Date of Award
8-3-2007
Degree Type
Thesis
Degree Name
Master of Arts (MA)
Department
Philosophy
First Advisor
Andrew I. Cohen - Chair
Second Advisor
Andrew Altman
Third Advisor
Andrew J. Cohen
Abstract
Several contemporary virtue ethicists have provided systematic presentations of normative virtue ethics. The virtue ethical literature, however, does not contain much information on the meta-ethical roots of virtue theories. The present paper seeks to address this deficiency by examining the neo-Aristotelianism of Rosalind Hursthouse in an effort to ascertain what meta-ethical commitments are most consistent with her theory; these commitments are shown to be cognitivism, objectivism, and (in some form) naturalism. These positions are then put into dialogue with Moore’s seminal metaethical arguments against naturalism and agent-relative value. Ultimately I show that the literature on normative virtue ethics is rich enough to provide powerful responses to Moorean criticisms.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.57709/1059757
Recommended Citation
Byrd, Brandon Thomas, "Virtue Ethics and Moore's Criticisms of Naturalism." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2007.
doi: https://doi.org/10.57709/1059757