)	(0.446)	(0.819)	(0.528)	(0.889)	(0.464)	(0.843)	(0.530)	(1.186)
/cut3	0.854***	0.556	1.859***	3.445***	1.678***	2.858***	1.347***	1.202	2.003***	3.008**
	(0.272)	(0.430)	(0.494)	(0.899)	(0.545)	(0.923)	(0.490)	(0.861)	(0.570)	(1.230)
/cut4	1.331***	0.976**	2.302***	3.948***	2.005***	3.318***			2.457***	3.666***
	(0.287)	(0.437)	(0.550)	(0.941)	(0.556)	(0.946)			(0.616)	(1.278)
N	119	116	52	50	46	45	46	44	36	34
Pseudo R-squared	0.001	0.030	0.020	0.146	0.014	0.106	0.007	0.127	0.088	0.272

For participants in the crime victimization threat treatment group, higher levels of authoritarianism is generally associated with great support for roughing up protestors, which is against expectations as stated in *hypothesis 4*. However, it is important to note that, as depicted in Figure 6-10, this is not because individuals with low levels of authoritarianism are fully opposed to violence against protestors while high authoritarians universally accept it. Rather, low authoritarians under these conditions have an approximately 35 percentage point likelihood of claiming that protestors moderately deserve to be roughed up, but high authoritarians have a nearly 60 percentage point likelihood of claiming the same. Similarly, participants that received both the political power

threat and the violence approval messages are also more likely to believe that protestors deserve violence. For individuals in this treatment group, low authoritarians have a 60 percentage point likelihood of claiming that protestors moderately deserve to be roughed up, and a 20 percent likelihood of expressing that protestors deserve violence a great deal. Each of these results are in line with expectations outlined in *hypothesis 11*, lending this hypothesis a great deal of support.



Figure 6-10: Support for Roughing Up Protestors by Level of Authoritarianism

Additionally, for individuals exposed to the political power threat, feeling high levels of sadness had a large impact on the extent to which they support the use of violence against protestors. The impact of this emotion for these participants are displayed in Figure 6-11, below. While participants that were only exposed to the political power threat were overwhelmingly likely to report that protestors do not deserve to be roughed when they expressed feeling a high level of

sadness, those participants that were then exposed to the violence approval message demonstrated far different responses. For those that received the violence approval message after the political power threat, as their reported level of sadness increased there is a fairly steady increase in the acceptance of violence against protestors, until participants reported feeling extremely sad. These individuals were most likely to claim that protestors deserve to be roughed up a great deal.



Figure 6-11: Belief that Protestors Deserve to be Roughed Up by Level of Sadness

The final measure being used to assess attitudes towards the use of political violence addresses an individual's support for the use of torture. As viewed in Table 6-3, internal efficacy again fails to be statistically significant in nearly every model, and consequently, continues to fail to support *hypotheses 6* and *12*. However, and similarly to previous measures, authoritarianism is statistically significant, and moves in the expected direction for participants in both treatment

conditions that were exposed to the crime victimization threat frame. Predicted probabilities for these relationships are displayed in Figure 6-12 below.

Table 6-3: Ordered Probit of Support for the Use of Torture

	Control		Crime Victimization Threat		Crime Victimization & Violence Approval		Political Power Threat		Political Power & Violence Approval	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Political Efficacy	-0.169	-0.221	0.166	-0.0189	0.227	0.461	0.268	0.341	-0.172	-0.497
	(0.136)	(0.140)	(0.212)	(0.255)	(0.218)	(0.292)	(0.248)	(0.299)	(0.280)	(0.471)
Authoritarianism	-0.158	-0.196	0.129	0.590*	0.734**	0.704*	0.284	0.618	0.520	0.559
	(0.189)	(0.201)	(0.274)	(0.326)	(0.348)	(0.401)	(0.300)	(0.397)	(0.319)	(0.432)
Women		-0.0623		0.802**		0.335		0.381		0.767
		(0.224)		(0.408)		(0.440)		(0.419)		(0.598)
White		0.105		0.510		0.140		0.577		0.282
		(0.252)		(0.501)		(0.466)		(0.414)		(0.785)
Partisan Identification		0.0365		0.868***		0.420*		-0.0973		0.755*
		(0.140)		(0.242)		(0.238)		(0.260)		(0.394)
Political Tolerance		-0.143		0.569*		-0.568**		0.0466		0.235
		(0.164)		(0.309)		(0.287)		(0.340)		(0.382)
Anger				0.0623		-0.245		0.318		0.512
				(0.223)		(0.249)		(0.229)		(0.373)
Disgust				-0.416		0.412*		-0.479*		-0.610
				(0.280)		(0.243)		(0.261)		(0.519)
Fear				0.504**		0.109		0.658***		0.0251
				(0.257)		(0.260)		(0.246)		(0.249)
Sadness				0.0909		0.188		0.0494		0.249
				(0.284)		(0.308)		(0.229)		(0.432)
/cut1	-0.509*	-0.722	0.0769	2.957***	0.701	2.160**	0.346	1.840*	0.0132	1.238
	(0.281)	(0.452)	(0.444)	(0.915)	(0.555)	(0.971)	(0.488)	(0.981)	(0.553)	(1.367)
/cut2	0.307	0.128	0.722	3.905***	1.801***	3.662***	1.219**	3.035***	0.683	2.182
	(0.279)	(0.449)	(0.451)	(0.971)	(0.586)	(1.074)	(0.506)	(1.026)	(0.559)	(1.388)
N	119	116	52	50	46	45	46	44	36	34
Pseudo R-squared	0.009	0.016	0.006	0.271	0.054	0.220	0.019	0.202	0.037	0.280



Figure 6-12: Support for the Use of Torture by Level of Authoritarianism

For participants that only received the crime victimization threat frame, the impact of authoritarianism on torture support is fairly clear. While low authoritarians exposed to exposed to this threat condition had an approximately 60 percent likelihood of opposing the use of torture, high authoritarians had an approximately 50 percent likelihood of supporting torture. For participants that received both the crime victimization threat frame and the violence approval message, the of these treatments on low authoritarians is challenging to determine because of the large confidence intervals. However, the impact of these treatments on high authoritarians is much clearer, with there being a 40 percent likelihood of these participants neither favoring nor opposing such a policy, and another 40 percent likelihood of high authoritarians supporting the used of torture.

Finally, two emotions have a significant impact on support for the use of torture – fear and disgust – under some treatment conditions. Participants that experienced higher levels of fear in response to exposure to either threat treatment, but not the violence approval message, were significantly more likely to support the use of torture. As visible in Figure 6-13 below, experiencing higher levels of fear in response to the crime victimization threat frame does not have a particularly linear impact on support for the use of torture, but participants that reported an extreme level of fear were nearly universally likely to support the use of torture; which is far from the predicted behavior of those that feel no level of fear in response to the crime victimization threat frame. Similarly, individuals that were instead exposed to the political power threat were far more likely to support the use of torture if they expressed feeling either very or extremely afraid; though, the rather large confidence intervals – particularly among those that were extremely fearful – make it challenging to predict the exact likelihood of support. Lastly, similar trends in support for the use of torture are observable among those that received both the political power threat and the violence approval message, despite this relationship not being statistically significant.



Figure 6-13: Support for the Use of Torture by Level of Fear

The second emotion that has a statistically significant impact on attitudes towards the use of torture is the disgust that individuals experience following exposure to either threat frame, though for participants that received the crime victimization threat frame this emotion was only significant among those that also received the violence approval message. Additionally, this emotion has a divergent impact on attitudes for participants in these conditions, with those that were reacting to the crime victimization threat generally being more supportive of the use of torture, while those that reacted to the political power threat were less likely to support the use of torture. Predicted probabilities for disgust are viewable in Figure 6-14 above. What's most noteworthy here is that individuals in the crime victimization and violence approval treatment are fairly unique in their increased support for the use of torture. While disgust is only significant for those in the political

power treatment condition, all other treatments do tend to behave similarly, with support for the use of torture decreasing as the reported level of disgust increases, especially amongst those that experienced particularly high levels of disgust.



Figure 6-14: Support for the Use of Torture by Level of Disgust

6.3.4 Predictors of Likelihood of Individuals Personally Engaging in Violence

The second group of dependent variables explored in this chapter focuses on the willingness of individuals to personally engage in violence following exposure to a threat frame and a message approving of violence. This concept is addressed through two measures, difficulty controlling one's temper and likelihood of hitting someone after being provoked. Expectations for these variables

continued to be outlined in hypotheses 1 through 12. As these hypotheses are addressed, they will be discussed in more detail.

The first aspect of propensity to engage in violence that will be explored is the reported difficulty controlling one's temper, and the first predictor to be addressed is authoritarianism. As the models displayed in Table 6-4 below demonstrate, authoritarianism proves to be a statistically significant indicator for those that received the violence approval message in addition to a threat frame, though for those in the political power threat condition this only holds true in some limited models. For individuals in these treatment groups, authoritarianism appears to have a positive impact on the level of difficulty they report having in controlling their temper.

A predictive probabilities analysis for both violence approval treatment conditions reveals that those respondents that reported lower levels of authoritarianism were most likely to indicate that they had no particular difficulty controlling their tempers. However, in both of these conditions, high authoritarians were very likely to indicate at least some difficulty. Additionally, as demonstrated by the differences between individuals that were only exposed to the crime victimization threat frame, high authoritarians were actually more likely to indicate relative ease in controlling their tempers. Yet, when respondents were also exposed to the violence approval message, high authoritarians were most likely to indicate either a moderate level of difficulty or an extreme level of difficulty, suggesting a powerful relationship between being told that violence is acceptable, and an increased likelihood of one losing their temper.

