Date of Award
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
To what extent does judicial independence reduce or increase the prevalence of election violence in transitional states? Specifically, how does variation in judicial independence affect the strategic use of post-election violence by state and non-state actors? Using quantitative and qualitative analysis on judicial independence and post-election violence in African elections, my findings indicate that, compared to non-independent and independent judiciaries, opposition political parties are more likely to employ post-election violence strategically under quasi-independent judiciaries with the purpose of creating electoral uncertainty in order to influence assertive behavior from judges in disputed elections. Consequently, I argue that variation in judicial independence can help explain the likelihood of post-election violence in African countries, all else being equal.
Simati, Meshack, "Semi-independent Judiciaries and the Danger of Election Violence: An Analysis of African Elections." Dissertation, Georgia State University, 2018.