Date of Award
Spring 4-13-2011
Degree Type
Thesis
Degree Name
Master of Arts (MA)
Department
Philosophy
First Advisor
Christie Hartley
Second Advisor
Sebastian Rand
Third Advisor
Andrew Altman
Fourth Advisor
Eddy Nahmias
Abstract
On a standard philosophical conception, being autonomous is roughly equivalent to having some particular natural capacity. This paper provides argues that this conception is incorrect, or at least incomplete. The first chapter suggests that adopting an alternative conception of autonomy promises to resolve to several objections to the metaethical constitutivism, and so promises to provide highly desirable theory of moral reasons. The second chapter first motivates a broadly Kantian account of autonomous action, and then gives reasons to think that Kant's own development of this theory runs into damaging action-theoretic problems. The way to address these problems, I argue, is to modify Kant's account of autonomy in a way that leaves no room for the standard conception of autonomy to do any work.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.57709/1946322
Recommended Citation
Tulipana, Paul, "Autonomy, De Facto And De Jure." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2011.
doi: https://doi.org/10.57709/1946322