Table 6-4: Ordered Probit of Difficulty Controlling Temper

	Control		Crime Victimization Threat		Crime Victimization & Violence Approval		Political Power Threat		Political Power & Violence Approval	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Political Efficacy	-0.314**	-0.311**	-0.0594	0.117	-0.0284	0.00919	-0.0791	-0.0539	-0.787***	-0.764**
	(0.129)	(0.132)	(0.198)	(0.220)	(0.203)	(0.264)	(0.235)	(0.277)	(0.275)	(0.386)
Authoritarianism	-0.169	-0.112	-0.301	-0.304	0.604*	1.160***	-0.338	-0.301	0.509*	0.413
	(0.177)	(0.187)	(0.264)	(0.289)	(0.318)	(0.384)	(0.278)	(0.341)	(0.291)	(0.325)
Women		-0.0622		-0.385		0.117		0.969**		0.720
		(0.213)		(0.328)		(0.397)		(0.402)		(0.546)
White		-0.499**		-0.242		-0.466		-0.722*		-0.605
		(0.239)		(0.431)		(0.427)		(0.396)		(0.627)
Partisan Identification		-0.0977		-0.414**		-0.425*		-0.146		0.148
		(0.134)		(0.211)		(0.217)		(0.240)		(0.346)
Political Tolerance		-0.120		0.103		0.0410		-0.545		0.378
		(0.157)		(0.251)		(0.254)		(0.333)		(0.341)
Anger				0.115		-0.0150		0.444**		0.0809
				(0.167)		(0.225)		(0.220)		(0.292)
Disgust				0.185		-0.303		-0.310		0.00109
				(0.216)		(0.209)		(0.241)		(0.343)
Fear				0.154		0.519**		0.218		-0.126
				(0.217)		(0.264)		(0.227)		(0.222)
Sadness				-0.142		-0.0527		0.277		0.190
				(0.197)		(0.283)		(0.217)		(0.329)
/cut1	-0.976***	-1.528***	-0.847*	-0.605	0.0897	0.346	-0.823*	-0.885	-1.529***	-1.079
	(0.269)	(0.443)	(0.441)	(0.750)	(0.495)	(0.879)	(0.467)	(0.864)	(0.557)	(1.189)
/cut2	-0.244	-0.779*	0.0676	0.353	0.866*	1.253	0.0270	0.171	-0.565	-0.0999
	(0.262)	(0.433)	(0.425)	(0.739)	(0.510)	(0.899)	(0.460)	(0.848)	(0.532)	(1.198)
/cut3	0.391	-0.108	0.421	0.759	1.603***	2.158**	0.972**	1.569*	0.152	0.829
	(0.264)	(0.426)	(0.433)	(0.736)	(0.542)	(0.923)	(0.483)	(0.896)	(0.520)	(1.176)
/cut4	0.860***	0.349	1.197**	1.631**	1.994***	2.745***	1.347***	2.105**	0.657	1.478
	(0.275)	(0.431)	(0.483)	(0.778)	(0.558)	(0.940)	(0.517)	(0.961)	(0.522)	(1.175)
N	119	116	52	50	46	45	46	44	36	34
Pseudo R-squared	0.020	0.037	0.009	0.080	0.026	0.127	0.013	0.211	0.091	0.189

Next, and again across treatment conditions, internal efficacy proves to be a statistically significant factor. As shown in Table 6-4 above, respondents in either the control group or that received the political power threat frame and the violence approval message were less likely to indicate that they would have a hard time controlling their temper if their held a higher level of internal efficacy. Again, a predictive probability analysis shows that while this factor is not statistically significant in the other three treatment groups, individuals tend to be far less likely to lose control of their tempers when their sense of internal efficacy is higher. This is best demonstrated by the respondents that received both the political power threat and violence approval

message. Here, individuals with low levels of internal efficacy are overwhelmingly likely to indicate at least some level of difficulty controlling their tempers, and individuals with even a moderate level of internal efficacy demonstrate similar difficulties controlling their tempers. However, those with a higher level of internal efficacy were far more likely to indicate fewer difficulties, with a lower than 30 percent probability of expressing any serious difficulty controlling their temper.

The second variable used to address an individual's propensity to personally engage in violence concerns how likely said individual is to respond to provocation by hitting someone. As with each of the previous variables, the ordered probit for each treatment condition is presented in Table 6-5 below. Looking, first, at the hypothesized relationship between internal efficacy and likelihood of engaging in violence demonstrates that internal efficacy appears to have no significant impact on one's likelihood of responding to provocation with violence. This is, again, in contrast with expectations outlined in hypotheses 6 and 12. In addition to the lack of statistical significance, the relationship between internal efficacy and likelihood of provocation also fails to move in a consistent direction across treatment conditions, furthering the lack of support for hypotheses 6 and 12.

Table 6-5: Ordered Probit of Likelihood of Being Provoked to Violence

	Control		Crime Victimization Threat		Crime Victimization & Violence Approval		Political Power Threat		Political Power & Violence Approval	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Political Efficacy	-0.100	-0.0591	0.144	0.227	0.0204	-0.279	-0.0689	0.234	-0.422	-0.651
	(0.141)	(0.151)	(0.231)	(0.280)	(0.219)	(0.299)	(0.255)	(0.318)	(0.284)	(0.545)
Authoritarianism	-0.225	-0.0532	0.00685	-0.112	0.537	0.949**	-0.0190	0.550	0.131	0.183
	(0.193)	(0.209)	(0.305)	(0.354)	(0.328)	(0.395)	(0.284)	(0.395)	(0.306)	(0.473)
Women		0.123		-0.570		-0.432		0.819*		0.908
		(0.237)		(0.398)		(0.471)		(0.467)		(0.721)
White		-0.577**		-0.0136		-1.020**		-1.162***		-0.708
		(0.252)		(0.529)		(0.456)		(0.411)		(0.701)
Partisan Identification		-0.408***		-0.224		-0.653**		-0.490*		0.974**
		(0.154)		(0.243)		(0.256)		(0.289)		(0.462)
Political Tolerance		-0.147		-0.456		0.271		0.340		0.780*
		(0.178)		(0.316)		(0.282)		(0.401)		(0.455)
Anger				0.317		0.513**		0.264		0.189
				(0.210)		(0.262)		(0.261)		(0.349)
Disgust				0.129		-0.226		-0.371		-0.682
				(0.248)		(0.221)		(0.279)		(0.560)
Fear				-0.158		0.346		0.110		-0.767**
				(0.251)		(0.265)		(0.282)		(0.348)
Sadness				-0.269		-0.508		0.390		1.347**
				(0.235)		(0.328)		(0.259)		(0.524)
/cut1	-0.0998	-0.668	0.574	-0.464	0.734	-0.670	0.0572	1.319	-0.434	1.265
	(0.283)	(0.474)	(0.495)	(0.889)	(0.545)	(1.014)	(0.477)	(1.003)	(0.565)	(1.642)
/cut2	0.198	-0.308	0.856*	-0.193	1.264**	0.118	0.603	2.006**	-0.292	1.483
	(0.285)	(0.471)	(0.505)	(0.891)	(0.554)	(1.006)	(0.480)	(1.005)	(0.567)	(1.642)
/cut3	0.594**	0.0975	1.125**	0.112	1.745***	0.880	0.919*	2.465**	0.0926	2.095
	(0.286)	(0.467)	(0.514)	(0.895)	(0.577)	(1.001)	(0.498)	(1.038)	(0.569)	(1.659)
/cut4	1.117***	0.617	1.607***	0.534	2.107***	1.457	1.596***	3.679***	0.781	3.367*
	(0.295)	(0.472)	(0.525)	(0.897)	(0.606)	(1.021)	(0.570)	(1.194)	(0.564)	(1.722)
N	119	116	52	50	46	45	46	44	36	34
Pseudo R-squared	0.006	0.067	0.003	0.063	0.022	0.211	0.001	0.231	0.024	0.300

In contrast, authoritarianism does behave as hypothesized for those exposed to both the crime victimization threat frame and the violence approval message. As a result, individuals with high levels of authoritarianism who were exposed to these treatments were significantly more likely to respond to provocation with acts of violence. Specifically, predicted probabilities reveal that low authoritarians exposed to this threat frame and violence approval message exhibit a greater than 50 percent likelihood of not responding with violence, but high authoritarians were nearly equally likely to indicate that was a moderate to low likelihood of responding to provocation with violence. Furthermore, while other treatment conditions do not exhibit statistically significant relationships,

and with the exception of the group that only received the crime victimization threat frame, authoritarianism does appear to have a similar impact on an individual's likelihood of being provoked into violence.

6.4 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Support for Political Violence and Engagement

6.4.1 Data and Methods

Again, the question wording used in the experimental study is identical to that in the 2016 American National Election Study[6]. Consequently, with only minor exceptions, the coding of this data is identical to that of the experimental study. The major exception for this portion is the substitution of life satisfaction for the internal efficacy variable used above. This variable is coded ordinally with 0 indicating that the respondent is not satisfied with their life, and 2 indicating that the respondent is satisfied.

Additionally, because there is no direct way of assessing how likely a particular individual is to have been exposed to a threat frame over the course of the 2016 campaign, a series of variables are used to approximate likely exposure for each respondent. These variables include questions which ask respondents how interested they are in political campaigns and politics generally, and an index variable that is used to assess how much an individual engaged with a political campaign. Each of these is coded ordinally, with higher values indicating a greater level of interest. The campaign engagement variable is an additive index of five questions: how many news programs the respondent watched, how many campaign speeches the respondent listened to on the radio, how many times the respondent sought campaign information online, how many stories the respondent read in a newspaper about the campaign, and whether the respondent visited a candidate's website[7]. This

[6] Again, further details about question wording can be found in Chapter 3.

[7] One potential shortcoming of this particular measure is the lack of distinction between the type of campaign events or information the individual is engaging with, as well as which candidate's campaign activities they are paying attention to. It is possible that respondents were paying attention to only one candidate's behaviors, or only one type of activity. This

index ranged in value from 0 to 12 and was recoded to reduce the number of categories. As with the authoritarianism measures earlier, the recoded campaign engagement variable now ranges from 0 to 2, with a value of 1 indicating a moderate amount of campaign engagement and 0 and 2 indicating low and high engagement, respectively, and are placed at one standard deviation above or below the mean.

6.4.2 Evidence from the 2016 ANES

Beginning again with attitudes towards various forms of political violence, the results of an ordered probit analysis for these three measures are in Table 6-6 below. Starting with the justification of political violence and the factors that are hypothesized to have a significant impact on this attitude, authoritarianism has a statistically significant and positive impact on how justifiable respondents find political violence. However, life satisfaction does not have a significant impact on this belief. Finally, the level of attention to politics and the government, used here to assess the overall level of exposure to the threat frames and violence approving messages that were a prominent feature of the 2016 presidential races, has a statistically significant but negative impact on the believed justifiability of political violence. Predicted probabilities for each of these variables below.

measure does not make a distinction between the various ways in which individuals may selectively engage with campaign activities, opting instead to focus on just *total* attention to campaigns.

