Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-1-2002
Abstract
We conduct experiments in which humans repeatedly play one of two games against a computer decision maker that follows either a reinforcement learning or an Experience Weighted Attraction algorithm. Our experiments show these learning algorithms more sensitively detect exploitable opportunities than humans. Also, learning algorithms respond to detected payoff increasing opportunities systematically; however, the responses are too weak to improve the algorithms’ payoffs. Human play against various decision maker types doesn’t significantly vary. These factors lead to a strong linear relationship between the humans’ and algorithms’ action choice proportions that is suggestive of the algorithm’s best response correspondence.
Recommended Citation
Shachat, Jason and Swarthout, Todd, "Learning about Learning in Games through
Experimental Control of Strategic Interdependence" (2002). ExCEN Working Papers. 140.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/excen_workingpapers/140
Comments
To learn more about the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies and ExCEN Working Papers Series, visit https://aysps.gsu.edu/ and http://excen.gsu.edu/center/.