Date of Award
8-6-2007
Degree Type
Thesis
Degree Name
Master of Arts (MA)
Department
Philosophy
First Advisor
Andrea Scarantino - Co-Chair
Second Advisor
Eddy Nahmias - Co-Chair
Third Advisor
Erin McClure
Abstract
The past 40 years have seen an enormous amount of research aimed at investigating human reasoning and decision-making abilities. This research has led to an extended debate about the extent to which humans meet the standards of normative theories of rationality. Recently, it has been proposed that dual-process theories, which posit that there are two distinct types of cognitive systems, offer a way to resolve this debate over human rationality. I will propose that the two systems of dual-process theories are best understood as investigative kinds. I will then examine recent empirical research from the cognitive neuroscience of decision-making that lends empirical support to the theoretical claims of dual-process theorists. I will lastly argue that dual-process theories not only offer an explanation for much of the conflicting data seen in decision-making and reasoning research, but that they ultimately offer reason to be optimistic about the prospects of human rationality.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.57709/1059754
Recommended Citation
Kvaran, Trevor Hannesson, "Dual-Process Theories and the Rationality Debate: Contributions from Cognitive Neuroscience." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2007.
doi: https://doi.org/10.57709/1059754