Table 6-6: Cross-Section of Individual Attitudes Towards Violence

	Political Violence is Justified	Protestors Deserve Being Roughed Up	Support for the Use of Torture
Age	-0.129***	0.061***	0.029**
	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Women	-0.154**	-0.003	0.098**
	(0.061)	(0.043)	(0.046)
White	-0.238***	-0.013	-0.065
	(0.072)	(0.056)	(0.059)
Education	-0.054**	-0.062***	0.056***
	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Income	-0.108***	-0.027	0.012
	(0.028)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Partisan Identification	-0.013	0.179***	-0.179***
	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Authoritarianism	0.174***	0.226***	-0.243***
	(0.042)	(0.029)	(0.031)
Political Knowledge	0.014	-0.068**	-0.036
	(0.048)	(0.034)	(0.036)
Life Satisfaction	-0.007	-0.024	0.065**
	(0.043)	(0.031)	(0.033)
Political Tolerance	0.135**	-0.085**	0.062
	(0.054)	(0.040)	(0.042)
Attention to Campaigns	-0.020	0.020	0.021
	(0.051)	(0.037)	(0.039)
Attention to Politics and the Government	-0.089***	-0.088***	0.081***
	(0.030)	(0.021)	(0.023)
cut1	0.260*	-0.001	-1.009***
	(0.146)	(0.107)	(0.114)
cut2	0.624***	0.573***	-0.051
	(0.147)	(0.108)	(0.113)
cut3	1.240***	1.377***	
	(0.151)	(0.110)	
cut4	1.575***	1.905***	
	(0.158)	(0.112)	
N	2769	2761	2766
pseudo R-sq	0.061	0.068	0.083
Standard errors in parentheses	* p<0.10	** p<0.05	*** p<0.01"

Predicted probabilities demonstrate that the vast majority of respondents, regardless of their level of authoritarianism, claimed that there was no justification for political violence, high authoritarians were significantly less likely to claim the same. While there was 90 percent probability of low authoritarians claiming this lack of justifiability, there was only an 83 percent probability of high authoritarians claiming the same. In contrast, there was a, combined, 14 percent probability that high authoritarians would claim that political violence was either a little or somewhat justifiable; about twice the probability of low authoritarians.

Additionally, greater attention to politics and government tends to result in a lower belief in the justifiability of political violence, as viewable in Figure 6-20 below. Again, the greatest likelihood is that respondents would report that there was no justification for political violence. However, there is a significant difference in the probability of this occurring based on the frequency of their attention. While individuals that reported following politics nearly everyday had a nearly 90 percent probability of claiming political violence had no justifiability, those that claimed they neve paid attention to politics had only a 76 percent probability. In contrast, among those that never pay attention to politics and the government, there was an approximately 3 percent probability of claiming that there was a great deal of justification for political violence; whereas, among those that reported following politics and the government daily, there was a less than 1 percent probability of the same.

The second variable used to explore aggregate attitudes about the use of political violence is the belief that protestors deserve to be roughed up. As shown in Table 6-6 above, the results for this variable are comparable to those of the belief that political violence is justifiable. As with the previous variable, life satisfaction is statistically insignificant and moves in opposition to the expected direction. Despite this, authoritarianism continues to be statistically significant, and moves in the expected direction. Predicted probabilities suggest that there is an approximately 50 percent probability that low authoritarians will indicate that protestors do not deserve to be roughed up at all. However, this likelihood is considerably lower for high authoritarians, who have only a 32 percent probability of answering the same way. In contrast, there is a 10 percent probability that high authoritarians will indicate that protestors deserve to be roughed up a great deal, but low authoritarians have only a 4.5 percent probability of answering the same. These results are well within expectations and demonstrate a significant relationship between authoritarianism and acceptance of political violence.

In addition, attention to politics and the government also continues to have a significant impact on attitudes about the acceptability of political violence. Again, as individuals reported a greater frequency of paying attention to politics, they were significantly less likely to support the use of political violence against protestors. The predicted probabilities below demonstrate a clear, substantively significant relationship between these two concepts. While respondents that never paid attention to politics had only a 31 percent probability of believing that protestors do not deserve to be roughed up at all, those that paid attention to government frequently had a 43 percent probability. In contrast, inattentive respondents had a nearly 12 percent likelihood of believing that protestors deserved violence a great deal, but attentive respondents had only a 6 percent probability.

The final measure for attitudes towards political violence is again support for the use of torture. Again, the results of an ordered probit are in Table 6-6 above. Similarly to the two previous measure of acceptance of political violence, life satisfaction remains statistically insignificant, though it does move in the expected direction. However, in contrast to the previous measures, authoritarianism is not statistically significant, and additionally moves in the opposite direction from expectations. Despite this, the final explanatory variable with clear expectations, attention to politics and the government, is statistically significant, and moves in the expected direction. Individuals that reported consuming political and governmental information more frequently were significantly more likely to support the use of torture. Predicted probabilities demonstrate that among individuals that reported never paying attention to the government or politics there was a 39 percent probability of them opposing the use of torture and only a 17.6 percent probability of them favoring the use of torture. In contrast, individuals that reported paying a great deal of attention to government had relatively consistent probabilities of either favoring – at a 28.2 percent probability – as they did of opposing the policy – at a 27 percent probability.

The final concept to be explored here is the extent to which personal propensity to engage in violence was affected in the aggregate. Again, this concept is addressed through two different measures, likelihood of one losing their temper and their likelihood of responding to provocation by hitting someone. The ordered probit analyses of these two variables are in Table 6-7 below.

Table 6-7: Cross-Section of Individual Likelihood of Engaging in Violence

	Difficulty Controlling Temper	Likelihood of Being Provoked to Violence
Age	-0.072***	-0.180***
	(0.014)	(0.018)
Women	-0.089**	-0.331***
	(0.045)	(0.056)
White	-0.011	-0.133**
	(0.058)	(0.068)
Education	-0.053***	-0.140***
	(0.016)	(0.020)
Income	-0.000	-0.086***
	(0.021)	(0.026)
Partisan Identification	-0.011	0.006
	(0.011)	(0.013)
Authoritarianism	-0.061**	0.182***
	(0.030)	(0.038)
Political Knowledge	0.036	0.014
	(0.035)	(0.043)
Life Satisfaction	-0.111***	-0.164***
	(0.032)	(0.039)
Political Tolerance	-0.156***	-0.089*
	(0.041)	(0.050)
Attention to Political Campaigns	-0.009	0.0143
	(0.039)	(0.047)
Attention to Politics and Government	-0.038	-0.055
	(0.031)	(0.038)
cut1	-0.875***	-0.587***
	(0.114)	(0.136)
cut2	0.194*	0.072
	(0.114)	(0.136)
cut3	1.043***	0.678***
	(0.118)	(0.140)
cut4	1.458***	1.146***
	(0.127)	(0.150)
N	2757	2755
pseudo R-sq	0.015	0.093

Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Starting with one's difficulty controlling their temper, both authoritarianism and life satisfaction are statistically significant. Despite this, neither of these relationships move in the

expected direction, with both life satisfaction and authoritarianism having a negative impact on one's difficulty controlling their tempers. Additionally, attention to politics and the government is not statistically significant and does not move in the expected direction. This is in contrast with the three measures addressing attitudes towards political violence, where, generally, authoritarianism and political attention were statistically significant.

A predicted probability analysis was run to determine the impact that one's level of satisfaction with their life on their reported difficulty controlling their temper. Here, regardless of one's life satisfaction, most participants claimed they had, at most, only a little difficulty controlling their tempers. However, even among participants that claimed that it wasn't hard for them to control their tempers, there is a clear difference between those respondents that claimed a high level of life satisfaction and those that claimed only a low level of satisfaction. While those with a high level of satisfaction had a greater than 50 percent likelihood of claiming no difficulties controlling their tempers, those with a low level had only a 45 percent likelihood, a difference of nearly 8 percentage points. At the other end of the spectrum, while those with a high level of satisfaction had a less than 1 percent probability of claiming a great deal of difficulty, those low in satisfaction had a nearly 2 percentage point likelihood of having a great deal of difficulty controlling their tempers.

Turning to the impact of authoritarianism on the difficulty of controlling one's temper, again, there is a statistically significant and negative relationship between these two concepts. Predicted probabilities demonstrate that while authoritarianism has a clear impact of one's ability to control their temper, this relationship is much more constrained than for measures about violence attitudes. While low authoritarians had a nearly 47 percent probability of claiming that their tempers were not at all hard to control, high authoritarians had a nearly 52 percent probability of claiming the same. This pattern generally holds across the range of difficulty that one could express.

The final measure to be explored here is the extent to which individuals report being likely to respond to provocation with physical violence. Here, as with the previous measure, both authoritarianism and life satisfaction were statistically significant, but only authoritarianism had a positive impact on an individual's likelihood of being provoked. Additionally, frequency of attention to political and the government continues to lack statistical significance and continues to move in the opposite direction of expectations. Predicted probabilities reveal that those high in life satisfaction were most likely, about an 82 percent probability, to report that they were not at all likely to respond with violence to provocation. Additionally, these same respondents became increasing less likely to report higher levels of provocation, eventually leading to only a 0.7 percent likelihood of those high in satisfaction to report that they were extremely likely to respond with violence provocation. In contrast, while those low in life satisfaction still had a 73 percent likelihood of being unlikely to respond violently, there was a nearly 2 percent likelihood that those low in life satisfaction would be extremely likely to respond to provocation by hitting someone.

A similar relationship also emerges between likelihood of responding violently to provocation and authoritarianism. Again, predictive probabilities show that those low in authoritarianism are overwhelmingly unlikely to respond with violence to provocation, with an approximately 85 percent probability. Additionally, while high authoritarians also had a 76 percent probability of claiming the same, they were nearly twice as likely – with a 1 percent probability – as low authoritarians – with a 0.5 percent probability – to claim that they would be extremely likely to hit someone if provoked.

6.5 Conclusions and Implications

The above results demonstrate a number of key trends in the impact of exposure to threat frames and messages condoning the use of violence. First, and as hypothesized, across all treatment

conditions high authoritarians were consistently more likely to support the use of political violence. Additionally, once exposed to a message supporting violence, these respondents were more likely to indicate that they might personally engage in acts of violence. In contrast, internal efficacy consistently either failed to produce statistically significant results or produced results in the opposite direction of expectations.

In addition, the results in this chapter continue to demonstrate the importance of emotions in determining the attitudinal and behavioral consequences of exposure to threat frames and violence approving messages. Crucially, the ANOVA analyses at the beginning of this chapter suggest that emotions actively play a bigger role in determining one's willingness to engage in violence or approve of those that do than simple exposure to threat frames or violence supporting messages. Despite the, broadly, significant relationship and attitudes towards political violence, these relationships do not always play out as expected. For example, disgust seems to rarely behave in expected ways, while anger does. Furthermore, fear does occasionally perform as expected, but this result is not consistent.

The evidence in this chapter demonstrates that there is a clear link between individual psychology and attitudes towards political violence. However, this chapter also demonstrates that the link between threat frames, themselves, and attitudes towards political violence is less clear, and potentially more complicated than theorized. Despite this, the evidence here suggests a number of avenues for future research. First, greater attention should be paid to clarifying the role of threat exposure, emotional responses, and underlying psychology play in attitude generation. Because of the long standing evidence of threat exposure and individual attitudes, it is reasonable to expect that this kind of exposure would alter attitudes towards political violence. Yet, the results in this chapter, seemingly, contradict this argument; instead, suggesting that emotions are the driving force behind

these attitudes. Future research should attempt to isolate these two forces in order to clarify the causal mechanism.

