OCS Leasing and Auctions: Incentives and the Performance of Alternative Bidding Institutions

Authors

James C. Cox, Georgia State UniversityFollow
R. Mark Isaac, Florida State UniversityFollow
Vernon L. Smith, Chapman UniversityFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

1983

Abstract

In Watt v. Energy Action Educational Foundation, the Supreme Court rebutted a challenge to the federal government's mix of 'nontraditional' outer continental shelf lease-auction mechanisms authorized under the 1978 OCS Amendments. The issues of this case addressed here include: the economic intent of the congressional language; incentive properties of various of the authorized auction processes; methodological shortcomings inherent in the implicit congressional directive for field experimentation; and, the usefulness of laboratory experimental economics in answering relevant auction-policy questions. The discussion of experimental economics includes evidence already gained from laboratory experiments relating to hypotheses about auction-market performance.

Comments

Originally published in:

Cox, James C., R. Mark Isaac, and Vernon L. Smith. 1983. “OCS Leasing and Auctions: Incentives and the Performance of Alternative Bidding Institutions”. Supreme Court Economic Review 2, 1983.

(c) University of Chicago Press; posted with the permission of the publisher

Recommended Citation

Cox, James C., R. Mark Isaac, and Vernon L. Smith. 1983. “OCS Leasing and Auctions: Incentives and the Performance of Alternative Bidding Institutions”. Supreme Court Economic Review 2, 1983.