Date of Award
Summer 7-10-2012
Degree Type
Thesis
Degree Name
Master of Arts (MA)
Department
Philosophy
First Advisor
Dr. Andrea Scarantino
Second Advisor
Dr. Eddy Nahmias
Third Advisor
Dr. Gwen Frishkoff
Fourth Advisor
Dr. Michael Owren
Abstract
Jesse Prinz proposes that attended intermediate-level representations (AIRs) are sufficient for conscious awareness. He extends this claim to emotion, arguing that attention is the mechanism that separates conscious from unconscious emotions. Prior studies call this entailment into question. However, they do not directly address the intermediate-level requirement, and thus cannot decisively refute the AIR theory of consciousness. This thesis tests that theory by manipulating participants’ attention to different features of subliminally processed words while recording both behavioral and electroencephalogram (EEG) data. Both measures suggest that subliminally processed stimuli are attended according to participants’ conscious intention to complete a task. In addition, the EEG data demonstrate that intermediate-level neural activity was modulated by the subliminal stimuli. Thus, these results suggest that AIRs are not sufficient for conscious emotion. This finding undermines Prinz’s AIR theory, and its account of the distinction between conscious and unconscious emotion.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.57709/3070655
Recommended Citation
Stenson, Anais F., "A Test of Prinz's Air Theory: Is Attention Sufficient for Conscious Emotion?." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2012.
doi: https://doi.org/10.57709/3070655