Secondly, and as discussed in earlier in Chapter 4, there may be some benefit to exploring the role that repeated exposure to threat frames has on attitudes towards political violence and willingness to engage in political violence. Again, individuals in this study were only exposed to a single threat frame at a single moment in time. Additionally, some respondents were only given one message condoning the use of violence. Because each of these messages have been repeated numerous times, by several actors, over a prolonged time period in American politics, the cumulative impact of these messages is currently unknown and requires further attention.

Finally, future works should work to develop greater clarity around which actions are broadly considered "violent" and which of those are understood to be "political". Throughout this chapter a number of different variables and examples of political violence are used, however there is no certainty that participants all believed that those examples were "political violence". Additionally, this chapter assumes that these acts are all similar in some important way. That assumption needs to be examined to guarantee that it is valid.

7 CONCLUSION

The use of violence to achieve political aims has been relatively absent from American politics over the last half century. Consequently, the sudden rise of violent behavior during the 2016 presidential election was shocking to many political observers and commentators. The intervening years have not been able to provide many reassurances that this trend was an aberration that would be diminished with time. Rather, acts of political violence have become increasingly serious and common. From the murder of Heather Heyer at the "Unite the Right" Rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, to the mailing of 16 pipe bombs to prominent Democrats and the CNN studios, the kidnapping plot of the Michigan governor by members of the Wolverine Watchmen, a militia group based in Michigan, culminating in the storming of the United States capital on January 6, 2021, political violence has only become more common, and more deadly, over the last five years. It remains to be seen whether this level of violence will continue in American politics, but it is imperative to understand the causes underlying this increase. This dissertation has attempted to provide such an explanation.

It has been argued throughout this dissertation that the rise in political violence during the 2016 presidential campaign was a direct result of the reliance on outgroup threat throughout that year's campaign rhetoric. Furthermore, these outgroup threats were frequently paired with an encouragement of the use of violence and the suggestion that these behaviors should be more prevalent. These messages are additionally expected to generate negative emotions in those exposed to them and activate authoritarianism in those with higher levels of this predisposition. These negative emotions are also expected to play an additional, important role in generating more negative attitudes towards outgroup members, and more positive views towards political violence. This theory was tested through an experimental survey which exposed participants to examples of these threat frames and violence encouraging messages, and was paired with data from a cross-

sectional survey conducted by the American National Election Studies during the 2016 presidential election.

7.1 Summary of Findings

Through three empirical chapters a number of key findings were identified to explain the rise in negative attitudes towards immigrants and positive attitudes towards the use of political violence. In the first of these, exposure to threat frames were identified to produce several negative emotions in those that are exposed to them. Furthermore, these emotions were, largely, directed towards the target of the threat frame, in this case immigrants. Finally, the political power threat was generally much more powerful in producing these emotions than the crime victimization threat. This highlights the power of these threat frames, and this threat was relatively benign in its rhetoric.

Next, Chapter 5 explored the extent to which these threat frames and the emotions they produced altered an individual's attitudes towards the impact that immigrants have on American society and the immigration policies that they would prefer to be enacted. This chapter revealed that threat frames themselves largely have no impact on individual-level attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. Rather, the emotions that these threats produced provided greater explanatory power than the threats, themselves. Yet, the power of these emotions was greatly reduced once all emotions and demographic factors were accounted for in a multivariate analysis. Furthermore, amongst participants in the cross-sectional survey, authoritarianism and engagement with the political environment, through campaign or news exposure, were the two defining factors that informed individuals' attitudes towards immigrants. These divergent results reflect the, frequently, contradictory evidence from prior studies, and necessitate further investigation.

Finally, Chapter 6 directly tests the impact that threat exposure individual psychology have on attitudes about the acceptability of political violence, and potential willingness to engage in violence. The evidence in this chapter, again, demonstrates that threat frames and violence approving

messages, alone, do not generally explain one's attitudes towards the acceptability of political violence. Rather, it is the emotions that these threat exposures that appear to provide a crucial role in determining whether one will approve of various forms of political violence. Furthermore, individuals that exhibited higher levels of authoritarianism were far more likely to approve of the use of violence an to indicate that they might engage in violence themselves.

7.2 Areas for Further Research

In light of the findings presented in this investigation, several opportunities for future research present themselves. First, greater effort should be expended to differentiate between threat frames themselves, and the emotions they produce. This can be attempted in several different ways. For example, future studies should attempt to elicit emotions from participants without exposing them to a threat frame. It is not clear at this moment whether the simple experience of fear, disgust, or anger elicits behavior or attitude change, or whether these changes are only the result of these emotions in the wake of threat.

Additionally, participants in this study frequently reported experiencing positive emotions in response to threat frame exposure. While the influence of these emotions is not explored in this study, the presence of these emotions highlights how little is currently known about the influence of emotions on behavior, and how these emotions are elicited by political campaigns.

In addition, the context of an experimental survey three years removed from the presidential election in which these threat frames were initially used is fundamentally different and offers a number of potential study designs which may prove useful. First, participants in this study were only exposed to one threat frame at a single moment in time. Political observers in the 2016 election would have been exposed to these messages in a variety of forms and contexts

and would have likely been exposed to both threat frames, as well as other kinds of threat, that were used in this study. At this moment it is not clear what the impact of repeated exposure to a single threat or multiple threats would have on individuals' attitudes and behaviors. Furthermore, during a political campaign individuals would also be exposed to information and rhetoric rebutting the threat posed by outgroups, which could have additional effects on attitudes and behaviors. Finally, this study does little to explain the durability of the attitude and behavior change explored here. If greater acceptance of political violence is a temporary force, lasting little longer than the time it takes to complete a survey, then the threat posed by threatening rhetoric about outgroups is not likely to be the primary cause of the troubling rise in political violence. However, if this effect is more durable, or even increases on repeated exposure, this poses a troubling problem in the modern era.

REFERENCES

Altemeyer, Bob. 1981. *Right-wing Authoritarianism*. Canada: The University of Manitoba Press.

Altemeyer, Bob. 1988. *Enemies of Freedom: Understanding Right-wing Authoritarianism*. Hoboken, NJ: Jossey-Bass.

Altemeyer, Bob. 1996. *The Authoritarian Specter*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Álvarez-Gálvez, Javier. 2014. "Media Exposure and Attitudes towards Immigrants." *Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas*. 145: 3-24.

Atkinson, Matthew D., Christopher B. Mann, Santiago Olivella, Arthur M. Simon, and Joseph E. Uscinski. 2014. "(Where) do Campaigns Matter? The Impact of National Party Convention Location." *Journal of Politics*. 76(4): 1045-1058.

Averill, James R. 1983. "Studies on Anger and Aggression: Implications for Theories of Emotion." *American Psychologist*. 38(11): 1145-1160.

Avery, James M., and Jeffrey A. Fine. 2012. "Racial Composition, White Racial Attitudes, and Black Representation: Testing the Racial Threat Hypothesis in the United States Senate." *Political Behavior*. 34: 391-410.

Bandura, Albert. 1977. "Self-Efficacy: Toward a Unifying Theory of Behavioral Change." *Psychological Review*. 84(2): 191-215.

Bandura, Albert, and Nancy E. Adams. 1977. "Analysis of Self-Efficacy Theory of Behavioral Change." *Cognitive Therapy and Research*. 1(4): 287-310.

Banks, Antoine J., and Nicholas A. Valentino. 2012. "Emotional Substrates of White Racial Attitudes." *American Journal of Political Science*. 56(2): 286-297.

Bargh, John A., and Melissa J. Ferguson. 2000. "Beyond Behavioralism: On the Automaticity of Higher Mental Processes." *Psychological Bulletin*. 126(6): 925-945.

Bargh, John A., and Paula Pietromonaco. 1982. "Automatic Information Processing and Social Perception: The Influence of Trait Information Presented Outside of Conscious Awareness on Impression Formation." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.* 43(3): 437-449.

Baron, Reuben M., and David A. Kenny. 1986. "The Moderator-Mediator Variable Distinction in Social Psychological Research: Conceptual, Strategic, and Considerations." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.* 51(6): 1173-1182.

Beck, Kenneth H. 2008. "A Conceptualization of Threat Communications and Protective Health Behavior." *Social Psychology*. 44(3): 204-217.

Beck, Kenneth H., and Arthur Frankel. 1981. "A Conceptualization of Threat Communications and Protective Health Behavior." *Social Psychology Quarterly*. 44(3): 204-217.

Beck, Kennth H., and Clive M. Davis. 1978. "Effects of Fear-Arousing Communications and Topic Importance on Attitude Change." *The Journal of Social Psychology*. 104: 81-95.

Berkowitz, Leonard, and Eddie Harmon-Jones. 2004. "Toward an Understanding of the Determinants of Anger." *Emotion*. 4(2): 107-130.

Berman, Ari. 2016. *Give Us the Ballot: The Modern Struggle for Voting Rights in America*. New York: Picador.

Billig, Michael. 1985. "Prejudice, Categorization, and Particularization: From a Perceptual to a Rhetorical Approach." *European Journal of Social Psychology*. 15: 79-103.

----------. 1989. "The Argumentative Nature of Holding Strong Views: A Case Study." *European Journal of Social Psychology.* 19: 203-223.

----------. 2001. "Humour and Hatred: The Racist Jokes of the Ku Klux Klan." *Discourse and Society.* 12(3): 267-289.

Blalock, Hubert M. 1967. *Toward a Theory of Minority Group Relations*. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Blumer, Herbert. 1958. "Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position." *The Pacific Sociological Review*. 1(1): 3-7.

Bobo, Lawrence. 1983. "Whites' Opposition to Busing: Symbolic Racism or Realistic Group Conflict?" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. 45(6): 1196-1210.

Bobo, Lawrence D. 1999. "Prejudice as Group Position: Microfoundations of a Sociological Approach to Racism and Race Relations." *Journal of Social Issues*. 55(3): 445-472.

Bobo, Lawrence, and Vincent L. Hutchings. 1996. "Perceptions of Racial Group Competition: Extending Blumer's Theory of Group Position to a Multiracial Social Context." *American Sociological Review*. 61(6): 951-972.

Bobo, Lawrence, and James R. Kluegel. 1993. "Opposition to Race-Targeting: Self-Interest, Stratification Ideology, or Racial Attitudes?" *American Sociological Review*. 58: 443-464.

Bobo, Lawrence, and Frederick C. Licari. 1989. "Education and Political Tolerance: Testing the Effects of Cognitive Sophistication and Target Group Affect." *Public Opinion Quarterly*. 53(3): 285-308.

