Author ORCID Identifier
https://orcid.org/0009-0007-1295-1611
Date of Award
8-2024
Degree Type
Thesis
Degree Name
Master of Arts (MA)
Department
Philosophy
First Advisor
Dr. Sarah F. Brosnan
Second Advisor
Dr. Andrea Scarantino
Abstract
In this thesis, I present Feinberg and Mallatt's (2020) theory of neurobiological naturalism and attempt to situate it within the broader philosophical discussion of consciousness. They propose what they consider to be the neurobiological components sufficient for phenomenal consciousness to have evolved and claim to have filled the explanatory gap in our understanding of how the brain gives rise to experience. I will argue that their claim for doing so is premature and rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of what distinguishes the hard and easy problems of consciousness, which results in a vicious circularity. I explore how Feinberg and Mallatt could respond and remain internally consistent with their theory. One way is an appeal to what I have called virtual irreducibility, which is an epistemic claim regarding the limitations of our knowledge of weakly emergent system properties. I consider this response, among others, and demonstrate why they are problematic.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.57709/37124616
Recommended Citation
Villarreal, Bailey, "The Hard Problem of Consciousness and Neurobiological Naturalism." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2024.
doi: https://doi.org/10.57709/37124616
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