Date of Award
Fall 12-13-2013
Degree Type
Thesis
Degree Name
Master of Arts (MA)
Department
Philosophy
First Advisor
Andrea Scarantino
Second Advisor
Andrew I. Cohen
Third Advisor
Eric Wilson
Abstract
In this thesis I argue that a leading sentimentalist theory, Rational Sentimentalism, faces the Problem of Superfluity because the evaluative properties to which certain emotions are responses can be defined independently of examining those emotional responses. In other words, the connection to value that Rational Sentimentalism aims for fails to obtain. I show that at least one such emotion, disgust, is influenced by higher cognition to a degree incompatible with Rational Sentimentalism avoiding the Problem of Superfluity. I conclude by suggesting ways in which other emotions are structurally similar to disgust, and therefore face the same problem in being incorporated into Rational Sentimentalism.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.57709/4925498
Recommended Citation
Stanford, Benjamin, "How The Cognitive Penetrability Of Emotions Undermines Rational Sentimentalism." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2013.
doi: https://doi.org/10.57709/4925498