Cooperation often involves behaviours that reduce immediate payoffs for actors. Delayed benefits have often been argued to pose problems for the evolution of cooperation as learning such contingencies may be difficult as partners may cheat in return. Therefore, the ability to achieve stable cooperation has often been linked to a species’ cognitive abilities, which is in turn linked to the evolution of increasingly complex central nervous systems. However, in their famous 1981 paper, Axelrod & Hamilton stated that in principle even bacteria could play a tit for tat strategy in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma. While to our knowledge this has not been documented, interspecific mutualisms are present in bacteria, plants and fungi. Moreover, many species which have evolved large brains in complex social environments lack convincing evidence in favour of reciprocity. What conditions must be fulfilled so that organisms with little to no brainpower, including plants and single celled organisms, can, on average, gain benefits from interactions with partner species? On the other hand, what conditions favour the evolution of large brains, flexible behaviour which includes the use of misinformation, etc? These questions are critical, as they begin to address why cognitive complexity would emerge when ‘simple’ cooperation is clearly sufficient in some cases. This paper spans the literature from bacteria to humans in our search for the key variables that link cooperation and deception to cognition.
Brosnan, S.F., Bshary, R., Salwiczek, L. (2010). The interplay of cognition and cooperation. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society Series B, 365(1553), 2699-2710. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2010.0154
This article was originally published in the journal Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B. Copyright © 2010 The Royal Society.
The post-peer-reviewed version is available here with the permission of the author.