Brader, Ted. 2006. *Campaigning for Hearts and Minds*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Brader, Ted, Eric W. Groenendyk, and Nicholas A. Valentino. 2010. "Fight or Flight? When Political Threats Arouse Public Anger and Fear." Paper presented at *Conference on Measurement in Experimental Methods, Ohio State University*.

Brader, Ted, Nicholas A. Valentino, and Elizabeth Suhay. 2008. "What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration Threat." *American Journal of Political Science*. 52(4): 959-978.

Brock, Bernard L. 1969. "1968 Democratic Campaign: A Political Upheaval." *The Quarterly Journal of Speech*. 55(1): 26-35.

Brown, M. Craig, and Barbara D. Warner. 1969. "Immigrants, Urban Politics, and Policing in 1900." *American Sociological Review*. 57(3): 293-305.

Brussino, Silvina, and Edgardo Etchezahar. 2013. "Psychological Perspectives in the Study of Authoritarianism." *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences*. 5(3): 495-521.

Butler, J. Corey. 2000. "Personality and Emotional Correlates Right-Wing Authoritarianism." *Social Behavior and Personality: An International Journal*. 28(1): 1-14.

Cacioppo, John T., and Richard E. Petty. 1989. "Effects of Message Repetition on Argument Processing, Recall, and Persuasion." *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*. 10(1): 3-12.

Carver, Charles S. 2004. "Negative Affects Deriving from the Behavioral Approach System." *Emotion*. 4(1): 3-22.

Ceballos, Miguel, and Oksana Yakushko. 2014. "Attitudes toward Immigrants in Nebraska." *Great Plains Research*. 24(2): 181-195.

Cera, Joseph, and Aaron C. Weinschenk. 2012. "The Conditional Effects of Competing Messages during Presidential Nominating Conventions." *Presidential Studies Quarterly*. 42(1): 161-175.

Cera, Joseph, and Aaron C. Weinschenk. 2012. "The Individual-level Effects of Presidential Conventions on Candidate Evaluations." *American Politics Research*. 40(1): 3-28.

Chaiken, Shelly. 1980. "Heuristic Versus Systematic Information Processing and the Use of Source Versus Message Cues in Persuasion." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. 39(5): 752-766.

Chiricos, Ted, Michael Hogan, and Marc Gertz. 1997. "Racial Composition of Neighbourhood and Fear of Crime." *Criminology*. 35(1): 107-131.

Chiricos, Ted, Ranee McEntire, and Marc Gertz. 2001. "Perceived Racial and Ethnic Composition of Neighborhood and Perceived Risk of Crime." *Social Problems*. 48(3): 322-340.

Chong, Dennis, and James N. Druckman. 2007. "Framing Thoery." *Annual Review of Political Science*. 10: 103-126.

Corzine, Jay, James Creech, and Lin Corzine. 1983. "Black Concentration and Lynchings in the South: Testing Blalock's Power-Threat Hypothesis." *Social Forces*. 61(3): 774-796.

Cos, Grant, and Kelly Norris Martin. 2013. "The Rhetoric of the Hanging Chair: Presence, Absence, and Visual Argument in the 2012 Presidential Campaign." *American Behavioral Scientist*. 57(12): 1688-1703.

Covington, Jeanette, and Ralph B. Taylor. 1991. "Fear of Crime in Urban Residential Neighborhoods: Implications of Between- and Within-Neighborhood Sources for Current Models." *Sociological Quarterly*. 32(2): 231-249.

D'Hombres, Béatrice, and Luca Nunziata. 2016. "Wish You Were Here? Quasi-Experimental Evidence on the Effect of Education on Self-Reported Attitude Toward Immigrants." *European Economic Review*. 90: 201-224.

Davison, W. Phillips. 1983. "The Third-Person Effect in Communication." *Public Opinion Quarterly*. 47: 1-15.

Dixon, Travis L., and Daniel Linz. 2000. "Overrepresentation and Underrepresentation of African Americans and Latinos as Lawbreakers on Television News." *Journal of Communication*. 50(2): 131-154.

Doherty, Brendan J. 2007. "'Elections': The Politics of the Permanent Campaign: Presidential Travel and the Electoral College, 1977-2004." *Presidential Studies Quarterly*. 37(4): 749-773.

Doty, Richard M., Bill E. Peterson, and David G. Winter. 1991. "Threat and Authoritarianism in the United States, 1978-1987." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. 61(4): 629-640.

Doyen, Stéphane, Olivier Klein, Cora-Lise Phicon, and Axel Cleeremans. 2012. "Behavioral Priming: It's all in the Mind, but Whose Mind?" *PLos ONE*. 7(1):1-7.

Druckman, James N. 2001. "On the Limits of Framing Effects: Who Can Frame?" *Journal of Politics*. 63(4): 1041-1066.

Druckman, James N., and Kjersten R. Nelson. 2003. "Framing and Deliberation: How Citizens' Conversations Limit Elite Influence." *American Journal of Political Science*. 47(4): 729-745.

----------. 2004a. "Priming the Vote: Campaign Effects in a U.S. Senate Election." *Political Psychology*. 25(4): 577-594.

----------. 2004b. "Political Preference Formation: Competition, Deliberation, and the (Ir)relevance of Framing Effects." *American Political Science Review*. 98(4): 671-686.

Druckman, James N., and Justin W. Holmes. 2004. "Does Presidential Rhetoric Matter? Priming and Presidential Approval." *Presidential Studies Quarterly*. 34(4): 755-778.

Druckman, James N., Lawrence R. Jacobs, and Eric Ostermeier. 2004. "Candidate Strategies to Prime Issues and Image." *Journal of Politics*. 66(4): 1180-1202.

Druckman, James N., and Rose McDermott. 2008. "Emotion and the Framing of Risky Choice." *Political Behavior*. 30: 297-321.

Druckman, James N., Jordan Fein, and Thomas J. Leeper. 2012. "A Source of Bias in Public Opinion Stability." *American Political Science Review*. 106(2): 430-454.

Edwards, George C. III, William Mitchell, and Reed Welch. 1995. "Explaining Presidential Approval: The Significance of Issue Salience." *American Journal of Political Science*. 39(1): 108-134.

Eitle, David, Stewart J. D'Alessio, and Lisa Stolzenberg. 2002. "Racial Threat and Social Control: A Test of the Political Economic, and Threat of Black Crime Hypotheses." *Social Forces*. 81(2): 557-576.

Eitle, David, and John Taylor. 2008. "Are Hispanics the New 'Threat'? Minority Group Threat and Fear of Crime In Miami-Dade County." *Social Science Research*. 37: 1102-1115.

Ernst, Nicole, Rinaldo Kühne, and Werner Wirth. 2017. "Effects of Message Repetition and Negativity on Credibility Judgments and Political Attitudes." *International Journal of Communication*. 11: 3265-3285.

Evans, Jonathan St. B. T. 2008. "Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition." *Annual Review of Psychology*. 59: 255-278.

Facchini, Giovanni, and Anna Maria Mayda. 2009. "Does Welfare State Affect Individual Attitudes Toward Immigrants? Evidence Across Countries." *The Review of Economics and Statistics*. 91(2): 295-314.

Fazio, Russell H., David M. Sanbonmatsu, Martha C. Powell, and Frank R. Kardes. 1986. "On the Automatic Activation of Associated Evaluations: An Overview." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. 50(2): 229-238.

Feldman, Stanley. 2003. "Enforcing Social Conformity: A Theory of Authoritarianism." *Political Psychology*. 24(1): 41-74.

Feldman, Stanley, and Karen Stenner. 1997. "Perceived Threat and Authoritarianism." *Political Psychology*. 18(4): 741-770.

Ferraro, Kenneth F. 1996. "Women's Fear of Victimization: Shadow of Sexual Assault?" *Social Forces*. 75(2): 667-690.

Fredrickson, Barbara L. 2003. "The Value of Positive Emotions." *American Scientist*. 91: 330- 335.

Freeman, Joanne B. 2002. *Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the New Republic*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Fridkin, Kim L., and Patrick Kenney. 2011. "Variability in Citizens' Reactions to Different Types of Negative Campaigns." *American Journal of Political Science*. 55(2): 307-325.

Frijda, Nico H., Peter Kuipers, and Elisabeth ter Schure. 1989. "Relations Among Emotion, Appraisal, and Emotional Action Readiness." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. 57(2): 212-228.

Funk, Carolyn L. 1999. "Bringing the Candidate into Models of Candidate Evaluation." *Journal of Politics*. 61(3): 700-720.

Gadarian, Shana Kusner. 2010. "The Politics of Threat: How Terrorism News Shapes Foreign Policy Attitudes." *Journal of Politics*. 72(2): 469-483.

Garrow, David J. 1978. *Protest at Selma: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Voting Rights Act of 1965*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Goidel, Robert K., Todd G. Shields, and Mark Peffley. 1997. "Priming Theory and RAS Models: Toward an Integrated Perspective of Media Influence." *American Politics Quarterly*. 25(3): 287-318.

Goldstein, Judith L., and Margaret E. Peters. 2014. "Nativism or Economic Threat: Attitudes Toward Immigrants During the Great Recession." *International Interactions*. 40: 376-401.

Gorodzeisky, Anastasia, and Moshe Semyonov. 2018. "Competitive Threat and Temporal Change in Anti-Immigrant Sentiment: Insights from a Hierarchical Age-Period-Cohort Model." *Social Science Research*. 73: 31-44.

Green, Donald P., Dara Z. Strolovitch, and Janelle S. Wong. 1998. "Defended Neighborhoods, Integration, and Racially Motivated Crime." *American Journal of Sociology*. 104(2): 372- 403.

Greenberg, David F., Ronald C. Kessler, and Colin Loftin. 1975. "Social Inequality and Crime Control." *Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology*. 7(3): 684-704.

Groeling, Tim, and Matthew A. Baum. 2009. "Journalists' Incentives and Media Coverage of Elite Foreign Policy Evaluations." *Conflict Management and Peace Science*. 26(5): 437-470.

Groenendyk, Eric. 2012. "Justifying Party Identification: A Case of Identifying with the 'Lesser of Two Evils'." *Political Behavior*. 34: 453-475.

Haidt, Jonathan. 2008. "Morality." *Perspectives on Psychological Science*. 3(1): 65-72).

Halperin, Eran, Ruthie Pliskin, Tamar Saguy, Varda Liberman, and James J. Gross. 2014. "Emotion Regulation and the Cultivation of Political Tolerance: Searching for a New Track for Intervention." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 58(6): 1110-1138.

Hastie, Reid, and Bernadette Park. 1986. "The Relationship Between Memory and Judgment Depends on Whether the Judgment Task is Memory-Based or On-line." *Psychological Review*. 93(3): 258-268.

