Date of Award
Summer 8-12-2014
Degree Type
Thesis
Degree Name
Master of Arts (MA)
Department
Philosophy
First Advisor
Daniel Weiskopf
Second Advisor
Jessica Berry
Third Advisor
Andrew I. Cohen
Abstract
Both philosophers and literary critics have championed artworks as necessary to moral education. As a result many of these critics believe that art that is bad or immoral can causally affect our character, resulting in moral harm. Moral harm is the idea that artworks possess a strong disposition to affect our moral beliefs such that we are less able to distinguish between what is good and what is bad. I examine this concept of moral harm and argue that immoral artworks do not have this kind of causal power over our moral beliefs. Proponents of the moral harm thesis are in error to attribute such a power to artworks. Additionally, I propose a definition of immoral artworks consistent with moral harm, as well as discuss the distinction between immoral artworks and artworks that are merely elicit disgust or offense.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.57709/5670223
Recommended Citation
Caruso, Maria, "Why Immoral Art Cannot Morally Harm Us." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2014.
doi: https://doi.org/10.57709/5670223