Date of Award
12-2013
Degree Type
Thesis
Degree Name
Bachelor of Arts (BA)
Department
Philosophy
First Advisor
Eric Wilson
Abstract
David Hume’s project in A Treatise of Human Nature is founded upon his loosely-defined distinction between impressions and ideas. This distinction causes problems for his theory because it has difficulty accounting for the differences between species of perceptions. In this thesis, I try to solve some of these issues using a phenomenological account of the difference between impressions and ideas. My account supplements Stephen Everson’s “functional” account to create a more robust system for differentiating Hume’s perceptions.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.57709/13436030
Recommended Citation
Fowler, Casey, "Hume’s Impressions and Ideas: The Representative Account." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2013.
doi: https://doi.org/10.57709/13436030