Herr, J. Paul. 2002. "The Impact of Campaign Appearances in the 1996 Election." *Journal of Politics*. 64(3): 904-913.

Herring, David R., Katherine R. White, Linsa N. Jabeen, Michelle Hinojos, Gabriela Terrazas, Stephanie M. Reyes, and Jennifer H. Taylor. 2013. "On the Automatic Activation of Attitudes: A Quarter Century of Evaluative Priming Research." *Psychological Bulletin*. 139(5): 1062-1089.

Hetherington, Marc J. 1996. "The Media's Role in Forming Voters' National Economic Evaluations in 1992." *American Journal of Political Science*. 40(2): 372-395.

Hickel, Flavio Jr., and Melissa Bredbenner. 2020. "Economic Vulnerability and Anti-Immigrant Attitudes: Isolated Anomaly or Emerging Trend." *Social Science Quarterly*. 101(4): 1345-1358.

Hill, Ronald Paul, Michael Capella, and Yoon Na Cho. 2015. "Incivility in Political Advertisements: A Look at the 2012 U.S. Presidential Election." *International Journal of Advertising*. 34(5): 812-829.

Hillygus, D. Sunshine. 2005. "Campaign Effects and the Dynamics of Turnout Intention in Election 2000." *Journal of Politics*. 67(1): 50-68.

Holbrook, Thomas M., and Scott D. McClurg. 2014. "Campaigns, Mobilization, and Turnout in Mayoral Elections." *Political Research Quarterly*. 67(1): 42-55.

Huber, Gregory A., and John S. Lapinski. 2006. " The 'Race Card' Revisited: Assessing Racial Priming in Policy Contests." *American Journal of Political Science*. 50(2): 421-440.

Huber, Peter, and Doris A. Oberdabernig. 2016. "The Impact of Welfare Benefits on Natives' and Immigrants' Attitudes Toward Immigration." *European Journal of Political Economy*. 44:53-78.

Inbar, Yoel, David A. Pizarro, and Paul Bloom. 2009. "Conservatives are More Easily Disgusted than Liberals." *Cognition and Emotion*. 23(4): 714-725.

Inbar, Yoel, David A. Pizarro, Joshua Knobe, and Paul Bloom. 2009. "Disgust Sensitivity Predicts Intuitive Disapproval of Gays." *Emotion*. 9(3): 435-439.

Inbar, Yoel, David A. Pizarro, Ravi Iyer, and Jonathan Haidt. 2012. "Disgust Sensitivity, Political Conservatism, and Voting." *Social Psychological and Personality Science*. 3(5): 537-544.

Iyengar, Shanto, Donald R. Kinder, and Mark D. Peters. 1984. "The Evening News and Presidential Evaluations." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. 46(4): 778-787.

Iyengar, Shanto, and Adam Simon. 1993. "News Coverage of The Gulf Crisis and Public Opinion: A Study of Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing." *Communication Research*. 20: 365-383.

Jackson, Pamela Irving, and Leo Carrol. 1981. "Race and the War on Crime: The Sociopolitical Determinants of Municipal Police Expenditures in 90 non-Southern U.S. Cities." *American Sociological Review*. 46(3): 290-305.

Jacobs, David. 1979. "Inequality and Police Strength: Conflict Theory and Coercive Control in Metropolitan Areas." *American Sociological Review*. 44(6): 913-925.

Jacobs, David, and Daniel Tope. 2008. "Race, Crime, and Republican Strength: Minority Politics in the Post-Civil Rights Era." *Social Science Research*. 37: 1116-1129.

Jacobs, David, and Katherine Wood. 1999. "Interracial Conflict and Interracial Homicide: Do Political and Economic Rivalries Explain White Killings of Blacks of Black Killings of Whites?" *American Journal of Sociology*. 105(1): 157-190.

Jacobs, Lawrence. 1994. "Issues, Candidate Image, and Priming: The Use of Private Polls in Kennedy's 1960 Presidential Campaign." *American Political Science Review*. 88(3): 527-540.

Jaime-Castillo, Antonio M., Ildefonso Marqués-Perales, and Javier Álvarez-Gálvez. 2016. "The Impact of Social Expenditure on Attitudes Towards Immigration in Europe." *Social Indicators Research*. 126: 1089-1108.

Janis, Irving L., and Seymour Feshbach. 1953. "Effects of Fear-Arousing Communications." *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*. 48(1): 78-92.

Jasper, James M. 1998. "The Emotions of Protest: Affective and Reactive Emotions in and Around Social Movements." *Sociological Forum*. 13(3): 397-424.

----------. 2011. "Emotions and Social Movements: Twenty Years of Theory and Research." *Annual Review of Sociology*. 37: 14.1-14.19.

Jones, Jeffrey M. 1998. "Does Bringing Out the Candidate Bring Out the Votes? The Effects of Nominee Campaigning in Presidential Elections." *American Politics Research*. 26(4): 395-419.

Keeter, Scott. 1987. "The Illusion of Intimacy: Television and the Role of Candidate Personal Qualities in Voter Choice." *Public Opinion Quarterly*. 51: 344-358.

Kelleher, Christine, and Jennifer Wolak. 2006. "Priming Presidential Approval: The Conditionality of Issue Effects." *Political Behavior*. 28(3): 193-210.

Krosnick, Jon A., and Laura A. Brannon. 1993. "The Impact of the Gulf War on the Ingredients of Presidential Evaluations: Multidimensional Effects of Political Involvement." *American Political Science Review*. 87(4): 963-975.

Krosnick, Jon A., and Michael A. Milburn. 1990. "Psychological Determinants of Political Opinionation." *Social Cognition*. 8(1): 49-72.

Krosnick, Jon A., and Donald R. Kinder. 1990. "Altering the Foundations of Support for the President Through Priming." *American Political Science Review*. 84(2): 497-512.

Kuklinski, James H., Paul J. Quirk, Jennifer Jerit, and David Schwieder. 2000. "Misinformation and the Currency of Democratic Citizenship." *Journal of Politics*. 62(3): 790-816.

Kunda, Ziva. 1990. "The Case for Motivated Reasoning." *Psychological Bulletin*. 108(3): 480-498.

Kuntz, Anabel, Eldad Davidov, and Moshe Semyonov. 2017. "The Dynamic Relations Between Economic Conditions and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment: A Natural Experiment in Times of the European Economic Crisis." *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*. 58(5): 392-415.

Kurz, Tim, Marta Augoustinos, and Shona Crabb. 2010. "Contesting the 'National Interest' and Maintaining 'Our Lifestyle': A Discursive Analysis of Political Rhetoric Around Climate Change." *British Journal of Social Psychology*. 49: 601-625.

Kusch, Frank. 2004. *Battleground Chicago: The Police and the 1968 Democratic National Convention*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kusow, Abdi M., and Matt Delisi. 2020. "Attitudes Toward Immigration as a Sense of Group Position." *The Sociological Quarterly*. 62(2): 1-20.

LaGrange, Randy L., and Kenneth F. Ferraro. 1989. "Assessing Age and Gender Differences in Perceived Risk and Fear of Crime." *Criminology*. 27(4): 697- 719.

Larsen, Jeff T., and A. Peter McGraw. 2011. "Further Evidence for Mixed Emotions." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. 100(6): 1095-1110.

Lau, Richard R. 2013. "Correct Voting in the 2008 U.S. Presidential Nominating Elections." *Political Behavior*. 35: 331-355.

Lau, Richard R., and David P. Redlawsk. 2001. "Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive Heuristics in Political Decision Making." *American Journal of Political Science*. 45(4): 951-971.

Lavine, Howard, Milton Lodge, and Kate Freitas. 2005. "Threat, Authoritarianism, and Selective Exposure to Information." *Political Psychology*. 26(2): 219-244.

Lavine, Howard, Milton Lodge, James Polichak, and Charles Taber. 2002. "Society for Political Methodology Explicating the Black Box Through Experimentation: Studies of Authoritarianism and Threat." *Political Analysis*. 10(4): 343-361.

Lecheler, Sophie, Linda Bos, and Rens Vliegenthart. 2015. "The Mediating Role of Emotions: News Framing Effects on Opinions About Immigration." *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*. 92(4): 1-27.

Lenz, Gabriel S. 2009. "Learning and Opinion Change, Not Priming: Reconsidering the Priming Hypothesis." *American Journal of Political Science*. 53(4): 821-837.

Lerner, Jennifer S., Roxana M. Gonzalez, Deborah A. Small, and Baruch Fischhoff. 2003. "Effects of Fear and Anger on Perceived Risks of Terrorism: A National Field Experiment." *Psychological Science*. 14(2): 144-150.

Lerner, Jennifer S., and Dacher Keltner. 2001. "Fear, Anger, and Risk." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. 81(1): 146-159.

Liska, Allen E., and Paul E. Bellair. 1995. "Violent Crime Rates and Racial Composition: Covergence Over Time." *American Journal of Sociology*. 101(3): 578-610.

Liska, Allen E., and Mitchell B. Chamlin. 1984. "Social Structure and Crime Control Among Macrosocial Units." *American Journal of Sociology*. 90(2): 383-395).

Liska, Allen E., Andrew Sanchiroco, and Mark D. Reed. 1988. "Fear of Crime and Constrained Behavior Specifying and Estimating a Reciprocal Effects Model." *Social Forces*. 66(3): 827-837.

Liska, Allen E., Joseph Lawrence, and Andrew Sanchiroco. 1982. "Fear of Crime as a Social Fact." *Social Forces*. 60(3): 760-770.

Lodge, Milton, Kathleen M. McGraw, and Patrick Stroh. 1989. "An Impression-Driven Model of Candidate Evaluation." *American Political Science Review*. 83(2): 399-419.

Lodge, Milton, Marco R. Steenbergen, and Shawn Brau. 1995. "The Responsive Voter: Campaign Information and the Dynamics of Candidate Evaluation." *American Political Science Review*. 89(2): 309-326.

Mackey, Cameron D., and Heidi L. Dempsey. 2018. "Personality Traits, Political Ideology, and Candidate Preference in the Deep South." *Modern Psychological Studies*. 23(2): 1-24.

MacKuen, Michael, Jennifer Wolak, Luke Keele, and George E. Marcus. 2010. "Civic Engagements: Resolute Partisanship or Reflective Deliberation." *American Journal of Political Science.* 54(2): 440-458.

MacWilliams, Matthew C. 2016. "Who Decides When the Party Doesn't? Authoritarian Voters and the Rise of Donald Trump." *PS: Political Science and Politics*. 49(4): 716-721.

Maddux, James E., and Ronald W. Rogers. 1983. "Protection Motivation and Self-Efficacy: A Revised Theory of Fear Appeals and Attitude Change." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*. 19(5): 469-479.

