Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1988
Abstract
The authors of this paper use the median voter model to predict the patterns of rank-and-file voting on wage concessions in a multiplant setting, then test those predictions using data from the 1982 GM-UAW negotiations. The model predicts that workers in plants with large layoffs will vote in favor of a wage concession only if they believe that a concession will save their jobs. Surprisingly, workers in plants with growing or stable employment are also actually more likely to vote Yes. A third prediction is that the Yes vote will be smallest in plants with the most adversarial labor relations. The empirical analysis supports all three predictions.
Recommended Citation
Bruce Kaufman and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez. “Voting for Wage Concessions: The Case of the 1982 GM-UAW Negotiations,” with Bruce Kaufman. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 41, no. 2 (January 1988): 183-194.
Comments
Originally published as:
Bruce Kaufman and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez. “Voting for Wage Concessions: The Case of the 1982 GM-UAW Negotiations,” with Bruce Kaufman. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 41, no. 2 (January 1988): 183-194.
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