Marcus, George E., and Michael B. MacKuen. 1993. "Anxiety, Enthusiasm, and the Vote: The Emotional Underpinnings of Learning and Involvement During Presidential Campaigns." *American Political Science Review*. 87(3): 672-685.

Marcus, George E., W. Russell Neuman, and Michael Mackuen. 2000. *Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Marcus, George E., John L. Sullivan, Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, and Daniel Stevens. 2005. "The Emotional Foundation of Political Cognition: The Impact of Extrinsic Anxiety of the Formation of Political Tolerance Judgments." *Political Psychology*. 26(6): 949-963.

Markowitz, Fred E., Paul E. Bellair, Allen E. Liska, and Jianhong Liu. 2001. "Extending Social Disorganization Theory: Modeling the Relationships Between Cohesion, Disorder, and Fear." *Criminology*. 39(2): 293-319.

Martin, John Levi. 2001. "The Authoritarian Personality, 50 Years Later: What Questions Are There for Political Psychology." *Political Psychology*. 22(1): 1-26.

May, Gary. 2014. *Bending Toward Justice: The Voting Rights Act and the Transformation of American Democracy*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Mayda, Anna Maria. 2006. "Who is Against Immigration? A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes Toward Immigrants." *The Review of Economics and Statistics*. 88(3): 510-530.

McCann, Stewart. 2009. "Political Conservatism, Authoritarianism, and Social Threat: Voting for Republican Representatives in U.S. Congressional Elections from 1946 to 1992." *Journal of Psychology: Interdisciplinary and Applied*. 143(4): 341-358.

McClurg, Scott D., and Thomas M. Holbrook. 2009. "Living in a Battleground: Presidential Campaigns and Fundamental Predictors of Vote Choice." *Political Research Quarterly*. 62(3): 495-506.

McFarland, Sam. 2010. "Authoritarianism, Social Dominance, and Other Roots of Generalized Prejudice." *Political Psychology*. 31(3): 453-477.

McGee, Michael Calvin. 1980. "The 'Ideograph': A Link Between Rhetoric and Ideology." *The Quarterly Journal of Speech*. 66(1): 1-16.

McGraw, Kathleen M., and Cristina Ling. 2003. "Media Priming of Presidential and Group Evaluations." *Political Communication.* 20(1): 23-40.

McGregor, Shannon C., and Rachel R. Mourão. 2017. "Second Screening Donald Trump: Conditional Indirect Effects on Political Participation." *Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media.* 61(2): 264-290.

McLaren, Lauren, Hajo Boomgaarden, and Rens Vliegenthart. 2018. "News Coverage and Public Concern About Immigration in Britain." *International Journal of Public Opinion Research.* 30(2): 173-193.

Mendelberg, Tali. 2001. *The Race Card.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Mendelsohn, Matthew. 1996. "The Media and Interpersonal Communications: The Priming of Issues, Leaders, and Party Identification." *Journal of Politics.* 58(1): 112-125.

Meuleman, Bart, Eldad Davidov, and Jaak Billiet. 2009. "Changing Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe, 2002-2007: A Dynamic Group Conflict Theory Approach." *Social Science Research.* 38: 352-365.

Milburn, Michael A., Miho Niwa, and Mrcus D. Patterson. 2014. "Authoritarianism, Anger, and Hostile Attribution Bias: A Test of Affect Displacement." *Political Psychology.* 35(2): 225-243.

Miller, Arthur H., Martin P. Wattenberg, and Oksana Malanchuk. 1986. "Schematic Assessments of Presidential Candidates." *American Political Science Review.* 80(2): 521-540.

Miller Joanne M., and Jon A. Krosnick. 2000. "News Media Impact on the Ingredients of Presidential Evaluations: Politically Knowledgeable Citizens are Guided by a Trusted Source." *American Journal of Political Science.* 44(2): 301-315.

Morris, Jonathan S. 2009. "The Daily Show with Jon Stewart and Audience Attitude Change during the 2004 Party Conventions." *Political Behavior.* 31(1): 79-102.

Morris, Jonathan S., and Peter L. Francia. 2010. "Cable News, Public Opinion, and the 2004 Party Conventions." *Political Research Quarterly*. 63(4): 834-849.

Murray, Shoon Kathleen. 2006. "Private Polls and Presidential Policymaking: Reagan as a Facilitator of Change." *Public Opinion Quarterly*. 70(4): 477-498.

Mutz, Diana C. 1992. "Mass Media and the Depoliticization of Personal Experience." *American Journal of Political Science.* 36(2): 483-508.

----------. 1994. "Contextualizing Personal Experience: The Role of Mass Media." *Journal of Politics.* 56(3): 689-714.

Nice, David. 1980. "Ideological Stability and Change at the Presidential Nominating Conventions." *Journal of Politics.* 42: 847-853.

Pan, Zhongdang, and Gerald M. Kosicki. 1997. "Priming and Media Impact on the Evaluations of the President's Performance." *Communication Research*. 24(1): 3-30.

Panagopoulos, Costas. 2008. "Presidential Nominating Conventions: Past, Present, and Future." *The Forum*. 5(4): 1-12.

----------. 2012. "Campaign Context and Preference Dynamics in U.S. Presidential Elections." *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion, and Parties*. 22(2): 123-137.

Parker, Karen F., Brian J. Stults, and Stephen K. Rice. 2005. "Racial Threat, Concentrated Disadvantage, and Social Control: Considering the Macro-Level Sources of Variation in Arrests." *Criminology*. 43(4): 1111-1133.

Parker, Michael T., and Linda M. Isbell. 2010. "How I Vote Depends on How I Feel: The Differential Impact of Anger and Fear on Political Information Processing." *Psychological Science*. 21(4): 548-550.

Parrott, Scott, Jennifer Hoewe, Minghui Fan, and Keith Huffman. 2019. "Portrayals of Immigrants and Refugees in U.S. News Media: Visual Framing and its Effect on Emotions and Attitudes." *Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media.* 63(4): 677-697.

Peffley, Mark, and Jon Hurwitz. 1992. "International Events and Foreign Policy Beliefs: Public Response to Changing Soviet-U.S. Relations." *American Journal of Political Science*. 36(2): 431-461.

Petrocik, John R. 1996. "Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study." *American Journal of Political Science*. 40(3): 825-850.

Price, Vincent, and David Tewksbury. 1997. "News Values and Public Opinion: A Theoretical Account of Media Priming and Framing." In *Progress in the Communication Science.* 13th ed, eds. George A. Barnett and Franklin J. Boster. New York: Ablex.

Pryce, Daniel K. 2018. "U.S. Citizens' Current Attitudes Toward Immigrants and Immigration: A Study From the General Social Survey." *Social Science Quarterly*. 99(4): 1467-1483.

Quillian, Lincoln. 1995. "Prejudice as a Response to Perceived Group Threat: Population Composition and Anti-Immigrant and Racial Prejudice in Europe." *American Sociological Review*. 60(4): 586-611.

Rader, Nicole E. 2004. "The Threat of Victimization: A Theoretical Reconceptualization of Fear of Crime." *Sociological Spectrum*. 24(6): 689-704.

Ramet, Sabrina P., and Christine M. Hassenstab. 2013. "The Know Nothing Party: Three Theories about its Rise and Demise." *Politics and Religion.* 6(3): 570-595.

Redlawsk, David P., Andres J.W. Civettini, and Karen M. Emmerson. 2010. "The Affective Tipping Point: Do Motivated Reasoners Ever 'Get It'?". *Political Psychology*. 31(4): 563-593.

Reilly, Katie. 2016. "Read Hillary Clinton's 'Basket of Deplorables' Remarks About Donald Trump Supporters." *Time,* September 10. time.com/4486502/hillary-clinton-basket-of-deplorables-transcript/ (March 20, 2018).

Richey, Sean. 2012. "Campaign Advertising and the Stimulation and Activation of the Authoritarian Personality." *Political Communication*. 29(1): 24-43.

Rickert, Edward J. 1998. "Authoritarianism and Economic Threat: Implications for Political Behavior." *Political Psychology*. 19(4): 707-720.

Rippetoe, Patricia A., and Ronald W. Rogers. 1987. "Effects of Components of Protection-Motivation Theory on Adaptive and Maladaptive Coping with a Health Threat." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. 52(3): 596-604.

Rogers, Ronald W. 1975. "A Protection Motivation Theory of Fear Appeals and Attitude Change." *Journal of Psychology: Interdisciplinary and Applied.* 91(1): 93-114.

Roseman, Ira J., Martin S. Spindel, and Paul E. Jose. 1990. "Appraisals of Emotion-Eliciting Events: Testing a Theory of Discrete Emotions." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.* 59(5): 899-915.

Rosenstein, Judith E. 2008. "Individual Threat, Group Threat, and Racial Policy: Exploring the Relationship Between Threat and Racial Attitudes." *Social Science Research*. 37: 1130-1146.

Rountree, Pamela Wilcox. 1998. "A Reexamination of the Crime-Fear Linkage." *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency.* 35(3): 341-372.

Rountree, Pamela Wilcox, and Kenneth C. Land. 1996. "Burglary Victimization, Perceptions of Crime Risk, and Routine Activities: A Multilevel Analysis Across Seattle Neighborhoods and Census Tracts." *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*. 33(2): 147-180.

Rudolph, Thomas J., Amy Gangl, and Dan Stevens. 2000. "The Effects of Efficacy and Emotions on Campaign Involvement." *Journal of Politics*. 62(4): 1189-1197.

Sales, Stephen M. 1973. "Threat as a Factor in Authoritarianism: An Analysis of Archival Data." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. 28(1): 44-57.

Sanderson, Matthew R., Moshe Semyonov, and Anastasia Gorodzeisky. 2021. "Declining and Splitting: Opposition to Immigration in the United States, 1996-2018." *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*. 80: 27-39.

Schlueter, Elmar, and Ulrich Wagner. 2008. "Regional Differences Matter: Examining the Dual Influence of the Regional Size of the Immigrant Population on Derogation of Immigrants in Europe." *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*. 49(2-3): 153-173.

Schnall, Simone, Jonathan Haidt, Gerald L. Clore, and Alexander H. Jordan. 2008. "Disgust as Embodied Moral Judgment." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*. 34(8): 1096-1109.

Schwarz, Norbert, and Gerald L. Clore. 2003. "Mood as Information: 20 Years Later." *Psychological Inquiry*. 14(3-4): 296-303.

Sears, David O., and Jonathan L. Freedman. 1967. "Selective Exposure to Information: A Critical Review." *Public Opinion Quarterly*. 31(2): 194-213.

Semyonov, Moshe, Rebeca Raijman, and Anastasia Gorodzeisky. 2008. "Foreigners' Impact on European Societies: Public Views and Perceptions in a Cross-National Comparative Perspective." *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*. 49(1): 5-29.

Short, Robert, and Lisa Magaña. 2002. "Political Rhetoric, Immigration Attitudes, and Contemporary Prejudice: A Mexican American Dilemma." *The Journal of Social Psychology*. 142(6): 701-712.

Sidanius, Jim, Felicia Pratto, and Lawrence Bobo. 1996. "Racism, Conservatism, Affirmative Action, and Intellectual Sophistication: A Matter of Principled Conservatism or Group Dominance?" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. 70(3): 476-490.

Singh, Shane P., and Kris Dunn. 2015. "Authoritarianism, Socioethnic Diversity, and Political Participation Across Countries." *European Journal of Political Research*. 54(3): 563-581.

Sirin, Cigdem V., Nicholas A. Valentino, and José D. Villalobos. 2017. "The Social Causes and Political Consequences of Group Empathy." *Political Psychology*. 38(3): 427-448.

Small, Deborah A., and Jennifer S. Lerner. 2008. "Emotional Policy: Personal Sadness and Anger Shape Judgments about a Welfare Case." *Political Psychology* 29(2): 149-168.

Smith, Craig A., and Phoebe C. Ellsworth. 1985. "Attitudes and Social Cognition: Patterns of Cognitive Appraisal in Emotion." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. 48(4): 813-838.

Sparks, Anthony. 2009. "Minstrel Politics or 'He Speaks Too Well': Rhetoric, Race, and Resistance in the 2008 Presidential Campaign." *Argumentation and Advocacy*. 46: 21-38.

Stack, Steven. 2003. "Authoritarianism and Support for the Death Penalty: A Multivariate Analysis." *Sociological Focus*. 36(4): 333-352.

Stenner, Karen. 2005. *The Authoritarian Dynamic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Stoker, Laura. 1993. "Judging Presidential Character: The Demise of Gary Hart." *Political Behavior*. 15(2): 193-223.

Sullivan, Denis G., and Roger D. Masters. 1988. "'Happy Warriors': Leaders' Facial Displays, Viewers' Emotions, and Political Support." *American Journal of Political Science*. 32(2): 345-368.

Taylor, Ralph B., and Jeanette Covington. 1993. "Community Structural Change and Fear of Crime." *Social Problems*. 40(3): 374-397.

Tittle, Charles R., and Debra A. Curran. 1988. "Contingencies for Dispositional Disparities in Juvenile Justice." *Social Forces*. 67(1): 23-58.

Valentino, Nicholas A. 1999. "Crime News and the Priming of Racial Attitudes During Evaluations of the President." *Public Opinion Quarterly*. 63: 293-320.

Valentino, Nicholas A., Antoine J. Banks, Vincent L. Hutchings, and Anne K. Davis. 2009. "Selective Exposure in the Internet Age: The Interaction between Anxiety and Information Utility." *Political Psychology*. 30(4): 591-613.

Valentino, Nicholas A., Vincent L. Hutchings, and Ismail K. White. 2002. "Cues That Matter: How Political Ads Prime Racial Attitudes during Campaigns." *American Political Science Review*. 96(1): 75-90.

Valentino, Nicholas A., Vincent L. Hutchings, Antoine J. Banks, Anne K. Davis. 2008. "Is a Worried Citizen a Good Citizen? Emotions, Political Information Seeking, and Learning via the Internet." *Political Psychology*. 29(2): 247-273.

Valentino, Nicholas A., Ted Brader, Eric W. Groenendyk, Krysha Gregorowicz, and Vincent L. Hutchings. 2011. "Election Night's Alright for Fighting: The Role of Emotions in Political Participation." *Journal of Politics*. 73(1): 156-170.

Vallely, Richard M. 2004. *The Two Reconstructions: The Struggle for Black Enfranchisement*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Walker, Kyle E. 2014. "The Role of Geographic Context in the Local Politics of US Immigration." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. 40(7): 1040-1059.

Warr, Mark, and Mark Stafford. 1983. "Fear of Victimization: A Look at the Proximate Causes." *Social Forces*. 61(4): 1033-1043.

Weinschenk, Aaron C. 2015. "Polls and Elections: Campaign Field Offices and Voter Mobilization in 2012." *Presidential Studies Quarterly*. 45(3): 573-580.

Weinschenk, Aaron C., and Costas Panagopoulos. 2016. "Convention Effects: Examining the Impact of National Presidential Nominating Conventions on Information, Preferences, and Behavioral Intentions." *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion, and Parties*. 26(4): 511-531.

Weise, David R., Thomas Arciszewski, Jean-François Verhiac, Tom Pyszczynski, and Jeff Greenberg. 2012. "Terror Management and Attitudes Toward Immigrants: Differential Effects of Mortality Salience for Low and High Right-Wing Authoritarians." *European Psychologist.* 17(1): 63-72.

Willnat, Lars, and Jian-Hua Zhu. 1996. "Newspaper Coverage and Public Opinion in Hong Kong: A Time-Series Analysis of Media Priming." *Political Communication.* 13: 231-246.

Witte, Kim. 1992. "Putting the Fear Back into Fear Appeals: The Extended Parallel Process Model." *Communication Monographs*. 59(4): 329-349.

Witte, Kim, and Mike Allen. 2000. "A Meta-Analysis of Fear Appeals: Implications for Effective Public Health Campaigns." *Health Education and Behavior.* 27(5): 591-615.

Wlezien, Christopher, and Robert S. Erikson. 2002. "The Timeline of Presidential Election Campaigns." *Journal of Politics.* 64(4): 969-993.

Yang, Michelle Murray. 2016. "At War with the Chinese Economic Yellow Peril: Mitt Romney's 2012 Presidential Campaign Rhetoric." *Journal of Intercultural Communication Research*. 45(1): 45-69.

Zajonc, R. B. 1980. "Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences." *American Psychologist*. 35(2): 151-175.

APPENDICES

Appendix A

Appendix A.1: Treatment Transcripts

Crime Victimization Threat

Unedited	"Neutral" Edit
Then there is the issue of security. Countless innocent American lives have been stolen because our politicians have failed in their duty to secure our borders and enforce our laws like they have to be enforced. I have met with many of the great parents who lost their children to sanctuary cities and open borders. So many people, so many, many people. So sad. They will be joining me on this stage in a little while and I look forward to introducing, these are amazing, amazing people. Countless Americans who have died in recent years would be alive today if not for the open border policies of this administration and the administration that causes this horrible, horrible thought process, called Hillary Clinton.	
This includes incredible Americans like 21-year-old Sarah Root. The man who killed her arrived at the border, entered Federal custody and then was released into the U.S., think of it, into the U.S. community under the policies of the White House Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton. Weak, weak policies. Weak and foolish policies. He was released again after the crime, and now he's out there at large. Sarah had graduated from college with a 4.0, top student in her class one day before her death.	Countless innocent American lives have been stolen because our politicians have failed in their duty to secure our borders and enforce our laws. I have met with many of the parents who lost their children to sanctuary cities and open borders. Countless Americans who have died in recent years would be alive today if not for the open border policies of this administration. Like Grant Ronnebeck, a 21-year-old convenience store clerk from Mesa, Arizona. He was murdered by an illegal immigrant gang member previously convicted of burglary, who had also been released from federal custody. Another victim is Kate Steinle. Gunned down in the sanctuary city of San Francisco, by an illegal immigrant, deported five previous times. A 2011 report from the Government Accountability Office found that illegal immigrants and other non-citizens, in our prisons and jails together, had around 25,000 homicide arrests to their names.
Also among the victims of the Obama-Clinton open borders policy was Grant Ronnebeck, a 21-year-old convenience store clerk and a really good guy from Mesa, Arizona. A lot of you have known about Grant. He was murdered by an illegal immigrant gang member previously convicted of burglary, who had also been released from federal custody, and they knew it was going to happen again. Another victim is Kate Steinle. Gunned down in the sanctuary city of San Francisco, by an illegal immigrant, deported five previous times. And they knew he was no good.	
Then there is the case of 90-year-old Earl Olander, who was brutally beaten and left to bleed to death in his home, 90 years old and defenseless. The perpetrators were illegal immigrants with criminal records a mile long, who did not meet Obama administration standards for removal. And they knew it was going to happen. In California, a 64-year-old Air Force veteran, a great woman, according to everybody that knew her, Marilyn Pharis, was sexually assaulted and beaten to death	

Trump Speech Transcripts – Political Power Threat

Unedited	"Neutral" Edit
We've admitted 59 million immigrants to the United States between 1965 and 2015. Many of these arrivals have greatly enriched our country. So true. But we now have an obligation to them and to their children to control future immigration as we are following, if you think, previous immigration waves. We've had some big waves. And tremendously positive things have happened. Incredible things have happened. To ensure assimilation we want to ensure that it works. Assimilation, an important word. Integration and upward mobility. Within just a few years immigration as a share of national population is set to break all historical records. The time has come for a new immigration commission to develop a new set of reforms to our legal immigration system in order to achieve the following goals. To keep immigration levels measured by population share within historical norms. To select immigrants based on their likelihood of success in U.S. society and their ability to be financially self-sufficient. We take anybody. Come on in, anybody. Just come on in. Not anymore.	We've admitted 59 million immigrants to the United States between 1965 and 2015. Many of these arrivals have greatly enriched our country. But we now have an obligation to them and to their children to control future immigration as we are following previous immigration waves. To ensure assimilation, integration, and upward mobility, we want to ensure that it works. Within just a few years immigration as a share of national population is set to break all historical records. The time has come for a new immigration commission to develop a new set of reforms to our legal immigration system in order to achieve the following goals. To keep immigration levels measured by population share within historical norms. To select immigrants based on their likelihood of success in U.S. society and their ability to be financially self-sufficient. We take anybody. Come on in, anybody. Just come on in. Not anymore.

Appendix A.2: Randomization Checks

Randomization Check

	Regression	Ordered Probit
Age	-0.007	-0.005
	(0.065)	(0.049)
Women	0.116	0.081
	(0.186)	(0.139)
White	0.098	0.091
	(0.230)	(0.173)
Education	0.082	0.088
	(0.124)	(0.094)
Income	-0.098	-0.095
	(0.143)	(0.108)
Partisan Identity	0.063	0.052
	(0.108)	(0.080)
Authoritarianism	0.160	0.147
	(0.151)	(0.114)
Internal Efficacy	0.177	0.123
	(0.116)	(0.088)
Constant	1.887	
	(0.326)	
/cut 1		0.177
		(0.250)
/cut 2		0.630
		(0.252)
/cut3		1.047
		(0.254)
/cut 4		1.626
		(0.260)
N	295	295
Prob > F	0.7624	
R^2	0.017	
Prob > χ^2		0.6816
Pseudo R^2		0.0064